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Abstract 
 
The purpose of the thesis is to examine the International Community’s (IC) 
responses to post-conflict at the turn of the twenty-first century and in a period of 
transition.  The thesis will establish whether there are any standard models for 
the IC’s engagement in post-conflict and if so whether these models are 
gradually ‘evolutionary’ or subject to radical change.  The thesis will situate the 
IC’s response within the existing academic models and will encompass a review 
of these models so as to establish whether recent post-conflict interventions can 
be adequately defined by them.  The thesis will also define a typology of post-
conflict so as to establish whether the existing definitions are ‘fit for purpose’.   
 
The thesis will make use of a substantial body of empirical evidence which was 
gathered by the author during a period of fourteen years spent in the Western 
Balkans.  It will in consequence address the issue of ‘observation’ in the research 
design and conclusion.  The thesis will use this corpus of evidence gathered to 
illuminate the points raised during the thesis and to establish whether the 
changes in the typology of the IC’s response to post-conflict in the Western 
Balkans were specific to those particular missions or whether they represented a 
longer-term change in approach by the IC.  As part of this changing approach to 
post-conflict, the thesis will also examine the role of the European Union (EU) 
and question the role which the EU, only one amongst many regional and sub-
regional organisations, has ascribed to itself in the IC’s management of post-
conflict.
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GUIDE TO ACRONYMS 
(in English) 
 
AFBiH - Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina 
AFRICOM - Africa Command 
AFV - Armoured Fighting Vehicles 
ANP - Afghan National Police 
ANSF - Afghan National Security Forces 
APEC - Asia Pacific Economic Forum 
ARRC - Allied Rapid Reaction Corps 
ASCII - American Standard Code for Information Interchange 
AU - African Union (successor to the OAU) 
AV - Alternative Vote 
BG - Battlegroup 
BBC - British Broadcasting Corporation 
BFBS - British Forces Broadcasting Service 
BiH - Bosnia and Herzegovina 
BRIC  -  Brazil, Russia, India and China 
C3 - Command, Control and Communications 
CAFAO - Customs and Fiscal Assistance Office 
CAG - Civil Affairs Group 
CAM  - Customs Assistance Mission (of the EU), suffix letter 
denotes state or entity e.g. CAM-A is the CAM for Albania.  Has 
now been replaced by CAFAO 
CAPOC - Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command 
CAR - Central African Republic 
CARDS  - Community Assistance for Reconstruction, Development and 
Stabilisation  
CAST - Conflict Assessment System Tool 
CCA - Control Commission for Austria 
CCG - Control Commission for Germany 
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CEC - Central Election Commission 
CEU - Central European University 
CFE - Conventional Forces Europe 
CFSP - Common Foreign and Security Policy (of the EU) 
CIMIC - Civil Military Co-operation 
CMEA  - Council for Mutual and Economic Assistance (The civilian 
equivalent of the Warsaw Pact) 
CMT  - Crisis Management Team 
CNN - Cable News Network (a US Time-Warner owned 
broadcaster) 
COE - Council of Europe 
CORE - Centre for OSCE Research (in Hamburg, Germany) 
CP - Close Protection 
CPA - Coalition Provisional Authority 
CPC - Conflict Prevention Centre (of the OSCE) 
CRHB  - Croat Republic of Herceg-Bosna, (the wartime third ‘entity’ in 
BiH) 
CSCE - Conference on Security and Co-operation Europe 
CSDP - Common Security and Defence Policy (of the EU) 
CSRC - Conflict Studies Research Centre (of the UK Defence 
Academy) 
DCAF - Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces 
DDR - Disarmament, Demobilisation and Re-integration 
DECC - Department of Environment & Climate Change 
DfID -  Department for International Development (UK) 
DHM - Deputy Head of Mission 
DHR - Deputy High Representative 
DM - Deutschmark  
DoD  - Department of Defense (of the USA), see MoD for UK 
DPKO - Department of Peacekeeping Operations (at the UN) 
DRC - Democratic Republic of the Congo 
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DRS - Data Research Systems 
DSF - Directorate of Special Forces 
EAM - National Liberation Front (in Greece, from 1941) 
EC - European Commission 
ECB - European Central Bank 
ECMM - European Commission Military Monitors 
EDB - European Development Bank 
EEAS - European External Action Service 
EEC - European Economic Community 
EEZ - Exclusive Economic Zone 
EIC - East India Company 
ELAS - National People's Liberation Army (in Greece, from 1941) 
EPC - European Political Co-operation 
ESDP - European Security and Defence Policy (now the CSDP) 
ESRC - Economic and Social Research Council (UK) 
ESS - European Security Strategy 
EU - European Union 
EUFOR - European Union Force 
EUFOR RD Congo - European Union Force Democratic Republic of Congo   
EULEX - European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo  
EUMM - European Union Military Monitors 
EUNAVFOR - European Union Naval Force 
EUPM - European Union Police Mission 
EUROPOL - European Police Office 
EUSR - European Union Special Representative 
FAC - Forward Air Control  
FAO - Food and Agriculture Organization 
FASP - Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (see also HR FASP) 
FCO - Foreign and Commonwealth Office 
FDI - Foreign Direct Investment 
FIDF - Falklands Islands Defence Force 
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FO - Field Offices 
FOM - Freedom of Movement 
FOO - Forward Artillery Observation       
FPTP  - ‘First Past The Post’ – Element of an electoral system such 
as that used in the UK 
FRG  - Federal Republic of Germany 
FRY - Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
FY - ‘Former’ Yugoslavia 
FSI - Failed States Index 
fYROM - former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 
GATT - General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs 
G8 - Group of eight (leading economies) 
G20 - Group of 20 (leading economies) 
GDR - German Democratic Republic 
GFAP  - General Framework for Peace, often referred to as the 
Dayton Agreement 
GDP - Gross Domestic Product 
GDR -  German Democratic Republic (GDR) – DDR in German 
GTZ  - German Agency for Technical Cooperation 
HCNM - High Commissioner for National Minorities (OSCE) 
HDZ  - Croatian Democratic Union, the principal Bosnian-Croat 
political party, whose parent political party is based in Croatia   
HGV  - Heavy Goods Vehicle 
HighRep - High Representative (in Kosovo) 
HLPG - High Level Planning Group (of the OSCE) 
HMSO - His/Her Majesty’s Stationery Office 
HOM - Head of Mission 
HR - High Representative (in BiH) 
HRFASP - High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy 
HIV - Human Immunodeficiency Virus 
HV - Croatian Army (in Croatia) 
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HVO - Croatian Defence Forces (in BiH) 
IAWG - Inter Agency Working Group 
IBIS - Institute for British-Irish Studies 
IBRD - International Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
IC - International Community 
ICAO - International Civil Aviation Organisation  
ICC - International Criminal Court 
ICG - International Crisis Group 
ICITAP  - International Criminal Investigative Assistance Training 
Program (US)  
ICRC - International Committee of the Red Cross 
ICTR - International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 
ICTY  - International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia (sometimes 
referred to as the ‘Hague’ tribunal) 
ID  - Identity (Card/s) 
IDEA  - International Institute for Democracy and Electoral 
Assistance 
IDP - Internally Displaced Person 
IED - Improvised Explosive Device 
IGB - Inner German Border 
IEBL - Inter Entity Boundary Line 
IED - Improvised Explosive Device 
IFES - International Foundation for Electoral Systems 
IICK - Independent International Commission on Kosovo 
IFOR - Intervention Force 
II - Image Intensifying   
ILO - International Labour Organisation  
IMC  - International Mercy Corps 
IMF - International Monetary Fund 
INGO - International Non-Governmental Organisations 
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INTERPOL  - International Criminal Police Organisation (a UN affiliated
 body with 184 member countries) 
IO - International Organisation 
IO  - Information Operations (UK & US Military term) see also 
PsyOps 
IOM - International Organisation for Migration 
IPTF - International Police Task Force 
IR - International Relations 
ISAF - International Stabilisation Force 
IT - Information Technology 
ITU - International Telecommunications Union  
JCC - Joint Civil Commission 
JCG  - Joint CIMIC Group (UK Military) 
JCO - Joint Commission Observer team/organisation (in BiH) 
JHQ - Joint Headquarters 
JMC - Joint Military Commission 
JNA - Yugoslav National Army 
JSC - Joint Staff College 
KE - Convertible Euro (the currency of Kosovo) 
KFOR - Kosovo Force (the IC military presence) 
KLA - Kosovo Liberation Army 
KM - Convertible Mark (the BiH currency) 
KPC - Kosovo Protection Corps 
KPS - Kosovo Police Service 
KVM - Kosovo Verification Mission 
LDK - Liberal Democratic Union (A major political party in Kosovo) 
LRA - Lords Resistance Army 
LTO - Long Term (election) Observer 
MAC - Mine Action Centre 
MBT - Main Battle Tank(s) 
MEU - Marine Expeditionary Unit (of the US Marine Corps) 
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MNC - Multi-National Corporations  
MND - Multi-National Division 
MONUC  - United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo  
MONUSCO  - United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo 
MPRI - Military Professional Resources International 
MoD - Ministry of Defence, see also DoD for USA 
MSF - Medecins Sans Frontieres (a medical INGO) 
MSU - Multi-national Specialist Unit 
NAFTA - North American Free Trade Area 
NATO - North Atlantic Treaty Organisation 
NDI - National Democratic Institute 
NGO - Non-Governmental Organisation 
NHQT - NATO Headquarters Team (in Skopje, fYROM) 
NHS - National Health Service 
NIC - National Intelligence Cell e.g. UKNIC for UK 
NM - Nautical Mile 
NV - Night Vision 
OAU - Organisation of African Unity (now the AU) 
OCHA - Office for the Co-ordination of Humanitarian Affairs  
OCR - Optical Character Read/Readable/Reading 
ODIHR - Office of Democratic Institutions and Human Rights 
OED - Oxford English Dictionary 
OHCHR - Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights 
OHR - Office of the High Representative (in BiH) 
OIC - Organisation of the Islamic Conference 
OMIK - OSCE Mission in Kosovo 
ONS - Office of National Statistics (UK) 
OPCON - Operational Control 
OSCE - Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe 
 11 
OTI - Office of Transition Initiatives (US) 
OUP - Oxford University Press 
P5 - Permanent members of the UN Security Council 
PACE - Police and Criminal Evidence Act 
PC - Permanent Council (of the OSCE) 
PCRU - Post-Conflict Reconstruction Unit – UK joint DfID and FCO 
PfP - Partnership for Peace 
PIC - Peace Implementation Council 
PIFWC - Person(s) Indited For War Crime(s) 
PKSOI  - United States Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations 
Institute 
POG - Psychological Operations Group 
POLAD - Political Advisor 
POW - Prisoner/s Of War 
PRC - Political Resource Centre 
PsyOps  - Psychological Operations (Military) (Was replaced by 
“Information Operations” and later by “Perception Operations”) 
The ‘Quint’  - The informal EU equivalent of the P5; includes, France, 
Germany, Italy, UK and the rotating Presidency, but does not have 
veto powers 
RCDS  - Royal College of Defence Studies 
RDF  - Rapid Deployment Force  
REACT  - Rapid Expert Assistance and Co-operation Teams  
RFE  - Radio Free Europe 
RHA  - Rolled Homogenous Armour 
RIB  - Rigid Inflatable Boats 
RL  - Radio Liberty 
RPN  - Refugee Participation Network 
RS  - ‘Serb Republic’, the predominantly Bosnian-Serb entity 
within BiH 
RUSI - Royal United Services Institute 
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SAA  - Stabilisation and Accession Agreement (process for 
admission to the EU) 
SACEUR - Supreme Allied Commander Europe (of NATO forces) 
SAS - Special Air Service 
SF - Special Forces 
SAM  - Serbia and Montenegro (the transitional successor state to 
the FRY). 
SAT  - Standard Assessment Tasks 
SBS - BiH State Border Service (Border Police) 
SDA - Party for Democratic Action (the principal Bosniac party in 
BiH) 
SDS - Serb Democratic Party (the principal Bosnian-Serb party in 
BiH) 
SFOR - Stabilisation Force 
SFRY - Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
SHAPE - Supreme Headquarters Allied Personnel Europe 
SHERBRIG - (UN) Standby High Readiness Brigade 
SIDA - Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency 
SME - Subject Matter Experts 
SMR -  Senior Military Representative (of NATO) 
SOCA - Serious and Organised Crime Agency (UK) 
SOCEUR - Special Operations Command Europe (US Military) 
SOF - Special Operations Forces (US Military) 
SPRK - Special Prosecutors Task Force (Kosovo) 
SRSG - Special Representative of the Secretary General (of the UN) 
SS  - SchutzStaffel part of the world war two German armed 
forces in particular the Waffen-SS, literally the Military SS 
SSR  - Security Sector Reform 
STASI -  Ministry for State Security (in the GDR) 
T & AVR -  Territorial and Army Volunteer Reserve 
TI  - Thermal Imaging 
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UKSF - UK Special Forces 
UN - United Nations 
UNAMIC - United Nations Advanced Mission in Cambodia 
UNAMID - African Union/United Nations Hybrid operation in Darfur 
UNCA - United Nations Civil Affairs 
UN CIVPOL - United Nations Civilian Police 
UNDOF - United Nations Disengagement Observer Force 
UNDP - United Nations Development Programme 
UNDPA - United Nations Department of Political Affairs 
UNDPKO - United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations 
UNFPA - United Nations Population Fund 
UNGA - United Nations General Assembly 
UN-HABITAT - United Nations Human Settlements Programme 
UNHCR - United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
UNICEF - United Nations Children’s Fund 
UNIFIL - United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon 
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UNMAS - United Nations Mine Action Service 
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UNMO - United Nations Military Observer 
UNMOGIP - United Nations Military Observer Group in India and 
Pakistan 
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Chapter 1 
 
Introduction 
 
Statement of aims 
 
This thesis will examine the International Community’s (IC)1 role in the 
management of post-conflict. It will do so by interrogating received theories of IC 
intervention in relation to three case studies.  As part of this examination it will 
offer a novel typology of IC intervention in post-conflict based on a historical and 
comparative analysis of such interventions.   
 
The thesis will also aim to demonstrate the changing relationship between old 
and new actors, for example the EU, and to demonstrate how that changing 
relationship, for example the increasing marginalisation of the UN, has altered 
the concept and theories of post-conflict intervention.  The thesis will contrast the 
essentially worldwide multilateral concept of liberal-interventionism adopted by 
the UN with the post-conflict interventions of small ad-hoc groups, or even single 
states or regional organisations which have recently taken place and question 
whether these often more closely fit the colonialist or imperialist models.    
 
                                                 
1 The IC is generally taken to include the diplomatic and other representation of nation states and the 
representatives of accredited international organisations such as the UN, the EU, NATO, the OSCE and 
other associated bodies of these organisations.  Although the understanding of the ‘IC’ varies in 
composition from place to place and across time, it will in general conform to the definition given in the 
preceding sentence. 
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The thesis will demonstrate these changing relationships, concepts and theories 
through a detailed examination of the IC’s management of post-conflict, as it was 
manifested in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries.  Not only will it 
achieve this by judging those interventions in the light of some key concepts and 
theories as these will provide the necessary link to the existing corpus of 
knowledge on this theme, but uniquely it will also examine the practical impact of 
these new approaches as they affected both the post-conflict states and the 
International Organisations (IO) engaged in the process.   
 
While the thesis will specifically examine the methodologies used by the IC to 
manage the post-conflict period in both Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) and 
Kosovo, it will do so by focusing upon the empirical evidence as gathered by a 
senior practitioner of post-conflict at the time.  In focusing upon the empirical 
evidence, this will be evaluated within the thesis in the context of the theoretical 
constructs and as such make a bridge between a purely empirical study and a 
theoretical and often normative study which would be lacking in historical and 
empirical weight.  The thesis will also clearly demonstrate which concepts and 
analytical frameworks are relevant to the illustrative cases and which are not.    
 
In identifying and focusing upon the impact of the absence, or reduced role of the 
United Nations (UN) within the overall IC post-conflict structure, the thesis will 
identify whether the different co-ordinating mechanisms identified at that time as 
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being required were more, or less effective, than the UN.2  The thesis will also 
examine the increasing impact of the EU in terms of post-conflict, The Western 
Balkans conflicts were keynote events for the development of the EU and ones 
which with few exceptions such as those identified by Whitman3 were little noted 
at the time.  They have, however, already become of increasing importance and 
will continue to grow in relevance in the years ahead.   
 
The thesis will further identify how change within the IC strategy for post-conflict 
management has evolved over time by using the examples of BiH and Kosovo as 
case studies.  This has previously been suggested as being an appropriate 
approach to this type of research by both Yin and Blaxter4.  BiH and Kosovo 
were two episodes separated very briefly in time, 1995 and 1999, but not in any 
meaningful sense by space as at their closest points the borders of BiH and 
Kosovo are significantly less than one hundred miles apart and both lie within the 
former Yugoslavia. 
 
The structure of the thesis 
 
The research design and the methodology will be covered in Chapter 2.  As 
stated in the ‘aims’, the thesis benefits from a considerable body of empirical 
                                                 
2 For Kosovo the discussions around the final status talks clearly identified the EU as the lead 
organisation, particularly after the planned withdrawal of the UN once an agreement had been 
reached, but the thesis will examine the process by which this decision came about. 
3 Richard Whitman, From Civilian Power to Superpower? The international identity of the EU.  
4 Robert K. Yin, Case Study Research – Design and Methods, p 1; and Loraine Blaxter,  
Catherine Hughes, and Malcolm Tight, How to Research, p 66.  
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knowledge; as such the research design adopted is key.  It will concentrate on 
linking the empirical knowledge of what happened, or was planned to have 
happened, during the IC’s management of the post-conflict operations in both 
Bosnia and Kosovo to the various academic models and methodologies currently 
in use.  This will enable the thesis to examine which of the models are most 
relevant to the IC’s management of post-conflict in the late twentieth and early 
twenty-first centuries and to indicate whether these models are evolving to 
respond to the increasing complexity of post-conflict operations.  In order to do 
this the thesis will refer to texts and discussions about the IC’s engagement in 
post-conflict which have been made primarily from an academic background as 
well as to texts and other data supplied by the organisations directly involved in 
the operations themselves.  The chapter will illustrate that some academics, 
often of considerable stature such as Donald Horowitz,5 were also present as 
practitioners on the ground in Bosnia6 and Kosovo and the thesis will examine 
how closely their practical decisions ‘on the ground’, matched the academic 
propositions that have been made in their work.  In particular, the thesis will 
attempt to map the impact of politics and the policies of contributing states upon 
those implementing post-conflict strategies by using all of the data available.   
 
The research design of this thesis is based upon a novel approach to the 
collection of empirical data.  It raises key issues about how such research and 
                                                 
5 Donald L. Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict. 
6 Horowitz was a member of the elections advisory panel in Bosnia in the period 1997-9.  This   
appointment was directly relevant to his academic experience.  It is believed that he performed a 
similar function in Kosovo.  
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perhaps this type of research in general can or ought to be conducted.7  Finally, 
this chapter will propose that the issue of the nature of participant observation 
should be re-examined, so as to recognise that ‘decision makers’ in the process 
are also ‘participants’.   
 
In Chapter 3, the thesis will judge interventions in the light of key concepts and 
theories.  It will examine whether the theories of colonialism, imperialism, or even 
nationalism are relevant to post-conflict.  If so, then the thesis will examine 
whether the definitions of the words themselves are always used in the correct 
context, noting the possible tensions between what practitioners say and 
academic studies describe.  The thesis will also briefly note the casual and 
sometimes pejorative use and misuse of these words by some sectors of the 
media and political elites.  If as the thesis will demonstrate they are generally not 
relevant to the IC’s management of modern post-conflict situations, then it will 
examine whether the IC’s activities have more to do with the theories of ‘liberal 
interventionism’ and ‘cosmopolitanism’ as developed and enlarged upon by the 
‘constructivists’ and in particular by the ‘English school’.  Among these models 
there are interesting and critical questions about the use of these terms and their 
                                                 
7 Mark Etherington, for example, who had previously served in more junior positions both in 
Bosnia and Kosovo, then went on to become a provincial governor in Iraq and wrote a book about 
the year that he spent there; Revolt on the Tigris – The Al-Sadr Uprising and the Governing of 
Iraq.  Senior post-conflict managers, such as Paddy Ashdown also write memoirs or 
autobiographies; A Fortunate Life: The Autobiography of Paddy Ashdown, which are in general 
self-justifying or self-congratulatory rather than detailed examinations of the processes involved.  
In Ashdown’s autobiography, only pp 331–72 are devoted to Bosnia with pp 345-47 briefly 
describing his twin role as both High Representative (HR) and EU Special Representative 
(EUSR).  
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relevance to a post-conflict as opposed to, say, a humanitarian intervention 
environment.   
 
Indeed, even with the terms ‘post-conflict’ and ‘humanitarian intervention’ there 
are grounds for debate over some of the definitions which have been used to 
demarcate them.  Murphy8 when discussing humanitarian intervention refers in 
his definition to the use of force or the threat of force, thus implying that any 
intervention which takes place without any force, or threat of force being present, 
cannot by definition be ‘humanitarian’.  This is patently not so as shown by the 
North American and Western European interventions in Aceh in the immediate 
aftermath of the Asian tsunami in 2004.  At that stage, the northern part of Aceh 
in areas affected by the tsunami were in conflict, yet those individuals deployed, 
even if military, were for the most part unarmed9 and it was made clear from the 
outset that where the military were present they were only there to facilitate the 
civilian relief effort, usually by providing capabilities which did not exist (or at 
least in the right quantities), in the civilian sphere.  The tsunami disaster acted as 
a trigger for the peace settlement which followed.10  This was facilitated by a 
Finnish NGO,11 but was negotiated between the domestic actors in conflict and 
                                                 
8 Sean D. Murphy, Humanitarian Intervention: In an Evolving World Order. 
9 Amongst the few deployed UK military personnel were seven members, some of them 
reservists, of the UK Joint CIMIC Group (JCG).  Their role, working initially from light poncho 
‘tents’ on the airfield was to coordinate the UK supply of relief materials being brought in by RAF 
Hercules transports in order to supply those items in greatest need at each stage of the 
operation.  As with most, if not all, of the deployed UK personnel they lived amongst the 
community and were not armed. 
10 The Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between the Government of the Republic of 
Indonesia and the ‘Free Aceh’ Movement which was signed by both parties on 15 August 2005 
11 The NGO was ‘Crisis Management Initiative’ led by former Finnish President Martti Ahtisaari.  
He was also a key actor in the negotiations in Kosovo. 
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did not involve the IC.  That the EU then moved on to assist in the post-conflict 
restitution of Aceh, and to establish a mission there,12 does not diminish the 
humanitarian nature of the initial intervention post-tsunami.  A similar and even 
more convincing case can be made for a ‘civilian’ humanitarian intervention 
during the Mozambican floods in 2000 and 2001 where both UK and South 
African military helicopters were extensively used in a purely humanitarian and 
civilian role.13   
 
In Chapter 4 the thesis will also briefly examine the history of what can broadly 
be called liberal interventionism and the international management of conflict and 
post-conflict.  This will cover from what Bass14 would argue was its first 
deployment in 1829 until 1990.  The thesis will also examine the evolutionary 
nature of this activity, particularly in the period from 1945 and discuss some of 
the impacts of failing to take a more revolutionary approach such as the 
foundation of a UN Army.15  The chapter will also map the steady rise in the role 
of the UN and other international bodies in post-conflict to that point in 1993 
when, with 78,000 UN peacekeepers deployed across a wide range of operations 
worldwide, the UN had, some observers such as Shawcross argued, become 
                                                 
12 This mission too was civilian and unarmed in nature.  In addition to the HQ there were 
observers and monitors positioned across Northern Aceh.  Its purpose was primarily to act as a 
‘tripwire’ and its functions were definitely post-conflict rather then humanitarian as can be 
illustrated by the fact that it had a large number of political and diplomatic rather than aid posts 
within the mission.  
13 BBC – 5 March 2001: “Two South African military transport aircraft carrying support staff to 
operate helicopters and light planes have arrived in Mozambique to help with flood relief 
operations as the Zambezi river continues to rise.  Observers say the aircraft are urgently needed 
for ferrying emergency aid and for moving people out of flooded areas, because Mozambique has 
only two serviceable helicopters of its own.” 
14 Gary J. Bass, Freedom’s Battle - The Origins of Humanitarian Intervention. 
15 See Adam Roberts, Proposals for UN Standing Forces: A critical History, pp 99–132.  
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visibly ‘overstretched’.16  This provides a backdrop to the consistent attempts by 
the USA and others to conduct post-conflict operations either without the 
involvement of the UN or, certainly, without the UN in a lead role and has 
become a feature of US-supported post-conflict intervention in the period 1995 – 
2010 for which Bosnia and Kosovo were the ground-breaking models. 
 
Post-conflict intervention in the period from 194517 to the present day will also be 
considered in Chapter 5 which will propose a typology of post-conflict 
intervention.  It will examine whether the evolutionary change observed both in 
Kosovo and earlier has continued and whether there was continuous forward 
progress or whether some lessons, previously learned, had been ‘unlearned’.  
For the EU and the UN the thesis will examine the increasing trend towards 
‘hybrid’ operations and in particular the UN’s operations with the AU, such as the 
UNAMID mission in Dharfur as well as operations mounted by regional 
organisations under the UN banner such as the AU UNISOM mission in 
Mogadishu.  Lastly, it will consider the two US-led post-conflict interventions in 
Iraq and Afghanistan, examining whether or not developments made during the 
Bosnia and Kosovo operations were maintained in these two operations, 
particularly given that in the case of Iraq many of the same senior and mid-level 
managers were involved.  This chapter will also consider those interventions for 
                                                 
16 William Shawcross, Deliver us from Evil – Warlords and Peacekeepers in a World of Endless 
Conflict. 
17 It will therefore include both the management of the referendum in East Timor, the violence 
which took place as a consequence of the result, and the subsequent post-conflict mission. 
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which considerable planning, has taken place,18 but are pending, perhaps as the 
result of ‘frozen conflicts’ such as those in Moldova and Nagorno-Karabakh, to 
see if these too have been ‘informed’ by the operations of the recent past.  It will 
also examine why some regional organisations have been relatively successful at 
developing and leading post-conflict operations while others such as the OSCE 
in the wider European sphere, have been less successful both in developing 
missions and in gaining international support for doing so. 
 
Chapters 6 and 7 of the thesis, will attempt to identify some key lessons learned 
from the BiH and Kosovo experiences which may be utilised elsewhere and will 
touch upon those alternative methodologies to the management of post-conflict 
either applied elsewhere in the world in that particular epoch or in the twenty-first 
century which may illustrate effective future methodologies for conducting 
international post-conflict intervention.    
 
Chapter 8 will examine the developing role of the EU in post-conflict.  The 
Western Balkans conflicts marked the first time that the EU and its institutions 
became an ‘actor’ on the world stage, rather than simply a source of funding for 
humanitarian aid.  They will also indicate that the EU’s presence will continue to 
grow in relevance in the years ahead.  Although active at the time of the Balkans 
conflicts in the mid-1990s the EU was very much a regional player focused upon 
Western Europe and the fringes of Europe.  Now not only its money but its 
                                                 
18 The OSCE has maintained a seven person planning team in Vienna since 2000 solely to 
prepare for a future intervention in Nagorno-Karabakh.  It maintains a further four-person 
monitoring team in Nagorno-Karabakh itself. 
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activities and its aspirations stretch worldwide.  As a result of these 
developments, the thesis devotes a chapter to this topic and in particular 
examines the conditions which the EU imposes as a basis for receiving funds 
and assistance from what is often now a single source of funds as aid 
contributions from the EU member states are becoming increasingly pooled.  In 
particular, when it comes to models it challenges whether the EU’s involvement 
fits within the traditional model of liberal interventionism or whether it is, or is at 
least perceived to be, closer to one of the other models.  Is it possible, as some 
may argue, that a multi-national institution rather than, or perhaps in addition to, 
a sovereign state could be accused of ‘colonialism’ and ‘imperialism’?  This 
chapter will also examine how an organisation, most of whose key functionaries 
are not directly elected, can advise others on democracy and the importance of 
the ballot.  This is a particularly relevant factor for those who have been 
intimately involved in the organisation and management of elections on their 
behalf. 
 
Chapter 9 will examine the legacies and consequences of the IC’s intervention in 
BiH and Kosovo and will illustrate that sixteen and twelve years on, both remain 
‘works in progress’.  The chapter will examine the impact of both post-conflict 
missions not only on the states themselves and the wider Europe, but also in 
terms of their relevance to subsequent operations and, in particular, the 
development of the EU models for post-conflict intervention. 
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Finally, Chapter 10 will offer some conclusions on the evidence presented within 
the thesis and make suggestions as to how the approaches to post-conflict 
operations may be modified so as to make them more effective.  
 
The empirical evidence 
 
The empirical evidence forms the core of this thesis.  A considerable amount of 
the empirical data comes from the privileged position and access available to the 
author during the initial period of post-conflict intervention in both Bosnia and 
Kosovo.  Having occupied a position in a UK ministry supervising personnel on 
the ground in Bosnia and Croatia in the period from March 1994 to August 1995, 
the author was present in Bosnia and Kosovo from August 1995 until October 
2002 and continued to have regular direct involvement both in Bosnia and 
Kosovo, particularly in the field of elections management and observation, whilst 
serving as the Deputy Head of Mission (DHM) for the OSCE in Albania from 
October 2002 to April 2009.  In his role as director of the Joint Elections 
Operations Centre (JEOC) in Bosnia in 1996-7 and then as Director General 
(DG) for elections in Bosnia in 1997–2000 he had considerable exposure to 
decision making at senior levels both in Bosnia and in capital cities across the 
whole range of the post-conflict operation.  As the co-author of the elections plan 
for Kosovo prepared for the Rambouillet peace talks in March 1999 
(implemented from July 1999), he had considerable exposure to the process of 
mission formulation; the management structure for the Kosovo mission, and in 
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particular to the creation of the OSCE post-conflict capability both in Kosovo and 
later in Macedonia.19  As the research design will make clear, much of the 
material made available to the author is now in the public domain, but the direct 
sources for a very limited amount of information must remain confidential.     
 
Concluding statement 
 
Whilst the empirical evidence was collected during a considerable amount of time 
spent ‘on the ground’ in Bosnia and Kosovo, the collection of evidence continued 
during activities conducted both within the UK, European, and North American 
arenas in post-conflict planning activities, in training those deploying on post-
conflict operations, and in debriefing those who have returned.  As a result, the 
material previously gathered was throughout, continuously being supplemented 
with the current ‘ground truth’ whenever possible.  In consequence, while this 
thesis has been completed, the overall study of post-conflict is in fact, as it must 
be, a ‘work in progress’.  This leads us back to the aim of the thesis which is to 
report and analyse a set of post-conflict interventions so as to inform the reader 
of a critical period during which the IC’s management of post-conflict, whilst 
continuing to evolve, underwent a fundamental shift from dependency upon the 
UN and its agencies as the solution to all post-conflict problems, to one where 
the UN became just one more partner and in some cases had no involvement in 
particular post-conflict missions.  
                                                 
19 Although the OSCE had maintained a small mission in the former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia (fYROM) since 1993, the author was closely involved in the deployment of the OSCE 
‘Monitors’ to fYROM in 2000-1 and the establishment of the later, larger mission. 
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The thesis will demonstrate that the recent developments in post-conflict 
intervention are worthy of study and of mapping against the theoretical 
framework already in place, so as to see whether that framework remains ‘fit for 
purpose’ or must itself again evolve.  If it must evolve, the thesis will proffer 
potential solutions and provide indicators as to areas where further work is 
required. 
  
This thesis will contribute to informing the various theories through its discussion 
of what took place and what concepts and models can be derived from the IC’s 
management of post-conflict in both BiH and Kosovo.  At the practitioner level, it 
is clear that many lessons have already been learned20 and that yet more are 
known, but are awaiting a suitable scenario in which to be implemented. This 
thesis, therefore, incorporates a ‘legacies and consequences’ chapter, so that 
some of these developments may be usefully summarised in an accessible 
manner. 
 
The thesis has theoretical and practical (policy) applications.  While the thesis 
may be of interest to other researchers and academics as theory informs 
practice, at the opposite end of the spectrum, practice informs theory, not only 
                                                 
20 The effective development of a worldwide electoral registration and postal ballot methodology, 
later utilised in both Afghanistan and Iraq is one such.  This particular electoral technique, 
developed in BiH was described at the worldwide conference of electoral officials in Guadalajara, 
Mexico in 1998, as being; the most comprehensive and effective absentee voter strategy 
developed anywhere.  For a description of this and the impact upon the electoral system see; 
Hans Schmeets The 1997 Municipal Elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina – An Analysis of the 
Observations. 
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directly through academic works and theses, but also by providing the bedrock of 
work on which the next generation of senior practitioners base their ideas, 
whether this be through general study and research, as for example at Wilton 
Park21 and the Royal College of Defence Studies (RCDS) or in detailed study of 
a particular area and zone of operations, in the period before deployment.22  In 
particular, at the most senior levels, new incumbents and their immediate staffs 
are likely to make use of ‘one-on-one’ interviews with existing or previous 
practitioners,23 who are either specialists in the area24 to which they are to be 
                                                 
21 Wilton Park is an FCO-run study centre in Sussex.  This is used extensively not only by UK 
foreign service personnel.  See for example the description of the conference held there involving 
Iraqi exiles in David L Phillips Losing Iraq – Inside the Post War Reconstruction Fiasco. 
22 This process is very clearly and extensively described by Michael Rose Fighting for Peace.  
Whilst Rose made use of local practitioners both current and dating back to World War Two, such 
as Fitzroy Maclean, for some time the UK advisor to Tito and the partisans (see Fitzroy Maclean 
Eastern Approaches for a description of these events) and someone he had known personally for 
many years.  Rose also made extensive use of those academic sources that were immediately 
available to him and co-located with him at Sandhurst where he was Commandant of the Army 
Staff College, namely the Conflict Studies Research Centre (CSRC) under C. J. Dick.  The CSRC 
initially under its new head, Ann Alldis and later at the Defence Academy at Shrivenham played a 
similar role since at least February 2005 in the pre-briefing of Lt-Gen. Richards, the Commander 
of the Allied Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC) prior to the deployment of the ARRC to Afghanistan in 
May 2006.  The centre, renamed in 2006 as the Advanced Research and Analysis Group 
(ARAG), was closed down in 2010, but the briefing requirement remains. 
23 By their very nature such interviews, or the governmental material listed below, are likely to 
take place ‘unattributably’ and are therefore unlikely to appear in either the academic or more 
biographical literature of post-conflict activities.  Neither are the extensive briefings given by news 
media personalities with knowledge of these areas and in particular the local political actors, likely 
to feature.  Again given that in most post-conflict environments the media are likely to have got 
there first, we can expect to see this as a regular feature of the briefings prior to future IC 
interventions.  For some reference to this symbiotic relationship between the IC and the media 
see Kate Adie, The Autobiography: The Kindness of Strangers.  Some writers combine both the 
academic and ‘media’ or ‘populist’ roles, notably in the Western and Southern Balkans James 
Pettifer and Misha Glenny (The Balkans – Nationalism, War and the Great Powers) who 
combines writing with a successful print and radio journalism career. 
24 There are very few areas of the world where this cannot be done, as Lt-Col. Blashford-Snell the 
famous explorer discovered, when he claimed in the 1970s to have been the first ‘Westerner’ to 
have visited a part of Ethiopia.  ‘M’ Force led by Orde Wingate with a team of officers and men 
including Laurens Van der Post and J. Neilson Lapraik, had operated in the area extensively 
during the period 1940–42 and Blashford-Snell was discretely advised to adjust his ‘publicity 
material’.  This he did.  He left the Army shortly thereafter.  
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deployed,25 or who have particular subject specialisms, in the period prior to their 
deployment.  This was certainly the case with Lord Ashdown prior to his 
deployment as High Representative in BiH.26  In addition, such persons27 will 
also have access to a wide range of governmental data28 on the area to which 
they are deployed and increasingly access to the data of other coalition states.29 
 
                                                 
25 It is unlikely that the leader of any IC post-conflict organisation will find himself or herself to be 
either the first in the area and most likely that many IC agencies will have been represented in the 
area both pre and even during the conflict.  This was the case even in Kosovo, where many 
humanitarian and church affiliated INGOs remained even during the bombing.  One such INGO 
international, a US citizen, had been in Kosovo for eleven years at the time of the bombing and 
remained in Pristina, unmolested throughout.  He subsequently provided briefings to incoming 
KFOR commanders and other senior IC actors during their pre-deployment work-up.  
26 Prior to his deployment, Lord Ashdown worked for a number of months from a suite of offices in 
the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) with his immediate staff. 
27 It is worth noting that Lord Ashdown’s two principal advisors are now the principal foreign policy 
advisors for the Prime Minister and the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary, so the long-term 
impact of their three-year service in and about Bosnia upon UK foreign policy should not be 
underestimated.  Additionally a further member of the Prime Minister’s foreign policy staff is a 
Bosnian national recruited during the same period. 
28 In the case of BiH those managing the ‘post-conflict’ period also had access to an extensive 
archive created by UNPROFOR and the UN during the period 1992–95.  There were also the files 
maintained by the individual nation states which had troop contributions within UNPROFOR.  This 
data ranged from the extremely useful but banal lists of available interpreters by ethnicity and 
location, through to detailed information on the political structures and linkages in specific areas, 
to the detailed plans, diagrams and surviving functionality of essential infrastructure projects such 
as the hydro barrages on the Neretva river, who the surviving technicians were and where they 
were located.  Information such as this was vital for the rapid (re)start-up of BiH’s infrastructure.   
Similar data was maintained on Kosovo, it was, however, in practice less effective due to the 
more rapid, recent displacement of the population and the Kosovars’ desire to ethnically cleanse 
or murder anyone who was not ethnically Albanian.  An example of this last practice relates to the 
manager of the thermal power plant outside Pristina. He was identified post-conflict and returned 
to work.  He was murdered within weeks despite being not a Serb but a Bosnian, who had been 
brought in to manage the plant during the ‘Tito’ era.  This power plant, which was not damaged 
either by the Serbs, or by NATO bombing, is still not running at full capacity, leading to frequent 
power outages. 
29 In the case of the Netherlands contingent to UNPROFOR, for example, they were allowed 
access to the German World War Two sicherheit strangeheim (literally ‘Secret Security’ – i.e. 
German eyes only) files which presumably provided much case file information on personalities 
and locations.  The UK had also in the past (and may continue to do so) maintained files and 
membership records of people who had served with the pro-allied resistance in the Western 
Balkans and Greece during the Second World War. 
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These senior practitioners are also likely both to have read the practitioners’ 
‘memoirs’ and more general literature30 and perhaps31 to have studied the 
academic literature carefully, particularly in areas which may not be going so well 
or are of concern.  In BiH for example this included the difficulty of effectively 
integrating the education systems at all levels and moving from ‘three schools 
under one roof, to one school under one roof’,32 with the students from the 
various ethnic groups studying together and using the same syllabus and 
textbooks.  This was a principal concern of Lord Ashdown and led to the 
establishment of an education department within the OSCE Mission to BiH.  It 
was, of course, realised early on that there was already considerable expertise in 
this field elsewhere and the Bosnian experience,33 repeated later in Sierra Leone 
and elsewhere, has also helped stimulate further study and literature on the 
topic.34   
 
                                                 
30 In BiH for example there were few if any senior UK personnel who did not have a copy of 
Rebecca West’s Black Lamb and Grey Falcon – A Journey Through Yugoslavia on their desk or 
bookshelf and/or a well thumbed copy of Fizroy Maclean’s Eastern Approaches, often with 
Baedekers Yugoslavia (2nd Edn, 1984) as the most comprehensive and current guide-book. 
31 This mechanism for briefing, one-on-one interviews and correspondence with experts, as well 
as the reading of ‘histories’ would have been familiar to any Roman governor during the Imperial 
period, see; N. J. E. Austin and N. B. Rankov, Exploratio: Military and Political Intelligence in the 
Roman World from the Second Punic War to the Battle of Adrianople.  See in particular Chapter 2 
– The Hostile Horizon – Strategic Intelligence, pp 12-38 for a detailed description of this process. 
32 Ambassador Robert Beecroft (US), OSCE Ambassador in BiH 2001–04 discussing the 
establishment of an Education Department within the OSCE Mission to BiH in 2001.  
33 There was no comparable experience in Kosovo, as the post-NATO intervention led to the 
expulsion of the Serbs from all non-Serb majority areas and their corralling into enclaves. This 
ensures that education remains firmly segregated. 
34 An example of this is the Commonwealth Secretariat’s publication, Peter Williams, Good 
Practice in Crisis and Post-conflict Reconstruction: A Handbook for Education Policy Makers and 
Practitioners in Commonwealth Countries. 
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Having identified the aims and objectives of this thesis, the following two 
chapters covering the research design and then the theoretical underpinning of 
the thesis, will enable the thesis to examine both the academic and other 
contemporary material along with the empirical data to see how the two 
effectively interrelate and how the empirical evidence informs the theoretical 
models.
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Chapter 2 
 
Research Design 
 
The role of the observer 
 
In discussing the research design of this thesis, it is necessary to start by 
addressing the matter of the author’s role as an active participant in the process 
of post-conflict development and what impact, if any, that may have upon the 
narrative of the thesis.  In particular, as the academic literature currently defines 
it, the author can either be a discrete and impartial, ‘analytical observer’, or a 
‘participating observer’.   It can be argued that in the author’s case, and as 
referred to but not discussed by Bernard,1 he was neither of the above, but was 
in fact an ‘active participant’.  As the research design will go on to indicate, the 
role and definition of an ‘active participant’ have yet to be adequately defined, but 
the thesis will demonstrate that there remains a need for such a definition, given 
that there are a significant number of academics deployed as ‘active participants’ 
on post-conflict operations and who themselves go on to publish academic works 
relating to their activities.  In addition, many of those who go on to obtain higher 
level degrees through the dissertation by publication route have themselves done 
so by being active participants in post-conflict, such as Mark Etherington.2  In the 
conclusion to this thesis, such a definition will be provided
                                                 
1 H. Russell Bernard, Social research Methods: Qualitative and Quantitative Approached, p 321. 
2 Mark Etherington, Revolt on the Tigris – The Al-Sadr Uprising and the Governing of Iraq.  
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and will delineate clearly the division between an ‘active participant’ and a 
‘participating observer’.  As a review of Etherington’s book will demonstrate, to 
describe someone who has been the administrator of a key province in post-
conflict Iraq for one year as a ‘participant observer’ would not adequately reflect 
the influence that he brought to bear upon the post-conflict process.   
 
Traditionally the role of an impartial analytical observer has been the approach 
taken in most studies of post-conflict.  However, if the author has acknowledged 
their role in the events as they occurred, and has stated that although this could 
be seen to qualify their impartiality as it has given them a particular insight into 
what happened, then this may be designated as the ‘participatory observer’ 
approach.  This is also a valuable approach and is becoming increasingly 
common, given the unwillingness of the military in particular, to have remote and 
dangerous areas visited by academics. The participatory observer approach, too, 
will often make best use of the material that researchers may have gathered 
during their period in the post-conflict area.   
 
For this thesis the use of the ‘impartial observer’ approach would permit the 
author to cite a number of ‘elite interviews’, etc within the text.  This will not be 
possible if the ‘participatory observer’ approach is to be adopted, as the ‘elite 
interviews’ would have to be recognised as part of the everyday work routine, as 
is made clear by the discussion on the preparation for elite interviews in Arksey 
 36 
and Knight .1  They state that some 60 per cent of the time devoted to such 
interviews is negotiating access.  In this case, it would clearly be inappropriate to 
claim an ‘elite’ interview with someone, for example, the OSCE Ambassador in 
Bosnia or even the High Representative to whom the author (by nature of his 
employment), had daily, or at least regular, access.   
 
If the observer were to be totally independent, then they would have to depend 
solely upon published resources.  If the author were to totally disassociate 
himself from the events which took place and to present themselves as an 
independent observer, then this is what they must do.  Alternatively, if he has 
adopted the participatory observer approach as described by Whisker,2 it would 
have to be acknowledged that some information to which he has been privy 
cannot be corroborated by documentary evidence, either simply because none is 
available, or alternatively it may be withheld from public purview either for a few 
more years or perhaps permanently.3  This might be true particularly for the 
period from March 1994 when the author again became involved with Yugoslavia 
at the UK Joint Headquarters (JHQ) at Wilton near Salisbury, to the period in 
May 1997 when he officially ceased to be attached to what had by then become 
the Stabilisation Force (SFOR).   
 
                                                 
1 Hilary Arksey and Peter Knight, Interviewing for Social Scientists, pp 122-5.   
2 Gina Wisker, The Post Graduate Research Handbook, p 142. 
3 The author had previously been in Yugoslavia with the FCO in the 1970s.    
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As stated above, one of the most useful discussions on the roles of observers is 
conducted by Bernard,4 who, whilst primarily discussing ethnographic research, 
identifies three rather than two different classes of observer; the complete 
participant, the participant observer, and the complete observer.  Rather 
unhelpfully, Bernard then proceeds to describe the latter two groups and to 
illustrate them with examples from his own research, whilst making no further 
comment on the ‘complete participant’.  This may be in part because Bernard has 
perhaps5 had no direct experience of being an active participant so whilst 
recognising the need to identify a third class of observer, still felt unqualified 
himself to define it more fully.  However, Bernard does comment on the 
participant observer as follows:  
By far, most ethnographic research is based on the second role, that of 
the participant observer.  Participant observers can be insiders who 
observe and record some aspects of life around them or they can be 
outsiders who participate in some aspects of life around them and record 
what they can.6   
In the absence of definitions of the ‘complete participant’ it is likely that the most 
apt current definition for the position in which the author found himself, is that of 
the participant observer insider, but it is suspected that this rather understates 
the role and that there is, as has just been described, a place for describing the 
‘complete participant’ in terms of their role as a researcher as well as a 
participant.  None of the academic descriptions which have so far described the 
                                                 
4 Bernard (2000). 
5 See H. Russell Bernard CV on the internet (last updated March 2011).  
6 Bernard (2000), p 321. 
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role of a ‘participant observer’ indicate that a ‘participant observer’ can frame or 
indeed drive and alter policy and yet some of those who have recently completed 
academic papers have done just that.  Indeed, throughout the literature the 
emphasis is on the word ‘observer’, but particularly in the field of post-conflict 
there are now a generation of researchers and academics who are, or who have 
been, placed in the position of decision makers, even if only at a local level and 
for whom clearly the term ‘complete participant’ is more appropriate.   
 
As an example, take the recent career of Dr J. H. Nichols, Professor, Rule of 
Law, Security, Reconstruction & Transition at the US Army Peacekeeping & 
Stability Operations Institute (PSKOI), who has written extensively about Bosnia 
and Afghanistan.  Nichols served in Bosnia as a military officer in the US Army 
Reserve (USAR) in 1996 and then in increasingly senior roles within the OSCE in 
Bosnia as a civilian between 1997 and 2000 before returning to the military in the 
office of the US Assistant Secretary for Defence as part of the Balkans task force 
in 2000–2, at which point he retired as a colonel.  After a spell at the PSKOI he 
served as the field program officer for USAID in Gardez, Afghanistan 2003-4 and 
then returned to the PSKOI.  Given that Nichols was accredited to the academic 
staff of the PSKOI from 2000, to say that his field texts were based on those of 
an informed participating observer,7 would do a disservice to those who 
genuinely are ‘participating observers’ and who will have lacked the access and 
experience that Nichols clearly enjoyed and continues to enjoy.  Throughout 
Nichols’ involvement with post-conflict, he has maintained the complete 
                                                 
7 Bernard (2000). 
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confidence of his employers and his government, thus permitting access to and a 
detailed knowledge of the processes involved, such as would be denied to a 
traditional academic researcher.  The constraints of the existing approaches 
determine that this thesis will be based on that of ‘participatory observer’ 
approach, albeit, for the reasons given, this is an inadequate definition, 
particularly in areas such as the electoral policy of post-conflict in the Western 
Balkans.  There the author was the director general for three years in Bosnia and 
the drafter of the policy and the de facto first acting head of the OSCE elections 
department in Kosovo.        
 
There is another and related area to the role of the ‘complete participant’.  Within 
the sphere of business and indeed within the community involved in post-conflict, 
there is a very specific research and analytical role assigned to them in the 
context of ‘lessons learned’.  Lessons learned has become an increasingly 
complex methodology for recording what happened, ‘what went well’ and in 
particular ‘what went wrong’ and why and how that happened.  Increasingly, the 
‘lessons learned’ methodology is making use of academic approaches to 
research, including the use of ‘elite interviews’ and it will be worthwhile examining 
their approaches to ‘complete participants’ to see if the void left by Bernard can 
be filled.   
In business and government ‘lessons learned’ techniques evolved originally from 
the field of ‘project management’, but have now moved across the whole sphere 
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of government and business and have been further complemented by ‘project 
audits’, which are often more detailed and are certainly more time sensitive.  To 
quote ‘Get Smart’, a semi-official UK website for project managers,8 ‘lessons 
learned’ are designed:   
to incrementally capture with 20-20 hindsight (lessons learned) and 
turning that hindsight into 20-20 foresight (best practices), you will achieve 
far greater long-term success than if you simply ignore or forget what 
occurred once a project ends. This approach can greatly reduce the 
negative effects of attrition on a company's intellectual assets when 
people leave because they quit, retire, are laid off, or were temporary 
workers to begin with.   
Whilst couched in ‘business language’, such a definition is clearly very relevant to 
post-conflict, where the process is by its very nature transitional and ephemeral 
and the staff, with their multi-national membership and typically ninety-day and 
six-month tour rotations, even more so.   
In defining project audits Michael Stanleigh says that9: 
a project audit provides an opportunity to uncover issues, concerns and 
challenges encountered during the project lifecycle. Conducted midway 
through the project, an audit affords the project manager, project sponsor 
                                                 
8 It was established to support those who are, or who have, undertaken PRINCE 2 project 
management courses and are project management professionals.  
9 Stanleigh is a leading project management professional and the author of; From Crisis to 
Control: A New Era in Strategic Project Management. 
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and project team an interim view of what has gone well, as well as what 
needs to be improved to successfully complete the project. If done at the 
close of a project, the audit can be used to develop success criteria for 
future projects by providing a forensic review. 
Again a very relevant process for post-conflict and one that was, to an extent, 
conducted during the Bosnian and Kosovan post-conflict phases, but one which 
was apparently ignored in the latter phases of the planning for post-conflict in 
Iraq, as will be discussed later in the thesis.  
    
The role of autobiography and auto-ethnography 
 
It is also clear that a thesis of this kind, which is attempting to analyse the IC’s 
changing management strategy towards post conflict, is not the place for any 
element of autobiographical or auto-ethnographical writing as it is currently 
defined in the literature.  In any event, the literature on auto-ethnographical 
writing currently focuses almost exclusively upon the literary, clinical, and 
psychiatric areas.  Indeed, unlike many such events, for example, the mass 
killings which took place in Rwanda or elsewhere in the ‘Great Lakes’ region of 
Africa in the 1990s, where everyone present, both participants and observers, 
were profoundly affected, it is possible to argue that in the Western Balkans by 
simply not being Bosnian or Kosovan, many of the tensions that may have arisen 
because of one’s direct participation in events, may not be so acute.  In that case 
 42 
any such auto-ethnographic experiences would be of very limited use and would 
not produce a text which adequately: 
seeks to describe and systematically analyze personal experience in 
order to understand cultural experience.10   
Denscombe11 makes some asides on the problem of self in his chapter on 
‘ethnography’.  Unfortunately as with much of the other available literature of 
which Blaxter, Hughes, and Tight are but one example, Denscombe takes a 
purely ‘ethnographic’ approach.12  In Denscombe’s work, a considerable amount 
of the focus on participant observation is specifically focused on the subject of 
participant observation in the context of ‘ethnography’ and little else.  Gray13 too 
takes the same approach, but comes closest to describing the true nature of the 
author’s role within the fieldwork model with his description of the practitioner 
researcher.    That might particularly be the case if one could argue that the 
participatory observer was able to display a sense of ‘professionalism’ during his 
or her deployment to the areas that are the subject of study and had also been 
exposed previously to other conflict situations in various areas of the globe.  It is 
hoped that this assumption will be accepted by the reader, as this is indeed the 
case.14   
                                                 
10 Carolyn Ellis, Tony E. Adams and Arthur P. Bochner, Autoethnography: An Overview. 
11 Martyn Denscombe, The Good Research Guide, p 89.     
12 Loraine Blaxter, Christina Hughes, and Malcolm Tight (1996), How to Research, pp 58 – 66. 
13 David E. Gray, Doing Research in the Real World, p 243. 
14 Amongst other activities the author served with the Diplomatic Service in Lebanon during the 
Arab-Israeli conflict in October 1973, Greece during the coup in February 1974, and subsequently 
during the Cyprus invasion June 1974 and its aftermath including the transition to democracy in 
Greece.  The author also had cause to visit the Mayan Highlands of Guatemala in 1978-9 during 
the Mayan revolt, again whilst serving with the Diplomatic Service, and the Kurdish areas of 
Eastern Turkey in 1983 whilst serving with the military.  During the ‘Great Lakes’ crisis, which 
overlapped the Yugoslav conflict the author was employed as part of a small team in the UK, on 
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Furthermore, auto-ethnography as outlined in Clandinin and Connelly’s15 
hypotheses is not particularly relevant, nor is the comment accurate when related 
to the work of a member of the IC in a post-conflict environment.  It is certainly 
not true to state that the ‘field text’, where these exist, contains stories and does 
not contain analysis and interpretation16 and that this is solely the province of the 
academic researcher.17  Indeed, much fieldwork, particularly in the area of 
elections, which has principally been the author’s own post-conflict ‘discipline’, is 
almost exclusively of an analytical and interpretative nature and in many cases 
was focused upon accurate quantitative data collection.  It is, however, 
recognised that in many, if not most cases, such activity is focused upon 
‘operational’ and current issues, rather than the ‘strategic’ and long term or 
theoretical and even hypothetical, as is much academic work.   Indeed, the role 
of either a political officer or an elections officer in a post-conflict environment 
can be described as almost entirely analytical and interpretative when placed 
within the practical setting where he/she is employed. 
 
It is also unlikely that a participant observer will need to be aware of his or her 
role as a researcher as described by Stacy Holman,18 but it is, of course, 
essential that they were and are aware of their roles and aims as a participant 
                                                                                                                                                 
the creation of an information campaign for refugees. These products were in a range of media, 
given the lack of a written form of the principal language Keena-Rwanda and designed to assist 
the return of Tutsi refugees in the camps of Eastern Zaire, mostly women and children, to their 
homes in Rwanda.  
15 D. Jean Clandinin and F. Michael Connelly, Narrative Enquiry: Experience and Story in 
Qualitative Research. 
16 Clandinin & Connelly (2004),  p 121. 
17 Ibid., 
18 Stacy Holman Jones, Mothering Loss: Telling adoption stories, Telling Performativity, pp 113-
35. 
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observer and of the distortions in viewpoint that this might (necessarily) bring 
about.  It is perhaps also relevant that the work which had led to this thesis was 
first initiated in 1997 as part of the study for an MA and that the process of data 
collection whether of oral written or other testimony and documentation has been 
a deliberate and systematic one since that date, as has been the pursuance of 
academic research into the topic.  It is also worth noting at this point that were 
the position of a participatory observer to be taken by the author, so too several 
other key members of staff in the IC organisations were either themselves 
academics, such as Donald Horowitz, whose seminal work was on the topic of 
ethnic groups in conflict19 and Arend J. Lijphart, or people who were undertaking 
similar research work in parallel with their official duties.20   
 
In practice, for the ‘participant observer’ there will exist a considerable blurring of 
the roles, where the ‘field text’21 will have been in fact generated as a result of 
                                                 
19 Donald L. Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict. 
20 Both Horowitz and Lijphart served as members of the OSCE’s Elections Advisory Commission 
(EAC) in Bosnia and this presumably led to their joint interest in Consociationalism.  Indeed, 
given his experiences it comes as no surprise, seeing that he saw it being implemented first hand 
by the practitioners in the period from 1996 to 2000 in Bosnia, that Lijphart could say of 
Consociationalism in 2004, that he had merely discovered what political practitioners had 
repeatedly – and independently of both academic experts and one another – invented years 
earlier.   This active participation by academics enabled considerable scope for academic 
discussion both during the course of the operation and subsequently.  It also gave considerable 
exposure not only to the academics themselves but also to the practitioners of academia and 
academic methods of problem solving.  Furthermore as the requirement for appointment to 
middle and senior management appointments within the OSCE required a higher-level degree or 
equivalent, much of the methodological discussion around resolving practical problems were 
often conducted in an academic manner.  A further factor and one perhaps not easily appreciated 
was that it exposed academics in this environment to the real ‘political pressures’: being 
experienced by the practitioners.  To cite just one example, Horowitz stated publicly in Bosnia 
while a member of the EAC and sharing a platform with the (US) OSCE Ambassador that 
ethnicity need not be the primary motivating factor in Bosnia post-conflict politics.  This statement 
is contrary to the central tenets of his seminal work which states that where and once ethnicity 
becomes an issue it will always be the primary driver of the political process and political parties.  
21 Clandinin and Connelly (2004).   
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employment which is also ‘field work’.   Similarly,  the role of the participant 
observer will result in much of the subsequent academic work taking the form of 
a written ‘elite interview’, so that the concept of interviewing one’s own self as 
outlined by Devault,22 Hobbs,23 and others, is not relevant within this model.  It is 
also perhaps worth noting that much of the extant literature incorporating auto-
ethnography such as that by Devault, Jones, Jago,24 Ronai,25 and others, 
focuses on the use of auto-ethnography in a social or purely clinical environment, 
but that this need not invalidate auto-ethnography as a methodological approach 
used within the post-conflict environment.  
 
Auto-ethnography is a method which if developed correctly is ideally suited to 
recovering the experiences of both ‘participant observers’ and ‘active 
participants’ which can then be exploited by subsequent academic research.  
Indeed, at the ‘strategic’ level this already takes place in terms of the academic 
commentary on political memoirs and so on.26  That auto-ethnography may be a 
useful methodology, is particularly true for research which will examine those 
mechanisms adopted by post-conflict practitioners at the operational and tactical 
                                                 
22 Marjorie L. Devault, Personal Writing in Social Research, pp 216-28. 
23 Catherine L. Hobb,s The Elements of Autobiography and Life Narratives (Elements of 
Composition). 
24 B.J. Jago, Chronicling an Academic Depression, pp 729–57. 
25 C.R.Ronai, Multiple Reflections of Child Sex Abuse: An Argument for a Layered Account, pp 
395 – 426. 
26 See for example the extensive and often highly critical commentaries upon Donald Rumsfeld 
Known and Unknown: A Memoir.  Reviewed by Jonathan Powell, Tony Blair’s former chief of 
staff, in the New Statesman on 9 March 2011.  Powell, quoting Talleyrand, said that Rumsfeld; 
learned nothing and forgot nothing.  
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level, where there are few direct or detailed reports of what took place.27  There 
is clear evidence that this lack of first-hand exposure to and experience of 
practical post-conflict problem solving was recognised at the time in UK official 
circles.  This can be indicated by the use of the Defence Debriefing Team (DDT) 
to conduct skilled debriefs of civilian officials upon their return to the UK at the 
completion of their mission so as to aid the ‘lessons learned’ process.  One could 
argue that had the UK trained and encouraged its own civilian staff to undertake 
an auto-ethnographical approach to their work when deployed the DDT would not 
have been required, nor would it continue to be required.28   
 
The role of ‘elite interviews’ 
 
The use of military debriefing teams to conduct in-depth interviewing of post-
conflict practitioners, leads directly to the use of the analogous academic 
research methodology the ‘elite interview’.  The role of ‘elite interviews’ has been 
mentioned briefly in the introductory paragraphs to this chapter, both in the case 
of the discrete and impartial ‘analytical observer’ and with the ‘participatory 
observer’.  It will be appropriate at this stage to examine whether the 
methodology for ‘elite interviews’ might not also be employed effectively by the 
participant observer.  In this context it will also be important to identify what are 
                                                 
27 In contrast to both the ‘Strategic’ level and the military sphere of post-conflict where there is 
often a wealth of, admittedly not impartial, political and other memoirs. 
28 It is believed to be still active in this role in 2011 but whether it is only partially effective due to a 
lack of resources, is not clear.  The author recently received a presentation from and had a 
conversation with the UK political officer who had served for a year in Sangin within Helmand 
province, Afghanistan in 2009-10.  He stated that he had not been formally debriefed for the 
‘lessons learned’ process by his seconding department, DfID.   
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the likely differences in the approach, the conduct of the interview, and the 
results obtained, between the discrete ‘impartial observer’ and the ‘participatory 
observer’ and then to link these observations specifically to the context of the 
research for this thesis.   
 
In addition to having examined the academic literary sources on the topic of elite 
interviews, the author has been fortunate enough to participate as the 
‘interviewee’ in some thirty to forty elite interviews.  These ranged from the 
discrete ‘impartial observer’, through those who were in practice ‘participatory 
observers’ to colleagues and associates such as Lijphart who were interviewing 
the author specifically for their own academic purposes.  Unsurprisingly, the 
author was able to observe significant differences between those interviews 
conducted by ‘impartial observers’ from those who were already intimately 
involved with the specific processes to which the interviews related.  Whilst the  
views given are necessarily impressionistic, some clear points emerge which 
indicate that it would have been impossible for someone so heavily engaged in 
the process as the author then was, to have conducted typical, discrete, and 
impartial interviews.  Whilst the interviews conducted did not in every case form 
part of the everyday work routine and in some cases were conducted, usually in 
an informal setting, so as to gather material with the consent of the interviewee 
for this thesis, it is clear from Arksey and Knight 29 and others that these did not 
constitute elite interviews, even if they were conducted in the same manner.   
 
                                                 
29 Arksey and Knight (1999).   
 48 
As previously stated by Arksey et al, some 60 per cent of the time devoted to 
obtaining elite interviews is negotiating access.  It is this emphasis upon access 
which is perhaps the key element and which is reflected in the difference 
between an elite interview by an ‘impartial observer’ and an interview conducted 
by a participant observer.  Namely, that the discrete ‘impartial observer’ has a 
need to demonstrate that they have come as close as they can to the ‘ground 
truth’ of the decision-making process and that this can be achieved through the 
mechanism of the elite interview.  The participant observer, on the other hand, 
has no such requirement as they can demonstrate that they themselves were 
part of or were closely associated with the processes taking place. 
 
Whilst it is true that in a similar interview conducted by a ‘participant observer’ 
access is not usually an issue nor often is there a need to demonstrate that such 
access was possible, there are, however, a number of other more relevant 
factors which will inform the outcome of the interview.  The ‘participant observer’ 
is likely already to know exactly where the interviewee will be located within the 
overall architecture of the post-conflict structure and so will be better able to 
‘situate’ their questions accordingly.  Hence the ‘participant observer’ is likely to 
be better able to focus upon the questions to which they need to find the 
answers, rather than asking broad generalities. As the depth of perception of the 
questioner will be greater and the questions more focused, it is likely that they 
will be more challenging to the interviewee.  Indeed, it is possible that the 
interview may take the form of two meetings with the first discussion largely 
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raising the topics to be discussed and the second providing answers which may 
have had to be researched by the interviewee or his staff.  There are, it should be 
stated, potential problems with this approach.  If the interlocutors are familiar with 
each other much may be taken for granted or assumed.  There may be issues of 
rank and seniority which will affect the relationship between the interviewer and 
the interviewee and, finally, if both have been involved in the same long-term 
project, there may be a fear by both participants of identifying systemic problems 
or difficulties and in either upsetting a cosy atmosphere or simply an inability to 
break through ‘groupthink’.  
 
As for the interview itself, it is most likely that both participants know each other, 
if not formally then informally, so that the meetings are usually more relaxed and 
the questions can hence be wider ranging and as Bernard30 states, ‘semi-
structured’ and often ‘unstructured’.  Neither the interviewer nor the interviewee 
are required to establish any ‘groundwork’ as to their role etc, nor be distracted 
by discussing details of which both participants would already be aware.  
Additionally, there is the issue of ‘trust’ to consider.  The interviewee is likely to 
‘trust’31 the ‘participant observer’ to a greater extent, in terms of what is 
discussed, recognising that this is a purely ‘academic exercise’ and that both of 
them will be continuing to work together in the future.  Why is this issue of ‘trust‘ 
relevant?  It is because those members of the IC working in post-conflict (and 
                                                 
30 Bernard (2000), p 191.  
31 In this context ‘trust’ in the broadest context and not in the context of the interviewer having 
received security clearance etc, although this might also be relevant when for example 
interviewing a senior military officer or a key member of the High Representative’s staff. 
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probably elsewhere) know, that many post-graduate students, particularly from 
Central and Eastern European countries and the United States of America, fund 
their studies and, in many cases, their research visits by also acting as part-time 
‘journalists’; indeed some appear to be full time journalists and part-time 
students.  Being cautious of appearing on the front page of Česky Pravda, as 
happened once to the Director General for Elections in Bosnia32 having 
participated in an ‘elite interview’, those being invited to take part in ‘elite 
interviews’ or their support staff are likely to be extremely restrained in what they 
say and the interviewer will in many cases get little that would not otherwise be 
available elsewhere.  With the participant observer, on the other hand, the 
interviewee may well be willing to explain ‘why’ they took a particular decision 
and what the thought process was behind the decision and, in some cases, what 
particular information drove them to take a particular decision at a certain time, 
confident that the privileged information will not be later revealed.   This is 
valuable to the interviewer as they can then understand the context in which 
decisions were taken and in many cases the competing pressures upon key 
decision makers, in particular from participating states and donors.33   
                                                 
32 He was interviewed by a Czech MA student of International Relations (IR) at the Charles 
University in Prague at the time of the Sarajevo Conference.  Her visit had been funded by Česky 
Pravda and whilst she had been unable to get any personal interviews at the Conference itself, 
she was able to conduct others by presenting herself as a legitimate IR and politics MA student.  
‘Snapshots’ of these interviews then appeared in the newspaper, with the elections piece on the 
front page.  As background, the interviews had been set up by a Czech Diplomat working for the 
OSCE.  
33 A practical example can serve to illustrate the proposition just made.  One can observe the 
skewing of social and developmental programmes as a result of decisions taken in remote 
capitals by donors and particularly from those states which grant substantial amount of aid funds 
directly and not through third parties such as the EU or the UN.  In 1998-9 if on a field visit to 
Bosnia, a discrete and impartial observer may well have noticed that many of the programmes 
being run by a number of agencies such as the OSCE focused particularly upon the development 
of the roles of women in a wide range of areas of society.  If they asked a question in an ‘elite 
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Ethical issues 
 
The role of ethical issues as they impact on either the analytical observation or 
participant-observer approaches, should also be examined and it is important 
that both analytical and participant observers are aware of these.  Critically both 
types of observer should be open and transparent with their ‘subjects’ about their 
aims and the methodologies they will use to achieve them.  In the cases 
examined in the thesis, both the role of the observer and the majority of the 
process itself, was open and transparent.  It is also a limiting factor, that in line 
with their conditions of employment, the participant observer will not disclose 
confidential material or that which is gained ‘in confidence’ by nature of their 
employment.  This raises a second ethical issue.  If, to the participant observer, 
there is for them at least, as Rumsfeld34 would say, a known unknown and this 
information is not reported, then he or she, is guilty of deliberately misleading 
their audience.  It was specifically for this reason that the author focused the 
case studies on the period after he had left military service.  
                                                                                                                                                 
interview’ about why there was such a focus they might have been told that it was because this 
was an important issue, there was a lot of ground to make up in the treatment of women etc.  All 
of which was, of course, true.  What they might not have been told and a participant observer 
might, or may indeed already have known or guessed, was that the sudden switch of emphasis 
across those agencies, such as the OSCE, which were implementers of aid provided from 
elsewhere, had all been told that Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA) 
would only fund those programmes in the coming two years which had a major gender 
component.  Bureaucrats, being what they are and wishing to maintain their departments and a 
significant number of their staff, had adjusted their programming accordingly, but they are unlikely 
to say this publicly.  There are many similar cases and, indeed, the same adjustments were made 
later in Albania for exactly the same reason in 2006, when once again SIDA decided to focus its 
funding almost exclusively on women’s issues.  As a result the emphasis in post-conflict 
developmental terms was and is often guided by what funds were available and who was 
prepared to commit funding, rather than on the basis of the strict criteria of needs as assessed by 
the experts on the ground.            
34 Rumsfeld (2011). 
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The fact that one of the active participants in the electoral and other process was 
also observing them, was in this case, neither harmful nor raised ethical issues.35  
Indeed, the author was actively encouraged to adopt this approach by his 
management and both was and continues to be encouraged to do so.  
Additionally, the thesis will not be making use of excerpts or quotes from 
personal correspondence or e-mails, except on those rare occasions where 
information was specifically requested for the purpose of the thesis. 
 
Furthermore, the fact that ‘participant observation’ was taking place was also 
widely known at the time, as it was openly discussed in the author’s places of 
employment and, as has been suggested earlier, was taking place across the 
process with a number of other participant observers of differing specialities and 
in various locations.  
 
On balance, the benefits of the ‘participatory observer’ approach do outweigh the 
‘impartiality’ of the ‘discrete, impartial observer’ approach.  The participatory 
observer approach is also intellectually and in every way, ‘more honest’ in that 
having been a ‘participatory observer’, it is then very difficult to act as if one had 
not been present.  It is also worth noting that much of the literature discussing 
                                                 
35 That this should be so, is perhaps not a surprise.  David De Vaus, Research Design in Social 
Research, especially pp 246–47.  De Vaus makes this point in his discussion on ethical issues.  
Were this observation to be an investigation of for example criminal or domestic violence issues it 
will, De Vaus suggests, be more relevant. 
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research, such as Wisker36 and others, discuss the participatory observer 
inserting themselves into a group for anything up to three years, so as to conduct 
research.   This particular participant observer did not need to insert himself as 
he was present by nature of his employment.  As such, the phrase practitioner 
researcher or active participant, both of which are used by Gray37 appear to 
come closer to the reality.  Unfortunately his terminology and approach, which 
allows of a number of participatory observer approaches, is not widely used 
elsewhere, perhaps because his work post-dates much of the other material on 
the subject and that work which is equally current, such as that of Seale 38 whose 
Chapter 6 on participatory observation, simply abstracts a chapter from McCall 
and Simmons39.  The work by McCall and Simmons consists of the original 
journal piece by Becker and Geer40 with an additional unattributed commentary 
by Trow and a ‘riposte’ by Becker and Geer.  Other recent literature, such as that 
by Bauma,41 fails to discuss the issue at all, whereas Robson,42 unlike much of 
the other literature, at least recognised the participant observer as a full 
participant in the process while Richards, and Pestle43 also recognised that the 
role of participant observer put the researcher under considerable additional 
pressure. 
 
                                                 
36 Wisker (2001), p 178. 
37 Gray (2004).  
38 Clive Seale (ed), Social Research Methods – A Reader. 
39 G. McCall and J. L. Simmons (eds), Issues in Participant Observation. 
40 H. Becker and B. Geer, Participant Observation and Interviewing: a Comparison, pp 28–35. 
41 Gary D. Bauma, The Research Process, pp 58–66. 
42 Colin Robson, Real World Research. 
43 S. Richards and K. Pestle, Surviving in the Field: an Exploration of the Challenges of 
Participant Observation in Social Work Settings, pp 7–41. 
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At the very least, if one were to claim to be a disinterested observer, one would 
be intellectually dishonest as there are things that a participant observer knows 
that would be denied to the outside observer.  This is not a matter of ‘going 
native’, it is a question, of by being directly involved, being ‘grainier’, ‘grittier’, and 
being able to add more analytical nuances.  The participant observer will also 
have access to information and impressions which would be denied to the 
researcher who had not been present when these events took place.  Moreover, 
as the observer was present in a natural way by virtue of his employment, it was 
not ‘disturbing the environment’ as a reporter or researcher would have done and 
which has been one of the concerns of Blaxter, Hughes, and Tight.44  Nor did he 
have to negotiate ‘access’ as this was given by nature of his employment.  
 
This access and the means by which it was acquired was particularly relevant in 
the case of BiH and Kosovo and, it is suspected, in other post-conflict situations, 
as so many activities took place which were neither minuted, nor recorded in any 
way, often in informal meetings with no agenda and no set list of invitees.  This 
was not in an attempt to preserve secrecy but simply because the key aim of the 
participants was to ‘get the job done’ and to take ‘sensible’ decisions.  An 
example of such a process may be seen in the meetings between the IC and 
generals such as Ratko Mladic.  The IC routinely met the generals commanding 
all the warring factions including Mladic.  The meetings with Mladic stopped 
because it appeared appropriate to do so, not because of a formal order, 
although this would have undoubtedly been issued at some stage had it proved 
                                                 
44 Blaxter et al. (1998).  pp 142–5. 
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necessary to do so.  This action was taken despite the fact that at that point 
Mladic had not been formally indicted by the ICTY.  It is highly unlikely that any 
written record exists of the initial decision taken nor of any similar decision that 
officials from the OSCE should not meet Karadzic. 
 
In addition, whilst the author may have needed to get permission for certain 
statements and documents to be used in, for example, the bibliography, or as 
footnotes, most if not all are now in the public domain; for those which are not, as 
a participatory observer, he will be at least aware of their existence and can 
acknowledge them.  Whereas were he to present himself as a disinterested 
academic observer and analyst, the observer should, if he were to be honest, 
ignore their existence.  The discussions at the US Army Institute for Peace in 
Carlisle, Pennsylvania on the nature of the future pillar structure within Kosovo 
and on which organisation was to carry out which activity and which were held 
before these proposals were put to the UN in May 1999, would be a case in 
point.  The minutes and notes from this conference which included the UN SRSG 
in BiH and the future Deputy High Representative in Kosovo have never been 
made public, whereas the author attended as a guest speaker talking about 
elections and could clearly report on the decision-making process as a 
‘participatory observer’.  Similarly, both the elections and ‘Policing’ plans 
presented to the participants at the ‘Rambouillet’ summit have never been made 
public.  
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A discussion of the methodology used 
 
The preceding elements of the chapter outline the initial question as to which 
methodology to adopt.  They inevitably lead to the conclusion that the study will 
lean very heavily on practical fieldwork or as Yin45 described it, the method of 
choice when the phenomenon under study is not readily distinguishable from its 
context.  This I would suggest is an accurate description of BiH and Kosovo in 
the post-conflict period.  The methodology will also employ the available 
empirical evidence.  Cosley and Lung46 describe in some detail the nature of the 
data that may typically be collected by using this approach, although their 
illustration is founded upon a business and governmental example based upon 
one state, while the range of data collected on this occasion has been somewhat 
wider, being by definition multi-national.  This research material was gathered 
from a fourteen-year stay in the Balkans, in increasingly responsible posts whilst 
seconded by the UK Government.  Over seven years of this time was spent 
based in BiH from 1995 to 2002 and the author was present on both the date of 
the implementation of the Dayton Agreement hence the formal move to a post-
conflict state and on 1 July 2004, the date at which BiH formally moved from a 
post-conflict to a transitional state in EU and European terms.  He also made 
frequent visits to other areas within the Western Balkans, including Serbia and 
Kosovo, both before and after the NATO bombing campaign.  For the majority of 
                                                 
45 Robert K. Yin, Applications of Case Study Research Applied Social Research Methods.  In 
particular p 3. 
46 D. Casley and D. Lury, Data Collection in Developing Countries, especially p 65.  
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that period he was directly involved in the management and organisation of 
elections for both BiH and Kosovo, for a significant period as the OSCE Director 
General for Elections in BiH.   These electoral processes included the very large 
refugee populations in Croatia, Serbia (including Kosovo), and Montenegro (at 
that time still part of Federal Yugoslavia), hence the visits to those places.47   
 
The empirical fieldwork gathered using participatory observation in this type of 
qualitative research reaps benefits as described by Bryman,48 where he debates 
participatory observation at length in making his thesis and would indicate that, 
for most social scientists, qualitative research is superior to quantitative research.  
Bryman’s views are shared by Waddington.49  It is clear from the evidence 
presented as a result of previous academic research that the correct 
methodology for this thesis is to use the participatory-observer approach making 
use, wherever possible, of an auto-ethnographical methodology in order to obtain 
most value from the material thus available. 
 
Using the empirical evidence available from the participatory-observer approach 
it will be necessary to carefully select certain themes for more detailed 
investigation.  The empirical evidence which has been collected and which will 
form the core of the thesis, will be set against both a historical perspective of  
                                                 
47 In 1998 there were estimated to be 30,000 Bosnian Serb voters registered within the 
boundaries of Kosovo and four registration and polling stations in Pristina, Mitrovica/Kozarska 
Mitrovica Pec/Peja, and Prizren.  All had to be established and manned by international 
personnel in the period May – July and September 1998. 
48 Alan Bryman, Quantity and Quality in Social Research, in particular pp 47–91. 
49 D. Waddington, Participant Observation, see in particular pp 24 and 27. 
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post-conflict intervention as well as the perspective of international colonialism, 
imperialism, cosmopolitanism, and liberal interventionism and any other 
theoretical models which are relevant and which it is appropriate to discuss. 
 
Theory and practice in this research 
 
Whilst it would not be appropriate within the research design to delve too deeply 
into the theoretical construct within which the thesis is emplaced, it is important to 
state at this point that it is this which will underpin the empirical evidence 
throughout.  As an example, whilst liberal interventionism can be traced back to 
Palmerston in the mid-nineteenth century and even before, it was also the model 
used by US academics such as Peceny and Sanchez50 and Daalder51 to 
describe President Clinton’s lift and strike proposals made with regard to Bosnia 
in 1992.  Additionally Beck and Cronin52 believe that the UN can be seen as one 
element of the idea of cosmopolitanism.  They also see within that vision, the 
development of the thought that crimes against humanity should become an 
accepted concept within humanitarian law and that it was this idea which led to 
the development of the International Criminal Tribunals (ICT).  Of the ICT, the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia (ICTY) forms but one example and 
the ICT is of particular relevance not only to Bosnia, but also to the other post 
                                                 
50 Mark Peceny and Shannon Sanchez-Terry, Liberal Interventionism in Bosnia. 
51 Ivo H. Daalder, Getting to Dayton: The Making of America’s Bosnia Policy.  
52 Ulrich Beck and Ciaran Cronin, Cosmopolitan Vision, p 45. 
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war genocides.  For some such as Klitou,53 it was specifically these human rights 
elements which attracted them towards the cosmopolitanism model. 
 
By definition, the thesis will focus upon the IC’s management of post-conflict and 
not humanitarian intervention which has been defined amongst others by 
Murphy54 as:  
the threat or use of force by a state, group of states, or international 
organization primarily for the purpose of protecting the nationals of the 
target state from widespread deprivation of internationally recognized 
human rights.55   
That said, it is impossible to de-link the two activities or phases within a conflict.  
It would also appear that not only do some textbook writers such as Heywood,56  
understandably given his undergraduate audience, take a simplistic definition of 
humanitarian intervention and the immediate issues surrounding it, so did many 
of those responsible for political decision making, with regards to BiH and 
Kosovo including, perhaps, many close to President Clinton. 
 
In general it can be argued that humanitarian intervention and post-conflict 
should and in most cases necessarily are intertwined.  It was arguably the 
principal problem with the UNPROFOR mandate 1992–95, that it was not, and 
that each issue had been addressed independently in the case of the ongoing 
                                                 
53 Demetrius Klitou, The Friends and Foes of Human Rights. 
54 Sean D. Murphy, Humanitarian intervention: In an evolving world order. 
55 Murphy (1996), p 343. 
56 Andrew Heywood, Politics, p 134. 
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conflict, if at all.  For the policy and practical effects of this strategic de-linkage 
both in BiH and elsewhere Shawcross57 gives a good catalogue of the impacts, 
both upon those within BiH and the peacemakers, whilst Rose58 illustrates the 
practical impacts at the operational level across BiH and Richardson59 and 
Stewart60 describe the impact at the local level in Gorazde in 1994 and Central 
Bosnia in 1993.  Except in so far as they directly relate to the conduct of 
operations both within BiH and Kosovo, these issues will not be covered within 
the thematic chapters of the thesis.  Where they are relevant to the concepts and 
ideas being examined, one example being the response drawn from the 
unplanned and impromptu ‘humanitarian intervention’ in Kosovo caused by 
Milosevic’s expulsion of the Kosovars in 1999, these will be discussed primarily 
in the ‘lessons learned’61 elements of the thesis.  Chomsky62 in particular gives a 
more general description of the impact of these events upon Kosovo. 
 
In a similar manner the thesis will not deal specifically with gender issues within 
post-conflict, except in so far as they are relevant to the thesis or the description 
of post-modern definitions of ‘colonialism’ and ‘imperialism’; as space will not 
permit such digressions.  That is not to say that gender issues are not extremely 
relevant, particularly in both BiH and Kosovo, where rape was used as a weapon 
                                                 
57 William Shawcross, op.cit. 
58 Michael Rose, Fighting for Peace. 
59 Nick Richardson, No Escape Zone. 
60 Bob Stewart, Broken Lives: A Personal View of the Bosnian Conflict. 
61 It is worth noting that this specific ‘lesson’ does not appear to have been ‘learned’ by the IC.  
Ghaddafi threatened to flood Europe with third country nationals from Libya and is now in mid- 
2011 doing so via Libya’s Mediterranean coastline.  Yet again the IC is fumbling to make an 
‘emergency’ and currently ineffective response to this action. 
62 Noam Chomsky, The New Military Humanism – Lessons from Kosovo. 
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of war by a number of protagonists.  The impact of specialised NGOs such as the 
Dublin Rape Crisis Centre63 who brought their previous experience, of dealing 
with rape victims in a society where abortion was not permitted (namely the 
Republic of Ireland), to both BiH and Kosovo cannot be underestimated, 
particularly as the number of agencies willing to deal with long-term psychiatric 
and psycho-sexual care was and remains extremely limited, because of both the 
cost and the investment in time required.  Whilst in the thematic chapters the 
focus will be upon the Western Balkans, it is important to recognise that for 
example in Rwanda issues of gender were desperately important, because in 
those areas affected there were mostly only adult females left who, moreover, 
were not only usually displaced, but also forced to act in unfamiliar roles such as 
head of household. 
 
The thesis will limit the use of non-European examples and these, where given, 
will generally be from Africa and Eurasia so as to provide a degree of broad 
continuity within the limited space available.  This is not to say that the problems 
encountered and the methodologies adopted elsewhere are not relevant, they 
are.  It is, however, true that in some cases, both the international response to 
the trigger for conflict, for example the Indonesian occupation of the former 
Portuguese Timor64 and the eventual post-conflict IC intervention, will vary in 
context from case to case.  Whilst the international responses to the initial 
                                                 
63 For the Dublin Rape Crisis Centre and their activities see; www.drcc.ie. 
64 The Indian military assault and occupation of Portuguese Goa, undertaken whilst Goa 
remained a Portuguese colony in 1961 and resulting in over sixty combat deaths could be noted 
as a parallel case.  For more details see Oliviera Salazar, The Invasion and Occupation of Goa 
by the Indian Union.  
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causes of the conflict are unlikely to be replicated in Eurasia, some events 
leading up to the independence of what is now Timor-Leste are potentially 
relevant to other cases of post-conflict and should be examined as part of the 
lessons to be learned for the future.  One such example in the case of Timor-
Leste, was the impact and aftermath of the referendum on independence 
organised and conducted under foreign supervision.  The result of this 
referendum, in August 1999, was clear even before polling began and whilst the 
exact nature of the Indonesian response could not necessarily have been 
predicted, the fact that the Indonesians were likely to respond negatively and, 
perhaps, extremely violently, should have been.  It is clear, however, that both 
those members of the IC working on the ground and the local population, who 
were swept along in an outpouring of euphoria over the forthcoming 
independence, neither foresaw the Indonesian response nor had in place any 
contingency plans for any electoral outcome other than a peaceful vote for 
independence.  This was clear from a conversation with Jeff Fisher of the 
International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES), who was the director of 
the electoral administration for the referendum.65  That these lessons appear to 
                                                 
65 Jeff Fisher was an executive Vice-President of IFES and the elections Director for the first 
round of elections in Bosnia.  Even before the East Timor referendum had taken place Fisher had 
been selected to be the first Director of the Joint Registration Task Force (JRTF) in Kosovo in 
September 1999.  I spoke to him in Kosovo about his experiences in Timor and he was still 
traumatised by them and suffering from a feeling of guilt that the referendum could have had such 
a traumatic aftermath.  It was clear from that interview that the violent response had come as a 
complete shock to him.  The Indonesian government sponsored Timorese Militias killed 
approximately 1,400 Timorese and drove a further 300,000 people into West Timor as refugees. 
The majority of the country's already limited infrastructure was destroyed.  In part, as a result of 
this disaster, the independence of East Timor, now the state of Timor-Leste was not recognised 
by the UN until 20 May 2002. 
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have been learned66 is clear from the way in which the referendum on the 
independence of South Sudan has been handled and the slow and cautious 
build-up over three years to the referendum day itself. 
 
For the thematic chapters on BiH and Kosovo, both the start point and, in the 
case of Bosnia, the end point for the ‘post-conflict’ period is fairly clear.  A cease-
fire is signed with an agreed start date when the fighting ceases almost 
completely and it can be reasonably stated, particularly with the benefit of 
hindsight that a post-conflict phase has begun.  It was not immediately clear that 
this was the case at the time in Sarajevo.  December 1995 saw one particularly 
bloody incident with seven deaths on a tram after it had been hit by a rocket-
propelled grenade fired from Serb Sarajevo.  UK and French troops in Sarajevo 
were still dealing with (and engaging) Bosnian Serb snipers in March 1996.  Was 
this argument regarding post-conflict valid, for example, in Iraq in 2005-7 and, if 
not, how do we define post-conflict?  Phillips67 convincingly argues that having 
reached the ‘post-conflict’ phase in Iraq in late 2003, the US and its allies then 
withdrew from this phase in 2004-7.  If one of the definitions for a ‘post-conflict’ 
phase for the military is the ability to deploy Civil Military Co-operation (CIMIC) 
teams into isolated ‘team houses’, as was done in Iraq in 2003, then Phillips’ 
argument is correct.  These CIMIC teams were withdrawn in 2004 as it was no 
                                                 
66 Fisher himself has, subsequently, twice written on the issue of violence at election times: 
Democratic Control of Armed Forces and Kosovo Security in the Absence of State (2001) and 
Electoral Conflict and Violence: A Strategy for Study and Prevention (2002). 
67 David L. Phillips, Losing Iraq – Inside The Post War Reconstruction Fiasco. 
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longer safe.  Etherington68 makes a similar point from a UK perspective and 
drawing upon his previous experience of conflict and post-conflict in Northern 
Ireland, BiH, and Kosovo. The thesis will also define a typology of specifically 
post-conflict intervention, as opposed to conflict and even pre-conflict 
intervention which by definition and by their nature are earlier phases of the 
conflict.  Whilst some of these interventions have been tabulated by Nye69  
amongst others, it is possible that some of the conclusions drawn by Nye in 
defining intervention during conflicts might also be claimed to have some utility in 
post-conflict situations.  However, it may be doubted whether international actors 
would regard some of his low-level interventions e.g. making radio broadcasts, 
as making any contribution to the management of post-conflict at all.  Nor will the 
thesis examine examples where both ‘conflict’ and ‘post-conflict’ IC operations 
are taking place within the same nation state, as currently in Sudan.  In EU 
terms, at least, South Sudan is in the post-conflict phase and activities such as 
police training programmes are taking place,70 but in Western Dharfur there are 
emergency relief operations and (AU-led) military interventions. 
     
This thesis will focus primarily on BiH and Kosovo as the basis for its case 
studies.  Whilst Brady and Collier71 and Gray72 amongst others, talk about the 
                                                 
68 Mark Etherington, The Revolt on the Tigris - The Al-Sadr Uprising and the Governing of Iraq.  
69 Joseph S. Nye, Understanding International conflicts – An introduction to Theory and History, in 
particular Figure 6.1, p 161 and others.  
70 E-mail dialogue with Mr Brian Steers, currently chief of logistics for the EU funded police 
development mission in Southern Sudan 2005, and conversations with Mr Peter Phillips CBE, 
formerly Deputy Head of the DFID mission to South Sudan.  UK-led police training programmes 
have been taking place since at least 2002. 
71 Henry E. Brady and David Collier (2004), Rethinking Social Enquiry, pp 105–21.  
72 David Gray (2004), p 125.  
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selection of case studies, this is not relevant to this research design, in that the 
observer was only able to participate directly in these two relatively recent post-
conflict situations.  As such, the thesis will not identify ‘third world’ IC intervention 
and post-conflict activity in very much detail.  In addition, the thesis will try to 
determine clear examples of each type of intervention. This will include those 
interventions that prevented further worsening of an already existing conflict or 
internal chaos and which are not perhaps, post facto, recognised as ‘post-
conflict’ as, in these cases, full-scale military operations never took place.  The 
Italian intervention during Operation ‘ALBA’ in Albania in 1997–8 would be one 
such and several of the US interventions in Haiti would also fit this model, 
although in both the Albanian and the Haitian examples, interventions by in 
excess of 8,000 military personnel, albeit with a primarily humanitarian focus, at 
least initially, would perhaps be deemed by some commentators as full-scale 
military operations.    
 
The thesis will further attempt to identify if there are, or were, clear models for IC 
post-conflict activity in BiH andKosovo and which are relevant for elsewhere, 
even if these were not immediately apparent to those implementing them at the 
time.  If there are no models it will attempt to define if there are clear and 
identifiable guidelines to which the international actors work, or whether these 
are developed solely on a case-by-case basis.  Additionally, it will examine 
whether the evolutionary nature of the methodologies employed is in part linked 
to the fact that they depend upon the same relatively small group of technical 
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experts who are simply ‘recycled’ through each post-conflict operation as they 
occur.  The field of elections is one such area where the number of practitioners 
at senior, middle, and even junior levels, are limited and where inevitably those 
practitioners base their current practices on the lessons they personally have 
learnt from past operations.  Again Fisher, the referendum director in East 
Timor,73 is possibly a useful case in point, a fact confirmed by some of his 
writing,74 as would be Erben75 and Sekniashvili76 and others.  Additionally, given 
the limited number of practitioners, the academic community has been forced to 
reply upon a limited source of references when sampling direct experiences of 
electoral operations in post-conflict.  For an example of this one need look no 
further than the bibliography of writers such as Sisk,77 where it can be seen that 
many of the practical references come from a limited number of sources 
including former IFES employees and the Swedish based international Institute 
for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA). 
 
The fieldwork and empirical evidence will also be used to help identify and define 
the ‘legacies’ and ‘consequences’ of the IC’s involvement in these two post-
conflict environments and to compare them not only with previous examples 
                                                 
73 Fisher was the Director of the electoral authorities during the transition in Angola, Mozambique, 
El Salvador, Bosnia, Kosovo, East Timor (Referendum), and Iraq as well as being involved in ‘out 
of country voting’ in Afghanistan.  
74 Fisher (2002).  Fisher uses his experiences in the countries where he has worked as case 
studies. 
75  Peter Erben held various appointments in Bosnia, was for a while the Director for Elections in 
Kosovo and then managed ‘out of country voting’, a key appointment for both Iraq and 
Afghanistan. 
76   Although always in field appointments, Sekniashvili served as an elections officer in Georgia, 
his mother country, Bosnia, Kosovo, and as a voter registration officer in Pakistan for the Afghan 
Electoral Authority.  
77 Timothy D. Sisk, Elections in Fragile States: Between Voice and Violence. 
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including those from the traditional ‘colonial’ period, but also those others that 
were taking place in parallel such as in Lebanon.   There will also be an attempt 
to define clearly the terms ‘legacy’ and ‘consequence’ and to differentiate 
between ‘intended’ and ‘unintended’ legacies and consequences.  Furthermore, 
the fieldwork will also be used to identify and exemplify any ‘lessons learned’ 
from both BiH and Kosovo, particularly those which may have a utility elsewhere 
and to demonstrate whether any of those lessons learned have been either 
implemented or ignored, where they were relevant to later or current post-conflict 
environments.   
 
Finally, the research design has been formulated so as to situate the study within 
the context of the key literatures on the subject and will attempt to identify where 
the thesis either corroborates or departs from this existing thinking.  Whilst this 
element will focus on the literature in areas such as post-conflict reconstruction, 
democracy promotion, the character of the IC, its intervention strategies and 
record, it will also look at the issue of the EU’s attempted ‘governance’ of non-EU 
spaces, in other words government without governance, a topic which will be 
covered in more detail within the relevant chapter.  
 
As discussed earlier in this chapter, ‘elite interviews’ and similar devices are not 
part of the research design as they would appear as an artifice for a participatory 
observer who had a considerable degree of access to those who might be 
interviewed.  As will be demonstrated, it is intended to maximise the practical 
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benefits that elite interviews would otherwise bring, particularly to theses which 
are based primarily upon qualitative research as described by Arksey and 
Knight,78 Bryman,79 and others, by integrating that empirical material which was 
collected orally throughout the thesis.  
 
It is important to return at this point to the ethical question which affects all 
participant observers.  Should the author quote from written texts which had been 
requested or received in a personal capacity and where they have not been 
written specifically for the purposes of inclusion in this thesis, it has been 
necessary to obtain informed consent.  This has been done.  In all cases where it 
has been possible to refer to material which is now in the public domain the 
author has done so.  In a similar manner the author has only used oral material, 
such as the comments from Fisher on the referendum, where it has been 
necessary in this case to indicate that the shock at the Indonesian response went 
right to the top.  Rather than submitting these documents as individual papers, 
instead, these actors and the relevant papers will be brought into the thesis 
where they are relevant and as part of the main body of the text.  For a similar 
reason questionnaires and sampling techniques were not employed, except 
where they occurred as a result of work carried out at the time and which is now 
being quoted as ‘evidence’ within the text.   
 
                                                 
78 Hilary Arksey and Peter Knight (1999). 
79 Alan Bryman (2006), pp 47–91. 
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In the conclusion, the thesis will illustrate the evolving nature of the research 
models which are in practical use today and will attempt to provide adequate 
definitions of the activities of fellow researchers who were in similar positions to 
the author.  It will recognise that the post-conflict operations in Bosnia and 
Kosovo whilst both being ‘snapshots in time’ were representative of key 
developments in that particular evolutionary process which is the development of 
post-conflict operations.  In particular, it will note the move away from purely UN 
and UN-led operations, to a more state and regional based multi-national 
environment that has increasingly become the model for post-conflict operations 
in the twenty-first century. 
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Chapter 3 
 
Imperialism, Colonialism and other Post-Conflict models 
 
Introduction 
 
This chapter, and the next, provide the conceptual and comparative historical 
underpinning and background to the empirical case chapters. This chapter will 
establish whether the imperialist and colonialist models which were certainly 
applicable for most of the nineteenth and perhaps early twentieth century remain 
valid.  Alternatively it will examine whether, as practitioners would claim, they 
have increasingly given way in modern post-conflict models to more liberal 
interventionist, cosmopolitan, and humanitarian interventionist approaches or 
whether, in the twenty-first century, they remain valid and are explicable by the 
theories that have been developed.  In order to do so it will also be necessary 
first to discuss ‘capitalism’ as the concepts of colonialism and imperialism, at 
least within the overall Marxist framework and as used in modern times are often 
linked to capitalist expansion.  As Callinicos states:  
Imperialism is neither a transhistorical political form, nor a state policy but 
‘a special stage in the development of capitalism’.1 
 
This chapter will demonstrate that both the theories and concepts of colonialism 
and imperialism need to be re-examined in the light of the increasing complexity 
                                                 
1 Alex Callinicos, Imperialism and Global Political Economy,  p 3. 
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of the modern world, where a relatively limited short-duration conflict in one small 
part of the African continent2 can have a global impact upon policies, 
commodities, and potentially, livelihoods worldwide.   Further, it is possible to 
demonstrate that, whilst the definition of what constitutes ‘colonialism’ has 
altered, it is still recognisable in terms of ‘colonialism’ as understood in the 
classical period i.e. from the eighteenth Century up and until 1948.  Unlike 
colonialism, it will be argued that for a number of reasons the earlier ‘traditional’ 
definitions of imperialism have not stood the test of time and that the theory of 
imperialism has evolved to take these changes into account.  It will also be 
argued that in the twenty-first century the definition of imperialism is regarded not 
only as being wider than formerly, so as to include such areas as cultural 
imperialism which are discussed within the chapter, but also the scope of 
imperialism and post-imperialism in both a conceptual and definitional sense, if 
indeed they still exist, are still a matter of current debate.3  That said, imperialism 
it will be argued, is defined too widely by various vested and other sectarian 
interests, amongst them environmentalists and regional nationalist groups. 
 
While acknowledging the impact of unintended ‘cultural imperialism’ and perhaps 
also that of ‘economic imperialism’ in some cases,4 the chapter will then proceed 
to examine theories of ‘liberal interventionism’ and their relevance to post-conflict 
intervention.  As the historical overview will demonstrate, the link between ‘liberal 
                                                 
2 For example the conflict in early 2011 within the Ivory Coast. 
3 See for example the arguments for ‘empire’ versus imperialism in, amongst others, Michael 
Hardt and Antonio Negris, Empire. 
4 For example in Iraq. 
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interventionism’ and the IC’s intervention in post-conflict has been consistently, if 
initially at least, intermittently demonstrated over the past one hundred and fifty 
years.  The chapter will demonstrate that this close link between the theory of 
‘liberal interventionism’ and the IC’s involvement in post-conflict in general 
remains relevant in the early twenty-first century.   
 
Finally, while neither a model nor a theory, the chapter will also briefly examine 
the concept of a ‘protectorate’, as this has been regularly raised in discussions in 
connection with the IC’s management of post-conflict.  It will demonstrate that in 
the context of IC intervention in post-conflict that, with one possible exception, 
the term is of little relevance to present-day IC activities.  The issue of whether 
the behaviour of the EU in terms of post-conflict, in particular within the ‘wider 
Europe’, is relevant in the concept of ‘protectorates’ will be discussed in more 
detail in a later chapter. 
 
Capitalism 
 
An understanding of capitalism is key to an understanding of both colonialism 
and imperialism in so far as modern interpretations of these terms derive from 
the Marxist ‘dependency theory’5 of the 1960s and 1970s.  Capitalism links 
colonialism and imperialism to the matter of capital accumulation and hence 
‘capitalism’.  It is that linkage, theorists such as Baran and Sweezey6 and later 
                                                 
5 It is also sometimes referred to as the ‘world systems theory’. 
6 Baran and Sweezey, Monopoly Capital: An Essay on the American Economic and Social Order. 
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dependency theorists such as Callinicos7 were to argue, which was, and 
remains, the driver for colonialism and imperialism.  Indeed, Callinicos in his later 
writings is explicit in linking imperialism to capitalism, particularly in relation to the 
USA.8  If the accumulation of capital, as proposed by the theorists, has been the 
driver of the external policies and relations of core states in their dealings with 
other states throughout the last two centuries, capitalism must therefore be 
considered and discussed as to how much it is relevant to the post-conflict 
environment. In both its historical sense and in the twentieth century capitalist 
imperialism was an essential part of the process of the creation of empires and 
its pivotal role is well defined by Colas, who states that:  
developing international trade must be seen as key process in Empire-
building.9   
With reference to what Colas says, capitalist imperialism is not a new 
phenomenon but has existed as long as empires have existed, not only in 
Europe but also elsewhere.10  Capitalism has been and is still the basis on which 
both colonialism and imperialism developed in the modern period and was, as 
                                                 
7 Callinicos, op.cit, p 104. 
8 Alex Callinicos, New mandarins of American power: the Bush administration’s plans for the 
world. 
9 Alejandro Colas, Empire,  p 75. 
10 Ibid p 75.  He specifically mentions the Abbasid and Ummayad empires in the Middle East and 
the Chinese as examples. 
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Marx11 and others have indicated the motor for much12 of the colonialism and 
imperialism in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.13   
 
The theory of ‘unequal exchange’ forms an essential element of the Marxist 
approach to capitalism and is integral to their development of the theories of 
colonialism and imperialism.  In its simplest form it involves the extraction of raw 
materials, such as cotton or minerals, at the lowest price possible and the sale of 
the processed materials back to the dependent colony or state at a much higher 
price, indeed the highest price possible.  This is an accurate description of the 
practices of most colonial empires starting with that of the Spanish.14  As 
Harvey15 and others such as Kiely16 correctly identify, this process need not 
necessarily be carried out by states themselves; any capitalist entity can conduct 
these activities,17 particularly if they manage to place themselves in a monopoly 
position through regulations or other means, or are more often, as Kiely points 
out, supported by a powerful state: 
                                                 
11 Karl Marx, Das Kapital.    
12 But by no means all.  Some colonial expansion took place, at least initially, both in the classical 
period and in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries to relieve population overpressure or for 
other purposes, for example the penal colonies in Australia. 
13 It could be claimed that capitalism, or at least the development of trade and commerce was a 
driving force in the colonies of the classical period also, but to define the economic system at that 
stage of human development as capitalist in nature would be premature. 
14 The Spanish developed this by prohibiting their colonies from importing any materials not 
manufactured in Spain and thereby creating an effective cartel. 
15 David Harvey, A Brief History of Neoliberalism, p 7. 
16 Ray Kiely, Empire in the Age of Globalisation: US Hegemony and Neo-Liberal Disorder (Critical 
Introductions to World Politics).  
17 The British East India Company would be a seventeenth - nineteenth century example of this.  
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 the post-war era saw a massive increase in the growth of multinational 
companies, and US hegemony played a key role in policing the profits of 
this expansion.18  
Halliburton’s activities in Iraq were those of an organisation which has benefited 
from what Harvey describes as:  
a state apparatus whose fundamental mission was to facilitate conditions 
for profitable capital accumulation on the part of both domestic and foreign 
capital.19  
 
With the exception of Iraq, and possibly now Libya, capitalism is now perhaps 
somewhat less relevant to the context of the IC’s management of post-conflict in 
the twenty-first century and there are examples from even the late nineteenth 
and early twentieth century where capitalism does not appear to have been the 
primary motivating factor.20  Belgium for example, acquired its colonies out of 
both national pride and a desire to unify and defend a divided state.  As 
Pakenham21 says:   
Leopold I had picked up a throne in Belgium – but a throne perched on a 
tightrope.  Inside Belgium were two warring people…outside Belgium, 
                                                 
18 Kiely, op cit, p 61. 
19 David Harvey (1991), op cit, p 7. 
20  Much of the colonialist and imperialist fervour of the nineteenth century, in particular, was 
driven by the need to ‘block’ political competitors from particular areas, especially in the later 
period at the turn of the nineteenth/twentieth century.  There could be no capitalist or directly 
colonialist motive for the occupation of the Sudan or Chad for example, quite the reverse.  Much 
German and Italian colonisation, coming later than the other European powers was made for 
prestige purposes rather than for any other motive.  It was also the abhorrence of a vacuum, and 
the fear of the possible motives of the competitors, that drove the British and Russians forward in 
the Himalayas; not colonialism or capitalism.  See for example Peter Hopkirk The Great Game: 
On Secret Service in High Asia, for a more detailed explanation. 
21 Thomas Pakenham, The Scramble for Africa, p 12. 
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hemming it in, were two warring powers…Belgium’s survival depended 
upon two greedy neighbours. 
To his son Leopold II who seemed obsessed by the lesson of history,22 the 
solution to the problem appeared to be that a colony or colonies would: 
prove to the people of Belgium...that they were, despite themselves, an 
‘imperial people’ capable of dominating and civilizing others.23  
 
The thesis will therefore confine its later comments on capitalism, to those areas 
where capitalist expansion or alleged crisis management techniques directly 
impinge upon both the models and the case studies in the thematic chapters.  As 
the thesis will illustrate in the thematic chapters, while capitalism has not been a 
primary driver in many of the post-conflict interventions in the second half of the 
twentieth century and the beginning of the twenty-first,24 capitalists have not 
failed to profit from the opportunities provided to them by such interventions.  By 
wielding their influence, they can procure business, as the examination of the 
various telecommunications and IT projects in Kosovo will demonstrate.  Using 
the case studies the thesis will examine in the context of those international 
interventions, whether capitalism was the context within which these 
interventions were played out, or whether they took place within the context of a 
genuinely liberal interventionist model.  
                                                 
22 Ibid. 
23 Ibid.  Leopold as Crown Prince, presented the Minister of Finance with a paperweight saying 
that Belgium needs a colony in 1861. 
24 It could be argued that the defence manufacturers had a vested interest in for example the 
Korean War, but they clearly did not promote the intervention which was made following a UN 
resolution on purely human rights and rule of law grounds.  
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Colonialism and Imperialism. 
 
Imperialism is the extension of the British Empire where trade needs the 
protection of the flag.25  
  
Colonialism is the political control, physical occupation and domination of 
(one) people over another people and their land for purposes of extraction 
and settlement to benefit the occupiers.26   
 
This section will address modal definitions and theories.  Often, and particularly it 
would appear by Bosnian and Kosovan journalists, the terms colonialism and 
imperialism have become conflated.  It is worth noting that their origins are quite 
different.  In terms of both definition and reality the term colonialism implies a 
controlled and long-term plan.  The classical Greek concept of a colony27 was a 
settlement of people from the mother state or ‘metropolis’, designed to bring an 
area and its peoples under the control of, and exploited for the benefit of, the 
mother state. Explicit in the word and the model from its Roman and Greek 
origins, is the concept of control through settlement and the attempt through that 
settlement and influence, to transform the society upon which it is visited.  From 
                                                 
25  In 1920 the ‘Oxford English Dictionary’ defined Imperialism as follows: ‘Imperialism is the 
extension of the British Empire where trade needs the protection of the flag’ quoted in P. T. 
Leckie, Economic Causes of War, Chapter XV.  
26 Neta Crawford, Argument and Change in World Politics: Ethics, Decolonization and 
Humanitarian intervention, p 131.  
27 The Greeks believed their own definition to be inadequate, and borrowed both the word and 
definition of ‘colonia’ from Latin in about 300 BC. 
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ancient Greece through to the early twentieth century, colonialism was a process 
well understood by its practitioners.   
 
Within these definitions there was scope for variations, but on most occasions 
the colonising state simply used the colonisation process to exploit the area 
concerned, or developed the area so as to house or to resettle some of their 
existing populations.28  Such processes remained common until the Second 
World War, when the Nazi German concept of Lebensraum and the Italian 
colonization of Albania from 1939 may be seen as mid-twentieth-century 
examples of the genre.  Equally in some limited number of states, the practice of 
internal colonialism designates a domestic process involving the displacement 
and complete removal elsewhere within the state of existing populations and 
replacing them with those of another ethnic group or clan.  According to Hechter:       
one of the defining characteristics of the colonial situation is that it must 
involve the interaction of at least two cultures - that of the conquering 
metropolitan elite, and of the native culture.29  
The move of the Crimean Tatars to the Baltic States within the Soviet Union in 
1944-5, where clearly the intent was to:  
increase the individual's dependence upon and loyalty to the 
government.30   
                                                 
28 This was often simply due to population pressure and in more primitive societies often took 
place in a fairly random and unstructured manner.  Within Europe the Norse peoples were one 
such group and more recently in Australasia the colonization of New Zealand by the Polynesian 
peoples we know today as the Maoris, would be another such example. 
29 Michael Hechter, Internal Colonialism: The Celtic Fringe in British National Development, p 73. 
30 Hechter, Ibid p 16. 
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may be seen as a late example of this; as can the movement and enforced 
resettlement of clans across Albania in the immediate post-war period.  Finally, 
an extreme form of colonialism would be where the ‘incomers’ either eliminate or 
displace the entire resident population to a third state and simply take over.  Two 
examples of this process from the beginning and end of the colonial period would 
be the British in Tasmania in the first half of the nineteenth century31 and the 
move of the Chagos Islanders to Mauritius,32 again by the British, in the second 
half of the twentieth.   
      
In what is now largely understood to be a post-colonial world, the colonialism 
model has been refined in the literature in order to reflect those changes which 
have largely occurred as a result of the initial acts of colonisation, and so as to 
embrace broader concepts, for example race and gender, which were not 
originally taken as instances of colonialism. The relatively rapid demise of 
traditional colonialism in the second half of the twentieth century led to the 
elaboration of the concept of post-colonialism which has been described in its 
simplest form by Baylis, Smith, and Owens as focusing upon:  
the persistence of colonial forms of power in contemporary world politics, 
especially how the social construction of racial, gendered, and class 
differences uphold relations of power and subordination.33   
                                                 
31 The native Aboriginal population had been reduced to approximately 200 by 1833 and was 
entirely eliminated from Tasmania by 1876. 
32 The Chagos archipelago forms the principal element of the British Indian Ocean Territory 
(BIOT).  The islanders were displaced to Mauritius in 1957 so as to permit the building of the 
Diego Garcia air base. 
33 John Baylis, Steve Smith, and Patricia Owens, The Globalization of World Politics. 
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While Baylis et al, were attempting to arrive at a definition which expressed both 
the persistence and the general utility of the concept of post-colonialism, they 
demonstrated how post-colonialism could be used as a model when describing 
the treatment of diaspora populations in the UK from a ‘new commonwealth’ 
country.  There also remained ‘direct’ examples of the impact of post-colonialism 
across the Commonwealth and elsewhere.  In at least three ‘new’ 
Commonwealth countries,34 the current political elites and much of the wealth is 
concentrated in the hands of a population directly transported there by the 
British, with the resident ethnic groups35 continuing to be placed in a 
‘subordinate’ position.  In at least one of these states, Fiji, the new arrivals now 
also dominate demographically.36  A further form of colonial activity which has led 
to another form of post-colonialism was the practice of the colonialists selecting a 
dominant, and often ‘martial’, race or ethnicity already resident37 within the state 
which, whilst subjugated by the colonisers, would themselves subject other 
settled populations.  This approach worked to a degree during the colonial era 
through martial means.  In the post-colonial period, however, it has often led to 
serious inter-communal violence in the post-colonial states of the Commonwealth 
for example in India and South Africa.38  Elsewhere, and particularly within the 
                                                 
34 Fiji, Guyana, and Trinidad and Tobago.  In each case the ‘incoming’ ethnic group was from the 
Indian sub-continent.  
35 In the case of Trinidad and Tobago this refers to the Afro-Caribbeans, themselves ‘incomers’, 
as the original resident Indian population has been assimilated, died out or been exterminated. 
36 The CIA World Fact Book, 2009 gives the percentages of ethnic groups in states where this is 
regarded as a significant factor. 
37 It is worth noting here that the Bantu and in particular the Zulu, arrived in South Africa after the 
Dutch settlers.  The original occupants, the Bushmen and Hottentots, were either eliminated or 
driven to the areas of marginal land, especially in Namibia. 
38 The Sikhs and the Zulus respectively. 
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former Belgian colonies,39 it has led to the need for repeated IC intervention in 
Burundi and Rwanda. 
 
As with the issue of the ‘martial races’, Grovogui40 argues that in order to end 
colonial rule it is simply not enough to hand over the ‘baton of command’ or to 
pull down a flag and replace it with a new one.  Colonial influence will remain into 
the post-colonial period for a significant period of time, if not indefinitely.  
Grovogui cites as examples the legal and political structures which were handed 
over.  He also discusses the fact that, less obviously, the training41 and the 
manner in which the new elites were brought up and to whom power was often 
transferred, was also influenced by the nature of the colonial regime, even if not 
overtly42.  Grovigui demonstrates that this ‘allegiance’, even if it is antithetical to 
the stance adopted by the individual, will, for the most part, affect their mindset 
and in some cases their methodologies.       
 
At the time of de-colonization and in an attempt to adequately describe how the 
West managed to maintain so much control and influence in the Global South, 
the neo-colonialist model was evolved and with it the continued domination of 
                                                 
39 In Rwanda and Burundi the Tutsi were the favoured ‘martial’ race over the majority Hutu. 
40 Siba N’Zatioula Grovogui Sovereigns and Quasi Sovereigns, and Africans: Race and Self-
Determination in International Law (Borderlines). 
41 For example Mahatma Gandhi’s legal training at University College London and his ‘calling’ to 
the London Bar.  It is clear that at least during his period in South Africa (1895-1907) Gandhi 
attempted to work within the British system and, indeed, his methodology of ‘passive resistance’ 
was developed whilst he was in Natal. 
42 Lee Kuan Yew for example having been brought up with the BBC World Service, listened to it 
every morning when he was Prime Minister of Singapore and regarded it as his principal media 
source for world affairs.  Whilst he was, and clearly remains, a ‘nationalist’, he frequently looked 
to the UK for support and guidance during the period when he was in power in Singapore.  
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‘subaltern’ peoples as originally defined by Gramsci43 in his “Notes on Italian 
History: History of the subaltern classes”.  Many writers, for example Duffield44 
and Grovogui,45 stress that the level of control of Western interests politically, 
economically, and militarily over the Global South is now stronger than when 
large areas of the South were under direct colonial control.  For example, 
Grovogui demonstrates that the formulation of international law itself represents 
a kind of dominance and an imposition of Western legal values upon the South; 
as does the persistence of the administrative and political structures of the 
imported Western religions.  While in his key work,46 Grovogui focused on the 
continuing role of the Catholic Church in Africa and its domination at the senior 
level by Westerners, a similar case could also be made for the Anglican Church 
in Africa, where it now has more adherents than in the West, a fact not 
recognised in its management structure.   Additionally, and as a further 
complication, much of this increasing control, the neo-colonialists would argue, is 
not exercised by Western states or international organisations, but directly and 
increasingly by Multi-National Corporations (MNC).  Even the representatives of 
some of the MNCs directly concerned, for example Del Monte™,47 in Kenya, are 
                                                 
43 A. Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks.  See in particular Chapter 3; ‘Notes on 
Italian History’ in which ‘The History of the subaltern classes: Methodological Criteria’ forms part.  
This volume was translated into English and published in 1971, but the text was written in the 
1920s and 1930s. 
44  M. Duffield, Global Governance and the New Wars. 
45 Grovogui (1996).  Op. cit. 
46 Ibid. 
47 Conversation between the author and Barry Morgan (now deceased), formerly Director of Del 
Monte, Kenya during the 1980s.  Morgan pointed out that not only were Del Monte at that point 
controlling the production of and exporting greater quantities of soft fruit from Kenya than in the 
colonial period, but that there were now more UK citizens in Kenya earning relatively higher 
wages than under the colonial regime.  Separately the increase in coffee growing and hence a 
monoculture particularly in the fertile areas around Mount Kenya, have led to increasing food 
shortages and malnutrition in some districts.  
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willing to admit that privately this has been, and continues to be, the case.  
William Smith, a representative of the Papua New Guinea (PNG) Government, 
made the same point in regard to the operations of Rio Tinto Zinc (RTZ) in his 
own country in 2008.48 As part of their agreement with the PNG Government, 
RTZ have appointed a UK academic as an official anthropologist, who designs 
projects intended to support native communities.  Most of these are not 
implemented.49 
 
Imperialism 
 
Imperialism as a concept is recognised as having classical roots and the history 
of imperialism can be traced back at least as far as the Egyptians, two thousand 
years before the Roman and Chinese empires.  Imperialism has taken a wide 
range of forms as described by Colas,50 who illustrates the differing political, 
economical, cultural and military aspects of empires and how these evolved 
through time.  Even by the second half of the nineteenth century, it had been 
recognized for some nineteen centuries by both practitioners and observers 
alike, that imperialism was a much more transformational concept than 
colonialism and whereas colonialists would always remain ‘outsiders’ in the areas 
which they occupied, the ultimate aim of imperialists was to transform the 
occupied area into a fully integrated part of the state or ‘imperium’ itself.  As 
                                                 
48 William Smith, a PNG government advisor in conversation with the author in October 2008.  
49 Conversation by the author with Dr Katrina MacLeay of the UK Department of Environment & 
Climate Change (DECC), March 2011. 
50 Colas (2006). 
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Richardson states, the Romans under the Caesars understood this concept as 
‘imperium’51 and, in describing the Roman Empire, Colas tells of a:  
specific socio-political and geographic entity known as the Roman 
Empire,52  
and goes on to define an empire as built on expansion53 and invariably entailing:  
a relatively small political community…conquering other peoples and 
territories often settling among them, and always absorbing them through 
combination of coercive, legal cultural and economic mechanisms into a 
larger socio-economic and political entity – a(n) empire.54   
 
A classic definition of imperialism as it would have been perceived by the political 
elites of Western Europe and North America at the end of the nineteenth century, 
although written a century later might be: 
a system in which a country rules other countries, sometimes having used 
force to get power over them,55 
but that definition could already have been obsolete by 1900 as increasingly, 
‘imperialism’ as practised by both the UK and the USA could be better defined 
as: 
when one country has a lot of power or influence over others, especially in 
political and economic matters.56   
                                                 
51 J. S. Richardson, Imperium Romanum: Empire and the Language of Power, p 1.  The full 
definition of Roman ‘imperium’ and its evolution is on pp 1-9. 
52 Ibid, p 25. 
53 Ibid. 
54 Ibid. 
55 Cambridge English Dictionary. 
56 Ibid. 
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While capitalist-imperialism was not fully comprehended at the time, as Colas 
states:  
it was with the globalization of capital under nineteenth century British 
hegemony that the world market emerged as a distinctive social domain 
governed by a specific form of exchange.57   
Our forefathers would have recognized the dictionary definition applied to 
Imperial India, but they may not have recognized the second definition, although 
British imperialism was clearly already well underway in countries outside of the 
British Empire, in for example Argentina and Chile.  A modern-day student of 
Imperialism would reasonably argue as did Karl Polanyi,58 that in a country 
where an outsider owned and managed, usually through British-born 
‘compradors’,59 millions of acres of ranches and also owned the railways, the 
meat-packing plants, and the associated ports and ships, as the British did in 
Southern Chile, that this was indeed imperialism.  The phenomenon of this 
‘comprador’ class supporting largely absent landlords has been extensively 
discussed in the literatures on Latin American development. Andre Gunder 
Frank60 and Barry Gills when discussing the relationships between the core 
                                                 
57 Colas (2006), p 75. 
58 Karl Polanyi with K. Conrad, K. Arensburg and H.W. Pearson,  Trade and Market in the Early 
Empires -  Economies in history and theory, pp 246-7.  Polanyi looked back to Marx a century 
earlier and defined capitalism as, Outside of a system of price-making markets [capitalism] 
economic analysis loses most of its relevance as a method of inquiry into the working of the 
economy. A centrally planned economy, relying on nonmarket prices is a well-known instance. 
The choice between capitalism and socialism, for instance, refers to two different ways of 
instituting modern technology in the process of production.  Polanyi makes clear that he believes 
that this process was well entrenched in the British Empire in the nineteenth century and 
continued through into the period after the formal withdrawal from empire (which was still 
underway at the time that he was writing). 
59 In Spanish: ‘Agent’. 
60 Andre Gunder Frank, Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America: Historical Studies of 
Chile and Brazil, p 174. 
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industrialized world and the developing world, described the ‘compradors’ as its 
“agents” in the developing world.61  
 
What is more the ‘imperial’ period thus constituted lasted much longer than the 
traditional period of the ‘political’ empires62 and in some cases continues to this 
day.  In the USA, for example, academics recognized that the position of the 
USA post-Second World War was analogous to that of Britain in the late 
nineteenth century, and that while its formal empire was tiny,63 US imperialism 
rested largely on economic and cultural domination.  As Colas states:  
This reality forced commentators on post-war US foreign policy to 
consider the nature of imperialism in a post colonial world, developing new 
theories and insights into how and why the USA can exercise global 
supremacy without formally controlling overseas territories.64  
This concept they defined as ‘post-colonial imperialism’ a definition which has 
been used both to define the worldwide economic and political dominance of the 
USA in the 1950s and 1960s and President Bush’s imperial turn65, in the 
invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq.  Therefore, unlike colonialism and the end of 
the colonial era, there has been no clear end date for imperialism and thus no 
                                                 
61 Barry K. Gills with Jason P. Abbott and Barry Worth, Critical Perspectives on International 
Political Economy (Advances in Political Science).  
62 The ranches, railways, and packing plants were only dis-established in Chile in 1963-7 and in 
the Falkland Islands (itself a colony) remained extant in the form of the Falklands Islands 
Company until 1982.  The role of the United Fruit Company (still referred to in Spanish as the 
Octopus) in Cuba up and until 1959 and in Guatemala until the early 1970s would be a parallel 
US example. 
63 It consisted only of Puerto Rico, Guam, the US Virgin Islands, and several other very small 
dependencies. 
64 Colas (2006), op cit, p 158. 
65 Ibid, p 158. 
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immediate need to invent a new model rather than to extensively revise and 
broaden the older model so as to reflect the new conditions and to subsume 
colonialism within it.  Thus writers such as Colas can argue in defining post-
colonial imperialism that: 
Imperialism in the old, territorial form…has disappeared and been 
replaced (so to speak) by a new form of global rule by – an Empire – 
which is boundless and universal in its real subsumption of all the world’s 
population.66  
 
Hardt and Negri in the preface to Empire67 write in almost identical terms about 
imperialism having been replaced by ‘empire’.  They define the changes thus: 
  in contrast to imperialism, Empire established no territorial center of power 
and does not rely on fixed boundaries or barriers.  It is a decentered and 
deterritorializing apparatus of rule that progressively incorporates the 
entire global realm within its open, expanding frontiers.68   
The authors link these changes to the development of the capitalist method of 
production and state that the passage from modernity to postmodernity69 is really 
that from imperialism to Empire70.  Hardt and Negri go on to describe ‘empire’ as 
a third phase beyond both colonialism and imperialism and where, 
                                                 
66 Ibid, p 160. 
67 Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, Empire. p: xiii. 
68 Ibid, p xiii. 
69 Ibid, p xvi.. 
70 Ibid, p xvi 
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this relationship has fully matured, in which large transnational 
corporations have effectively surpassed the jurisdiction and authority of 
nation states.71      
 
As a consequence and as illustrated above, in the post-colonial era, post-
colonialism and ‘post-imperialism’ became increasingly conflated72.  This was 
particularly as regards the impact of post-imperialism upon the imperialists 
themselves. One example of the ‘end of empire’ was the return of many of the 
former colonists73 or their descendants, in considerable numbers and often in a 
very abrupt manner, as in the case of those former colonies which had been 
‘liberated’ by direct military action.  Additionally, the mother country was often 
forced to absorb migrants to the colony who had originated from elsewhere in the 
empire and who had been imported by the imperial power to ‘manage’ the 
colony.74  Increasingly the end of the imperial period was also signalled by the 
arrival of citizens of the British Commonwealth to the UK, and former members of 
the other European empires to their ‘mother’ countries.  Initially, their arrival in 
the mother country was often seen as the short-term solution to an increasing 
                                                 
71 Ibid, p 323. 
72 See for example, Luke Strongman whose paper is entitled Post-Colonialism or Post-
Imperialism. 
73 Of whom perhaps the best known were the pieds-noir who were Algerians of French heritage 
who were forced to return to France in 1962 when Algeria became independent. This resulted in 
the movement of over one million people from Algeria to France. 
74 Of these a good example would be the arrival in the UK in the early 1970s of some 40,000 
Ugandan Asians expelled from that country.  These were the descendants of indentured labour 
brought to Uganda and Kenya from India during the early twentieth century. 
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shortage of labour,75 but their continued presence and the later arrival of further 
waves of migrants76 is now very much seen as one of the issues of post-
colonialism.  Whilst the subject was discussed by Fanon in the 1950s and 
1960s77 and by Said78 in the 1970s, post-colonialism remains a relevant issue in 
the twenty-first century; European states continue to struggle with concepts such 
as multi-culturalism and the need to integrate an ethnically diverse and 
increasingly native-born population79 that has its origins and retains its cultural 
roots in their former colonies.  Indeed, an understanding of post-colonialism is 
increasingly seen as a weapon in the ‘Prevent’ strategy of the ‘war on terror’ in 
the twenty-first century, in the same way that Fanon’s work, along with that of 
Taber,80 were seen as essential reading for students of ‘counter-insurgency’ in 
the 1970s and 1980s.81 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
75 An example would be the recruitment of 492 Jamaicans to work for London Transport. They 
arrived at Tilbury along with other Caribbean ‘invitees’ on 23 June 1948, aboard the MV Empire 
Windrush. 
76 As an example, the total ethnic Jamaican population in the UK as at 2010 is estimated by the 
Office of National Statistics (ONS) to be about 800,000 only 144,000 of whom were born in 
Jamaica.  Of these, only 47,000 of these first-generation immigrants continue to hold Jamaican 
citizenship. 
77 Frantz Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth. 
78 Edward Said, Orientalism. 
79  The ONS data demonstrates that the majority of UK citizens of Jamaican descent, were born 
in the UK.  Even of those born in Jamaica, the number retaining dual nationality, i.e. maintaining 
their Jamaican citizenship, is less than one-fifth.  
80 Robert Taber, War of the Flea: Study of Guerrilla Warfare Theory and Practice. 
81 The author has held both volumes since that period, and both were regularly quoted from in the 
1970s in the context of ‘counter-insurgency’. 
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The impact of the ‘Cold War’ period upon the concepts of imperialism and 
colonialism 
 
The period of the ‘Cold War’ broadly between 1947 and 1989 saw a worldwide 
struggle between two competing political systems each of which had a clear 
champion and which led, for some Marxists as Kiely says, to a new era of 
imperialism based on a return to inter-imperialist rivalry.82  What is clear and 
what has led in part to the confusion over terminology is that ‘colonialism’ and 
‘imperialism’ along with ‘neo-colonialism’ became politically charged phrases and 
are now regarded as negative, indeed highly pejorative terms.  This, in part, is 
due to the work of Marxist, nationalist and some libertarian philosophers and to 
the position of Marxist and nationalist writers in general, towards the overthrow of 
much of the former colonial architecture of governance in the period after the 
Second World War.  While Marx was arguing from a primarily economic 
standpoint,83 his arguments were developed to the point where they could be 
used as ‘weapons’ in the political sphere, particularly given the specific 
conditions of bi-polarity during the ‘Cold War’.  Whilst it was clear that both the 
USA and the USSR were economic empires,84 the language of Marx was 
adopted and adapted by one side to further its own essentially ideological 
arguments.  This was not a new process, it having been initiated by Lenin85 at 
                                                 
82 Kiely, op cit, p 61. 
83 Karl Marx and Martin Nicolaus (Translator), Grundrisse: Foundations of the Critique of Political 
Economy,  pp 12-3 gives a catalogue of his other economic works throughout this period.   
84 In the case of the USSR a physical empire also, as the break up of the ‘Union’ in 1999 vividly 
demonstrated. 
85 Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, Imperialism the Highest Stage of Capitalism, pp 111–22.   
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the time of the First World War, and within which he saw the conflict as 
exemplifying imperial capitalist competition (between the British and German 
empires); and where industrial cartels gave rise to finance capital, the basis of 
imperialism which, for Lenin,86 was the zenith of capitalism.  During the Cold War 
period, one could argue that phrases such as ‘imperialist’, ‘capitalist’, and 
‘colonialist’ became almost interchangeable epithets to be frequently repeated in 
the political speeches of socialist leaderships.  As such the terms carry an 
ideological or polemical intent.87   
 
In the post Cold War period some Marxists, such as Justin Rosenberg, have 
been re-examining Marxist approaches to international relations theory and have, 
in effect, incorporated the second definition of imperialism given above88 into the 
Marxist model;  critiquing the orthodox realist theory of international relations and 
providing a historical-materialist approach to the international system. Rosenberg 
quotes Marx who states: 
It is always the direct relationship of the owners of production to the direct 
producers…which reveal the innermost secret, the hidden basis of the 
entire social structure, and with it the political form of the relation of 
                                                 
86 Lenin effectively ‘translated’ the works of Marx and Engels, changing the emphasis somewhat 
from a primarily economic into a more political model.  In doing so he borrowed heavily from the 
earlier work of Kautsky and Helferding.  
87 See Kozloff and others for rhetorical assaults on capitalism, colonialism, and imperialism by 
Castro, Chavez, Qadhafi and others.  Castro most recently used these terms to condemn the 
West’s interventions in Libya, see the Boston Herald of 22 February 2011.   
88 Lenin (1916), op, cit. 
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sovereignty and dependence, in short, the corresponding specific form of 
the state.89  
Read thus, the role of BP in Brunei today90 is the same as that of BP in Brunei 
prior to 1967, when it was, as Cheru and others would describe it,91 an organic 
part of the Imperial project.  So, although Brunei has been independent for over 
forty years, it is still subject to post-colonial imperialism particularly in terms of the 
ownership of the ‘means of production’.  Given that even when it became 
independent, the United Kingdom retained responsibility for its defence and 
foreign affairs,92 Marxist academics such as Rosenberg could easily have 
referred to Brunei as a ‘protectorate’.  Others, such as Gowan,93 Hudson,94 Kiely, 
and Callinicos95 see in the role of the USA the development of a ‘super-
imperialism’, a thesis which emphasises the success of the US in exercising its 
hegemony in this competitive [post cold war] environment.96  Hudson, however, 
points out that where in particular, the USA has differed from previous 
imperialists, is that it has achieved this objective both by virtue of its preeminent 
creditor status prior to 1960 and that critically since that time it has done so by 
virtue of its debtor position.97  
 
                                                 
89 See Justin Rosenberg, The Empire of Civil Society: A Critique of the Realist Theory of 
International Relations, p 51. 
90 Brunei has been independent since 1967. 
91 Fantu Cheru, Development in Africa: The Imperial Project Versus the Nationalist Project and 
the Need for Policy Space, pp 275-8. 
92 Brunei was the last British ‘protected’ state.  It only gained full independence in 1984. 
93 Peter Gowan, The Global Gamble: Washington's Faustian Bid for World Dominance. 
94 Michael Hudson, Super Imperialism: The Origin and Fundamentals of U.S. World Dominance.  
95 Callinicos (2009), op, cit.  
96 Ray Kiely, Empire in the Age of Globalisation: US Hegemony and Neo-Liberal Disorder (Critical 
Introductions to World Politics), p 62. 
97 Hudson, Justice, Intervention and Force in International Relations (Contemporary Security 
Studies), p 24. 
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What it is true to say is that whereas ‘imperialism’ was once solely seen as the 
dominance of one state over another, this is no longer the case.  Imperialism is 
now seen as extant in an increasing economic and cultural dominance in a wide 
range of activities.  This is not solely where one state is dominant over the other, 
but also in areas where an MNC or even one model or culture may dominate 
another.  In this sense, since the Second World War, imperialism has become 
‘post-modern’ in that it has become to quote Jameson, an element of the 
dominant cultural logic of late capitalism.98  Both Jameson and Harvey99 based 
their ideas on that of the Marxist theorist Ernest Mandel100 for whom ‘post-
modernism’ encompassed not only culture, but also such issues as ‘globalisation’ 
and ‘multi-national capitalism’.  One example that Mandel could have used by 
way of illustration of both globalisation and cultural-imperialism is the world of 
modern computing and the internet.  In the use of computers whether over the 
internet or elsewhere, it is the medium and culture of English which dominates, 
through its influence both directly and indirectly upon computer programming,101 
rather than that of the (predominantly) Japanese, Korean, and Chinese hardware 
producers.  It is these shifts in emphases that have led to the growth of models 
examining ‘economic-imperialism’ and ‘cultural-imperialism’.  As the technology 
of computing is advancing so fast there is no guarantee that the long hegemony 
of English will be maintained; however, a clearer example is that of air traffic 
                                                 
98 Fredric Jameson, Postmodernism, or, the Cultural Logic of Late capitalism (Poetics of Social 
Forms).  
99 David Harvey, The Condition of Postmodernity: An Enquiry into the Origins of Cultural Change.  
100 Ernest Mande,l An Introduction to Marxist Economic Theory. 
101 Even where the programming has been carried out in another language, such as Japanese, 
the underlying ‘logic’ of the computer software systems is based upon the English language.  This 
is something upon which the Chinese have recently commented, stating that they will attempt to 
create an alternative standard.  
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control.  Here, the medium of communication is English, even on domestic flights 
in non-English-speaking countries.  This hegemony is currently neither 
challenged nor under threat. 
 
In the context of looking at these and other International Relations (IR) models 
and theories which might have closer relevance to the IC’s management of post-
conflict, it is perhaps important to pause and briefly mention the increasing 
diversity of these global models.  A diversification compounded by the relatively 
recent102 and rapid development of para-statal institutions such as the UN and 
the EU.  While the thesis will examine some of these examples in detail in the 
thematic chapters, it is worth pointing out at this stage that these developments, 
particularly in the period following the formation of the UN in 1945, have 
fundamentally altered the relationships between nation states103 and in some 
cases subsumed them totally.104  These changes in relationships will clearly have 
an effect upon the definition of ‘colonialism’, in that any ‘post-modern’ IC 
                                                 
102 Only in May 1913 did the first multinational post-conflict intervention take place.  To quote Ivo 
Andric, “King Nikolla of Montenegro was, nonetheless, forced to yield, and on 4 May, in a 
telegramme sent to Sir Edward Grey, he ceded Shkodra to the Great Powers. The international 
occupation of Shkodra was to last from 5 May 1913 to the beginning of the World War.” – Ivo 
Andric "Draft on Albania" taken from Elaborat dra Ive Andrica o Albaniji”.in “Casopis za 
suvremenu povijest, pp 77-89. It was translated from the Serbo-Croatian by Robert Elsie on the 
basis of an existing English version. First published R. Elsie, Gathering Clouds: the Roots of 
Ethnic Cleansing in Kosovo and Macedonia, pp 131-148. 
103 Professor Richard Falk and others argue that these new para-statal structures undermine the 
‘Westphalian System’ of Nation States which has been in being since the Peace of Westphalia in 
1607.  For this view see, amongst others, Joseph S. Nye Jr, Understanding International Conflicts 
– An Introduction to Theory and History, p 6. 
104 The Palestinian ‘State’, if such it is, would be one probable example.  It is, as has recently 
been clearly demonstrated (January – May 2006), completely dependent upon the EU for its 
ability to pay its staff and to feed itself and is dependent upon the UN not only for its medical 
facilities, but also for such fundamental items of state sovereignty as the issue of passports and 
internationally accepted transit documents. 
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intervention into either a conflict or post-conflict situation will in most cases105 
certainly involve or take place alongside106 a multi-national entry into an area of 
activity, even if it does not formally involve a para-statal body.107   It is at this 
point, with the entry of a multi-national body,108 where the concept or process of 
‘colonialism’ could be said to be either working in parallel with other models 
which will be examined later, such as ‘liberal interventionism’, or in some cases 
to have been followed by them.  There are numerous examples from 1945 of the 
‘colonialist’ model being succeeded in practice by other conceptual models, 
particularly when a colonial power gives way to a multilateral intervention force. 
One example of this was the introduction of a UN force into Cyprus109 following 
inter-communal conflict in a newly independent Cyprus.  The mandate of United 
Nations Forces In Cyprus (UNFICYP) clearly indicated its liberal interventionist 
agenda110 and is in clear contrast to the mandate of the British colonial forces in 
the ‘Grivas campaign’ from 1953 to 1960,111 which was to prevent the union112 of 
Cyprus with Greece and which therefore (successfully) aimed to frustrate the 
wishes of the Greek Cypriot majority on the island.   
                                                 
105 The US ‘invasions’ of both Grenada (Operation Urgent Fury) in 1983 and Panama (Operation 
Just Cause) in 1989 were noteworthy exceptions. 
106 See John Pilger, New Rulers of the World.  Such was the case in Lebanon where both the 
Syrian and the later Israeli intervention (in 1981) took place in parallel to, or perhaps more 
appropriately ‘over the top of’ the existing UN presence, UNIFIL. 
107 The US-led assault on and subsequent occupation of Iraq would be one such example.  See 
D. L. Phillips (2005), op. cit. 
108 In terms of ‘multi-national’ bodies we mean those bodies which are sanctioned by the EU, the 
UN or some other such recognised body.  This would not include the so-called coalition of the 
willing in Iraq. 
109 The UN Forces In Cyprus (UNFICYP) was established on 13 March 1964. 
110The UNFICYP mandate is given on the UNFICYP website as follows: To use its best efforts to 
prevent a recurrence of fighting and, as necessary, to contribute to the maintenance and 
restoration of law and order and a return to normal conditions.  
111 Cyprus became an independent state within the Commonwealth on 16 August 1960. 
112 In Greek, Enossis. 
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The very nature of the use of the term ‘colonialism’ perhaps also raises the issue 
of ‘intent’.  When the term ‘colonialism’ is used today, apart from having a 
pejorative connotation, there is also the underlying impression of permanence in 
terms of its status. The notion of permanence is not carried or implied by the term 
‘intervention’, which both in linguistic terms and by implication, suggests a 
relatively brief occupation or activity, although in practice most modern 
interventions by the IC endure for about ten years in some form.113 
 
The issue of ‘permanence’ was never mentioned in the ‘classical’ definitions of 
colonialism, because it was assumed that having reached the status of colony, or 
perhaps the uniquely British, but legally and conceptually different, status of 
‘dominion’, this was to be a permanent condition.  Even in more recent periods, 
typically from 1945 to 1965 and in a relatively few cases at an even later date,114 
it was assumed that ‘de-colonization’ was taking place after a sustained period of 
occupation and had to be planned for as initially it had not really been intended to 
happen. How does this definition of colonialism sit with the accusation made by 
some present-day authors,115 that the IC’s management of post-conflict is 
                                                 
113 Many of those which have been for a shorter duration have been failed missions such as the 
United Nations Intervention in Somalia (UNISOM) II Mission, whereas some UN interventions in 
particular have lasted significantly longer, the UN mission in Palestine having been present since 
1948.  Mission size at the end of the ten-year period has in many cases been very modest and in 
the order of tens or hundreds of international personnel.  In the Balkans and the states of the 
Former Soviet Union (FSU) the initial peacekeeping mission has often been replaced by a 
permanent mission from the EU.  Albania, Kosovo, and Georgia would be examples of these 
phenomena. 
114 Such as the British withdrawal from Aden in 1967 and the Portuguese abandonment of Angola 
and Mozambique in 1975.   
115 See amongst others, Chapman et al. (2011), op. cit. 
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‘colonialist’ and that it involves the setting up of ‘protectorates’?  This is despite 
the fact that when the IC enters a country it usually states that its primary aim is 
to leave as soon as possible116 or as soon as it has assisted the territory 
concerned to recover to a point where it can function effectively without external 
intervention.  That this transitional period may typically take a decade or more is 
recognised by many Western governments and by post-conflict contingency 
planners117 and in that way, this transitional period is similar at least in duration, 
to the period118 in which the Control Commissions (CC) managed the affairs of 
Austria (CCA) and Germany (CCG).119  
 
Thus the definition of ‘colonialism’ implies the conscious creation of a long-term 
dependency upon the ‘mother state’.120  It also implies that the colony is 
developed only in those ways which favour the mother state either through the 
extraction of raw materials or the development of transport links, provision of 
                                                 
116 President Clinton’s commitment to a one-year programme for BiH outlined in the GFAP was 
according to Ambassador Robert Frowick, the Head of the OSCE Mission to BiH and a Democrat 
an essential if he was to secure a second term in office in November 1996, even though it was 
known to be unrealistic.  It was for the same reason that the attempt to run municipal elections in 
BiH was maintained until early October 1996 even though it was known that the capacity to do so 
did not exist.   
117 Both the DfID Stabilisation Unit and the UN Department for Peacekeeping Operations 
(UNDPKO) would agree with this analysis. 
118 The Control Commission for Austria was terminated on 15 May 1955 whilst that for Germany 
was not formally dissolved until 11 March 1991. 
119 These CCs do not appear to have been considered as colonialist.  If they were, then no-one 
within the Anglo-Saxon literature has said so, either at the time or since. 
120 Exactly as it was intended by the Greeks who saw their ‘colonies’ as dependencies or adjuncts 
to the metropolis or literally ‘motherstate’ which had dispatched their founding fathers.  As such 
both the Greeks and the Romans in antiquity saw the status of a colony as being a permanent 
one. Colonia for example (modern Koln or Cologne) remained a Colonia (Claudia Ara 
Agrippinensium) for over four hundred years, throughout the Roman period, in this case from 
approximately AD49 to AD459 when it fell to the Franks. 
 98 
labour, etc.  Clearly this ‘classical’ definition is not relevant to interventions, 
particularly UN-sanctioned post-1945 interventions.   
 
Many scholars would argue that colonialism is, however, still possible if solely 
political and economic dependencies are taken into consideration.  Whilst that 
argument could have been applied to the various post-war US interventions in 
Central America, this cannot be said to be the case for most, if not all, of the 
interventions which were sponsored by international organisations, such as the 
UN and the regional bodies which are subordinate to it, particularly those which 
were genuinely multilateral in nature.  Had, for example, the relatively brief UN 
intervention into post-independence Congo, later Zaire121 been successful, it may 
have, in the longer term, stimulated the development of the vast mineral wealth 
of the country.  As with the subsequent UN interventions122 that was not to be the 
case, but it can be argued that a longer intervention of this nature is not a 
colonialist or even a post-colonialist intervention.  Indeed, any development 
within Zaire is unlikely to solely benefit those who have intervened with 
peacekeepers on behalf of the UN, or indeed to benefit some of them at all.123  In 
practice, were Zaire to be fully developed for mineral extraction, or the Sudan for 
                                                 
121 1960 to 1964, and where direct military action by the UN led to the reunification of mineral rich 
Katanga with the rest of the Congo. 
122 From July 1999 the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo (MONUC) and from 28 May 2010 the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in 
the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO). 
123 For example Bangladesh, which is a major troop contributor, but which has very limited 
metallurgical industries domestically. 
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oil, then neither of the two likely principal beneficiaries would have contributed 
directly to the preceding peacekeeping process.124   
 
Even where interventions on a unilateral basis have taken place, such as the UK 
re-occupation of the Falkland Islands in 1982, these interventions were at the 
request of the islanders who were resident there and designed to protect, not to 
violate or exploit, their rights.125  As such, whilst the original settlements were 
‘colonialist’ or even ‘imperialist’, this intervention in the face of hostile aggression, 
one which was resisted by the islanders themselves,126 can be seen as a 
humanitarian intervention.    
 
It can be argued that the claim that current international and explicitly UN-
sanctioned humanitarian interventions are colonialist, cannot be upheld by the 
evidence.  Attention is drawn by those leading the post-conflict missions to the 
fact that these claims are usually voiced by local politicians, or the media outlets 
under their control127 in an attempt to accelerate the process towards full 
autonomy, or more to the point, where those local actors can personally assume 
                                                 
124 Particularly the USA and China.  The primary developers of the (South) Sudanese oilfields are 
Chinese petro-chemical industries. 
125 Hardt and Negris (2001), op. cit, are in error in their statement that the break up of the British 
South Africa Company and others at the turn of the twentieth century represented the close of 
private capitalist colonial exploitation within the British Empire/Commonwealth.  The almost total 
control of the Falklands Islands Company (owned latterly by ‘Coalite’) over this particular 
dependency was only relinquished following the UK military occupation in 1982.   Indeed, this 
was one of the few particularly beneficial impacts of the Argentine invasion.  
126 In particular by the Falklands Islands Defence Force (FIDF).  This was a locally recruited and 
funded militia. 
127 Such messages are usually delivered either to a domestic audience, as in Bosnia, or to a very 
specific international audience such as Russia in the case of the Serbs in both Bosnia and 
Kosovo, and perhaps also to a regional audience as in the case of Iraq in the Middle East and 
Afghanistan on the Indian sub-continent.  
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control or indeed circumvent international management.  While in some cases, 
the claim that the IC is not ‘colonialist’ can easily be upheld when it comes to the 
behaviour of, for example, the EU in a potential accession state, these claims 
should be examined carefully.  
 
One facet of modern media reporting is that any positive aspects of colonialism 
have been subsumed by the powerful normative charge now associated with the 
word.  The conclusion, however, must be reached that ‘colonialism’ is not an 
appropriate model to use in conjunction with the majority of international conflict 
and post-conflict interventions in the last twenty-five years.  There have been 
exceptions which involve interventions particularly by the USA and to an extent 
the USSR and its successor states, but these have generally either not been 
multilateral in nature128 or in the case of the USSR occurred either in their own 
domestic space or near abroad.129  
 
As stated above, where this statement may require some significant qualification 
is in the evolving role of the EU.  This is a matter which has already been raised 
in the introduction to this thesis and will be addressed in detail in a later chapter.  
Whilst the EU has been active in post-conflict intervention, particularly in its near 
abroad such as in Kosovo, its role has increasingly evolved into that of a semi- 
permanent source of funds and as a protector,  much as was the case with the 
                                                 
128 Such as the interventions made by the USA into Central America in the 1950s, most notably 
Guatemala, and also into Eurasia, for example Lebanon in 1961. 
129 Such as the interventions by the USSR into East Germany in 1951, Hungary in 1956, and, 
with its’ Warsaw Pact allies into Czechoslovakia in 1968. 
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colonial powers.  If Albania is taken as an example, a state which can only be 
considered as partially post-conflict following the collapse of 1998, the EU 
completed the construction of an impressive purpose-built office in Tirana in 2006 
and has now surpassed the US as the single largest donor of aid.130  
Additionally, unlike the US, the EU has considerable power over domestic 
Albanian legislation as Albania is now an EU accession state and as such is 
obliged to conform to the EU ‘acquis’.131  The impact of the EU, both in the 
Balkans and elsewhere, will merit specific examination.  
 
The evolution of imperialism in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries 
 
This chapter has considered both colonialism and imperialism but the conceptual 
framework of today’s world view has been complicated not only by the more 
rapid improvements in communications, but also by the growing realisation that 
those developments thought of as being incorporated within the recent notion of 
‘globalisation’ were already becoming visible by the 1870s during the “The Age of 
Empire”.132  It will be important to examine those models which have evolved 
from the original concept of ‘imperialism’ which are relevant to both the current 
practices and consequences133 of the IC’s intervention in post-conflict.  
 
                                                 
130 The EU tranche of aid funds for Albania in 2009-10 was planned to be in the order of €240 
million. 
131 Short for ‘acquis communautaire.’  These are the accumulated legislation, legal acts, and court 
decisions which constitute the body of European Union law. 
132 Hobsbawm, op.cit.. 
133 Both ‘intended’ and ‘unintended’. 
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As Thompson says:  
From the 1870s onwards, the integration of labour, capital and commodity 
markets promoted by empire, was very much skewed towards its white 
settler societies.  The economic benefits of empire for the so-called 
dependent colonies were much more meagre in comparison, or did not 
exist at all.134   
Similarly, the impact upon the affairs of nation states of the MNC, worldwide 
banking and other transnational arrangements such as those relating to trade 
agreements,135 is not a new phenomenon and can be traced back to at least the 
1870s.   That these institutions can dwarf the resources, at least financially, of 
even relatively large nation states136 has been known for decades, as the 
activities of ‘el pulpo’,137 the United Fruit Company in Cuba and across Central 
America in the late nineteenth138 and the first half of the twentieth century, 
testify.139  These MNCs, although they may have headquarters in one location, 
generally owe no loyalty to a particular nation state and yet as commercial 
entities can often be seen to be imperialist in the way in which they do business.  
                                                 
134 Andrew Thompson, Is Britain to blame for many of the world’s problems?, BBC website, 7 
April 2011. 
135 Shell Oil, for example, can trace its history back to 1833 and was a worldwide developer of 
oilfields, an oil transporter and retailer by 1907.  Shell’s principal competitor Standard Oil was 
founded in 1870 and by 1907 was the world’s largest multinational company.  It was broken up as 
a result of a ruling passed by the US Supreme Court in 1911. 
136 One financial institution, Banco Santander, is currently the world’s sixth largest MNC by value 
and holds global assets of some UK £8.81 Billion, a figure which is equivalent to the annual GDP 
of Honduras (2009). 
137 The octopus.  See Peter Chapman, Bananas: How the United Fruit Company Shaped the 
World, for a more detailed description of their activities. 
138 The precursor to the United Fruit Company (formed 1899), was established by Minor C Keith 
in 1873. 
139 For more details see Raj Patel, Stuffed and Starved: Markets, Power and the Hidden Battle for 
the World Food System, particularly Chapter V – ‘Permanent Banana Republic – The United Fruit 
Company’ and especially pp 99–102. 
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Prominent among the MNCs are many of the oil ‘majors’, most of whom find 
much of their business in areas populated by the more fragile nation states, 
including those where ‘frozen conflicts’140 are present, such as Azerbaijan and 
Georgia.  Furthermore, the concept of ‘imperialism’ has in recent years become 
especially focused on the development of pure economic imperialism as can be 
demonstrated by the definition provided by standard reference works such as the 
‘Oxford Dictionary of Economics’141 but this may not be a nuanced enough tool to 
describe imperialism in the modern globalised world142 where issues of control, 
power, and prestige still have considerable relevance, whether it be economic or 
political.  These issues of power and prestige will be examined in more detail, 
particularly in the chapter on the EU, where one can argue that the EU as with 
the new German Empire after 1871 is a relative newcomer to the world stage and 
                                                 
140 A ‘frozen conflict’ is one where there has previously been conflict but no formal ceasefire and 
where the opposing forces, minefields, etc, remain in place, but there is, ‘at the present time’, no 
conflict.  Conflict could break out at any time but this state of affairs may persist for many years.  
Some frozen conflicts alternate between ‘hot’ and ‘cold’ phases such as the Thai – Cambodian 
border disputes, which last went through a ‘hot’ phase in May–June 2011, leading to artillery 
exchanges.  
141 The ‘Oxford Dictionary of Economics’ online defines economic imperialism as:  Domination of 
the economies of colonies by their rulers, or of politically independent countries by foreign or 
multinational companies. It can be argued that true independence is impossible for small, weak, 
and backward countries faced with domination of their trade, and possibly their extractive 
industries, by large sophisticated and monopolistic firms based in the advanced countries. The 
dependency of peripheral countries is accentuated when the rules governing international trade 
and investment are written by the most advanced countries. 
142 Nor even in the late nineteenth century.  Words such as ‘power’ and ‘prestige’ do not feature in 
many of the academic or dictionary definitions but are highly relevant, particularly when 
examining imperialism during the ‘Age of Empires’.  See for example E. J. Hobsbawm, The Age 
of Empire 1875 – 1914 and Pakenham (1991), op. cit for a general discussion of these affects.  
The Belgian acquisition of Zaire has already been mentioned and certainly the Imperial German 
acquisition of the Marshall Islands for example was certainly not made for economic reasons. 
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is still trying to define its position within global society143 and to ‘secure’ its ‘place 
in the sun’.144  Johnston defines imperialism as:  
the creation and maintenance of an unequal economic, cultural, and 
territorial relationship, usually between states and often in the form of an 
empire, based on domination and subordination.145   
Although this definition is broader, it still retains a greater emphasis upon the 
relationships between states and empires than is seen today, at the dawn of the 
twenty-first century.   In addition, it is technological and cultural-imperialism, or at 
least cultural-transfer, which may be as important and in some ways more 
important than pure economic imperialism.  For example, access to mobile 
telephony, satellite communication, and media outlets146 in general can also be 
controlled by the ‘imperialists’ whether that be a state entity or an MNC.147  It is 
perhaps so as to maintain their independence in terms of controlling their own 
communications, that the United Arab Emirates (UAE) developed their own 
satellite communications system,148 while they still have the resources to do 
so.149  Many people will argue that the development of the computer and, 
particularly, of the almost ubiquitous ‘Microsoft’ software, has led to cultural-
                                                 
143 The continuing discussion whether the ‘EU’ as opposed to the other nation states should have 
a seat as a permanent member of the UN Security Council (UNSC) is a case in point.  
144 Kaiser Wilhelm II of Germany, talking of the need for the German Empire to have a place in 
the sun in a speech to the North German Regatta Association, 1901. 
145 Ronald John Johnston, The Dictionary of Human Geography (4th ed), p 375. 
146 As for example Rupert Murdoch’s News Corporation. 
147 As the News Corporation, chaired by Rupert Murdoch testifies.  
148 The ‘Thuraya’™ system.  Despite its ‘independence’ the system still requires a European or 
North American launch system to place its satellites into geo-stationary orbit. 
149 The members of the UAE, particularly Dubai, are well aware that their oil revenues will 
diminish in the short to medium term and are taking active steps to diversify their activities prior to 
that date, hence the Thuraya™ system and the purchase of large Western companies such as P 
& O and Associated British Ports in the UK, not to say MNCs.    
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imperialism, wherein knowledge of Western scripts and particularly of English150 
is necessary if one is to master the new technology.  Similarly, many people in 
Islamic communities might regard Western liberal democratic attitudes to gender 
as imperialist, especially if these are being exemplified by Westerners as the way 
towards development and advancement.   Whilst attempts were made to define 
cultural-imperialism in the mid-1960s, these earlier definitions owed a great deal 
to the metaphors of a more traditional colonialism which was increasingly less 
relevant.  By 1975 the media critic Herbert Schiller was writing:  
The concept of cultural imperialism today best describes the sum of the 
processes by which a society is brought into the modern world system and 
how its dominating stratum is attracted, pressured, forced, and sometimes 
bribed into shaping social institutions to correspond to, or even promote, 
the values and structures of the dominating centre of the system.151   
Schiller appeared to recognise that in the future cultural-imperialism would 
perhaps owe little to nation states, or even to oligarchs such as the head of the 
Hollywood film studios who must, to most of his peers, have represented at the 
time archetypal ‘cultural imperialists’.  What Schiller and later Tom McPhail, who 
described one subset of cultural-imperialism, observed was that cultural-
imperialism did not depend upon any one state or technology, but could and did 
occur in a whole manner of ways simultaneously.  McPhail defined ‘electronic 
imperialism’ thus:  
                                                 
150 The reference to English is not so much to the vocabulary, although that will greatly assist the 
user, but to the English syntax which underlies the software programs within the Microsoft and 
other linked families of software. 
151 Herbert I. Schiller, Communication and cultural domination,  pp 9–10. 
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as the dependency relationship established by the importation of 
communication hardware, foreign-produced software, along with 
engineers, technicians, and related information protocols, that vicariously 
establish a set of foreign norms, values, and expectations which, in 
varying degrees, may alter the domestic cultures and socialization 
processes.152   
This accurately defines at least the subset of cultural-imperialism of concern to 
McPhail, but he at no point discusses nation states or even MNCs.  As he states 
in his definition, imperialism in the twenty-first century has moved beyond states 
and organisations and is about the control and domination, not only of technology 
and equipment, but also increasingly about the control of ideas and concepts by 
an often unidentifiable and independent group of technical experts who for the 
most part are free of all control.  If one were to accept these arguments of 
McPhail’s and Schiller, taken to there broadest extent, it is possible for one 
culture to be ‘guilty’ of cultural or technological imperialism in one sphere whilst 
itself being subjected to cultural or technological imperialism in another related 
sphere.  To return to McPhail and electronic imperialism as an example, Japan, 
Korea, and increasingly China are manufacturers of most of the hardware and 
much of the software being produced in the world in the twenty-first century.  
Using McPhail’s definition they could be defined as electronic imperialists.  The 
language upon which the software was based, however, was written by English 
                                                 
152 Thomas L. McPhail, Electronic Colonialism: the Future of International Broadcasting and 
communication, p 18. 
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speakers and it is this language form McPhail would argue153 and the ideas 
contained within it, which has both shaped and constrained computer software 
development thus far.154  Japan, Korea, and China could thus be seen to be 
simultaneously both the exploiters and the victims of cultural-imperialism.  The 
views of McPhail and other cultural-imperialists have been challenged by 
amongst others, Jessica Gienow-Hechts155 and Tom Smith156 who argue that 
there is a more nuanced process at work, one of cultural-transfers of goods and 
cultural symbols and that while one culture may predominate, it is not all a one-
way flow, nor is there a monopoly of dominance such as an ‘empire’ might exert 
necessary.  As Gienow-Hecht states: 
A number of critical studies on the concept of Americanization as cultural 
imperialism have shown that this concept ignores that cultural transfers 
work differently from economic takeovers or the monopolization of 
markets.157 
In particular cultural-transfer recognizes that on occasions it is: global rather than 
national forces behind cultural transfers,158 and the changes which are taking 
place.      
 
                                                 
153 This is an argument with which Noam Chomsky would probably disagree.  Chomsky 
developed the ‘Chomsky hierarchy’ in 1956 as a containment formula to describe a hierarchy of 
grammar within languages including mathematical languages.  The American Standard Code for 
Information Interchange (ASCII) computing code was developed from the late 1950s using the 
‘Chomsky hierarchy’ and owes, Chomsky would argue, nothing to any specific language. 
154 From the beginning of the twenty-first century computer programming software has begun to 
move away from formal languages and hence from a hierarchy of grammars. 
155 Jessica Gienow-Hecht, Cultural Imperialism in the Encyclopedia of American Foreign Policy. 
156 Tom Smith, Cultural Transfer or Cultural Imperialism. 
157  Jessica Gienow-Hecht, Decentering America (Explorations in Culture & International History). 
158 Smith (2000), op. cit. 
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What is the relevance of cultural-imperialism, cultural-transfers, and 
communications to this thesis?  It is that whilst the IC interventions in post-
conflict may not be imperialist in the traditional sense, their very intervention may 
lead to, or at least lead to, allegations of ‘cultural-imperialism’, even if this is 
inadvertent or unintended and where in many cases the term ‘cultural-transfer’ 
may be more appropriate.  The impact of a large number of cosmopolitan 
foreigners on a relatively underdeveloped state and society, may, in the longer 
term, change that state more radically than the conflict that preceded it.  To take 
an extreme example, the presence of a large159 transient population from the UK 
on the Falkland Islands following the conflict in 1982, has led to the provision of 
UK television programmes transmitted via satellite160 along with internet and 
mobile telephone communications provided, initially, not for the benefit of the 
islanders, but for the transient population.  Likewise in BiH, some of the most 
popular radio stations161 are those that were initially provided for foreigners and 
for which a knowledge of English is required.162  As a result, cultural-imperialism, 
is of more relevant concern in post-conflict, certainly in the longer term than 
traditional imperialism. 
 
As illustrated above, economic, technological, cultural-imperialism and cultural-
transfer, are increasingly complex areas of research and will continue to be so.  
                                                 
159 Almost matching in some cases, that of the indigenous population.  The current figures are: 
UK government employees 1,750, Falkland Islanders 1,800. 
160 There is no Falkland Islands TV, so Falkland Islanders watch for example the UK news.  
There is a Falkland Islands radio which gives the local news. 
161 Largely due to the range of music which they played. 
162 Virgin Radio plays a live feed into Sarajevo and other cities in Bosnia.  This includes the 
London traffic reports and weather. 
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For example Yogi Schulz,163 Theresa Clifford,164 and J. J. Velasco165 all 
discussed the impact of the Microsoft Corporation in terms of the development of 
IT systems and the internet and developed different models for describing it, but 
these are unlikely to be directly relevant to this thesis.  When examining post-
conflict, it is recognized that cultural and to an extent economic issues are likely 
to be relevant and may lead to economic and cultural-imperialism, or at least a 
transfer of goods and cultural symbols as described by Gienow-Hecht.166  These 
impacts will form only one small strand of the argument and will be addressed 
when appropriate.  In cultural terms if a predominantly francophone or historically 
Slavic oriented country adopts English as a second language or, for example, 
moves from a Cyrllic to an Arabic script in post-conflict, then clearly the cultural 
effect of the intervention may have had an impact.  Even in these circumstances 
it will be necessary to ascertain whether such a change would have occurred 
even if the state had not been involved in conflict.  What will be easier to 
catalogue will be those few occasions where a post-conflict state moves to re-
assert its own cultural heritage, moving in the other direction, for example from a 
predominantly Arabic script base to Cyrillic as Montenegro has done from 1995.  
Notwithstanding that some commentators such as Kiely believe that the current 
definition of cultural-imperialism is deeply flawed, he also acknowledges that 
cultural flows are far from equal.167  In terms of economic imperialism, this thesis 
will examine the decision to underpin and ‘peg’ the currencies in Bosnia, Kosovo, 
                                                 
163 Yogi Schulz, Microsoft: Guilty of Deliberate Cultural Imperialism? Not!. 
164 Theresa Clifford, Is Microsoft really Guilty of Digital Imperialism?.  
165 J. J. Velasco, Russia and the imperialism of Microsoft software. 
166 Gienow-Hecht (2007), p 126.  See also p 26, for a discussion of US – UK cultural transfers.  
167 Kiely (2005), op. cit, p 5. 
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and Montenegro against initially the Deutschmark and later the Euro to see 
whether these decisions constituted a form of economic imperialism, even if 
unintentionally so. 
 
Liberal Internationalism and Liberal Interventionism 
 
The preceding pages demonstrate that neither colonialism nor imperialism 
provide adequate models for understanding international intervention at the close 
of the twentieth century and the beginning of the twenty-first.  The motivation for 
IC intervention can be seen to be primarily related to immediate problem solving 
and generally to have a fixed duration.  IC intervention is also not about the 
exertion of long-term control over other states; one of the key principles is the 
restoration of effective local democratic governance as soon as it is possible.  
None of the principles of IC intervention can be construed as obviously 
colonialism or imperialism.  The questions which should be considered are:  
 - Is it more appropriate to examine the doctrine and practice of liberal 
internationalism, in particular liberal interventionism?  
- Is this a more appropriate analytical framework upon which to base 
interpretations of the international interventions of the past twenty-five 
years?   
- Can liberal interventionism be identified within the principle and practice 
of humanitarian intervention as the appropriate model to best define the 
IC’s management of post-conflict?   
 111 
 
There are variations on the theme of liberal interventionism and humanitarian 
intervention which will be discussed in this chapter and later in this thesis.  Some, 
including the former Prime Minister Tony Blair, would see liberal interventionism 
as being based upon ‘internationalism’ and would describe the interventions 
made during his period in office as ‘liberal internationalism’.168  Whereas those 
who subscribe to the ‘realist’ approach to international affairs, such as 
Howard,169 would describe his international policy as ‘liberal interventionist’ and 
would agree with those who claim that all interventions are backed by diplomatic 
pressure and, either the threat of, or, the use of, military force.  Alongside these 
arguments about what constitutes a liberal intervention, is the issue of 
humanitarian intervention and whether that in any ways differ from liberal 
interventionism.  Certainly in this case, the threat or use of force is an option, as 
Bass describes in the case of Greece and Syria,170 or indeed in the case of 
Dharfur today.171  From the perspective of Blair,172 both humanitarian intervention 
and liberal interventionism can be defined on the basis of an intervention carried 
out purely on the basis of supporting a ‘just cause’ and where the principles of 
‘just war theory’ can be seen to have been met.  This is the position adopted by 
Evans, who states that:  
                                                 
168 See Tony Blair in the ‘comment’ article in the Guardian of 26 April 2007. 
169 Roger Howard What's Wrong with Liberal Interventionism: The Dangers and Delusions of the 
Interventionist Doctrine. 
170 Bass (2008), op. cit. 
171 Most commentators such as Howard do not distinguish between the use of force as an 
enforcement measure and that which is applied purely for the protection of the humanitarian 
intervention. 
172 Blair (2007), op. cit. 
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‘humanitarian intervention’ asserts the right of other peoples to come to 
the aid of those whose state, in violating their rights, have consequently 
forfeited the right of inviolable sovereignty.173   
This view is challenged by Byers and Chesterman (who commented on the air 
war in Kosovo174), Anthony F. Larg,175 and others such as Jackson, who argue 
that: 
humanitarian intervention would create disorder as states waged wars to 
protect their own way of life and force others to live by their ethical 
preferences.176   
Bellamy177 explains in detail the breadth of the varying positions on ‘just war’ and 
their impact upon liberal interventionism and humanitarian intervention. 
 
Commentators would claim that humanitarian intervention is not a new 
phenomena, Moore178 argues that it was humanitarian intervention by other 
nation states which led to eight nation states achieving independence from 
colonial domination in the period 1783–1971.179  The proponents of liberal 
interventionism180 as both a doctrine and an analytical framework imply that in 
                                                 
173 Mark Evans (ed), Just War Theory: A Reappraisal. 
174 Byers and Chesterman, Changing the rules about rules: Unilateral humanitarian intervention 
and the future of international law, pp 177-91 in J. L. Holzgrefe and Robert O. Keohane (eds), 
Humanitarian Intervention: Ethical, Legal and Political Dilemmas.  See in particular p 181. 
175 Evans (2005), op. cit. p 51 
176 Robert Jackson, The Global Covenant: Human Conduct in a World of States, p 291. 
177 Alex J. Bellamy, Just Wars from Cicero to Iraq. 
178 See Roderick Moore, The Limits of Humanitarian Intervention.  
179 Ibid,  p 3. 
180 Unlike the proponents of humanitarian interventionism most liberal interventionists start with 
Palmerston and Greece and do not include the US War of Independence, the liberation of Italy in 
1859, or the liberation of Cuba and the Philippines in 1898, perhaps on the basis that the powers 
that assisted, respectively France, and the USA were not totally disinterested in the outcome.  
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these cases a state takes part in a conflict, or intervenes in some other way,181 
purely on the basis of supporting a ‘just cause’ and not for any specific national 
gain.  The British intervention in the Greek War of Independence is often cited as 
the first such case,182 with the Anglo-French operations in Lebanon and Syria in 
support of the Christian minorities in those provinces of the Turkish Empire as 
possibly the second.  In both cases the intervention was undertaken because it 
was perceived to be morally right to do so and without any desire to assume 
control on the part of the states intervening,183  both interventions were also 
intended to be, and were, of short duration.   
 
The modern proponents of humanitarian interventionism as the model for UN and 
other multinational interventions make it clear that they do not regard it as a ‘soft 
option’, but more as a moral approach, even where martial intervention is 
involved.  Indeed, the definitions espoused by Frye184 in his work for the UN 
make it clear that in drawing together the material, he sees a consensus in its 
main characteristic as being one of military intervention,185 by a state or states, 
into the affairs of another.  This was also broadly the definition accepted by the 
Independent International Commission (IIC) appointed by the Swedish 
                                                                                                                                                 
Indeed, for both Cuba and the Philippines it could be argued that they simply substituted colonial 
powers. 
181 Lord Soley of Hammersmith in a speech to the Henry Jackson Society conference on slavery 
and human trafficking at Chatham House on 11 June 2007, argued persuasively that the UK’s 
role in the abolition of the worldwide slave trade was an example of this form of liberal 
interventionism. An abstract of this speech is available at 
http://www.henryjacksonsociety.org/stories. 
182 Ibid.  This gives descriptions of both Greece and Lebanon/Syria. 
183 This is certainly true in the case of the United Kingdom.  The French motives in Syria were 
perhaps a little more opaque as Bass, op.cit. states in his text.  
184 Alton Frye, Humanitarian Intervention: Crafting a Workable Doctrine.  
185 Ibid.  Frye’s first characteristic is that ‘Humanitarian Intervention involves the threat and use of 
military forces as a central feature’. 
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Government to review their participation in the Kosovo conflict in 1999.186  In this 
case they stated that whilst the intervention was technically illegal, in that it had 
not been sanctioned by a UN resolution under Chapter VII of the charter,187 they 
still reached the conclusion that the operations in Kosovo constituted a 
humanitarian intervention because both the intent and the impact of the 
intervention was to improve the human rights and humanitarian conditions of the 
Kosovars.  What the IIC did not say was as Schechter points out: 
the (whole) notion of humanitarian interventionism, for all its moral 
justifications, has no basis in international law.  Furthermore, even if it 
were legal, some argue that issuing a blanket commitment to stop 
atrocities around the globe might actually provoke more of them. Truly 
effective humanitarian intervention would require the US188 to seed the 
Third World with military bases in order to rapidly deploy to troubled spots. 
Such a policy would, however, invite charges of imperialism.189 
.  
Unlike the conventions for the conduct of war and the treatment of prisoners 
etc,190 there has never been a conference, a convention, or series of 
conventions, which govern the IC’s intervention, humanitarian or otherwise, into 
                                                 
186 The Executive Summary of the Commission’s Findings can be found online at: 
http://www.reliefweb.int/library/documents/thekosovoreport.htm. 
187 This was due to a veto being imposed by two P5 member states, Russia and China. 
188 Given the nature of his text this author believes that must be an error and he presumably 
means the UN. 
189 Erik Schechter, Should We Stop the Next Genocide?, Carnegie International, Ethics Online, 
Monthly Aug. 2010, lead article. 
190 These are usually referred to as the ‘Geneva Conventions’, in particular the Convention of 
1949 and the three additional protocols of 1977 and 2005. 
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the activities of third states.191  Each case is therefore dealt with on its own 
merits, often, with some reference to precedent.  Whilst principles behind the 
decisions are rarely if ever discussed at this stage, the analysis would lead to the 
conclusion that the models outlined in this chapter inform much of the decision 
making, at least within the European and North American states, and are 
therefore relevant when the case studies are examined in the thematic chapters.  
In particular, it will be observed both from the concepts which follow and in the 
thematic chapters that the US attempted to embrace, retrospectively, the ideals 
of cosmopolitanism when it came to legitimizing its activities in Iraq from 2003.   
 
Cosmopolitanism 
 
Cosmopolitanism will now be discussed as the arguments advanced above by 
Frye are endorsed by those of cosmopolitan interventionists such as Smith.192  
Of all of the theories and models ‘cosmopolitanism’ is by far the oldest and can 
be traced back to ancient Greece and Rome and the writings of Diogenes in the 
fourth century BC who cited earlier philosophers, whose works are now mostly 
lost.193  Cosmopolitan thinking has only developed in its most modern form since 
the closing stages of the Second World War, in part as a result of the ethnic 
nature of some of the genocide which occurred.   Unlike Beck and Cronin194 at 
the turn of the twenty-first century many academics and others see 
                                                 
191 The closest may be the two Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907, For the Peaceful 
Adjustment of International Disputes. 
192 W. Smith, Anticipating a Cosmopolitan Future: The Case of Humanitarian Military Intervention.  
193 Laertius Diogenes, The Lives of Eminent Philosophers, Translated by C. D.Yonge. 
194 Ulrich Beck and Ciaran Cronin, Cosmopolitan Vision.  
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cosmopolitanism as but one further strand in the development of a progressive 
‘globalisation’ in the world political order.  They see global NGOs, trans-national 
social movements such as the World Social Forum (WSF), and the coming 
together of world political and economic leaders at events, such as the annual 
Davos Conference as examples of globalisation rather than cosmopolitanism.  
Held, in the preface to a recent series of essays, defines his view of 
cosmopolitanism by comparing it with democracy and globalization as follows:  
democracy is about self determination, globalization about trans-border 
processes and cosmopolitanism which must shape and limit all human 
activity.195   
Held’s extremely wide-ranging definition of cosmopolitanism would certainly, 
were it accepted across the academic community, embrace the activities of the 
IC in post-conflict, indeed, as phrased in this statement it would embrace almost 
any activity in conflict or post-conflict.      
 
Given the key role of the UN family of organisations and the critical role of the 
development of the Rule of Law within post-conflict states, maybe it is possible to 
discern a few aspects of cosmopolitanism within the development of what might 
prove to be a new world social order.  The idea of a universal concept of human 
rights has been a persistent theme of international multilateral intervention in the 
period since 1945.  This concept has led on to the development of the  
International Criminal Court (ICC), whose jurisdiction has generally been 
accepted world wide and which is increasingly turned to by the international 
                                                 
195 David Held, Cosmopolitanism: Ideals and Realities, p xi. 
 117 
community when they feel that third parties’ human rights have been infringed.196  
These are the practical applications of the cosmopolitan ideal, but they occur 
only within narrow niches of multilateral intervention and not across the whole 
spectrum of activities.  There is no set standard or process for the IC to 
intervene, nor even a clear definition of what constitutes a ‘conflict’197 triggering 
an international intervention.  In general, multilateral intervention has been 
pursued pragmatically and on a case-by-case basis, rather than in any 
systematic or wholesale normative manner.  As such, the IC rarely articulates 
cosmopolitan principles, except in perhaps the limited manner described above, 
nor does it attempt to implement the normative and prescriptive principles of 
cosmopolitanism into the practical resolution of conflict and post-conflict issues.  
What the IC is always attempting to do is to unite to pursue a ‘just war’, or at 
least one which can be presented as such and also to enter into a pragmatic 
arrangement to justify ignoring the principle of ‘sovereignty’ which states on their 
own would be reluctant to transgress.  This mechanism is most often illustrated 
by the attempts of those states who wish to intervene (militarily) to obtain a UN 
Security Council (UNSC) mandate.  A recent example of this process was the 
imposition of a ‘no fly zone’ over Libya which was legitimised by UNSC 
Resolution 1973.     
 
                                                 
196 The recent references to the ICC in the cases of Libya (February 2011) and Ivory Coast (April 
2011) are cases in point.  
197 The USA has attempted such definitions internally within the State Department and the United 
States Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute (PKSOI) and its predecessors, but 
these definitions themselves contain contradictions.  According to the PKSOI definition of an 
internal conflict/civil war, this is triggered when there are fifteen or greater deaths per annum.  
Using that definition, Bahrain, Syria, Yemen, and Pakistan would all be in a state of internal open 
conflict, yet clearly the USA does not currently (July 2011) regard that to be the case.  
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While it is true to say that multilateral interventionism was a rarity prior to 1945, at 
least two examples stand out: the Anglo-French campaigns in Syria between 
1859-61 described by Bass198  and the formation of the multi-national force under 
British leadership in the Shkodra area of Albania in 1913 during the conflict 
between the Serbians and Montenegrins on one side and the Turks and 
Albanians on the other.  This force, comprising British, French, German, Austro-
Hungarian, Netherlands, and Russian officers and men was deployed in an area 
where there were no direct foreign interests and as such it differs from other joint 
deployments during that period such as the ‘Boxer Rebellion’ in China in 1900; 
here there were either commercial interests or threats to foreign nationals. Thus 
cosmopolitanism is linked to a new style of liberal interventionism which, for the 
last sixty years, has no longer been the sole prerogative of single nation states 
as was generally previously the case, but has also since 1945, been exercised 
by the multilateral structures which were put in place by the victors of the First 
and Second World Wars.        
 
As a cosmopolitan interventionist Smith argues199 not only from a moral 
perspective but also, where appropriate, espouses the use of force.200  Both 
Smith and Fine examined cosmopolitanism and military intervention through the 
prism of the ‘just war’ theory and conducted a broad-based review of current 
                                                 
198 Gary J. Bass (2009). 
199 W. Smith, Anticipating a Cosmopolitan Future: The Case of Humanitarian Military Intervention.  
200 Ibid. 
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work201 on both the NATO operations in Kosovo in 1999 and the US-led 
intervention in Iraq in 2003.202  Smith and Fine also argue that:  
whilst cosmopolitanism in its normative variant is often presented as an 
ideal institutional blueprint, which ‘actually existing’ arrangements should 
approximate as much as possible…the downside is that cosmopolitanism 
may be conceptualised in an abstract and static way that detaches it from 
the ambivalences and complexities of the present-day world.203   
Tom J. Farer also argues in a recent paper204 that, whilst cosmopolitanism is 
perhaps the oldest of the ‘models’, the use of the term ‘cosmopolitan’ in terms of 
humanitarian intervention and post-conflict management is a relatively new 
concept dating back only to the past fifteen years or so, and which had until 
recently yet to be critically defined.  It is Farer’s aim in the paper, not so much to 
define cosmopolitanism in this context, as to define the legitimate reasons for 
humanitarian intervention.  Farer goes on to state:    
it follows that I see no value in adding ‘cosmopolitan’ to the list of 
conditions for treating the projection of force across a recognized order as 
legitimate.205 
 
                                                 
201 Including Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical 
Illustrations. 
202 W. Smith and R. Fine, ‘Cosmopolitanism and Military Intervention’ in Christopher Hughes and 
Richard Devetak (eds), The Globalization of Political Violence: Globalization's Shadow (Warwick 
Studies in Globalisation).  
203 ESRC New Security Challenges, pp 14-16 citing W. Smith and R. Fine, Kantian 
Cosmopolitanism Today: John Rawls and Jurgen Habermas on Immanuel Kant’s Foedus 
Pacificum, pp 5-22.  
204 Tom Farer, Cosmopolitan humanitarian intervention: a five-part test – On the meaning and 
uses of Cosmopolitan, pp 211-50. 
205 Ibid, p 213. 
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Farer argues that the criteria for humanitarian intervention must be much more 
restricted than the cosmopolitan ideal, or else large swathes of Sub-Saharan 
Africa and Latin America could be the legitimate targets for intervention with the 
result that much of those two continents would become or revert to 
protectorates.206  While the rights to freedom of association, to form political 
parties, etc, are recognized as being cosmopolitan ideals, Farer argues that there 
needs to be a specific trigger or ‘spike’ of egregious behaviour by a regime 
towards its citizens before humanitarian intervention can be justified, but that 
once an intervention has taken place this justification continues through to the 
post-conflict restoration phase.  In defining these criteria, Farer also 
acknowledges that:  
It follows that humanitarian intervention will remain what it has always 
been, a conditional license for the powerful to intervene in the weak for the 
sake of the defenseless.207   
Farer et al make a further point that from the late twentieth century the 
possession of large destructive capacities within some developed and developing 
states, in particular those with Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), makes 
humanitarian intervention in a physical sense impossible.  This they argue will be 
so, no matter how egregious the state’s behaviour may be, on the basis that 
conflict will be more damaging to the populations than the maintenance of the 
status quo.   
 
                                                 
206 Indeed, if the mistreatment of and effective enslavement of women were taken into 
consideration then a much wider area would need to be included. 
207 Farer (2005), p 218.  
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Increasingly, academic authors are seeing that the scope for humanitarian 
intervention is much wider than that for a physical intervention on the ground and 
such forms of intervention may come much closer to the cosmopolitan ideal.  The 
establishment of international war crimes tribunals implies the acceptance of a 
universal and universally accepted ‘human right’ which is clearly cosmopolitan in 
origin.  The imposition of sanctions and a travel ban on a state’s elites and the 
freezing of assets also represent non-invasive humanitarian intervention 
methods.  Travel bans and freezing of assets are directed at and targeted at 
individuals so recognise the cosmopolitan ideal that there is are global criteria, 
which can be used to regulate behaviour.  Whilst sanctions also meet these 
criteria, there has been an increasing recognition post-Iraq that they are a blunt 
instrument often most affecting those that they are supposed to be supporting 
and in some cases have led to a markedly increased mortality.208 
 
A final, and perhaps more practical, development linked to the Humanitarian 
Interventionist model would be to place it within the constructivist theories of the 
‘English School’.  While noting that constructivism is a meta-theory of social 
action and not a theory of international relations, let alone a theory of IC 
intervention, it does serve to demonstrate how the humanitarian intervention 
model is affected by the socially constructed character of international 
                                                 
208 International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, ‘The Responsibility to 
Protect’; and Thomas G. Weiss and Don Hubert, The Responsibility to Protect: Research, 
Bibliography, and Background.  
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relations.209 Whilst John Ikenberry writing in 1996 was able to state that (in the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries): 
industrial democracies took it upon themselves to ‘domesticate’ their 
dealings through a dense set of institutions, intergovernmental relations, 
and joint management of the western world polity.  Security and stability in 
the West were seen as intrinsically tied to an array of institutions [which], 
tied democracies together, constrained conflict, and facilitated political 
community.210 
This did not of itself entirely satisfy the hypotheses proposed by Wendt that: 
such a structure is socially constructed – that is, not given by nature and 
hence, capable of being transformed by human practice.211  
Examining the same proposition slightly earlier and from a sociological viewpoint, 
Giddens theory of ‘structuration’212 postulates that social life is not merely a 
series of random social acts, nor is it motivated solely by social forces rather, 
Giddens suggests, that human agency and social structure are in a relationship 
with each other.   Ted Hopf made the same point when he said that ‘Actors and 
structures are mutually constituted’.213   In his text Ikenberry214 then proceeded to 
make clear that neither ‘constructive realism’ nor ‘structuration’ were the only 
phenomena at work and that it is the understanding of the concept of an 
                                                 
209 See Robert Jackson and Georg Sorensen, Introduction to International Relations: Theories 
and Approaches (4 ed), p 166; “Constructivism was introduced to International Relations by 
Nicholas Onuf (1989) who coined the term”. 
210 G. John Ikenberry, The Myth of Post-Cold War Chaos. 
211 Alexander Wendt, Anarchy is What states Make of It: The Social Construction of Power 
Politics, pp 396 – 403. 
212 Anthony Giddens, The Constitution of Society: Outline of the Theory of Structuration. 
213 Ted Hopf, The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory.  See specifically, p 
172. 
214 Ikenberry (1996), op. cit. 
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international society that enables the institutions of international society to 
function effectively.  Hopf also identified that constructivism correctly identifies 
that states interests imply choices,215 but that for constructivism unlike neo-
realism, the choices that states make will be different even if they are 
‘constrained’ within the same institutional structure.  Hopf uses the EU as an 
example216 of states which are structurally connected, but which do not always 
react homogenously.  NATO in the context of military humanitarian intervention 
would be an equally apt example. As Zehfuss says in the title of her work, 
constructivism in international relations: [is] the politics of reality.217  This is a 
statement with which at least some members of the ‘English School’ would 
agree.  Zehfuss, however, proceeds to examine the scholars’ role in international 
relations and to argue that by looking to constructivism as the future, they will be 
severely curtailing their ability to act responsibly in this area,218 and reaches this 
conclusion based largely on her research into German international military 
interventions from the mid 1990s and which, of course, commenced with Bosnia 
and Kosovo.  
  
Academics of the ‘English School’ and in particular Buzan219 have added further 
sophistication to the human interventionist and constructivist models in the last 
decade by acknowledging that it is no longer an international society, but that the 
                                                 
215 Ibid.  p 146. 
216 Ibid. 
  217 Maja Zehfuss, Constructivism in International Relations: The Politics of Reality.  
218 Cambridge University Press review of Zehfuss. 
219 Barry Buzan, From International to World Society?: English School theory and the Social 
Structure of Globalisation. 
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arena in which international relations are now played out is a world society where 
Ikenberry reviewing Buzan states:  
two systems co-exist: the system of states, sovereignty, territory, 
nationalism and great power politics will interact with the much less 
coherent system of transnationalism, global markets, and universalistic 
society.220  
While Ikenberry may reject some of the other ‘pluralist’ elements which have 
been espoused by Buzan, in particular that different societies should be 
permitted to evolve differently in terms of their democratic traditions etc,221 it is 
clear that in this case, he agrees with Buzan’s assessment of the future.  The 
author would go further and argue that the two systems identified by Buzan have 
existed in parallel since the 1970s and that it is the Humanitarian Interventionist 
approach, modified by the ideas of the ‘English School’, particularly within the 
last ten years, which best defines the model of interventions made by the 
international community over the last fifteen years and which should inform any 
future interventions.   
 
 
 
 
                                                 
220 G. John Ikenberry reviewing Buzan in Foreign Affairs – Capsule Review. 
221 How much Ikenberry’s commentary and this approach to democratic traditions has been 
framed or constrained as a result of his role as Professor of Geopolitics and Global Justice at the 
Foreign Service School at Georgetown University is not clear.  Given his position as a civil 
servant, it is perhaps difficult for Ikenberry to argue, as Buzan does, that approaches and policies 
which are in Western European and North American terms ‘undemocratic’ should be permitted to 
evolve and, indeed, that they are ‘legitimate’ systems which should be supported by the West.  
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A note on ‘protectorates’ 
 
Before looking directly at the models, it will be pertinent to define the term 
‘protectorate’.  The use of this term has been invariably linked, often 
inappropriately, to both colonialism and imperialism.  It is therefore relevant to 
any discussion of the theory of international intervention.   
 
The term protectorate has been widely used, often in a pejorative context, within 
the past two decades to define the IC’s position with regard to the post-conflict 
periods in both BiH and Kosovo and to a lesser extent in Iraq and elsewhere.  
Whilst the terms ‘intervention’ and ‘protectorate’ are not directly linked in any 
theoretical model, the term ‘protectorate’ has been used by some commentators, 
particularly in the print media, when referring to the long-term impacts of IC 
intervention.  Additionally, in the case of Kosovo, the Albanian Kosovar leader 
Ibrahim Rugova222 called for Kosovo to be made an international protectorate of 
the UN in 1998, whilst a respected NGO, the International Crisis Group (ICG), 
referred to Kosovo in June 1999 as the new protectorate.223  The exact concept 
of a ‘protectorate’ may vary, if the Cromwellian224 concepts of the seventeenth 
century225 are ignored, then the dictionary definitions are fairly harmonious, for 
example: 
                                                 
222 BBC World; Europe: Rugova calls for Kosovo 'protectorate', 24 June 1988. 
223 International Crisis Group, The New Kosovo Protectorate. 
224 Oliver Cromwell installed himself as Lord Protector in December 1653, thus initiating the 
English ‘protectorate’, this lasted until May 1659, latterly under Oliver Cromwell’s son Richard. 
225 For more detail see Barry Coward, The Cromwellian Protectorate (New Frontiers in History). 
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A relationship of protection and partial control assumed by a superior 
power over a dependent country or region,226 and, a territory largely 
controlled by but not annexed to a stronger state.227   
What the definitions do not qualify however, is any sense of what is meant by 
‘permanence’.  In practical terms, in the British and French empires a 
protectorate was a subordinate state ranked below that of a colony, where local 
rulers and practices often held sway, overseen by colonial ‘advisors’.  Many 
protectorates were formed from the hinterlands of existing colonies and acted in 
parallel with them.228  Over time, many protectorates were ‘promoted’ to the 
status of colonies or merged with them, as happened in Aden in 1937,229 whilst 
those which were simply too small to be self-funding, continued as protectorates 
or migrated to becoming territories and/or ‘dependencies’.230  All of the above, 
from the colonial era, shows that protectorates were considered to be long-term 
‘possessions’ of the governing state and that whilst the status of protectorate was 
seen as an interim measure in the graduation of these areas into fully fledged 
colonies or dominions, this could take a considerable amount of time.231    In the 
absence of a formal and accepted definition of a protectorate,232 the definitions 
                                                 
226 Houghton Mifflin The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language. 
227 Harper Collins Collins English Dictionary – 30th Anniversary Edition.    
228 Such as the Sierra Leone protectorate whose capital was Bo and was linked to the colony 
based in Freetown.  It remained in being as a separate protectorate throughout the colonial 
period up until independence in 1961.  
229 East and West Aden were protectorates of India from 1839 to 1937 at which time they were 
merged with the Aden crown colony and came under direct administration from London. 
230 The Falkland Islands Dependency, South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands (currently 
uninhabited) are good examples.  Until 1985 the latter two were territories administered by the 
Falkland Islands Dependency.  All three are now overseas territories in their own right. 
231 In the case of the two Aden protectorates, ninety-eight years. 
232 In part this was because a wide range of nation states used the term but interpreted it in 
different ways.  The Russians for example used it in Central Asia up and until 1920 in Bokhara 
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used here will be that provided by the British ‘Protected States and Protected 
Persons Order 1949/140’, where the definitions were spelt out for the purposes 
of controlling the migration of citizens from these states to the UK.233  The order 
also provides a catalogue of British protectorates at that date. 
 
There is no evidence that IC intervention post the Second World War particularly 
multilateral intervention has ever, with the possible exception of the EU, had any 
such long-term plan in mind.  The term ‘protectorate’ is being used in modern 
parlance as a journalistic shorthand to describe what is essentially a short-term 
transitional process, albeit one which may in the worst case last for some ten to 
fifteen years.  The impact of the measures imposed by the EU particularly in the 
Western Balkans will be discussed in detail in a later chapter and may, indeed, 
be seen in some circumstances to mirror the actions of a ‘protecting’ power and 
in at least one case to have created a de facto protectorate.   
 
                                                                                                                                                 
and Khiva (now Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan) to describe semi-autonomous regions under local 
administration within imperial Russia. 
233 Protected States and Protected Persons Order 1949/140  
Protectorates and Protected States 
1. Meaning of the expression 
1.1 Protectorates and Protected States, like mandated/trust territories (see 
MANDATED AND TRUST TERRITORIES), were foreign territories to which British 
protection was extended in one form or another. However, while mandated/trust 
territories were established under the auspices of the League of Nations/United 
Nations, protectorates and Protected States were proclaimed at the will of the Crown. 
1.2 Protected States were places in which: 
• there was a properly organised internal government; and 
• Britain controlled only the state's external affairs 
1.3 Protectorates were protected territories in which 
• there was no properly organised internal government; and 
• Britain not only controlled external matters, such as the protectorate's 
defence and foreign relations, but also established an internal administration 
1.4 In this sense, the extent of the Crown's involvement in a protectorate was similar 
to the extent of its involvement in a colony. The distinction was that the territories 
concerned were not brought formally within the Crown's dominions. 
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The relevance of the existing models to post-conflict  
 
Much discussion of colonialism and imperialism in relation to post-conflict 
interventions has broadly followed the concepts which have been discussed in 
this chapter, hence commentators, both those inside and outside of academia 
refer to both BiH and Kosovo as ‘protectorates’234 a term which harks back to the 
period of the mandates in Syria and Palestine in the 1920s and beyond.235  
These terms are then picked up by the local media in these countries and used in 
a pejorative sense, but with little understanding of their provenance.236  Indeed in 
economic terms both BiH and Kosovo, far from having been protectorates in the 
period from 1995 to 2002, may only now be entering the period of becoming a 
‘protectorate’ of the EU, whereat the EU provides both the finance and the real 
direct control of how the funds are spent237 and the state managed.  In that, they 
are not alone and are now joining the ranks of the other and less well endowed 
potential EU accession states238 and even in one case,  Kosovo a state well 
                                                 
234 For example David Chandler, The Bosnian Protectorate and the Implications for Kosovo and 
more recently in January 2006 by Catherine Samary, Europe’s Unwanted Protectorate (again 
referring to BiH) which was printed under the strapline ‘disintegrating states destabilised by their 
neighbours’. 
235 The term was first used by the British to refer to the Cephalonian Islands (captured from 
France), as far back as 1809.  By 1894 there were over a dozen such ‘protectorates’, but the term 
had effectively fallen into disuse by 1948 at which time the mandated territories such as Palestine 
and Syria had been granted independence. 
236 For example, amongst others, Andrea Zivkovic, The Protectorate, a Way to Dominate as 
reprinted in ‘Le Monde Diplomatique’, July 1999, who builds both his text and his argument upon 
Chandler’s book Faking Dayton, op. cit. 
237 The EU CARDS programme for example stipulates that any monies granted to the States in 
the Western Balkans may not be handed directly to those states and must either be administered 
by an EU managed programme or through an intermediary or a ‘contractor’ which in most cases 
is an IO such as the OSCE or UNDP.  
238 The CARDS programme, for example, in addition to BiH and Kosovo also includes Croatia, 
Serbia, Montenegro, fYROM, and Serbia which under most definitions are not considered as 
‘post-conflict’ states.  
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beyond the current confines of the EU albeit one not yet formally endorsed by the 
UN.  This is a topic which will be examined in more detail in the thematic 
chapters on Bosnia, Kosovo, and the EU. 
 
Trans-nationalism and Conclusion 
 
This thesis will argue that the international community’s actions in conflict and 
post-conflict operations in the Western Balkans was entirely consistent with the 
concepts of liberal interventionism as it has evolved through the humanitarian 
interventionist model and been further developed by the constructivist ideas of 
the ‘English School’, as propounded by Buzan, Ikenberry, and others.  Within the 
model recently proposed by Buzan are also included those elements of 
globalisation which are relevant to interventions in the last quarter of the 
twentieth century and beyond, namely the role of non-governmental actors and 
an increasing focus upon increasingly scarce global resources both within conflict 
as described by amongst others Klare, Ballard, and Renner239 and without.  
There has also been an increasing focus on the non-military elements of 
humanitarian intervention, such as the use of legal sanctions through the ICC 
and the imposition of restrictions upon assets held abroad by those who are 
perceived to have given rise to the humanitarian interventions concerned.  
Indeed, the international community’s understanding of the financial factors 
affecting conflict and particularly domestic conflict has been one of those areas of 
most rapid development within post-conflict as, clearly, any political or 
                                                 
239 See, for example, Michael T. Klare, Resource Wars: The New Landscape of Global Conflict. 
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humanitarian intervention which ignores the impact of trans-nationalism and the 
global markets will be doomed to failure as the IC’s interventions during the first 
Ivorian Civil War in 2002-4 demonstrated.240   
    
This thesis will argue that most interventions in the period following the conflicts 
in the Western Balkans have also followed this model with the possible 
exceptions of Iraq and Afghanistan, which were driven by a much more heavily 
politicised agenda.  It will also be argued in at least one case, that of South 
Sudan, a direct military humanitarian intervention was not required and that ‘non-
invasive’ methods were effective in achieving the international community’s 
objectives.  This last point would suggest that the strict nature of the tenets of 
humanitarian interventionism propounded by Frye,241 Smith,242 and Fine243 only 
ten years ago, have already become outdated and that the world is perhaps 
more closely approaching a cosmopolitan ideal.  Even within these revised 
definitions the concepts of humanitarian intervention continue to rapidly evolve.  
One could question whether a no-fly zone or a blockade imposed so as to 
support one particular element within a civil conflict, such as an oppressed 
                                                 
240 Rather than the conflict dislocating some 43% of the world’s supply of cocoa, the impact of the 
conflict was to increase production so as to maximise the revenue to both of the warring factions.  
That in order so to do, they had to co-operate together in this one area, was a function of the 
global markets and access to ports, not to institutional or ‘political’ factors.  Now at the onset of 
the second civil war Laurent Gbagbo one of the two ‘Presidents’ has once again moved swiftly in 
February 2011 to secure control of the cocoa market.  There are similar examples from the 
Bosnian War which illustrate that this is not a new phenomenon, simply one that the academic 
community is only now beginning to fully understand and to define. 
241 Frye (2000), op. cit. 
242 Smith (2004), op. cit. 
243 Fine (2007), op. cit. 
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civilian population244 and where no ground troops are involved, is ‘non-
invasive’.245  Both technically and in practical terms the implementation of the 
UNSCR on Libya involved the offensive use of substantial amounts of military 
force, both in order to deny the state or combatant concerned the use of its air 
assets and possibly also ground and/or maritime assets which the combatant 
may use both to harass their own civilian population and those intervening to 
enforce the no-fly zone, or even the wider international community.246
                                                 
244 As opposed to, for example, the Iraq ‘no-fly zone’ and maritime blockade which was put in 
place in support of a UN sanctions regime and which did not entail the use of force except in the 
face of a direct threat or non-compliance with the no-fly zone. 
245 Such as that imposed upon Libya by UNSCR 1970 on 26 February 2011.   
246 For example, the attack on the long-range anti-shipping missiles in Libya which could perhaps 
have been used to threaten the commercial use of the Mediterranean, as promised by Colonel 
Qadhafi. 
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Chapter 4 
 
A historical and comparative overview of International Intervention 
 
Definitions 
 
Before discussing the idea of ‘post-conflict’, it will be necessary to define what is 
meant by both ‘conflict’ and ‘international intervention’.  Clearly, although 
conflictual, the situation in Northern Ireland between 1969 and 1997 was not 
regarded as a ‘conflict’ by the state within which the dispute took place, nor by its 
Western allies.   Numerous Soviet, and later Russian Federation attempts to 
have the Northern Ireland conflict designated as such in the OSCE and 
elsewhere have failed.  The Russians have sought to have an OSCE Mission 
deployed to Northern Ireland and failed to achieve this objective on precisely 
these grounds; namely, that it would not be a conflict prevention measure, 
because there is no ‘conflict’.1  As over 3,000 people died as a result of the 
‘disturbances’ in Northern Ireland and in the 1970s there was at least a 
simulacrum of ‘ethnic cleansing’.2 if Northern Ireland was not considered as a 
                                                 
1 The last such attempt by the Russian Federation was at a Permanent Council (PC) meeting in 
2006.  On 29 June 2004, speaking at the OSCE Academy,  Counsellor Andrey Rudenko from the 
Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation to the OSCE explained the Russian position in 
detail stating that: 
Russia maintains that field missions could also be set up in the West and not just in post-
Soviet states, for example in Northern Ireland. The usual argument against such 
involvement in Northern Ireland is that the OSCE would not bring any added value, but 
this is not necessarily true. 
Report on the Summer Academy of the OSCE June 27 – 10 July 2004.  pp 16-7. 
2 As the majority of the ‘effective’ ethnic cleansing and ‘gerrymandering’ of electoral boundaries 
had already taken place in the five decades following the partition of the island of Ireland. 
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conflict, then what is the difference between that and Moldova which has 
been defined as a ‘zone of conflict’, at least in IC terms, despite a much 
lower number of casualties.  There appear to be two answers.  The official 
response is based around a set of often nationally defined norms.1  They 
include: the use of organised force and heavy weapons which result in levels 
of infrastructure destruction (which were not seen in Northern Ireland) and in 
the presence of foreign forces,2 or the use of foreign mercenaries (such as 
occurred at least within the Trans-Dniestrian province in Moldova).  If heavy 
weapons are to be a criterion then what constitutes ‘heavy weapons’?  In 
addition to the various CSCE treaties,3 the ceasefire agreement for the 
Bosnian conflict usefully sets out what it regards as heavy weapons in Annex 
1A, Article IV4 of the General Framework Agreement for Peace (GFAP). This 
would appear to suggest that for the most part the use of such weapons 
systems as Main Battle Tanks (MBT), artillery, and mortars, combined with a 
                                                 
1 These norms, however, are not internationally agreed, nor are they standardised.  As a 
result the Russians can claim that Northern Ireland was a ‘conflict’, whilst the UK and the 
USA have consistently denied this.  This goes against the internal ‘norm’ used by the US 
State Department to define ‘conflict’, which is an internal or cross-border dispute between 
armed groups (including the state’s own military, but not the police) that results in fifteen or 
more deaths per year. Northern Ireland clearly met these criteria for a substantial period. 
2 Perhaps also the degree to which, the internal conflict was affected by external 
intervention?  This was certainly the case not only in BiH and Kosovo, but also in the Trans-
Dniestrian region of Moldova, where the Russian 14 Army based within Trans-Dniestria was 
a significant actor in the conflict and intervened on behalf of the ‘Russian’ elements within 
the population.  For the degree to which this external involvement influences the conflict see 
Nichol Dima, op. cit., Pal Kolsto, op. cit., and also; Ann Lewis and Chris Patton. op. cit., who 
are, however, more concerned with Russia’s present-day interests in the region.    
3 Such as the ‘Conventional Forces Europe’ (CFE) Treaty, signed in Paris on 19 November, 
1990 by the twenty two members of NATO and the former Warsaw Pact.  This specifies the 
number of weapons systems of each type that can be held in each sub-region of Europe 
from the Atlantic to the Caucusus.  After the collapse of the Warsaw Pact and some NATO 
enlargement, thirty CFE States signed the Adaptation Agreement as Parties at the Istanbul 
OSCE Summit on 19 November 1999. 
4 The GFAP, Annex 1A, Article IV.   Note that this does not restrict the capability for waging 
and sustaining war, e.g. communications, fuel etc, but specifically defines heavy weapons, 
i.e. mortars greater than 75 mm calibre.  
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substantial devastation of the infrastructure would be what distinguishes, at 
least in the view of the IC, a conflict and hence a post-conflict intervention as 
opposed to a purely humanitarian intervention.5   Even in a humanitarian 
intervention there may still be a considerable military presence; after the 
tsunami in Aceh in 2004, where to quote UNICEF:  
The tsunami response in Aceh led to an unprecedented level of 
interaction between the UN, NGOs and the military.6  
There was no question, despite the presence of an ongoing civil conflict that 
this was anything but a humanitarian intervention.  That said, in practice all 
post-conflict interventions will incorporate a considerable component of 
purely humanitarian activities and are often likely to focus principally on 
humanitarian activities in the early phases of the operation,7 particularly if a 
sustainable ceasefire is in place.  The second issue which defined Moldova 
as a ‘conflict’,8 is a political one. Moldova was not a member of the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) nor a permanent member of the United 
Nations (UN) Security Council (P5), and so did not have a power of veto 
                                                 
5 This may also incorporate a considerable IC military force.  This is either for logistic 
support, or for local protection, or both.  The IC force operating out of Goma in Eastern Zaire 
in 1997–8 would be one such example.  The article by Nicholas Stockton; at that time, the 
Emergencies Director for Oxfam UK & Ireland, in Refugee Participation Network (RPN), 
Chapter 4.   The IC intervention following the Tsunami in South East Asia in December 
2005, in which the INGO community depended heavily on IC military support to facilitate 
supplies and medical cover, would be another and where at the height of the response there 
were military units from fifteen countries – See the UNICEF report by Claudia Hudspeth, 
Accessing IDPs in post-tsunami Aceh, p 1. 
6  Ibid, p 1. 
7 One measure of the transition between ‘humanitarian’ and ‘post-conflict’ might be to look at 
the change in relationships and budgets between UNHCR/UNWFP on the one hand and 
UNDP.  But this is beyond the scope of this thesis. 
8 Technically Moldova has been described at the OSCE council as a ‘frozen conflict’.  That 
is a conflict where no actual conflict is taking place, but the issues have not been resolved 
and the combatants remain in place.  
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over the declaration of a ‘conflict’. Moreover, the central government in 
Chisinau actively supported such a declaration.  In Northern Ireland, on the 
other hand, not only was the conflict taking place in only one obscure 
province separate from the mainland, but the UK Government neither 
requested nor would have welcomed any foreign interference in what it saw 
as its own domestic problems.  As a result Northern Ireland was not declared 
to be a ‘conflict’ whereas Moldova was and remains so.  It is of some interest 
in the wider context that the UK was supported in its position on Northern 
Ireland by the USA, given that US State Department planners are one of the 
few groups who have attempted to define substantial internal and external 
conflict.  Amongst other criteria, assuming that they use the US State 
Department criteria given earlier, they identify a conflict zone as one which 
gives rise to fifteen or more conflict-related deaths per annum.9  Throughout 
the period from 1970 to 199410 the deaths from the ethnic conflict in 
Northern Ireland remained consistently above 25 and in one year11 reached 
46712 and yet, in this case, the USA chose to ignore its own criteria for either 
intervening itself or for reporting the conflict to the UN.  Similar anomalies 
                                                 
9 Similar benchmarks are used by UN DPKO and others to predict future operational 
requirements.  Conversations with Hap Stutt of UNDPKO, by the author held at the NATO 
Defence School, in Oberammergau, Bavaria, FRG. 
10 There were at least 8–25 deaths in every other year from 1969 to 2002 with 50 in 1998.   
11 1973.  It is also worth noting that during 1973, in the worst period of violence during the 
‘marching season’ in June and July, there were more casualties due to street violence 
admitted to hospitals in Strathclyde than in the whole of Northern Ireland.  These casualties 
were not commented upon in the UK national press as they were presumably regarded as 
‘routine’.  As of 2011 there are over 1,000 Orange Order marches per year in the Glasgow 
City area and there continue to be numerous arrests for sectarian violence and of course, 
casualties, they remain similarly unreported in the national media.  
12 For more details on casualties during the peak of the ‘troubles’ from 1969 up until July 
1989 see John McGarry and Brendan O'Leary (eds), The Future of Northern Ireland.  See in 
particular, Appendix 3 Table A3.1. 
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occur on an annual basis and will be discussed in more detail when the 
typology of post-conflict is examined in the next chapter and for which this 
chapter will act as a prelude.    
  
Of necessity, the selection of case studies below is limited.  The international 
intervention in Greece which led to its independence is regarded as being 
the first ‘modern’ case of IC intervention and is the first case study.  The 
remaining cases from the nineteenth century have been selected as they are 
of interest as examples of cyclical or repetitive conflict, some of which 
continue to the present day.  Some, as with the Albanian case in the early 
twentieth century, are pertinent to the Western Balkans and are also 
illustrative of key developments in the IC’s responses to conflict and post-
conflict, such as the use of international observation.  This theme is 
continued throughout the twentieth century in that the selected case studies 
have been chosen as illustrative of the evolution in the ICs management of 
post-conflict.  This is true even where the mission failed or was withdrawn for 
other reasons, such as the United Nations Operations in Somalia II 
(UNOSOM II) mission.  Where a choice has been possible I have used 
examples from those states either where the author has served, such as 
Lebanon and Palestine, or where the author was directly involved in the 
planning for the missions concerned, such as UNOSOM II.  
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Historical Examples of Conflict and Post-Conflict intervention 
 
Greece 1827-32 
 
Most political historians, including the US historian Gary J Bass,13 regard the 
first IC involvement in conflict in the modern era to have been the British, 
Russian, and French intervention against the Turks at Navarino,14 during the 
Greek War of Independence.  This was the first multinational intervention 
and one where at least two of the powers involved were motivated principally 
by the desire to protect Greek Christian civilians from the depredations being 
visited upon them by Ibrahim Pasha, the Turkish Sultan’s commander in the 
Peleponnese.  Additionally, the Anglo-French intervention was designed to 
remove the motivation for a war between Turkey and Russia, which they 
believed the Turks would lose, and to focus the international effort instead 
solely upon Greek Independence.  The Battle of Navarino in 1827 decided 
the issue of naval control of the Eastern Mediterranean, but failed to evict the 
Turks from the Peleponnese and Central Greece.  This was only achieved 
after a landing by significant numbers of French troops in 1828 and the 
distraction of a major Russian invasion in another theatre in 1828-915 thus 
                                                 
13 Gary J. Bass (2006), op. cit. 
14 Bass (2000),  Ibid. and C M Woodhouse, The Battle of Navarino. 
15 The Russo-Turkish War of 1828-29, saw the invasion of Romania and Bulgaria by 
Russian forces.  Peace was declared only when the Russian forces were within 40 miles of 
Constantinople, the Ottoman capital.  Greece finally secured independence from the 
Ottomans in 1832.    
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negating the British campaign objectives to prevent a Russo-Turkish conflict.  
In terms of post-conflict or even rule of law issues there were no attempts 
during this campaign to address either these issues, nor the widespread 
starvation which had provided the major part of the justification for the attack 
in the first place.  Additionally, the Greeks were not aided in creating 
independent political institutions by the international intervention, quite the 
reverse.  The Great Powers insisted that the Greeks substitute Turkish 
sovereignty for a ‘Greek’ monarchy by importing a member of the Bavarian 
royal family.16  The conflict had, however, demonstrated one factor which 
was to be a continuing problem of IC interventions; that overwhelming sea 
and later air power, combined with a massive technical and material 
superiority, did not necessarily prove to be of much assistance when the 
opponent controls the ground and is determined to stay there.   
 
The Greek War of Independence also witnessed the effective working of the 
‘Concert of Europe’ which developed out of the Congress of Vienna.  This 
was the informal grouping which consisted of the five great powers of 
Europe and which effectively managed international affairs both within 
Europe and the ‘near abroad’, for over fifty years.  While the Powers were 
                                                 
16 The Convention of London in 1832 appointed the seventeen-year old Prince Otto, the 
second son of King Ludwig I of Bavaria as King Othon of Greece.  Otto was advised initially 
by a three-man regency of Bavarian officials and ruled as an absolute monarch until 1843 
when some constitutional reforms were introduced.  He was eventually overthrown in 1862 
to be replaced by King George, a member of the Danish royal house. 
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competitors and even, on occasions went to war with one another,17 this was 
the first time that an effective continent-wide diplomatic grouping had 
functioned effectively over such a sustained period.  Whilst it was not an 
international organisation as we would understand it in the twenty-first 
century, the ‘Concert of Europe’ could perhaps be regarded as a ‘proto-
international’ organisation.  Also in the Greek War of Independence we see 
the first formal example of the policy of ‘containment’18 in that the UK policy 
throughout was designed to ‘contain’, both in influence and physical terms, 
the other two powers and specifically to prevent the Turks from providing 
Russia with a casus belli.  This policy of containment by the UK was to be 
repeated in the case of the Syrian intervention when it was directed against 
France and also once again at Russia during the Bulgarian crisis in the 
1870s.  Whilst the popular motives19 were undoubtedly liberal interventionist, 
those of the UK political leadership were undoubtedly also tinged with 
political realism.    
 
 
 
                                                 
17 For example France and Austria-Hungary in 1848 in Northern Italy, France and the UK 
versus Russia in the Crimea and elsewhere in 1854-6, and Prussia (Germany) versus 
Austria-Hungary in 1866 and versus France in 1870-1. 
18 P. M. H Bell, The World Since 1945 – An international History, pp 105-29.  Bell uses this 
term to describe US responses to the USSR in the early to mid Cold War period.  The 
rationale and the methodology are, however, analogous to that used by the UK a century 
earlier and it would appear that ‘containment’ is an appropriate description of both the 
motivation and the methodology used.  
19 In the case of both Syria and Bulgaria the motives of Queen Victoria were also those of a 
liberal interventionist, at least initially.  The Queen was heavily committed emotionally to that 
part of Syria known today as Lebanon, in part because of its biblical connections.  As an 
example the Queen paid for stone walls to be built around the few remaining stands of 
Lebanese cedars.   
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Syria 1859–61  
 
Bass and many historians state that the second liberal interventionist 
episode again involved the UK and France acting against the Ottoman 
Empire, this time in the province of Syria20 in 1859-61.  This conflict arose 
out of initial attacks by the indigenous Christian population of the area 
against the Muslim Druze21 and the widespread Druze reprisals which led to 
the deaths of tens of thousands of Christians and which the Turks did 
nothing to suppress.  As in the conflict in Greece the governments of the UK 
and France were driven by public outrage in their own countries at the 
massacres; pressure made worse by the growing power of the national 
press which had recently demonstrated its reach and capability during the 
Crimean War by using the growing worldwide cable network to send 
accurate and timely reports back to London and Paris.  Additionally, the 
British response was driven by a need to match that of the French who 
under their adventurist monarch Napoleon III saw intervention in Syria by 
ground troops as a way of securing French influence in the area.22  Thus the 
British policy towards Syria, although primarily one of liberal interventionism 
                                                 
20 At this time the province of Syria incorporated modern-day Syria, Lebanon, Jordan and 
Northern Palestine. 
21 The Druze are a sect of Sunni Islam where the religious ritual is based upon an oral rather 
than a written tradition or liturgy.  They continue to be spread widely through ‘greater Syria’, 
with communities in present-day Lebanon, Syria, and Israel.  
22 This was important to France as in 1859 Ferdinand de Lesseps commenced the digging 
of the Suez Canal.  A French-led project carried out with the support of the government in 
Egypt, which at that time was still nominally a dependency of the Ottoman Empire. 
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in that they had no direct interests in Syria, was for some in the British 
Government, largely driven by a desire to provide a check on the French.23 
 
The military intervention in Syria, which finally lasted for two years until 1861, 
was noteworthy in a number of ways.  First, the interventionists attempted to 
apportion ‘blame’ for what would now be termed ‘war crimes’ and followed 
this up by insisting upon prosecutions for these ‘crimes’ through the Ottoman 
legal system.  Secondly, they attempted to put into place measures which 
would prevent further bloodshed when they had left.  Measures which 
included enshrining freedom of religion etc into the legal code of Syria and 
which led to the Lebanese Constitution of 1864.  Whilst these were positive 
steps, the ‘Great Powers’ refused to accede to Lebanese demands for 
autonomy from the Ottoman Empire and consistently backed the Ottoman 
Empire in its struggle with the Lebanese people.  This policy continued after 
the departure of the Anglo-French military forces, so that, even though the 
Lebanese forces under the Maronite leader Youssef Karam consistently 
defeated the Ottomans, they were unable to secure independence for 
Lebanon and in 1864 the French Government deported him from Lebanese 
territory. 
 
                                                 
23 In particular there was a difference of opinion on this issue between Lord Palmerston, the 
Prime Minister and Lord John Russell, the Foreign Secretary.  For further details of the 
British position on the intervention in Syria see; Paul H. Scherer, Partner or puppet? Lord 
John Russell at the Foreign Office, 1859-62,  pp 347-71.  
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Although the Great Powers in Lebanon and Syria did not move the process 
of liberal interventionism very far, Karam, the Lebanese leader did do so in 
that while in exile he wrote an open letter in which he called for the 
establishment of a 'Human Rights Association' or 'League of Nations',24 this 
he explained would be an ‘international organisation’, which would work for 
world peace and guarantee the rights of small nations.  In parallel, Karam 
wrote a letter to Amir Abdul Kader AI Jazaa'irri encouraging him to liberate 
all Arabs from Ottoman occupation and to then establish a form of 'Arab 
League' where each Member State would retain sovereignty and 
independence.  These letters, and the ideas contained within them, were 
written in the 1870s and 1880s and were well in advance of their time.  Both 
ideas would eventually be taken up in the twentieth century following the 
final collapse of the Ottoman Empire.  
 
The Bulgarian Crisis of 1876-8 
 
The Bulgarian crisis25 again involved the Ottoman Empire and the ‘Concert 
of Europe’.26  In this case the crisis was initiated by a revolt of the Bulgarian 
peasantry against oppressive taxation followed by the actions of Turkish 
                                                 
24 In contrast to the ‘Concert of Europe’ which was an informal grouping of the five great 
powers of Europe (Britain, France, Austria-Hungary, Russia, and Prussia (later the German 
Empire), which functioned effectively between 1815 and 1880 and in a somewhat more 
haphazard manner after that date. 
25 Gary J. Bass (2000), op. cit.,  pp 235–312. 
26 One of the ‘Great Powers’ France was still weakened as a result of the Prussian victory of 
1870 and the effects of the Paris Commune of 1871 and, although largely following the UK 
line, exerted limited influence throughout the crisis. 
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irregulars27 against the orthodox Christian Bulgarian population within that 
part of the Turkish province of Rumelia which today forms modern Bulgaria.  
The massacre of what is believed to be some 12,000 Bulgarians28 was 
reported in the Western,29 primarily British, press30 and led to an outcry of 
public opinion both in the UK and in Russia where it fuelled a continuing rise 
in pan-Slavic nationalism.  The situation was further complicated by the fact 
that Turkey was at war with Montenegro and Serbia, both also Slav states 
and where Serbia was already being supported by Russian military 
volunteers.  From the outset the policy of the British Government under 
Disraeli31 was to minimise the extent of the crisis and to tacitly support the 
Ottoman Government whilst telling them to ‘put their house in order’.  The 
UK Government’s concern was primarily to maintain the Ottoman Empire 
and to contain Russia.  To that end the UK Government did not want the 
Turks to give the Russians any pretext for intervening in Bulgaria.  In 
adopting this response the Conservative government in the UK misread the 
mood of the UK public and of the monarch who were horrified at the Turkish 
atrocities which were soon being reported to them on an almost daily basis 
                                                 
27 They were referred to in the literature and print media of the time as Bashi Bazouks. 
28 Of which some 5,000 were at Batak.  See R. J. Crampton, A Concise History of Bulgaria,  
pp 81-3.  
29 The initial story was written by Januarius Aloysius MacGahan an Irish-American journalist 
from Ohio.  MacGahan was working for the Daily News in the UK and filed his story on 1 
August 1876.  Six days later it was front page news in Western Europe. See Bass (2000), 
op. cit., pp 235-6.  
30 The removal of the newspaper tax in the UK in 1855 had greatly increased the popularity 
and reach of the press in the UK.  See Bass (2000), Ibid. p 256. 
31 And of Bismarck in Prussia who was also fearful of Russian expansionism in the Balkans. 
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and effectively in ‘real time’.32  The public, the Queen, and the Liberal 
opposition led by Gladstone wanted the UK to intervene to stop the 
massacres and, as they developed, to secure the independence of the 
Bulgarians.  These responses were ones of pure liberal interventionism and 
humanitarian action, as there were no direct UK interests at stake if Bulgaria 
were to become an effectively independent state either within or without the 
Ottoman Empire.  However, the UK government’s response and that of the 
German Empire under Bismarck, continued to be a policy of ‘realpolitik’ and 
of containment of Russian expansionism and imperialism. 
 
While the UK deployed the Mediterranean fleet to Besikya Bay close to the 
Bosphorus, and Disraeli, under pressure from the public and the media, 
eventually threatened to dispatch 40,000 troops to Bulgaria, none of the 
Great Powers, with the exception of Russia took any decisive action.  By the 
spring of 1877, whilst the atrocities in Bulgaria had declined but remained 
under international scrutiny, the Ottomans were close to defeating both 
Serbia and Montenegro, with the consequent fear of vicious Turkish reprisals 
in both countries.  Under increasing pressure from the pan-Slavists within his 
own government and court, the Tsar declared war on the Ottoman Empire 
on 24 April 1877.   At this point the policies of both Bismarck and Disraeli 
                                                 
32 The development in the preceding fifteen years of a worldwide submarine cable network 
meant that once a reporter could get his copy to a telegraph station it could appear within 
hours across Europe.  Ironically in this the Turks were the agents of their own misfortune as 
the atrocities were occurring within a relatively easy train journey from Constantinople and 
the principal submarine cables.  MacGahan filed his story by wire from Tatar Bazardjik 
which was only thirty miles from Batak.  
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were seen to have failed and in the UK both public and royal opinion swung 
rapidly from one of humanitarian intervention to that of countering Russian 
expansionism and therefore in favour of supporting the Turks.  By March 
1878, after putting up a strong resistance, the Turks were exhausted and 
sued for peace.  The Treaty of San Stefano created a greater Bulgaria, 
reducing European Turkey to a few fragments and leaving Russia in charge 
of Bulgaria for an initial two-year period.  As a result of this treaty the other 
Great Powers applied pressure upon Russia to withdraw, with the UK and 
Austria-Hungary rapidly deploying troops and the UK sending its fleet into 
Turkish waters.  As a result of this pressure Russia agreed to a review of the 
peace treaty at the Congress of Berlin in June 1878.33 
 
The Congress of Berlin was a triumph for the Western powers and for 
imperialism rather than liberal interventionism.  It was the aim of the British 
and the Germans that the Congress should deal a blow to the ambitions of 
Russia and to its policy of pan-slavism.34  Austria-Hungary who along with 
Russia was the other Great Power with an interest in the Balkans secured a 
protectorate35 over the Ottoman province of Bosnia and effective control 
                                                 
33 The conference ran from 13 June to 13 July 1878. 
34 Arguably the Russians had already contributed to this by their own deal-making in the run 
up to the war.  Notwithstanding the negotiations between the British and the Austro-
Hungarians in Berlin, the Russians had already offered Bosnia to the Austro-Hungarians so 
that they would remain neutral in the war.  To quote Bass Russia promised Bosnia to 
Austria-Hungary, as soon as it had been carved off from the Ottoman Empire – a 
monumental betrayal of the pan-slavist cause.  Bass (2000), op. cit. p 297.   
35 Luigi Albertini, Origins of the war of 1914 Vol 1, p 20. The British negotiations with Austria-
Hungary ended on 6 June by Britain agreeing to all the Austrian proposals relative to 
Bosnia-Herzegovina about to come before the congress while Austria would support British 
demands. 
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over the province of Novi Pazar.36  Russia was given Bessarabia37 which 
was taken from Romania which secured full independence as a result of the 
Congress, while the UK received Cyprus from the Ottomans.  For the 
Bulgarians there was independence, but only for part of ‘greater Bulgaria’, as 
Eastern Rumelia38 and Macedonia were retained by the Turks who promised 
reforms in their administration.  Both Serbia39 and Greece, which like Austria 
–Hungary had not been a combatant, were also ‘rewarded’ with small gains 
in territory at Ottoman expense whilst Montenegro was given access to the 
Adriatic through the acquisition of the port of Bar.    
 
The final result of international intervention over Bulgaria had therefore been 
a victory for the imperialists with direct gains in territory at the expense of the 
Ottomans, for all but the German Empire.  It led to an expansion of the direct 
influence of the European Great Powers throughout the Balkans, which now 
formally became a part of Europe.  Little heed was paid to the wishes of the 
citizens of the territories concerned and both the Serbs and Bosniacs fought 
on the side of the Ottomans against the Austro-Hungarians, in a vain attempt 
to prevent the annexation of Bosnia, whilst the new Bulgaria contained many 
hundreds of purely Turkish Muslim settlements.  Finally Cyprus, a mixed 
community of Muslim Turk and orthodox Christian Greeks, had not sought 
                                                 
36 Today the Sanjak of Novi Pazar forms part of Serbia and incorporating part of modern day 
Kosovo. 
37 Bessarabia is modern day Moldova. 
38 Eastern Rumelia encompassed most of the southern half of modern day Bulgaria. 
39 Both the Greeks and Serbs were disappointed with the gains they made.  The Serbs were 
also very disappointed that Bosnia had been given to Austria-Hungary, a traditional enemy.  
Albertini (2005), op. cit. p 32. 
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independence from the Ottoman Empire and was occupied by the UK largely 
because of its perceived strategic position.  As for IC activities in the post-
conflict period, except for ‘rump’ Bulgaria, most of the citizens of the Balkans 
and Cyprus simply swapped from membership of one empire to another and 
were then swept along with whatever developments were occurring within 
their wider empires.  For the Bosnians the direct impact was control from 
Budapest.  As they fell within the Hungarian portion of Austria-Hungary, the 
Ottoman officials were replaced with an official and managerial class of 
Croatians numbering eventually in excess of 100,000.  Whilst a short-term 
pragmatic success, the Congress of Berlin did not prevent further conflict in 
the Balkans, most notably in the first and second Balkan wars of the early 
twentieth century, and contributed to both the First and Second World Wars 
and a legacy of problems which complicated the Balkan conflicts of the 
1990s.  Even at the time the British recognised that this was not a long-term 
solution.  To quote Lord Salisbury, the UK’s chief negotiator in Berlin;  
We shall set up a rickety sort of Turkish rule again south of the 
Balkans. But it is a mere respite. There is no vitality left in them.40 
 
Albanian Independence 
 
As described in the succeeding chapter where we examine the reasons both 
for IC intervention and non-intervention, the IC failed to intervene in any way 
                                                 
40 A.J.P. Taylor, The Struggle for Mastery in Europe 1848-1918.  See pp 228–54 for the 
Balkan Crisis and pp 250-2 for the Congress of Berlin.  The quote is taken from p 253. 
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during the Ottoman massacres of the Armenians in the 1890s, and the next 
effective IC intervention41 was at the dawn of the next century during the 
siege of Shkodra in 1912.  The Ottoman province of Albania was attacked by 
Montenegro and Serbia in defiance of an agreement made amongst the 
‘Great Powers’.  Shkodra was very quickly besieged by the Montenegrins42 
and most of the coastline between Shkodra and Durres was captured by the 
Serbians, who also occupied the mountains of northern Albania.  By this 
stage the Great Powers had imposed a naval blockade on the coastline of 
Montenegro43 and King Nikolla of Montenegro was forced to cede Shkodra44 
to the ‘Great Powers’ on 4 May 1912.  The Great Powers then occupied 
Shkodra from 5 May 1913 until the beginning of the First World War.  Whilst 
the IC’s intervention was only in limited numbers, it was clearly, on the part 
of the Powers, motivated by a genuine desire to do ‘right’ and to honour the 
agreements that had been made to the Albanians.  The direct intervention 
can be seen as a clear example of liberal interventionism as at least two of 
the Powers taking part in the intervention clearly acted against their overall 
interest.45  In practice Shkodra was the first ‘monitoring mission’ with the IC 
providing a patrolling presence, so as to ensure that the warring parties 
maintained a ‘zone of separation’.  It was also noteworthy in that these small 
                                                 
41  The IC was a ‘participant’ rather than an ‘intervener’ during the ‘Boxer rebellion’ in China 
and the many other interventions during this period were made bilaterally and/or for imperial 
or colonialist reasons, an example being the Spanish-American war.  
42 Shkodra was defended by 5,000 Turkish troops and 10,000 Albanians.  It is worth noting 
that the Ottoman army throughout the Ottoman Empire was approximately one-third ethnic 
Albanian. 
43 The blockade was instituted on 12 April 1913. 
44 This was despite the fact that the Montenegrins had failed to capture the city.  For further 
details see Andric. 
45 Russia, who in international affairs in general, supported Serbia and France. 
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teams of officers were fully integrated and therefore multinational in nature at 
the lowest level; this too was a new development.  Finally, the Great Powers 
used their access to the port facilities and their access to Shkodra Lake46 to 
bring relief supplies and medical support, not only to the defenders and 
civilian population of Shkodra, but also to their Montenegrin opponents who 
had suffered a very large number of casualties.  The activities and posture of 
the Shkodra mission closely resembled many of the later missions in the 
second half of the twentieth century and many of their activities were solely 
humanitarian in nature.    
 
The Albanians had fought alongside the Turks so as to secure their own 
existence as an independent state and this was supported by all of the Great 
Powers even though it would leave Russia’s allies Serbia and Montenegro 
without a port or direct access to the sea.47  It had been the desire of these 
two Powers, to gain access to a deep-water port, which had led to the war in 
the first place.  The support of the Great Powers, and later their direct 
intervention, also led directly to the foundation of Albania as a sovereign 
state in 1912 and the guarantee of their territorial sovereignty at the ‘Treaty 
of London’ in May 1913.  This treaty, however, also ensured that that part of 
the former Ottoman territory of Rumelia, which had included the entire 
Albanian population within the Ottoman Empire, would now be divided 
                                                 
46 Ships could reach Shkodra port via the river and there was also a steamer service across 
the lake from a Montenegrin port which was linked by narrow gauge railway to the port of 
Bar on the Montenegrin coast. 
47 Kotor and the Bay of Kotor at that time and until 1919 formed part of the Austro-Hungarian 
province of Bosnia.  Bar was not a natural harbour and had few if any facilities. 
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between the new Albanian state, and Serbia, with those parts of Rumelia 
now forming Kosovo48 and Macedonia49 being awarded to the Serbian state.  
This left significant numbers of Albanians outside Albania and within the 
Serbian state; a decision which would lead to repetitive cyclical conflict 
throughout the ensuing century.  Finally, although the aspirations of the 
Great Powers had been liberal interventionist and humanitarian during the 
siege of Shkodra itself, they reverted to their imperialist ‘type’ at the Treaty of 
London by imposing on Albania a monarchy drawn from the family of a 
German prince,50 much as they had done in Greece and elsewhere.  This 
foreign management was unwelcome to the Albanians and Prince William of 
Wied, who arrived in Durres on 7 March 1914 protected by an escort of 
Netherlands gendarmes, was to remain in Albania for only a brief period.  
Wied left the country on 3 September 191451 following a pan-Islamic revolt 
led by Essad Pasha and from that date, apart from periods of occupation by 
the Italians and various powers during the First and Second World Wars52 
was to be self-governing.  
 
 
 
                                                 
48 Kosovo had formed an independent Vilayet within the Ottoman Empire since 1877 but 
was overrun by the Serbs in 1912. 
49 The Serbs and Bulgarians had driven the Turks out of Macedonia in 1912.  
50 William of Wied was a nephew of Queen Elisabeth of Romania.  See Owen Pearson, 
Albania in the Twentieth Century: A History, p 50.  
51 On September 3, 1914, Prince William had ended his inglorious six months' reign with (a) 
proclamation, informing his people that he deemed it necessary to absent himself 
temporarily, William Miller, The Ottoman Empire and its Successors 1801–1927, p 529. 
52 The French and Greeks. 
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The aftermath of the First World War 
 
The First World War provoked brief and often speculative incursions in a 
number of areas including that of Austria-Hungary into the area of Kosovo 
and this was followed by the inter-war period and the ‘mandates’.  For the 
first time individual nation states were asked to administer portions of a 
former empire53 as autonomous ‘states’, on behalf of the League of 
Nations,54 an international body set up with US prompting55 at the end of the 
First  World War.56  Whilst not post-conflict as we would recognise it and not 
international in terms of its management of each state, the mandate 
powers57 were for the first time at least authorised to carry out their activities 
on behalf of a worldwide body but in a colonialist, and in the case of the UK 
and France, an imperialist manner.  The UK mandate of Palestine was 
frequently referred to as forming part of the British Empire and was certainly 
depicted as such on contemporary British mapping. 
 
In other areas, the interwar period from 1918 to 1939 saw very little, in the 
way of humanitarian or international intervention, even where on occasions it 
                                                 
53 These were almost exclusively from the former Turkish Empire, with a few former German 
colonies in the Pacific.  See A. D. Harvey (1994), p. cit.  See p 607 and others. 
54 There were in total fourteen mandates divided among six mandatory nations.  In addition 
the League administered two territories directly, the Saarland until 1935 and Danzig until 1 
September 1939.  
55 The initial proposal from which President Wilson’s ideas derived had been made by Field 
Marshall Smuts in his 1918 treatise,  Jan Smuts, The League of Nations: A Practical 
Suggestion. 
56 The decision to form the League of Nations was incorporated within the Versailles Treaty 
and the first meeting was on 6t January 1920.  
57 These were the UK, France, and the USA (in the Pacific basin). 
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was clearly required.  Even before the peace treaties ending the First World 
War were concluded, the Turkish invasion of Armenia and the Greco-Turkish 
War in Anatolia of 1919-22 were underway.  Both of these conflicts involved 
massive dislocation of civilian populations and widespread attacks directed 
at civilian populations.  In the case of the Greco-Turkish War, these were 
directed against all those who were not ethnic Turk or Muslim and were 
described by Shelton58 as genocide.   Lack of international action arose in 
these cases from the unwillingness of the European Great Powers to 
intervene, as in both cases the Powers were split in terms of their support for 
the combatants.  None of them chose to refer either of the conflicts to the 
League of Nations, nor any of the other conflicts in the immediate aftermath 
of the First World War. 
 
The League of Nations 
 
The League of Nations suffered from the outset in not being inclusive in 
terms of representation59 and from the fact that the USA was never a 
member.60  It did not exist as a permanent body61 with a robust secretariat.62  
                                                 
58 Dinah Shelton, Encyclopaedia of Genocide and Crimes Against Humanity, p 303. 
59 At its greatest extent between 28 September 1934 and 22 February 1935 there were only 
58 members and by this time Germany, Japan, Brazil, and Costa Rica had already 
withdrawn from the League. 
60 The fact that the USA was not bound by League sanctions edicts made these worthless.  
This was a key factor in the League’s failure to effectively censure Japan following the 
Mukden incident in 1930.  
61 Routinely the Council of the League met only five times per year.  Including ‘extraordinary 
sessions’ the Council of the League (equivalent to the UNSC) met only 107 times between 
January 1920 and September 1939 and the full membership only met once per year. 
62 The total number of ‘diplomatic’ staff in 1924 was 75 and the clerical staff some 400. 
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The League did, however, see the start of the Permanent Court of 
International Justice, the International Labour Organisation (ILO), and the 
formation of a ‘health organisation’, the precursor of the World Health 
Organisation (WHO).  By the mid-1920s, however, the League had become 
increasingly involved in resolving territorial disputes and what we would now 
understand as ‘conflict resolution’.  Although the League threatened armed 
intervention as part of its dispute resolution procedures, such as the dispute 
between Poland and Lithuania over Vilnius,63 no armed intervention ever 
took place under League auspices.  Similarly, the League threatened to 
exercise ‘trusteeship’ over Liberia unless it ceased slavery and forced 
labour.64 but never carried it out as the threat proved effective.65  As a result, 
despite requests for League interventions to stop conflicts such as that made 
by Paraguay during the ‘Chaco War’ in 1932,66 the League throughout its 
twenty-six years, never participated in any conflict or international 
humanitarian intervention, or indeed any intervention and, as such, the 
period from 1919 to39 is marked by the lack of such interventions.    
 
The Second World War and its aftermath   
 
The Second World War saw numerous short-term occupations of states and 
territories by the combatant powers, including Kosovo by first the Italians and 
                                                 
63 F. S. Northedge, The League of Nations: Its Life and Times, 1920-1946, p 86.  
64 Suzanne Miers, Slavery in the Twentieth Century: The Evolution of a global Problem, pp 
140-1. 
65 W. E. Burghardt Du Bois, Liberia, the League and the United States, pp 682-95. 
66 George Scott, The Rise and Fall of the League of Nations, p 248. 
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then the Germans and BiH by first the Ustashe-led Croats and then 
increasingly by the Germans.67  None of these interventions can be called 
post-conflict although the Italian occupation of Kosovo was seen by many 
Kosovars as a liberation from Serb domination68 in much the same way as 
the Croat and German occupation of BiH was viewed by the Bosniacs and 
Bosnian-Croats,69 for a brief while at least, from mid-1941 to mid-1943, both 
entities assumed some of the appearances of post-conflict states.70   The 
final phases and the end of the Second World War was characterised by a 
number of IC or allied interventions into former occupied states, but whether 
all or indeed any of these can be called post-conflict is open to question. 
 
The UK occupation of Greece from December 1944 until the end of 1948 is 
one such conflict and post-conflict intervention; where the British Army 
assisted the royalist Greek forces in suppressing the National People’s 
Liberation Army (ELAS) and the communist partisans in the ‘bandit wars’.  
This led to the expulsion of up to 400,000 Greeks from within Greece to 
neighbouring Yugoslavia, in particular to the province of Macedonia71 and to 
Albania.  These operations were mostly bilateral in nature and formed part of 
                                                 
67 The majority of the ethnic German troops deployed in the Balkans in the Second World 
War, were, as in the First World War, Austrian, but in this case from the Austrian component 
of the Wehrmacht. 
68 See the various references throughout Noel Malcolm, Kosovo – A Short History. 
69 For this response to the occupation see; Fitzroy Maclean, Eastern Approaches.  In 
particular see pp 292, 336, and 359 amongst others and various references throughout Noel 
Malcolm, Bosnia – A Short History.  
70 The principal mosque and residence of the ‘Reis’, the national Muslim religious leader 
was completed in the centre of Sarajevo in this period.  It was handed over to the Reis in an 
impressive ceremony in 1943, in which German troops in full dress uniform took part. 
71 This forms a key sub-text to the current dispute between Macedonia and Greece in the 
twenty-first century.  The Macedonian President for much of the period 2002-7 was half 
Greek and descended from a former ELAS fighter.  
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the competition at the end of the war between the ‘East’ and the ‘West’ as to 
whether or not states were to have communist or anti-communist regimes.72  
The intervention of both sides, which attempted to use the policy of 
containment, was imperialist in nature as they struggled to spread their own 
value systems over the widest possible area of the globe. 
 
The United Nations era and the Cold War. 
 
The formation of the United Nations (UN) before73 the conclusion of the 
Second World War learnt from the mistakes of the League of Nations.  From 
the start it was more inclusive and included all the major powers at the time 
as ‘permanent’ members of a UN ‘Security Council’ (UNSC).  The UN was 
also entrusted with conflict resolution and dispute mediation powers from the 
outset and the political structure, secretariat, and staff to use them.  
Critically, the ‘permanent council’ or, as it was now termed, the ‘Security 
Council’ was to remain in permanent session,74 so that crises and conflicts 
could be dealt with immediately.  Furthermore from the outset the UN was 
given a mandate and subordinate bodies which enabled it to deal with a wide 
range of issues in conflict and post-conflict situations, and all the tools that 
might be needed for both peace keeping and nation building.  Also for the 
                                                 
72 The UK occupation of Vietnam prior to the arrival of the French occupation force in 1946 
was another example of this.  At one stage the British were forced to re-arm the Japanese 
Prisoners of War (POW) so as to contain Ho Chi Minh and the Vietminh. 
73 Bell (2000), op. cit. p 18.  The first meeting was in San Francisco in June 1945.  The UN 
declaration had been signed as far back as 1 January 1942 in Washington. 
74 Ibid., p 41. 
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first time, the UN charter enshrined what was in effect a mandate for 
humanitarian intervention in Article 39 of the charter which states:  
The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to 
the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make 
recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken…to 
maintain or restore international peace and security.75   
The assumption, as Stahn suggests,76 is that this statement implies that in 
future humanitarian intervention was to be considered only ‘on a strictly 
multilateral, UN mandated authority’. 
 
Israel and Palestine 
 
From the outset the UN was entrusted by the Great Powers with difficult 
missions and intractable problems, most but not all, relating to 
decolonisation.  The very first mission on which UN peacekeepers were 
deployed was related to the conflict that occurred immediately following the 
UK’s completion of its stewardship of the Palestine mandate.  The UK’s 
withdrawal led to conflict between the Jews and the Arabs and the 
foundation of the State of Israel.  Following a UN resolution the UN was 
asked to intervene and formed the UN Truce Supervision Organisation 
                                                 
75 Charter of the United Nations. 
76 Carsten Stahn, Responsibility to Protect: Political Rhetoric or Emerging Legal Norm?,  pp 
99-120. 
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(UNTSO) in June 1948.  As the conflict has never been resolved UNTSO 
remains in place in 2011.77   
 
Over time, however, the UN missions in the region and their mandates have 
been transformed, particularly in Palestine, into one of nation building and 
sustaining the parallel structures which for many years constituted the 
Palestinian state.  Apart from direct relief efforts in Palestine and for the 
Palestinian population in the near abroad, for example in Jordan and 
Lebanon, the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA), has been 
heavily engaged not only in direct relief work, but also in coordination with 
other UN agencies in creating a functioning education and health system 
and wider governmental structure.  This experience of nation building was 
later to become extremely valuable to the UN in the late 1980s and early 
1990s.  It began to develop missions which moved beyond the purely 
peacekeeping and monitoring model, towards the post-conflict 
development78 and nation building which the IC now has come to expect.  In 
the initial stages, this nation building activity was exclusively a UN preserve 
but with the foundation of the Palestinian State the development of the state 
structures and particularly the security and justice structures such as the 
customs and the police, have become increasingly the domain of the EU.  
                                                 
77 Officially the Israeli – Arab conflict is a frozen conflict, as Syria in particular remains 
technically at war with Israel.  Despite the ongoing crisis in Syria, the United Nations 
Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) mandate was renewed for a further six months 
by the UNSC on 30 June 2011.  UNDOF personnel man positions on the Golan Heights 
between Syria and Israel. 
78 See Cambodia and Mozambique below and Bosnia and Kosovo in later chapters. 
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These developments will be examined in Chapter 8 which will look at the 
increasing role of the EU, not only in its own ‘near abroad’, but worldwide 
and now even within the UN itself.79  
 
The Period of De-colonialization 
 
Following the partition of British India, upon British withdrawal the successor 
states India and Pakistan almost immediately found themselves in conflict 
and the UN was called upon to form the UN Military Observer Group in India 
and Pakistan (UNMOGIP), again this remains in place.  In the period 1950-3 
came the largest UN intervention yet, involving a major commitment of 
ground troops in the Korean War in support of South Korea.  Although the 
UNSC was unanimous80 only Western countries supported the resolution 
with ground troops and the leadership of the operation, as well as most of 
the troops, came from the US.  The UN involvement in the Korean conflict 
was not one of liberal interventionism, but one of containment on behalf of 
one of the world’s two principal imperialist powers at that time.  For the 
communist Chinese, who intervened on behalf of the North Koreans on 19 
December 1950, the motivation was even simpler, one, as they saw it, of 
                                                 
79 On 3 May 2011 the UN granted the EU the right to speak at the UN General Assembly 
(UNGA) in its own name rather than through the rotating presidency.  This is the first 
international organisation to be given this privilege and, whilst it does not confer voting 
rights, effectively gives the 27 EU member states 28 seats in the UNGA.  BBC News Europe 
0134 4 May 2011. 
80 Yugoslavia was absent and the USSR boycotted the meeting.  The Chinese seat was 
occupied by the Nationalists based in Taiwan. 
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survival.  In addition, as Bell says of the Chinese: The Americans were not 
the only ones to fear the domino effect of their enemies’ victories.81 
   
The Korean War, although a major UN intervention, led to no major role for 
the UN in the post-conflict period.  The management of post-conflict in North 
Korea was entirely the preserve of the Soviet Union and China;82 in the 
south of the peninsula it was largely US investment and an engagement with 
the US commercial model which characterized the post-conflict phase.  As 
with Israel, the conflict remains ‘frozen’ as opposed to resolved.   
 
What these first interventions demonstrated was that it was possible for the 
UN to intervene when called upon to do so, and to maintain a cease-fire, in 
some cases almost indefinitely.83  However, it was much more difficult for an 
international organisation to create a long-term peace or indeed to build 
effective governance and institutions in areas where only a partial peace or a 
cease-fire has been achieved, or more often where a state is failing but has 
not yet ‘failed’ or admitted ‘failure’.84  The UN can only intervene when it is 
called upon to do so and even then political pressures may limit the mandate 
                                                 
81 Bell (2001), op. cit.,  p 110. 
82 Very little has been written about the post-conflict period in North Korea.  It followed the 
standard doctrine for that time of focusing upon heavy industry.  
83 By 2011 there were no less than five UN peacekeeping missions which have been in 
place for thirty-three years or more.  
84 Yemen in the period from 2005 to 2010 may be a useful example. 
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in terms of the support which the UN can provide and the length of its 
programmes.85 
 
Returning to the case of Israel and its boundaries, the UN Interim Force in 
Lebanon (UNIFIL) is still in place after thirty-three years and it is now some 
thirty-five years86 since any effective governance, Lebanese or otherwise, 
was in place in the region.  While UNIFIL and the other UN agencies can 
supply food, medical help, assist with schooling and assist with a range of 
other issues, the area of Lebanon in which UNIFIL operates is in effect a 
failed state,87 with almost no ‘institutional capacity’ as defined by 
Fukuyama.88  Currently whilst there is little if any conflict, there is also only a 
limited amount of post-conflict activity taking place.  According to Fukuyama 
it is the issue of failed states and the West’s inability to do anything about it, 
rather than conflict itself, which should concern us.  As Fukuyama says it is 
the:  
lack of state capacity in poor states (that) has come to haunt the 
developed world much more directly.  The end of the cold war left a 
band of failed and weak states stretching from the Balkans through 
the Caucasus, the Middle East, Central Asia and South Asia.  State 
collapse or weakness had already created major humanitarian and 
                                                 
85 Typically many UN mission mandates are for one year and renewable.  Some are 
renewable at six-monthly intervals.  This makes long-term programme work difficult. 
86  There had been effective governance in the region prior to the civil war in Lebanon.  The 
author visited Nabatiyeh, the ‘capital’ of the area in February 1974 for a festival, and found a 
functioning society, with all of the organs of state including local police and gendarmerie. 
87 Francis Fukuyama, State-Building: Governance and World Order in the 21st Century. 
88 Professor Fukuyama was speaking at the Carnegie Council on 19 May 2004. 
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human rights disasters during the 1990s in Somalia, Haiti, Cambodia, 
Bosnia, Kosovo and East Timor.89 
 
According to the ‘Carnegie Foundation’ and the ‘Fund for Peace’, who 
together produce a yearly Failed States Index (FSI) using a Conflict 
Assessment System Tool (CAST)90 to measure which states are most at risk 
of governance failure, there were no less than thirty-two states at risk in 
2007, four more than in 2006.  As Wilner says:  
Put into context, one in every six national governments currently has 
difficulty in controlling aspects of its sovereign territory.91       
 
Long before Fukuyama was writing and the Carnegie Foundation were 
producing their papers the UN and the international community had become 
heavily involved in conflict and post-conflict worldwide and particularly in 
sub-Saharan Africa.  Almost all of the conflicts arose as a result of the de-
colonization process, in many cases because the colonists had ignored 
existing political and tribal boundaries at the time of colonization92.  In the 
period 1960-90, Bell93 identifies no less than twenty-four conflicts, many of 
them of long duration.94 
                                                 
89 Fukuyama (2004), op. cit., p xix. 
90 The FSI and CAST are used by the USA and perhaps others as foreign policy planning 
tools. 
91 Alex Wilner, Making the World Safe for Canada – Canadian Security Policy in a World of 
Failed States, p 4. 
92 Typically the colonists used rivers as boundaries, whereas for the native Africans the 
rivers were usually the centre points of tribal areas, not the edges.  
93 Bell (2004), op. cit.  See pp 448-9 which also includes a list of the conflicts. 
94 There were twelve conflicts which had durations of ten years or more. 
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Surprisingly given these numbers, during the period from 1948 to 1989 the 
UN was only involved in fourteen peacekeeping operations, of which only 
one was in sub-Saharan Africa.95  Even in these cases many ‘have 
amounted to little more than holding a slender line between two 
combatants’.96  Due to the colonial origins of many of the conflicts and the 
‘Cold War’ between two of the major powers, the manning of UN 
peacekeeping missions became the province of the second, and third-rank 
powers with little direct involvement of the major military powers.  For the 
majority of these missions post-conflict activity focused upon the short-term 
sustenance of the often innocent victims of the conflict through the provision 
of food aid by UNWFP (and others) and of refugee camps.  Although these 
were large scale and very costly activities,97 they were primarily focused 
upon short-term relief and not long-term nation building and food 
sustainability.  Little was done in the manner of formal Disarmament, 
Demobilisation and Re-integration (DDR) and so, even where UN or other 
interventions had proved successful in bringing a conflict to a conclusion, the 
states often remained vulnerable to further unrest, particularly if following the 
conflict there was little long-term employment available.    Although primarily 
UN led, there were other sub-Saharan missions which, were led by other 
                                                 
95 Bell (2004), op. cit.  See pp 511-12 which includes a list of the missions. 
96 Ibid., p 511. 
97 They were also very profitable to those involved.  One company contracted by WFP in 
Sub-Saharan Africa and elsewhere had a turnover of US $110 million by 1990.  This was, 
FEEDEM™, run by a former US marine and based in Kenya.  By 1990 it had operations in 
twenty-one countries, where as the company name suggests, it supplied vehicle haulage 
and fed people on UNWFP contracts.  FEEDEM™ was also a contractor for the UNOSOM 
missions. 
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organisations, or even by the former colonial powers, such as the UK 
intervention in Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) at the end of the Civil War.  These 
were usually time limited and often for a specific purpose such as that in 
Rhodesia, which is referred to in more detail below.   
 
Whilst the conflicts in sub-Saharan Africa and elsewhere had provided little 
practical opportunity for the UN or for other international interventions to 
develop their post-conflict procedures in the period from 1945 to 1990, the 
UN, and the IC at least, was able to establish the tools with which to do so 
and to develop procedures which would be of later use.  The UK and 
Commonwealth intervention in Rhodesia/Zimbabwe, post-independence and 
pre-election, in the period 1979-80, saw the development both of a process 
of DDR and of military support to a free and fair elections process including 
the provision of the security framework for the polling day.   A by-product of 
this intervention was that the UK military, whilst successfully completing the 
DD portion of DDR did not, in part due to the mandate,98 remain long enough 
in the country to complete the re-integration process.  This, it was quickly 
learned, is critical to ensuring long-term peace and stability. 
 
The ‘Post-Cold War’ period 
 
                                                 
98 The UK was not keen to have a large number of troops deployed to Rhodesia on a long- 
term basis.  There was also considerable, but in the event unjustified, international concern 
that the UK might remain in Rhodesia for a prolonged period.   
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Although the transition to and early years of the ‘post-Cold War’ period 
overlapped the continuing decolonialisation and post-colonial processes 
described in the preceding section, it differs from them, in that the world had 
moved from a bi-polar system to an initially, at least, mono-polar system 
focused upon the US.  Those states which had aligned themselves with the 
former Soviet Union, so as to receive large subsidies,99 or indeed those 
states that had attempted to position themselves between the two Power 
‘blocs’, so as to secure maximum financial and other advantages by 
bargaining with both sides, were now unable to do so.  As a result the post-
Cold War world saw a period of rapid change in the relationships between 
states.    
 
As with the ending of the Second World War, the end of the Cold War saw a 
surge in world-wide conflict with six new UN operations starting in 1991 and 
a further three in 1992.  In parallel, other international interventions began to 
take place, usually led by the USA or with the USA in a ‘framework nation’ 
role, but in support of or under the auspices of the UN.  Most notably this 
included a coalition of twenty-seven countries which joined together to 
support a UNSC resolution100 which had demanded that Iraq withdraw from 
                                                 
99 The Soviet Union’s guaranteed purchase price for Cuban sugar and discounted sale price 
for oil to Cuba would be an example. 
100 On 29 November 1990 the UN. passed Security Council resolution 678.  This stated that 
if Iraq had not withdrawn from Kuwait by 15 January 1991, the member states were 
empowered to use: ‘all necessary means’ to eject Iraqi forces from Kuwait.  The phrase ‘all 
necessary means’, has been employed in UNSC resolutions several times subsequently, 
most recently in 2011 in connection with Libya. 
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Kuwait, which it had invaded on 2 August 1990.101  The brief conflict which 
ensued102 resulted in the expulsion of the Iraqi forces and the restoration of 
the status quo ante.  The Iraq War did not lead to any of the modern post-
conflict processes as the government of Iraq remained in place and 
sovereign throughout its territory.  Furthermore, the Kuwaiti Government  
Kuwait funded its own post-war restoration and it fell to the allies solely to 
maintain an air-exclusion zone over Iraq so as to minimise any future 
potential threats from that source.  For the UN the only post-conflict 
involvement was to place the UN Iraq Kuwait Observer Mission (UNIKOM) at 
the border in April 1991,103 where it remained until withdrawn following the 
Second Gulf War on 6 October 2003.104  Originally authorised for, and never 
exceeding, 300 military observers, the mission had swollen to a size of 3,645 
including the international and local UN support staff by 5 February 1993.105  
This massive expansion in UN staff involved in peacekeeping operations in 
Kuwait was mirrored elsewhere in the UN peacekeeping operations 
worldwide, so that by the mid-1990s Shawcross was able to write of the UN 
managing some 68,000 ‘deployed personnel’.106  The UNIKOM mission also 
mirrored the UNOSOM missions in their relatively high casualty rate with 
eighteen fatalities, only five of whom were military observers.107  These 
trends towards relatively high casualties and to expansion in the size of 
                                                 
101 Bell (2004), op. cit., pp 552-3. 
102 The air campaign commenced on 16 January and the ground campaign on 24 February 
1991.  A cease-fire was unilaterally declared by the allies on 28 February 1991. 
103  It was established by UNSC Resolution 689 of 9 April 1991. 
104 UN peacekeeping website.   
105 Ibid. 
106 William Shawcross, op.cit. 
107 UN peacekeeping website.  
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missions were to lead to a change in composition of the military components 
of the UN missions and hence to their overall efficiency.108  In a relatively 
short space of time (of about five years or so) the traditional contributors to 
UN peacekeeping forces such as Canada, Ireland, Sweden, Finland, and 
Belgium began to withdraw, to be replaced by Third World countries in 
particular: Kenya, Bangladesh, and  Pakistan. It was also to lead to a radical 
overhaul of the UN’s own machinery for managing peacekeeping operations 
and to the establishment of a new department., the United Nations 
Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO) which became 
operational in 1992 and which was made directly answerable to the UN 
Secretary General (UNSG).  The mandate of DPKO is exceptionally wide.109  
Most of the specific tasks within a modern peacekeeping mission fall within 
the DPKO’s ‘Office of the Rule of Law and Security Institutions’ and include 
such elements as Security Sector Reform (SSR), policing, criminal justice 
and law reform, DDR and the UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS).  Military 
reform is not typically a UN function but, where this takes place, this also 
falls within DPKO and within the ‘military affairs division’.110   With the 
exception of ‘field support’, which remains under the remit of the UN 
Department of Political Affairs (UNDPA) at the UN, virtually all the functions 
within UN peacekeeping missions are now managed by DPKO which by 
                                                 
108 The comments on military efficiency were made to me by Col. Hap Stutt in 2005.  Stutt is 
a former Canadian officer now serving as one of the military planners in DPKO and who has 
been with the department since serving in Bosnia as a battalion commander with 
UNPROFOR.  He commented that it was the generally narrower skill base, for example the 
focus on infantry personnel and the lack of modern equipment provided, that was most 
noticeable. 
109 UNDPKO official organisation chart.  
110 Ibid. 
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2010 had grown to 125,000 staff spread amongst the UN HQ, regional 
centres, and some sixteen deployed missions.  
 
Ironically, whilst the First Gulf War started with clear humanitarian 
interventionist objectives and was supported by a UN mandate, if not under 
UN command, the UN’s own direct involvement through the UNIKOM 
mission appeared much more closely to resemble those of the ‘containment’ 
policies of the Great Powers in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.  
The UN, as an institution showed itself unable or unwilling to make any 
effective direct intervention under a UN banner111 when, immediately 
following the First Gulf War the leader of Iraq, Saddam Hussein, wreaked 
revenge for his defeat, on first the ‘marsh Arabs’ in the south of Iraq and then 
upon the traditional ‘whipping boy’ the Kurds in the north of the country.  It 
was a military coalition led by the USA and the UK112 that, as part of 
‘Operation Provide Comfort I’,113 deployed troops across the Turkish–Iraqi 
border to prevent a massacre of Kurdish civilians and provided humanitarian 
aid in the crisis which followed.  This operation and ‘Operation Provide 
Comfort II’ were to continue until 31 December 1996 and were only 
terminated at the request of the government of Turkey.  Although primarily 
and in the case of ‘Operation Provide Comfort II’, almost exclusively military 
in nature, these were clearly humanitarian intervention operations delivered 
                                                 
111 It did pass the necessary resolutions which permitted operations ‘Provide Comfort I’ and 
‘II’ to take place, but did not lead them. 
112 The UK operation was known as Operation HAVEN. 
113 The operation was initiated in response to UN Security Council Resolution 688 of 5 April 
1991. 
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in support of a civilian population whom both of their immediate neighbours, 
Turkey and Iran, had traditionally regarded with a degree of hostility.  Unlike 
the First and Second Gulf Wars which could be claimed to have revolved 
around access to energy resources,114 none of the powers directly involved 
in the operations in support of the Kurds had any mineral or other interests in 
the area, nor did they have a strategic reason for involvement.      
 
Following the First Gulf War there were a series of conflict resolutions to 
both long, and short-term conflicts in the early 1990s.  These UN 
interventions saw the start of the continuous evolution115 of the ‘standard’ 
post-conflict processes which we see today and which themselves have 
been captured in an extensive UN DPKO lessons learned process.116  Of 
these, by far the most important were the ending of the civil wars in 
Cambodia and Mozambique and the beginning of the post-conflict 
governance and nation-building processes in both countries. 
 
Cambodia  
                                                 
114 Which in the First Gulf War was linked more specifically to the pricing of oil.  The 
principal reason for Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait was the Kuwaiti increase in oil production.  This 
drove down the price per barrel of oil to a point where Iraq was placed in a position of 
economic crisis.  
115 The evolutionary process has been aided by the repetitive employment of several small 
groups of key specialists particularly amongst the middle and senior management of the UN, 
across numerous field missions complemented by the lessons learned process.  An 
example of the former is Jacques Klein (US).  He was UN SRSG to the United Nations 
Transitional Administration in Eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and Western Sirmium (UNTAES) 
1996-7, then Deputy High Representative in Bosnia 1997-9 followed by UN SRSG in Bosnia 
1999-03 and finally UN SRSG Liberia 2003-5.  Not only was Klein succeeded at UNTAES 
by William Walker (US) who then went on to become OSCE Head of Mission in Moldova, 
but his head of finance and political officer also followed with him through his various 
postings in the Balkans and Liberia.   
116 See UNDPKO organisation chart. 
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Cambodia had been in a state of conflict for some twenty years by the time 
that the Agreements on a Comprehensive Political Settlement of the 
Cambodia Conflict were signed in Paris on 23 October 1991.  First, 
Cambodia had been involved indirectly in the Vietnam War from the early 
1970s, then in a three-year war with the Vietnamese state from 1975 to 78 
and, finally, it had been forced to deal with the excesses of the Pol Pot 
regime, where many thousands were murdered and many millions banished 
to the countryside.  The signature in Paris was the result of ten years patient 
diplomatic effort by the UN and was to mark a transition from conflict to post-
conflict for a country which had by now been devastated.  As part of the 
peace agreement, the UN was to immediately deploy some 200 observers to 
monitor the ceasefire agreed as the United Nations Advanced Mission in 
Cambodia (UNAMIC).  The UNAMIC force was be absorbed into the larger 
United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) once this 
arrived in the country. 
One of the first tasks of UNAMIC was to map and then deal with the 
extensive mine117 contamination throughout Cambodia.  In addition, they 
were to train the local Cambodian population how to detect and avoid mines 
by running a mine awareness programme.  Very rapidly this programme was 
seen to be insufficient and following an expansion of its mandate by the UN, 
                                                 
117 Mine is used throughout this text as a ‘shorthand’ description for the whole range of 
activities including; booby traps, Unexploded Ordnance (UXO) including cluster bombs, and 
other devices as well as mines. 
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UNAMIC was told to prepare for a major de-mining effort, particularly in 
those areas which were designated to house refugees from the camps on 
the Thai border.  As a result of these changes in mandate UNAMIC worked 
closely with the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) who were 
providing the practical and infrastructure support for the returning refugees.  
From 15 March 1992 these responsibilities were gradually transferred to 
UNTAC as it arrived in the country.  The mandate given to UNTAC was 
limited to eighteen months, but was extremely broad and was designed to 
underpin the creation of a new democratic and independent Cambodian 
state, which was to be established by September 1993.  In addition to the 
counter mine operations, the mandate included:   
human rights, the organization and conduct of free and fair general 
elections, military arrangements, civil administration, the maintenance 
of law and order, the repatriation and resettlement of the Cambodian 
refugees and displaced persons and the rehabilitation of essential 
Cambodian infrastructure during the transitional period.118 
This daunting list of activities and the tight timescale, combined with the 
state of Cambodia upon the arrival of the UN, would be typical not only of 
this mission but also of those elsewhere that were to follow on from it.  In 
that sense Cambodia can be seen as the prototype of the modern post-
conflict mission, as seen subsequently in the Balkans and elsewhere.  
Cambodia was to be where the UN was to put into practice the skills which 
                                                 
118 UN peacekeeping website.  
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had been gradually evolving over time and to develop new ones.  As the 
UNTAC mission was successful in most areas, it would also become a 
‘touchstone’ and reference point, not only for the UN, but all international 
organizations in the years to follow and, more importantly, it was to become 
the training ground for many of the leaders and most of the middle managers 
in the IC’s resolution of post-conflict for the next ten or more years.  
Importantly, because it was not at the time known to possess strategic 
assets,119 Cambodia was a purely humanitarian intervention based upon 
liberal interventionist principles.  Cambodia was of no direct interest to any 
major power and simply represented a destabilising threat120 to the three 
medium-sized powers121 who bordered it.     
To give an idea of the scale of the mandate and the effort required from the 
UN the simple term ‘military arrangements’ in the UN mandate incorporated: 
separation of the combatant forces, DDR, the creation of new unified and 
effective Cambodian armed forces from amongst the former warring 
combatants and, in addition to the mine awareness campaign, a large mine-
clearance operation using mostly demobilised former combatants. 
Significantly, the peace agreement mandated countrywide free and fair 
elections to take place within a very short timescale and under UN 
arrangements and management.  Although the UN was also in the process 
                                                 
119 Exploitation of oil and gas has recently commenced. 
120 It was the Cambodians who had attacked the Vietnamese in 1975 and who had 
subsequently mounted border incursions into Thailand and Laos. 
121 These are, Thailand, Laos, and Vietnam. 
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of supervising the elections process in Angola in 1992, the operation in 
Cambodia was the first time that the UN had undertaken to deliver a 
comprehensive elections process.  This was to be delivered in a country 
which initially, at least, had very little infrastructure and where the experience 
of running multi-party elections was minimal.  To give some idea of the 
scope of the problem, in the sixteen months between UNTAC’s arrival and 
polling day, some 2,000122 polling stations had to be identified, some four 
million voters registered123 and assigned to polling stations and the staff for 
polling and counting recruited and trained.  In parallel, there was also to be 
activity in providing training and support to political parties, many of which 
were only formed during the election period itself.    This list of electoral 
related activities and the short timescale imposed was to be typical of the UN 
and other international missions which were to follow elsewhere, whether it 
be Georgia, Bosnia, East Timor, Kosovo, Iraq, or Afghanistan and will be 
discussed in more detail in the thematic chapters on the Western Balkans 
which follow. 
Significantly, the success of the Cambodian elections process was seen as 
being a methodology which effectively transformed a short-term ceasefire 
into a practical and fully implemented long-term peace agreement.  For the 
UN and its financial backers, in particular the USA, this was a fundamental 
revelation.  Formerly, the UN had regularly intervened with observers who 
would then picquet a ceasefire line often, it would appear, indefinitely.  The 
                                                 
122 UN peacekeeping website. 
123 UNTAC website.  
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UN had failed, for example with UNTSO,124 to achieve a long-term 
settlement of problems and had increasingly become a part of the problem.  
Almost overnight, or so it appeared to many observers, elections appeared 
to be the way forward and the way to ‘end wars’,125 or at least the way to 
achieve a peaceful transition such as was to happen in South Africa.   What 
was yet to become apparent was that polling day and the declaration of a 
result were only steps in the process towards effective governance and that 
the true results of an election could only be observed in retrospect.126  This 
was a lesson which the IC would not fully learn until after the local elections 
in Bosnia in 1997. 
In order for UNTAC to achieve this challenging mandate, of which the 
administration of elections formed only one component, it numbered at its 
peak some 22,000 personnel127 and UNAMIC and UNTAC combined, in the 
less than two years of their joint existence, cost some US $1.62 billion.128  In 
addition to the monetary cost there was also a human cost as some sixty-
four international personnel and fourteen national staff were killed,129 many 
of them in mine incidents. The UN missions in Cambodia set the benchmark 
for a succession of large high-profile and high-cost missions delivering a 
                                                 
124 At this stage UNTSO had been in being for forty-five years. 
125 George Sekniashvili, a member of the Georgian Central Election Commission (CEC), 
speaking to the author in 1997 about his own experiences in Georgia in 1994. 
126 Hung Sen’s Cambodian People’s Party although it lost the election initially shared power 
with Prince Ranarridh’s FUNCINPEC party and eventually replaced it as the ruling party 
following a coup in 1997.  Hung Sen, who has been the effective Prime Minister of 
Cambodia since 1986, remains in power today. 
127 UNTAC website.  
128 Ibid. 
129 Ibid. 
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wide range of post-conflict activities throughout the 1990s.  Additionally, 
unlike the long-term observer missions such as UNTSO, where years would 
pass between casualties occurring for UN personnel, these new missions 
continued (and continue today) to incur relatively high casualty rates.130 
A further issue which arose, given the scope of the mandate, was over the 
impact of the UN’S wide powers which it was provided by the IC.  Although 
the IC’s role in Cambodia can be seen to be liberal interventionist and 
humanitarian in its primary focus, by voting for such a broad mandate in the 
UN, it could also be seen to be establishing, even if only temporarily, what 
was in effect a UN protectorate; a protectorate, moreover, guarded by the 
UN’s own military and police.  This argument gained little resonance in 
Cambodia as the effective duration of the UNTAC’s presence in Cambodia 
was brief and the clear need to do something positive was widely 
understood.  The argument, however, about the role and presence of the UN 
in post-conflict  states and its apparent role in creating ‘protectorate’s’ was to 
resurface later and with greater resonance, first in Bosnia and then more 
substantively in Kosovo.  
 
 
 
Somalia – The UN Operation in Somalia the (UNOSOM) missions 
                                                 
130 UNDPKO continues to have personnel killed on an annual basis, particularly on its DDR 
missions.  In conversation with the Head of DDR in UNDPKO in September 2008 she told 
the author that her division within DPKO, typically lost between four to seven personnel per 
year, spread across the thirty DDR activities they had running at that time.   
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In parallel with the Cambodian missions the UN was also running a mission 
in Somalia between April 1992 and March 1993, UNOSOM I.  Whilst given 
the size of its predecessors it was a very large mission in UN terms,131 
nevertheless it was very much smaller than the operation in Cambodia and 
much more limited in its aims and objectives and hence its mandate.132  
Again, however, there were significant UN casualties.133  With the 
deteriorating security situation in Somalia which had led to the creation of the 
‘Unified Task Force’ (UNITAF) and the good example of the Cambodian 
intervention drawing to a close, the UN was mandated to undertake a much 
larger and more comprehensive mission in Somalia under the designation 
UNOSOM II.  This time the mandate was broader and not time bound, but 
clearly drew on the experiences from Cambodia.134       
 
                                                 
131 UNOSOM website.  It cost US $42.9 million and involved 4,500 personnel.   
132 Ibid.  The core element of the mandate was to; ‘monitor the cease-fire in Mogadishu, the 
capital of Somalia, and to provide protection and security for United Nations personnel, 
equipment and supplies at the seaports and airports in Mogadishu and escort deliveries of 
humanitarian supplies from there to distribution centres in the city and its immediate 
environs’. In August 1992, UNOSOM I's mandate and strength were enlarged to enable it to 
protect humanitarian convoys and distribution centres throughout Somalia. 
133 Ibid.  There were eight fatalities. 
134 Ibid.  The core elements of the mandate were to; take appropriate action, including 
enforcement measures, to establish throughout Somalia a secure environment for 
humanitarian assistance. To that end, UNOSOM II was to complete, through disarmament 
and reconciliation, the task begun by UNITAF for the restoration of peace, stability, law and 
order. Its main responsibilities included monitoring the cessation of hostilities, preventing 
resumption of violence, seizing unauthorized small arms, maintaining security at ports, 
airports, and lines of communication required for delivery of humanitarian assistance, 
continuing mine-clearing, and assisting in repatriation of refugees in Somalia. UNOSOM II 
was also entrusted with assisting the Somali people in rebuilding their economy and social 
and political life, re-establishing the country's institutional structure, achieving national 
political reconciliation, re-creating a Somali State based on democratic governance and 
rehabilitating the country's economy and infrastructure. 
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The budget for the new mission, which in the event lasted only two years, 
was some US $1.64 billion.  There were also some 28,000 international 
personnel and some 2,800 locally recruited personnel.  What is not shown in 
the mandate is the detail which went into the planning for the UNOSOM II 
mission and which was based upon the UN’s previous experience in the 
country and also Cambodia.  Greater attention was paid to cultural 
sensitivities than hitherto, with advisors and experts being recruited where 
possible from across the African Continent and from all races.  Extensive 
attention was given to the infrastructure planning along with detailed 
planning for implementation of a telecommunications infrastructure using, it 
was hoped initially at least, guarded sites for hubs.  A key component of the 
UNOSOM II plan also envisaged support to both local and international 
NGOs being provided around small thirty-man sized military ‘hubs’, who 
would provide local security and other facilities such as a helipad or airstrip, 
a medical aid post, and vehicle repair facilities.  Indeed, as planned in 1992 
and early 1993,135 UNOSOM II was a ‘model’ UN mission incorporating all of 
those elements which have since been observed on later UN missions.     
 
Unfortunately UNOSOM II, although well planned, was both a political and 
practical failure almost from the start.  Its initial liberal interventionist and 
                                                 
135 The author was part of a UK civil-military team working on the provision of two 
components of UNOSOM II, the rural telecommunications and other communications 
infrastructure and the provision of the guard forces which would secure these facilities.  The 
team’s work was based upon the experience that had been gained in producing a similar 
communications infrastructure and guard force in Colombia across the Andes in support of 
the BP pipeline being built there.  
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humanitarian objectives became diverted, increasingly towards purely 
military tasks and after a series of increasingly heavy casualties,136 which 
included the shooting down of two US Blackhawk helicopters, the mission 
which deployed in March 1993 was withdrawn in March 1995 and the tasks 
allocated were abandoned, so that Somalia continued and continues to be a 
‘failed state’.  The UN’s failure in Somalia and its inability to resolve the 
Bosnian crisis corroded the views towards the performance of the UN of one 
of its principal funders, the USA, throughout the remainder of the 1990s and 
into the early twentieth century, as the later chapters of this thesis will 
illustrate.   
 
The UNOSOM missions can also be seen to have been designed to create a 
‘protectorate’ in Somalia and one of their fatal flaws was that this is what 
they were perceived to be by the local populace and in particular the political 
elites.  That UNOSOM II was not ‘time bound’, as the UNTAC mission had 
been, was in retrospect a fatal flaw, as was the presence of significant 
numbers of US troops; albeit that they were not ostensibly participating in 
UNOSOM II.  Both of the UNOSOM missions were undoubtedly driven by 
liberal interventionist and humanitarian motives, but UNOSOM II in particular 
came to be identified too closely with US national aims and objectives which 
were clearly not.137  In addition, the use of Cambodia as a ‘role model’ was 
                                                 
136 UNOSOM website.  There were 147 fatalities, 146 of them involving international 
personnel. 
137 The US aims still remain somewhat opaque.  Although they were opposed to ‘war-
lordism’ their principal concern appears to have been one of removing the justification for an 
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politically flawed as the political groundwork for a lasting ceasefire between 
all parties, even if by the time of UNOSOM II they could have been identified, 
had not been achieved.  Further, and unlike Cambodia, Somalia was not a 
truly unified state with a long history; rather the amalgamation of two 
colonies from two different empires and one which did not even incorporate 
all of the ethnic Somali cultural heartland.138      
    
Mozambique 
 
Following on from its success in Cambodia, the UN also assisted with the 
Mozambique elections in 1994.139  These were the first to be held following 
the ‘Liberation War’ of 1964-74 and a long and bloody civil war from 1975 to 
92.  They also followed the promulgation of a new constitution in 1990, which 
allowed for Mozambique to become a multi-party democracy.  This mission 
was a success and involved the UN in even wider areas of infrastructure 
development and nation building.  As an example there was a considerable 
need within the country not only for DDR but also in instruction on how to 
grow crops, run a blacksmith’s shop, and all of the other things necessary to 
maintain a rural community.  As by 1992 the war had been in progress for 
thirty-eight years, many men from rural areas knew nothing other than how 
to be ‘soldiers’ and so DDR without extensive training programmes would 
                                                                                                                                         
invasion of Somalia by Ethiopia, at that time ruled by the ‘Derg’, a regime to which the US, 
was opposed.  If this was the case then the US policy was one of ‘containment’.   
138 The North East province of Kenya was formerly part of Somalia.  Italy exchanged it with 
the UK in return for concessions in what is today Puntland in former British Somaliland. 
139 UN Mozambique website. 
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not work and could indeed lead to starvation and hence a return to violence.  
Whilst the UN had an established agency, the Food and Agriculture 
Organization (FAO), this was focused principally upon long-term goals.  
What was needed in Mozambique were small multi-skilled teams who were 
able to sustain themselves in remote rural areas and who were equipped 
and capable of defending themselves if need be while providing the skills 
training required to make those communities self-sufficient.  This was a new 
development for the UN, but another facet of post-conflict which can be 
observed being implemented in later UN missions such as in Liberia and 
Sierra Leone. 
  
Mozambique was again a liberal intervention on the part of the UN although 
there were undoubtedly some capitalist companies who benefited from the 
stability it provided in the long term, as did the neighbouring states of South 
Africa, Malawi, Tanzania, and Zimbabwe.  The mission was a success.  It 
developed and implemented new processes which have proved of use in 
successor missions.  Its emphasis on capital infrastructure projects has been 
maintained by Prime Minister Chissano and others after the departure of the 
mission so that today in 2011, Mozambique is one of the few countries in the 
world where the development of the strategic waterways and the railways, 
including links to Malawi and Zimbabwe,140 continue to evolve, along with the 
                                                 
140 For example, the Chipata-Mchinji railway line opened in August 2010 provides railway 
and marine transport links to the port of Nacala, to the central and northern parts of 
Mozambique, to the Zambezi Delta midway between Beira and Quelimane, and to the port 
of Beira from Malawi and through Malawi to both Zimbabwe and Zambia. 
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development of the largest deep-water port in East Africa at Nacala.  The UN 
can also claim success in its DDR programme141 in that it successfully 
reintegrated 92,000 former combatants and collected 200,000 small arms by 
the end of its mission in late 1995.142  The misfortune for the UN was that the 
successes of the Mozambique mission were overshadowed by failures, not 
only in Somalia but also elsewhere and that, whilst the ‘lessons learned’ 
have been implemented, few now serving in the UN realise where many of 
them originated.  
 
Conclusion 
 
As these selected instances illustrate, although the IC has for almost two 
centuries come up with innovative solutions to the problems of conflict and 
post-conflict  these ‘solutions’ have been evolutionary rather than 
revolutionary.  This is particularly the case post-1945 where the concepts 
adopted have often been those that have worked previously; the use of 
international ‘observation’, or the concept and trial of people for war crimes.  
As the succeeding chapters will demonstrate, progress in the management 
of post-conflict has continued to be evolutionary and is likely to remain so, if 
only because of the continuity of the actors involved in securing its practical 
implementation, another factor that these historical examples also 
                                                 
141 ‘Disarmament, Demobilization, Reintegration (DDR) and Stability in Africa – Conference 
Report’  p 19.  
142 This was out of an estimated total of 1.5 – 1.6 million.  Collection efforts continue using 
the local authorities and NGOs. 
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demonstrate.  What is clear is that the perfect model for a post-conflict 
mission remains to be identified and that no handbook or manual for post-
conflict implementation yet exists.   
 
Separate from these issues, the IC has also continued to address the matter 
of what mechanism it can use collectively to resolve these problems whether 
it be by the ‘Concert of Europe’ in the nineteenth century, the League of 
Nations in the first half of the twentieth century, or the UN from 1945.  Again, 
all have demonstrated weaknesses and the period since 1990 has seen a 
series of alternative solutions being adopted.  These, too, have proved at 
best to be only partially successful and again there is no indication of a 
successful long-term solution being adopted.  What the past two decades 
have illustrated is that the model will continue to evolve and that the advent 
of new actors, such as the EU, will increasingly challenge the convention 
that the UN remains the default option. 
 
What the case studies do illustrate is that, even where liberal interventionism 
was the genuine reason for the initial intervention, there has been a 
tendency for that humanitarian response to conflict to be translated into an 
interventionism which all too often brings imperialism to the fore.  Although 
this was particularly the case, in the period up until the First World War with 
the resolution of the Balkan Wars of 1876-8 and the Spanish-American wars 
being cases in point, there are many later examples with perhaps one of the 
 182 
most recent and perhaps ‘crudest’ being the UK’s intervention in Iraq in 1961 
to protect ‘their’ oilfields.  The case studies also demonstrate some cases of 
liberal interventionism which were exactly that.  Albania again and more 
recently both Cambodia and Mozambique, but they also serve to indicate 
that this is a very weak ‘driver’ of foreign policy even for the major powers.  
The example of the USA and the Armenian genocide is a case which will be 
studied in the following chapter, but the failure of the IC to support both the 
Turkish and Greek civilian populations both during the conflict in 1920-1 and 
during the population exchanges which followed is another obvious example.  
There is also an implicit link between initial liberal interventionism and 
subsequent colonialism in the case studies given.  It was clear that even 
during the humanitarian intervention in 1859-61 that the French would have 
been happy to remain in Syria as, potentially, a ‘colonial power’.  This was a 
wish that was eventually fulfilled when the French argued that they should be 
the recipient of the mandate, following the First World War, in part because 
of their continuing interest and involvement in the area, an involvement that 
was allegedly, in origin, wholly one of liberal interventionism!   
 
The following chapters will examine the conflict and post-conflict period 
within the Balkans in the 1990s, to a limited extent the repetitive conflicts in 
the ‘Great Lakes’ region of sub-Saharan Africa, and the early years of the 
twenty-first century.  The later conflicts in East Timor, Iraq, and elsewhere 
will be examined in more detail in the later chapters of this thesis.  Prior to 
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moving on to the case studies, two groups of factors related to the IC’s 
involvement in conflict and post-conflict must be examined, most of which 
are evident today and all of which have been evident in one way or another 
in the various conflicts discussed in this chapter.  An examination of these 
factors is first an attempt to define why interventions either do, or, more 
often, do not take place and secondly an attempt to establish a typology of 
intervention so as to establish a baseline for existing and future IC 
interventions.  Although the typology of interventions will be based primarily 
upon the IC’s experiences in the last twenty years and the case studies 
presented in the later chapters of this thesis, it will be important to start with 
an overview of the earlier typology which developed as a result of the 
interventions illustrated in the earlier part of this current chapter. 
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Chapter 5 
 
Towards a Typology of Post-Conflict intervention - 
(and an explanation as to why the IC does not always intervene) 
 
Introduction 
 
This chapter follows the chronology of previous IC interventions in conflict and 
post-conflict and initially will examine some of the reasons why there have not 
been more interventions.  This chapter will develop the arguments made in the 
previous chapter and will illustrate the changing nature of the IC’s intervention in 
post-conflict over time.  It will commence by examining the factors why the IC 
does and does not intervene in conflicts and post-conflict, a particularly pertinent 
feature in the twenty-first century when comparing for example the ICs response 
to Libya and Syria.  
 
After briefly examining the development of IC interventions in the period until the 
Second World War, by which point many of the features of modern post-conflict 
interventions had already been demonstrated, the chapter will then establish a 
typology of those IC interventions that have taken place in the period since the 
foundation of the UN in 1945.  As has been demonstrated in the previous 
chapter, and will be illustrated in the historical overview, these have built upon 
the precedents established before the Second World War and some cases, pre-
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1914.   These  typologies will illustrate the complexity of post-conflict operations 
and will demonstrate that not only are there various typologies and hence 
approaches to post-conflict that can take place at any one time, but that specific 
IC interventions can themselves change in terms of their typology over time.  
Thus a complex intervention such as the IC’s response to the Iraqi invasion of 
Kuwait, can within a few years be transformed into a continuing IC presence, but 
at a low level and as a simple border-monitoring mission.1  An understanding of 
the typology of interventions will illustrate the ground-breaking nature of the IC’s 
various interventions in the Western Balkans in the 1990s and specifically those 
in Bosnia and Kosovo which are the subject of the later thematic chapters.  This 
chapter will also reinforce the fact that IC intervention whether into conflict or 
post-conflict is selective and that there are certainly ‘conditionalities’ that have to 
be met before the IC will consider intervention.  These ‘conditionalities’ appear to 
have changed little over time and are examined within the body of this chapter.  
Finally, it is essential to understand that there are various typologies which can 
be distinguished as these enable those studying and working in the field of post-
conflict to identify the nature of the activities which are likely to be undertaken 
and the probable cost and duration of the intervention.    
 
 The case studies of Bosnia and Kosovo in the succeeding chapters will focus 
upon two states which in addition to entering conflict as part of a successful 
attempt to secede from a larger state, have also been the scene of long-term 
cyclical conflict based upon both religious and ethnic differences.  These are 
                                                 
1 The UNIKOM mission. 
 186 
precisely the problems which have been highlighted in the preceding chapter and 
are specifically those which the IC has found most difficult to deal with over the 
preceding two centuries.  Indeed, if Horowitz2 is to be believed, long-term ethnic 
and religious conflicts have generally proved to be insoluble.  As the IC has 
wrestled with the intractability of these problems in the period since 1945, it has 
evolved a series of ever more sophisticated mechanisms for dealing with them.  
To date none has been proven to be successful in the medium, let alone longer 
term, but the typology given below can be used to identify and corroborate the 
evolutionary response of the IC to these problems.  
 
 Before moving to examine a typology of international intervention and post–
conflict resolution in the ‘United Nations era’ from 1945 to date, the thesis will first 
digress and examine the question as to what factors determine when intervention 
does and, more importantly, does not take place, as even today in mid-2011 
there are three or four3 very similar regime transformations taking place within 
the Arab world.  Two of them in countries bordering the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organisation (NATO), or with a Mediterranean littoral and yet the IC has chosen 
to take decisive action and intervene in only one case.   Many of the factors 
which relate to the failure to intervene have been consistent throughout the last 
two centuries.  It is appropriate to discuss these factors at this point so that it is 
clear that when the typology of the IC’s post-conflict intervention is examined it 
can be observed that the conflicts concerned must meet certain pre-determined 
                                                 
2 Horowitz (1985), 0p. cit. 
3 These are currently Libya, Syria, Bahrain, and Yemen.  Regime transformation is already 
underway in Egypt and Tunisia. 
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criteria before any intervention by the IC takes place.  As will be explained, the 
factors involved are complex and are not simply based upon access to mineral 
resources or strategic location, although undoubtedly in the twenty-first century 
these will continue to exert influence upon international decision makers. 
 
Some questions as to why Intervention does and does not take place  
 
Even if it is accepted that for at least one hundred and eighty years there have 
been states and international organisations which have held liberal interventionist 
and humanitarian views, then there are many other conflicts and natural 
disasters, both internal and external, in which they could have intervened but 
chose not to do so.  Indeed, many of the greatest tragedies of the past two 
centuries have occurred when states did not intervene, either to prevent conflict 
and massacre or simply a humanitarian tragedy.  This thesis will examine some 
of those where interventions did not take place, to identify why some events 
attract international attention and others do not.  It will also identify what trends 
were specific to a particular era or epoch, such as the colonial period and what 
elements continue today in the twenty-first century as inhibitors to international 
intervention and what new inhibitors may have appeared since 1945. 
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A blindness to one’s own inadequacies and the IC’s unwillingness to intervene in 
the internal problems of ‘developed’ states 
 
As an illustration of both historical and continuing biases in terms of the IC’s 
willingness to intervene, the thesis will start with a comparison of the ‘Bulgarian 
Crisis’ of 1877-78 with the impact of the ‘great famine’ upon Madras in British 
India which occurred at the same time. 
 
What to modern eyes appears astounding is the focus which liberal 
interventionists could have upon a relatively minor tragedy in a remote backwater 
of Europe (Bulgaria), whilst major catastrophes were taking place in states for 
which they had direct responsibility.  The most glaring example of this is 
Gladstone and the British intelligentsia’s liberal interventionist focus upon the 
sufferings of the Bulgarians in South-Eastern Europe where some 12,0004 are 
believed to have died at the hands of the Turks.5  The Bulgarian massacres took 
place between 1876 and 1878 at exactly the same time as the ‘great famine’6 in 
India, a state for which Britain bore direct responsibility.  That the famine in India 
was known and was being reported in the British media can be confirmed, as it 
was during this period that Britain was celebrating the relatively new 
responsibility of direct rule over India,7 by appointing Queen Victoria as ‘Empress 
                                                 
4 12,000 is the generally accepted figure and even the most extreme of the Russian pan-Slavists 
such as Ignatiev and Chernaev only claim 30,000.  Bass, op. cit. 
5 Ibid. 
6 John Keay, India: A History, p 454.  
7 This followed the Indian Mutiny in 1857.  Prior to that India had been ‘ruled’ by the East India 
Company.  
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of India’.8  That the Queen’s focus along with that of Disraeli her prime minister 
and the British public was almost exclusively on developments in Bulgaria and 
not on the 5.5 million of her subjects who are believed to have died during the 
famine,9 is something that would perhaps be unthinkable today.  That many of 
the deaths were preventable, had enough energy and resources been devoted to 
them, would appear to be even more surprising and yet the episode merited 
relatively little coverage in the national press and almost none in the wider 
European and North American print media. 
 
Countries at risk of instability, but not in NATO, the EU, or a member of the P5 
 
This issue is a subset of the point just made and is a permanent condition.  There 
is an assumption that countries at risk of instability and conflict, either internally 
or externally, are not in NATO or the EU, nor members of the P5 and, perhaps 
even these days, the BRIC, the Group of Eight (G8), or even the Group of 20 
(G20).  It is likely, therefore, that most if not all of the major powers consider their 
responses to conflicts and humanitarian disasters in countries which are in the 
‘second’ or ‘third’ worlds and discount the impact of conflict or disaster in 
countries which are members of the groups given above.  Consequently, not only 
will they be unwilling to intervene for any one or more of the various reasons 
given above or below, their contingency plans will be much less advanced or 
they will be unable to do so in a timely manner as they will have made no 
                                                 
8 Queen Victoria was created ‘Empress of India’ in 1877 at the suggestion of Disraeli. 
9 The figure is from the Imperial Gazetteer of India, Vol III, 1907 and is cited in Keay, op. cit.  p 
488.  
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contingency plans at all.  Whilst this point may be difficult to prove, as the 
information concerned is almost certainly ‘sensitive’, there is one potentially 
relevant fact and one parallel example which may be quoted.  The potentially 
relevant fact is that the NATO charter prohibits the collection of intelligence on an 
ally.  Intelligence per se is not defined, but in order to prepare for intervention in 
an internal conflict, or even a major humanitarian disaster, it is a prerequisite as 
the UN has discovered.  The parallel example is the German Democratic 
Republic (GDR) in the run up to the fall of the Berlin wall.  The GDR had an 
extremely efficient state security and intelligence service,10 but it had one blind 
spot.  It was not allowed to look at the number one ally,11 the Soviet Union.  As a 
result the GDR leadership was completely unsighted on the policy of the Soviet 
Union and specifically that of Gorbachev, particularly with regard to the future of 
the satellite states of the Warsaw Pact (WP).  The failure of the GDR to 
anticipate the eventual outcomes of Soviet policies were as a direct result of their 
inability to collect ‘intelligence’ as to what those policies might be. 
 
A higher threshold as a ‘trigger’ for IC intervention in the ‘third world’ 
 
One key and also one would hope ‘historical’ factor, at work in the comparison 
between Bulgaria and India was that of race and religion.12  The Bulgarians were 
                                                 
10 The STASI – the GDR’s, ministry for ‘state security’. 
11 See Dr Hope M. Harrison’s Op-Ed article in Die Welt am Sonntag 12 August 2004.  Dr Harrison 
covers the earlier evolution of this relationship in more detail in, Driving the Soviets up the Wall: 
Soviet-East German Relations, 1953-1961. 
12 Racism was normal even in polite society until relatively recently.  Even such a humanitarian 
and ‘New Englander’ as President Woodrow Wilson, could refer to African Americans as “an 
ignorant and inferior race”, Bass, op. cit.  pp 315-6.  
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‘European’ and Christian whereas the Indians13 were not.  The second concern, 
and this is a permanently operating factor visible today, is that one episode was 
taking place within the confines of Europe whilst the other was occurring in what 
we would now call the ‘third world’.  The response to conflict and disaster within 
Europe has always and continues to elicit a far greater response both within 
Europe and North America than similar episodes elsewhere, as the differing 
responses to the internal conflicts in Bosnia and Algeria, occurring in parallel in 
the mid-1990s and with approximately the same number of casualties, testify.14  
That this second factor continues to operate, regardless of the strategic 
importance of the state concerned, can be seen from the fact that Bosnia and 
later Kosovo were not only of limited strategic value in terms of resources15 
compared with Algeria, but even in terms of diaspora population and the risk of a 
wave of refugees coming into Western Europe were a more limited ‘risk’ than in 
Algeria.16    
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
13 Many of the attacks on Disraeli given his failure to react at an early stage to the Bulgarian 
crisis, made much of the fact that he was a ‘Jew’ and therefore did not possess ‘Christian 
feelings’. 
14 Whilst figures are imprecise, it is broadly accepted that about 30,000 people died in each of the 
two conflicts. 
15 Algeria is a major exporter of oil to Western Europe and the world’s second largest exporter of 
gas after Russia.  It is also a major recipient of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI).  
16 The French diaspora Algerian population currently totals 5.5 million, which is greater than the 
entire population of either Bosnia or Kosovo and broadly similar to both populations combined. 
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The IC’s avoidance of general conflict and of dealing with ‘great powers’ or their 
protégés 
 
A further permanently operating factor occurs if the conflict is in either the home 
country or a dependency of a ‘great power’.  At this point, other powers are 
unwilling to intervene unless they are invited to do so and in any event will do 
what they can to avoid a conflict with the power where the internal conflict or 
humanitarian catastrophe is taking place.  Two examples from the beginning of 
the period will serve here; one a humanitarian tragedy and the other an internal 
conflict.  The ‘famine’ in Ireland in 1845–51 alone, led to between 1.1 and 1.5 
million deaths17 and continued in a reduced form until 1856.  The causes of the 
famine were well known and indeed affected the rest of Europe and the British 
Government’s failures were also well chronicled in the British and international 
press.18  Little if any pressure was applied on the British Government internally or 
internationally, despite a failed Irish revolt19 in 184820.  Assistance from abroad 
for the victims was minimal because in part the UK rejected it21.  At the same 
time famine was taking place in the highlands and islands of Scotland (and the 
fact of which is even today less well known), leading to approximately 150,000 
                                                 
17 Joel Mokyr, Why Ireland Starved – a quantitative and analytical history of the Irish economy, pp 
266-7. 
18 Amongst these was the failure to close Irish ports to food exports.  Ireland continued to export 
food, primarily to the remainder of the UK, throughout the famine. 
19 This was the ‘Young Irelander’ rebellion. 
20 Hobsbawm (The Age of Revolution (1988)).   
21 The Sultan of Turkey offered £10,000 in famine relief but this was rejected and reduced to 
£1,000 by the British Government on the basis that Queen Victoria had only given £2,000.  The 
Sultan then sent three ships laden with grain to Ireland, but these were turned away from the 
major ports by the British authorities.  The grain was eventually unloaded at harbours in county 
Donegal.  
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deaths and accelerating the process of the ‘highland clearances’, so that 1.7 
million people left Scotland in the period 1846–61.  Again, no international 
pressure was applied, although the fact that large numbers of Scots were simply 
‘dumped’ in Canada, led to relief efforts by the Scottish diaspora22 particularly in 
Canada and the United States.  The massacres of Poles during the uprising of 
1863–4 when 25,000 were killed23 and the attacks against the Jews in Poland 
and European Russia from 1870 would be a second nineteenth-century example 
where an empire massacred thousands of ethnic minority inhabitants within its 
own boundaries and expelled tens of thousands more24 without noticeable 
foreign intervention until 1907, when the US Government concluded an 
agreement with the Russians to reduce the number of pogroms because they 
were unable to cope with the number of Jewish immigrants arriving in the USA.   
 
That this factor, of not wanting to antagonise or upset a Great Power, is still 
operative can be seen by the responses to the internal suppression of dissent by 
major powers until relatively recently, examples being the Chinese suppression 
of both ethnic minorities such as the Tibetans and in particular religious 
minorities such as the Muslim ‘Uighurs’ or the ‘falun gong’.  Similar relatively 
recent, but slightly earlier, examples can be seen in the former Soviet Union and 
even within second-tier states such as the massacre in Hama by the Syrian 
authorities in 1982 where estimates suggest that somewhere  between 10,000 
                                                 
22 Harvey Strum, Famine Relief from the Garden City to the Green Isle, pp 388-91. 
23 Norman Davies, Europe: A History, p 828. 
24 In particular the expulsion of Jews following pogroms which occurred throughout the period up 
until 1910. 
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and 40,00025 died.  Seale26 describes it as one of ‘the single deadliest acts by 
any Arab government against its own people in the modern Middle East’ and the 
culmination of a long campaign of terror,27 in the campaign between the Sunni 
Islamists and the regime.   Since 1945, if even a second-tier power has a single 
sponsor amongst the permanent members of the UNSC, the so-called P5, then it 
is almost impossible for the IC to operate in a co-ordinated way under the 
auspices of the UN.  If it is a P5 member itself then it would appear that IC 
intervention is in practical terms impossible no matter how severe or catastrophic 
the event may be.  As an example, between fifteen and twenty-five million 
Chinese are believed to have died in the period 1959–61 alone, due to the ‘great 
leap forward’ initiative,28 policy failure and flooding.29     
 
No IC willingness to intervene if the problem is ‘too difficult’ or if there is no ‘exit 
strategy’ 
 
A further permanently operating factor inhibiting IC intervention may be observed 
in the general inactivity of the IC to the continuing massacres of the Armenians 
within the Ottoman Empire in the period from 1893 to 1916, despite the fact that 
                                                 
25 Robert Fisk, Pity the Nation: Lebanon at War, pp 182-8.  Fisk, who was present as a reporter at 
the time, initially suggested 10,000 had died but has revised the figure upward over time.  
Whatever the true figure, the destruction of entire quarters of the town remains evident today, as 
do the visual reminders of the scale of the fighting - personal observation by the author in 2009.  
26 Patrick Seale, Asad of Syria: The Struggle for the Middle East, pp 93–104. 
27 Ibid.,  pp 332–333. 
28 Dikötter, Mao’s Great Famine.  In a recent publication where he had access to provincial 
archives, Dikötter offers an estimate of at least 45 million deaths between 1958 and 1962 (p 333).  
He argues that this figure is accepted amongst senior figures in the Chinese Communist Party, p 
334. 
29 Cormac O’Grada, Famine: A Short History, p 2 Table 1.1.   
 195 
the atrocities were well known, that they were well publicised in the media,30 and 
that intervention was pressed for by senior figures in the establishment both in 
the UK31 and USA.32  In part, this apparent inability to respond to the massacres 
was due to the inaccessibility of the area where the massacres were taking place 
and therefore the inability of the ‘West’ to effectively intervene, in an era before 
effective air power.  As with the Bulgarian conflict two decades earlier, effective 
intervention would have required the projection of sea power through the 
Dardanelles and into the Black Sea to support an Armenian uprising in its 
heartland in the lower Caucusus.  This the ‘Western’ powers were neither able 
nor capable of doing as it would have involved a full-scale war with Ottoman 
Turkey and no guarantee of eventual success, as the Gallipolli operation some 
twenty years later was to illustrate. 
   
The US failure to act in the so-called ‘Hamidian massacres’ in Armenia, was 
notable but as nothing compared with their behaviour almost twenty years later in 
April 1915 when the Turks started a much larger campaign of systematic 
extermination and deportation of the Armenians.  At this time the USA was still a 
neutral in the First World War, the administration had received copious official 
reports and requests to become engaged from its ambassador in 
Constantinople33 and was under pressure from both American public opinion and 
                                                 
30 Although it was the same media, led by Randolph Hearst, that consistently pressed for an 
intervention in Cuba, not Turkey.  Bass, (2000), op. cit., p 317. 
31 An elderly Gladstone was one.  Bass (2000), Ibid., p 216. 
32 Activists in the USA included Julia Ward Howe, the President of the Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology (MIT) and the Governor of Massachusetts. 
33 Morganthau was himself of Jewish extraction.  He was also a personal friend and financial 
supporter of Woodrow Wilson.  He eventually resigned his post in protest at the US position. 
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the media, in particular the New York Times.34  President Wilson was even under 
pressure from his predecessor, Theodore Roosevelt, who said on this issue:  
It is a wicked thing to be neutral between right and wrong.  Impartiality 
does not mean neutrality.35    
In this instance the Turkish atrocities against the Armenians were extremely 
widespread including within Constantinople itself and the large Armenian 
communities on or close to the Mediterranean coast in such cities as Edessa and 
Aleppo.  Additionally, the USA was asked by three of the other Major Powers36 to 
take the lead on the ‘Armenian question’, both because they were fully engaged 
in the war and because the USA was neutral.  At the cessation of formal 
hostilities the USA was asked to take on an Armenian mandate but declined.  At 
which point the newly independent Armenian Republic in the lower Caucusus 
was attacked by both the Bolsheviks and the new Turkish Republic.  France 
considered military intervention,37 but was again deterred by the isolated nature 
of the conflict and the fact that yet again any military intervention would mean 
forcing the Dardanelles and then potentially facing hostile Turkish and Russian 
fleets.  Finally, the Armenian Republic surrendered the land it had remaining to 
the Soviet Army and the Republic was extinguished.  It was not to re-appear as 
an independent state until 1991.     
 
                                                 
34 Bass (2000), op. cit., pp 322-6. 
35 Ibid.,  p 327. 
36 These were the UK, France and Russia.  Germany and Austria-Hungary were allied to Turkey. 
37 Ibid., p 337. 
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Whilst Armenia is a clear example of the impact of geography upon international 
intervention there are others, including the lack of willingness of the IC to become 
involved in the various conflicts with the Maoists in Nepal and with the more 
modern ‘frozen conflict’ between Armenia and Azerbaijan over Nagorno-
Karabakh.  The lack of direct official British engagement in Dharfur following the 
conflict in 2003 may also, one suspects, be an example of a lack of willingness to 
intervene in conflicts where access is difficult and the terrain simply too 
extensive38 to effectively control with the numbers that the IC would be willing to 
deploy.39 
 
There is no IC intervention if the event does not receive wide publicity or it is 
‘masked’ by another larger event 
 
The final permanently operating factors inhibiting IC intervention is if the conflict 
is not widely known about or reported in the ‘West’, or the event whether it be a 
conflict or a humanitarian episode is ‘masked’ by another wider event or events.  
Both of the principal examples given for this will come from within the former 
British Empire.  Another ‘masked’ event which occurred in the continental US will 
                                                 
38 Western Darfur alone is the size of France.  The whole of the Darfur province is the size of 
continental Europe from the Polish – Belorussian border westward.  There are no railway stations 
in western Darfur and the railhead in eastern Darfur is seven days by train from Khartoum and a 
further three days from Port Sudan on the Red Sea coast.  At present the NGO community are 
bringing in relief supplies by road from the ports in the Bight of Benin.  This is a distance of some 
2,000 miles.   
39 As the effectively ‘failed’ joint AU and UN African Union/United Nations Hybrid operation in 
Darfur (UNAMID) mission demonstrated, any military force deployed to maintain the peace and 
ensure the delivery of relief supplies would require significantly more than the 17,000 troops 
assigned to UNAMID, whose mandate and mission was very limited. 
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be briefly touched upon to illustrate that geographical remoteness is not an 
inhibiting factor when it comes to ‘masking’. 
 
When studying a possible UK ‘lead’40 in terms of the humanitarian crisis in 
Dharfur41 the team looked to identify if there had been any precedents for dealing 
with major relief operations in terms of an action upon this scale and in so remote 
an area.  In the process of this research it was discovered that there had been 
extensive massacres in Darfur in the period up to 1916 which had led on 
occasions to the wholesale displacement of large parts of the population.  
Equally whilst the conflict had been brought to a halt by the British, there had 
continued to be frequent famines and widespread starvation leading to large-
scale loss of life.  Major famines had taken place in 1913-4,42 through the 1920s 
and 1930s43 and most recently in1984-5 as chronicled by Alex de Waal.44  The 
Darfur conflict was therefore not a ‘new’ problem, but simply yet another in a 
cycle of continuing conflicts45 and humanitarian disasters in the region.  Why has 
the renewed46 conflict and subsequent humanitarian disaster provoked an 
                                                 
40 This was an initiative of the then Prime Minister Tony Blair.  The outline proposal was that the 
UK should act as the ‘lead agency’ and should co-ordinate the responses of the EU and the UN 
to the Dharfur conflict, including the provision of a military Brigade (Bde) to provide the framework 
security on the ground through a series of ‘hubs’.  The study team was a tri-service military team 
supported by NGO experts for technical advice.  The author, as a reservist, formed a part of the 
military planning effort while on leave from Albania. 
41 Following the study, the decision was taken not to proceed further with a ‘British initiative’ and 
Denmark took the European lead.  Had it taken place a British proposal for Darfur would probably 
have resembled the UNOSOM II model for Somalia in terms of its components. 
42 Alex de Waal, Famine that Kills: Darfur, Sudan. 
43 Ibid.  See pp 68 – 70 for a description of the famines in the Sudan, and the ‘closed society’ 
status of the Darfur province. 
44 Ibid. 
45 That there had been endemic warfare between the various sultans had been recorded by 
western visitors to the area since the mid-eighteenth century. 
46 The current round of conflict started in 2003. 
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international response when previous crises, even those occurring after 
independence in 1956, had not?  The answer appears to lie in the amount of 
media coverage which it generated, the apparent participation of the government 
in Khartoum in the massacres through its sponsorship of the ‘janjaweed’ militias, 
and the recognition that with the increased airlift capability of the late twentieth 
century that it was possible to get something done.  Previous famines had 
generated no comment in the UK, European, or North American media so, 
despite their regularity, nothing substantive was done nor was there an IC 
response47 leading to an IC intervention in the region until 2003. 
 
An example of one major event masking another was the Bengal famine of 1943-
5, described in detail by Keay and Sen.48  This is believed49 to have led to the 
deaths of between two to four million people50 and was, at least in part, 
preventable.  The deaths were as O’Grada briefly informs us, brought about by 
war, policy failure and supply shortfall,51 but the root causes of the famine go 
much deeper than this.  Whilst it is true that the fall of Rangoon to the Japanese 
in early 1942 to some extent disrupted supply, a factor to which Sen gives due 
credit,52 the principal cause of the famine was the priority given by the British to 
                                                 
47 Whilst it may have been able to justify a policy of non intervention during the colonial period 
(1894–1956) using the ‘major power’ and ‘veto’ arguments advanced earlier in the chapter, this 
was not a valid defence for inactivity by the IC post 1956. 
48 These are the dates as used in Amartya Sen, Poverty and Famines: An Essay on Entitlement 
and Deprivation, pp 52-85 and Keay (2001), op. cit.  
49 Sen, op.cit., p 52.  The official Famine Inquiry Commission into the Bengal Famine of 1943 put 
the death toll at about 1.5 million.  The overall death toll including 1944-5 must therefore be 
higher. 
50 The lower figure appears in O’Grada, op. cit., p 2 Table 1.1.   
51 Ibid. p 2. 
52 Sen, op. cit., p 52. 
 200 
military considerations, in particular their desperate need to find additional 
shipping so that they could participate as a full partner in the North African 
landings in late 1942, ‘Operation Torch’.  In order to meet this requirement they 
stripped India of the coastal shipping which was used to move foodstuffs around 
the sub-continent and in the process created a famine in food dependent areas.  
That this was then compounded by bureaucratic inefficiency and inertia which led 
to people being shot in front of warehouses stocked with food ‘because they did 
not have a legal entitlement to draw it’,53 only made the problem worse, although 
they perhaps could not be blamed for those deaths which occurred when rural 
peasants accustomed to eating rice, turned away wheat, over 100,000 tonnes of 
which was imported into Bengal in the final quarter of 1943.54  Whatever the 
reasons, the Bengal famine remains one of the largest, largely preventable 
losses of life in the last century and one which outside India is barely known of.  It 
would appear that outside of a major war it would be unthinkable that such an 
event could go largely unremarked, particularly in the USA, had they been made 
aware of it and had they been asked to assist.  The principal cause of the 
disaster was the decision by the British to match the US effort in combating the 
Germans and others in North Africa and without that decision a famine could 
have been avoided.  It was not, and as a result of the war the famine passed by 
the countries of the ‘West’ unnoticed, that is with the possible exception of 
academics in the Irish Free State.55   Finally, in a very much more limited 
                                                 
53 Sen, Ibid. p 45. 
54 Sen op. cit., p 60. 
55 This became the Republic of Ireland in 1948.  It is noteworthy that Irish scholars of the 
‘Famine’, such as O’Grada, see many close parallels between the British treatment of the Indians 
 201 
manner, but in the US itself and close to both Washington and New York, the 
‘great Atlantic hurricane’ of 17 September 1944, which saw tidal waves of thirty to 
fifty feet devastate five hundred miles of the east coast56 of the USA leaving 390 
dead, was masked by the conflicts in western Europe57 and in the Pacific.  
Amongst the many other casualties, four US warships were lost in the hurricane 
and the peak wave was assessed by the US coastguard at seventy feet, but an 
event, which was at least as devastating materially58 as the Japanese tsunami in 
2011 remains largely unrecorded59 in the public record60 as a result of the 
greater calamities occurring elsewhere at the same time. 
 
An identification of those states where Intervention is more likely to take place   
 
It is possible from studying the histories of IC interventions in conflict and post-
conflict, to identify two typical groups of states who are likely to be candidates for 
IC intervention.  These are states in transition, typically those either approaching 
                                                                                                                                                 
during the famine of 1943, with the British indifference and neglect of the Irish during their famine 
of the 1840s. 
56 The devastation stretched from North Carolina to Maine with the epicentre being the ‘sunshine 
coast’ of New Jersey north of Cape May.  The centre of the hurricane remained 30-50 miles out 
to sea and never came onshore.  Had it done so the destruction and tidal surge would have been 
even greater.  
57 In western Europe 17 September 1944 marked the start of ‘Operation Market Garden’ the 
Allied airborne assault on southern Holland - Eindhoven, Nijmegen and Arnhem - including the 
US 82nd and 101st Airborne Divisions.   In the Pacific the US 81 Division landed on Palau 
against strong Japanese resistance on 17 September 1944. 
58 It was as devastating in financial and material terms, but not in terms of overall loss of life. 
59 There is a description of events on two New Jersey websites (‘Tales of the New Jersey Shore’ 
and ‘Hurricane City’) and visitors to Ocean City will notice a band painted eleven feet up on lamp 
posts in the historic centre.  This indicates the maximum height of the surge tide in 1944.  It is, 
however, difficult, except on local websites (‘Tales of the New Jersey Shore’), to find references 
to the relocation of complete townships to safer ground post 1944. 
60 The author was tasked with conducting an emergency plans assessment in the coastal and 
Delaware river counties of New Jersey in August – September 2001.  The impact of possible tidal 
surges on the Cape May peninsula, the offshore islands, Atlantic City, and Ocean City formed a 
significant portion of the study. 
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independence from colonial domination or who have just achieved 
independence, or, less commonly, which secede from an existing state61 and 
those states which are subject to cyclical bouts of conflict often due to ethnic or 
religious divisions.  In some cases intervention occurs when both of the criteria 
given above are being met, such as was the case in Palestine in 1948 or Cyprus 
in 1961.  
 
In the approach to independence from colonial rule, or separation from 
‘empire’,62 it is likely that the colonial power will have attempted to select or 
‘manage’ the transition to independence and will attempt to hand over power to a 
group selected for this purpose.  If this group is felt to be unsuitable by the 
indigenous population for some reason, it is likely that this will result within a very 
short space of time in a coup, often military, where they will be replaced.63  It is 
also possible that the colonial power will attempt to manage the boundaries of 
the new state either for their own benefit, or for that of others, or alternatively 
leave the final decisions on boundaries to a plebiscite to take place only following 
independence.64  An example of the latter being the British who left Israel in May 
1948, handing the question of the division of the state between Arabs and 
Israelis over to the UN.  Finally, in some cases the colonial power will attempt to 
                                                 
61 This act of ‘secession’ almost invariably results in conflict.  One notable exception was the 
Czech and Slovak ‘velvet divorce’ of 1 January 1993.  
62 Within this term are incorporated such states as the former Soviet Union and Indonesia. 
63 That this did not happen in Zimbabwe was by accident.  The British would have preferred a 
newly independent Rhodesia to have been led by Joshua Nkomo.  Unfortunately for the British 
the need to hold a free and fair election meant that Robert Mugabe was elected instead.  Nkomo 
was a member of the Ndebele tribe who whilst preferred by the colonialists formed only 10% of 
the population of Southern Rhodesia (later Zimbabwe).  
64 This was the case with the boundary between Nigeria and French Cameroon. 
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hand over power to an ethnic group which does not form the majority, thus 
creating problems for the future.  The Belgian handover to the Tutsi in Rwanda is 
but one example,65 but closer to home is the partition of Ireland where there was 
no plebiscite and few at that point strategic considerations.  The Boundary 
Commission set the boundary in 1925, it is generally believed, in contradiction to 
the wishes of the people living closest to it and for whom it disrupted traditional 
patterns of life.66  The consequences of this were at least a part cause of the late 
twentieth-century ‘troubles’. 
 
Often the independence settlement will itself include constitutional arrangements 
which prove to be unsustainable in the longer term.  The division of political 
responsibilities between the various religious groups67 agreed in Lebanon on the 
departure of the French was one example.  This was based upon the breakdown 
of the populations at the time of the last accurate census which was in 1931.  
This was a rational decision in 1946, at the time of independence, but the 
agreement made became increasingly less relevant to Lebanon as the years 
progressed and was a significant contributory factor to the Lebanese Civil War of 
the 1970s and 1980s.68 
 
                                                 
65 A second example from the British Commonwealth was the transition of power to the ethnic 
Fijians in Fiji despite the fact that they were numerically inferior. 
66 K. J. Rankin, The Creation and Consolidation of the Irish Border, p 4. 
67 There had been similar agreements at various earlier dates in Lebanon, starting with the 
constitutional arrangement of 1864.  For a description of the provisions and impact at that time 
see Bass, op. cit. p 230. 
68 Robert Fisk, op. cit.  
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The second group of states are those where violence is cyclical and is bound up 
with longstanding ethnic and/or religious rivalries.  These were often suppressed 
during periods of colonial occupation, only to reappear at a later date. Within 
Europe and the Mediterranean basin the following are examplars: in the Adriatic, 
Bosnia and later Kosovo; in the Mediterranean, Cyprus, Lebanon, and Syria; 
while in the Caucasus, periodic and cyclical conflict between the Armenians and 
the Azeris has also been present for over a century.  To add to these ‘traditional’ 
conflicts there have also been a wide range of what are now ethnic and religious 
conflicts which were spawned as the result of the colonial powers bringing in 
indentured labour.  Fiji has already been mentioned, but to that list can be added 
Guyana, Sri Lanka, and Malaysia69 and, with lower levels of violence directed 
against their Indian communities, Trinidad and Tobago, Uganda, and Kenya.70   
 
As shown above the IC has shown itself willing to intervene in a wide range of 
these conflicts providing that they are manageable and fall within the confines of 
the permanently operating factors described earlier.  Where they have not the IC 
has tended to stand back from the conflict and allow it to run its course.  A 
notable example of the latter being the conflicts which arose during the ‘partition’ 
of India at independence and where according to Talbot,71  ‘the death toll 
                                                 
69 The communist insurgency in Malaya (later Malaysia) was almost exclusively an ethnic 
‘Chinese’ insurgency.  For a good general description of the insurgency see Noel Barber, The 
War of the Running Dogs: Malaya 1948-1960 or Robert Jackson, The Malayan Emergency and 
Indonesian Confrontation: The Commonwealth's Wars 1948-1966. 
70 Kenya additionally has ethnic conflict associated with tribal rivalries particularly over fertile land, 
but these are neither associated with ‘incomers’ nor with colonial rule.  The most recent effusion 
of such violence was in the Mount Elgon area of the rift valley during and following the electoral 
campaign of 2008.  
71 Ian Talbot, The Partition of India, p 2. 
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remains disputed to this day, with figures ranging from 200,000 to two million’ 
and perhaps the largest migrations in history.72  In this case, perhaps the first 
major test of the newly minted UN in 1947, the IC singularly failed to intervene in 
what became a widespread internal conflict as well as a humanitarian disaster on 
a vast scale, perhaps simply because the problem was primarily that of one of 
the ‘P5’ and also that they could see no scope for significant mitigation of the 
impact of partition without a commitment of resources,73 which was at that time 
beyond their means.   
 
A further inhibitor to IC action has been that in a period of decolonization the 
former colonial power, often the best equipped to manage the conflict and with 
the best local knowledge, has been, simply because it had been the colonial 
power, debarred from intervening as part of an IC intervention force especially if 
it was under the auspices of the UN.74  As a result Belgian troops have been 
deployed in former French colonies in West Africa under UN auspices, whilst 
Portuguese have been deployed to the Balkans, but there are no Belgian or 
Portuguese troops in Zaire and Angola respectively with the UN missions there. 
 
Developments in post-conflict intervention in the period up until the formation of 
the UN 
                                                 
72 Ibid. ch 4, pp 90 – 126 for specific examples.  Some estimates put the total numbers of 
‘population transfers’ at 14.5 million at the time of partition, but this excludes later migrations to 
Bengal in the 1950s and continuing population shifts (and conflicts) in Kashmir.    
73 The British  ‘Indian army’, which in the event failed to maintain law and order consisted of 
205,000 troops plus units from the Indian Navy and units detached from the British Army, perhaps 
300,000 troops in total. 
74 A notable exception to this general rule is the presence of British troops as members of 
UNFICYP in Cyprus. 
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This brief examination of the types of intervention prior to the formation of the UN 
will serve both to illustrate the evolutionary response of the IC to conflict and 
post-conflict and to illustrate that many of the concepts in use today are simply 
developments of old techniques.  To use UN terminology ‘first generation’ post-
conflict missions, were being deployed before the First World War to focus on 
such issues as border monitoring in Iran.75  ‘Third generation’ complex missions 
with a primary focus on humanitarian assistance were also taking place in 
Albania within a multinational context prior to the First World War, and some 
ninety years before Lakhdar Brahimi76 categorised them in his report.  The 
examples given below are necessarily restricted, but have been selected so as to 
demonstrate the development of IC intervention in the past century and to 
illustrate that the typology which follows builds upon these earlier interventions.   
 
A typology of intervention prior to 1914 
 
In terms of IC intervention in conflict or post-conflict, from an historical 
perspective, it becomes clear that prior to 1914 most IC interventions were by 
nation states acting independently77 even if by prior agreement with others 
and/or as part of a well-established group of major powers, or, finally, as a 
                                                 
75 Hopkirk, op. cit. 
76 Brahimi, op. cit. 
77 The IC’s response to the ‘Boxer’ rebellion in 1900 was one of the few noteworthy exceptions.  
See, for example, A D Harvey, Collision of Empires – Britain in Three World Wars 1793 – 1945, p 
356. 
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wartime military coalition.78  At this time ‘interventions’ were not always linked to 
the resolution of conflict, at least not one which had been ‘inspired’ by the state 
concerned and often formed part of a power struggle by European states which 
were attempting to expand their areas of influence.  In every case they involved 
the domination of a weaker state by a stronger one.79  In addition where such an 
intervention did occur, in what we would now regard as a ‘post-conflict’ scenario, 
often no conscious effort was made to develop a post-conflict strategy other than 
to incorporate the occupied territory directly within that of a more powerful state, 
or within its own empire.80  Therefore a colonialist and/or an imperialist outcome 
was often the case, even where the stated and, perhaps initial, aim of the 
intervention had been one of liberal interventionism. The US intervention in Cuba 
in 1898 which was ostensibly to assist81 an oppressed people who had risen up 
against a despotic ‘colonial’ power,82 was just one such example and led to the 
Spanish-American War.83  Once the USA had committed itself to military 
intervention in Cuba, the sentiments of the US population, political and economic 
                                                 
78 It is clear that the UK action in Greece in late 1944 and beyond, if not encouraged or 
sanctioned by the other significant ‘Western’ ally, the USA, was at least supported or tolerated by 
them.  The British activities were clearly against the interests of another ‘ally’, the Soviet Union, in 
that they resulted in the eventual destruction of the communist led resistance movement’s military 
wing, ELAS, and to the arrest or expulsion of many members of the National Liberation Front 
(EAM). 
79 The Italian invasion of Libya in 1911 would classically fit this model. See Harvey, op. cit.  pp 
218-21.  
80 Here the incorporation of Bosnia and Herzegovina into the Austro-Hungarian Empire after 1878 
would be an example.  This was initially as a Protectorate following the Treaty of Berlin in 1878 
and then finally incorporation into the Austrian Empire in October 1908. See New York Times, 12 
October 1908. 
81 President McKinley had originally proposed only to permit the shipment of weapons to the 
rebels, so as to assist them in their struggle against the Spanish.  
82 By the time the US intervention took place, the colonial war was already virtually at an end and 
the Cuban rebels would not have required US intervention in order to achieve independence from 
Spain.  
83 George C. Herring, From Colony to Superpower: U.S. Foreign relations since 1776.  Especially 
ch 8 pp 299 - 336. 
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lobbies rapidly changed to those of colonialism and imperialism that affected the 
conduct of US policy and leaving President McKinley, who had been the 
advocate of the original liberal interventionist policy, isolated and unable to resist 
these pressures.  As a result, apart from Cuba, the USA’s ‘liberation’ of the 
Philippines, another Spanish dependency which in practice had previously 
benefited from considerable autonomy from Spain, soon turned from a 
triumphant victory over the Spanish into the bloody Philippine – American War.  
This was a war in which many more American soldiers died than in the war 
against the Spanish.84  It also led to the de facto annexation of the Philippines 
and Guam and, following the Cuba conflict, to the beginning of a permanent US 
presence on Cuba85 which has lasted until today. 
 
The few examples of IC multilateral involvement in conflict and post-conflict 
which were not directed or concluded as examples of colonial and imperialist 
expansion prior to the First World War have mostly been outlined in the previous 
chapter.  Even amongst these there are examples which did not originate from 
the tenets of liberal or humanitarian interventionism, but often more from notions 
of that vague concept the ‘balance of power’ as the Bulgarian conflict from 1876 
illustrates.86  In three of the cases illustrated the interventions arose from the 
desire of the Major Powers, particularly the UK, to protect Turkey, which was 
                                                 
84 Ibid. p 329. 
85 The continuous US occupation of Guantanamo Bay dates from this period. 
86 Bass (2000), op. cit. pp 256-96. 
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seen as the ‘sick man of Europe’,87 from the predations of the other powers, in 
particular Russia and France.  It is worth noting that whilst the US has been 
criticised for its colonialist and imperialist behaviour during the Spanish-American 
War, when the US Admiral Dewey sailed into Manila harbour in 1898 after 
defeating the Spanish fleet he found the navies of no fewer than eight European 
powers already in the harbour awaiting his arrival and in the case of the 
Germans, whose fleet was larger than Dewey’s own, with instructions to secure 
the Philippines which Dewey had just ‘liberated’ as a German colony!88 
 
If there is a typology of post-conflict intervention prior to the First World War it is 
based upon the principles of the avoidance of war whenever possible and the 
maintenance of the balance of power between the ‘Great Powers’.  For the most 
part where post-conflict interventions occurred they resulted in the occupying 
power subsuming the territory concerned within their own, in most cases have 
acquired agreement to do so, for the other ‘Great Powers’.  There were however, 
one or two examples of a ‘modern’ approach to post-conflict, such as that in 
Albania, which provided useful lessons for post-conflict planners after 1945.    
  
The Inter - War period 
 
                                                 
87 A phrase attributed to Czar Nicholas I when describing the state of the Ottoman Empire to the 
British Ambassador in St Petersburg in 1853 prior to the Crimean War.  The UK and France went 
to war with Russia in 1854 so as to assist the Ottoman Empire. 
88 Herring, op. cit., ch 8. 
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There was little change by the ‘Great Powers’ to the approach to intervention and 
post-conflict during this period.  Despite the foundation of the League of Nations 
the secret agreement between the UK and France which agreed the division of 
the Near East was unquestioningly accepted and then endorsed by the award of 
the Syrian and Palestine mandates.  This despite the promises made in the 
‘Balfour declaration’89 to the Jews and separately, but on behalf of the British 
Government, by T. E. Lawrence90 to the leaders of the ‘Arab revolt’ against the 
Turks.   
 
While plebiscites were overseen and the results accepted and implemented,91 in 
limited areas92 within Europe the citizens of  the former Ottoman Empire and the 
German colonies were not consulted and were simply transferred at the whim of 
the ‘Great Powers’.  This occurred even within the territories of the victors, one 
example being the transfer of the Jubaland Province of Kenya93 including the 
port of Kismayo to Italian Somaliland in 1923 in exchange for the area now 
                                                 
89 M.E. Yapp, The Making of the Modern Near East 1792-1923, p 290. 
90 T. E. Lawrence, Seven Pillars of Wisdom, p 119 and others.  On p 119 Lawrence refers to the 
1916 Sykes-Picot Agreement between the UK and France which commits them to the 
establishment of independent Arab states in Aleppo, Damascus, and Mosul, as well as in the 
Hejaz (modern day Saudi Arabia).  This was an arrangement which the secret agreement 
repudiated and of which, at the time, Lawrence was unaware.    
91 For example the plebiscites held in Schleswig-Holstein in 1920 and the Saarland in 1935. 
92 The citizens of Alsace and Lorraine for example were not given the opportunity for a plebiscite 
and were simply transferred from Germany to France.  Many ethnic Germans from Lorraine 
continued to serve in the German army post-war and the Luchtringen (Lorraine) regiment of the 
German army was not disbanded until 1927 in Oerlinghausen, Nord-Rhein Westfalen.  
93 But not that part which fell within the area of the current North East Province of Kenya.  This 
area, north of the Tana River, is 95% ethnic Somali and which had until the time of the transfer 
formed part of the hinterland of Kismayo.  This province is, Arab, Muslim, and Arabic speaking, 
but incorporated within a black African state and is treated as an ‘internal colony’ by independent 
Kenya.  The police force for example is officered by black Africans and there are no Somalis 
serving in the police force above the rank of sergeant.  Senior officers and the governor are 
‘posted’ to the North East province on two year tours from Nairobi.  The province is as a result a 
potential future flashpoint for ethnic conflict, which may now be exacerbated by the influx of 
Somali refugees to the Dadaab and other refugee camps, following the drought in Somalia.    
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known as Puntland in Northern Somalia.94  This piece of territory was then 
attached to British Somaliland.  As we can see from this example, the indigenous 
population was not consulted, nor was the re-allocation of territory made along a 
demographic or other natural boundary, indeed local and regional trading 
patterns were completely dislocated by the decision. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
94 This was done for purely strategic reasons by the British, so as to control both sides of the 
Straits of Aden at the entrance to the Red Sea. 
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A Typology of current Post-Conflict Interventions. 
 
IDENTIFIED AS FEATURES EXAMPLE 
Historic – Liberal 
Interventionist 
Focus on humanitarian 
issues, generally short 
term in nature. 
Anglo-French Mission to 
Syria, 
International Mission in 
Albania, 
Historic – Colonialist or 
Imperialist 
Focus on control and 
stability often resulted in 
incorporation of territory 
into an existing Empire 
and the movement of 
territories between 
Empires. 
Cuba and the Philippines, 
Bulgarian crisis and the 
‘Congress of Berlin’, 
Kenya – Somalia and the 
exchange of territories. 
First Generation Neutral and observational 
a simple mission; 
focussed on border 
monitoring and 
separation of 
combatants. 
UNTSO, Israel – 
Palestine, 
UNIKOM, Iraq – Kuwait, 
UNFICYP, Cyprus. 
Second Generation A complex mission; 
focussed on post-conflict 
development and 
restoration of community 
and facilities. 
UNTAC, Cambodia, 
UNMOGIP, Mozambique, 
Sierra Leone – UK sole 
state, 
Cote D’Ivoire – French 
sole state. 
Third Generation Focused on humanitarian 
issues, but robust with 
significant war-fighting 
capabilities. 
UNPROFOR Bosnia 
Mission (1992-5), 
UNOSOM 1 Somalia 
Mission (1992-3 
Fourth Generation Complex multi-
dimensional missions, 
with robust war-fighting 
capabilities. 
UNOSOM II, Somalia, 
MINUSTAH, Haiti, 
MONURSO, DRC, 
Bosnia post 1996. 
Frozen Conflict Focused on maintaining 
separation of combatant 
forces and dialogue. 
OSCE  - Nagorno-
Karabakh Mission, 
OSCE - Moldova – Trans 
Dnestr dispute.  
NOTE: The table above identifies a range of typologies for post-conflict intervention.  
The ‘historic’ interventions occurred in the period up and until 1945, but, on occasions, 
incorporated features found in the later post Second World War interventions.  There are 
current examples of all four generations of post-conflict interventions.  On occasions 
post-conflict missions move between generations.  UNFICYP, for example, started as a 
first-generation mission in 1964, switching to a second-generation mission after the 
Turkish invasion in 1974, and then reverting to a first generation mission in the early 
1980s. 
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Having now examined the historical typology of IC intervention and the drivers for 
IC action and inaction in conflict and post-conflict, this thesis will now move to 
establish a ‘typology’ of IC intervention in conflict and post-conflict during the ‘UN 
era’ from 1945.  This typology will distinguish between the generic types of 
intervention and will also attempt to demonstrate how UN operations have 
evolved over time.  In part this will include an explanation of the differences 
between the UN concepts of first to fourth generation operations.95  The use of 
these common definitions both by academics such as Doyle96 and within the UN 
itself are, however, of limited value in the context of ‘time’.  This is a ‘language’ 
issue, as the use of the word ‘generation’ implies that these terms of themselves 
represent an ‘evolution’ and that is not the case.  It is for that reason that many 
commentators attempt to use other definitions for the evolving field of post-
conflict, referring to ‘ecologies’ of missions, although these terms too are often 
unsatisfactory.  
 
To remain with the UN as an example, the UNIKOM mission on the Iraq – Kuwait 
border was not deployed until April 1993 and as such, followed the initiation of 
the UNDPKO and a number of ‘third generation’ UN missions.  UNIKOM was, 
however, clearly a first generation mission in terms of both its mandate and 
function.  Indeed, the differences between first to fourth generation, relate entirely 
                                                 
95 Prior to the Brahimi Report in 2000 the principal distinction as far as the UN was concerned 
was the chapter under which the mission was mandated.  This was either chapter VI – the Pacific 
Settlement of Disputes or chapter VII – Actions with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches 
of the Peace and Acts of Aggression.  For a fuller description see the UN Charter.  Op.cit.  
96 Michael W. Doyle (2001), War Making and Peace Making: The United Nations’ Post-Cold War 
Record reprinted in Chester A. Crocker, Hampson and Aall (eds), Turbulent Peace: The 
Challenges of Managing International Conflict.   
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to the levels of complexity and sophistication of operations and whilst the terms 
were indeed introduced sequentially there are many effective first and second 
generation missions currently deployed.  The UN itself compounds the difficulty 
by regarding ‘modern’ post-conflict activity as necessarily always incorporating 
‘complex operations’.  To quote the Brahimi Report: 
Peacekeeping is a 50-year-old enterprise that has evolved rapidly in the 
past decade from a traditional, primarily military model of observing 
ceasefires and force separations after inter-State wars, to incorporate a 
complex model of many elements, military and civilian, working together to 
build peace in the dangerous aftermath of civil wars.97   
Whilst as a statement that is generally true, there are a range of deployed UN 
missions such as UNTSO and UNFICYP which are still effectively fulfilling firstt 
and second generation mandates. 
 
As stated earlier, it was assumed that once the UN had been created all such 
missions would be carried out by the UN and under UN auspices.  That has not 
been the case, particularly since 1995.  The typology will examine not only UN 
operations, but also the missions of other post-conflict IC actors and the following 
thematic chapters will also illustrate examples of where other actors operating 
independently of the UN have either selectively utilised UN processes and on 
occasions UN personnel, or have chosen to discard them in favour of other 
models.98        
                                                 
97 Lakhdar Brahimi, op. cit., p 18.  
98 This is particularly the case in the field of DDR. 
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Direct UN interventions 
 
It is perhaps appropriate here to start with the 2000 UN ‘Brahimi Report’99 and 
with definitions of the four peacekeeping ‘generations’ into which UN led 
peacekeeping operations have often been broadly divided, as follows:  
First generation Peacekeeping can be described as neutral and observational 
and is perhaps best typified by the UNTSO mission around the borders of Israel.  
Typically, the mission is deployed following ceasefires or peace agreements and 
involves monitoring of the opposing forces and borders often by using inter-
positional forces between the former combatants.  Generally these are long-term 
operations conducted with the consent of the parties and they are based upon 
the non-use of force.  Most of the earliest UN missions conformed to this model 
and the mission mandates were limited and did not involve any of what would 
now be regarded as post-conflict or nation-building measures.  Where these 
were later added, this was often done by creating a second mission with a 
different mandate such as the UNRWA mission which supports Palestinian 
refugees and has over the last thirty years become increasingly involved with a 
broad range of social and economic issues across the Palestinian-controlled 
areas of the region.  Over time it came to be realised that these first-generation 
missions were usually open-ended commitments.  According to Doyle the price 
of first generation peacekeeping, as in the long Cyprus operation was sometimes 
                                                 
99 Ibid. 
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paid in conflicts delayed rather than resolved.100  This realization led to the 
understanding that a more nuanced approach was needed, particularly if the UN 
was to develop into an organisation that managed ‘post-conflict’ reconstruction 
rather than just a ‘freezing’ of the status quo.   
Second-generation Peacekeeping missions are described as multidimensional 
operations and according to Doyle they involve the implementation of complex 
multidimensional peace agreements. In addition to traditional military functions, 
the peacekeepers are often engaged in various police and civilian tasks, the goal 
of which is a long-term settlement of the underlying conflict.101’102.  The 
development of second-generation peace operations came about largely through 
the initiative of the then UN Secretary General, Dr Boutros Boutros Ghali, and his 
‘Agenda for Peace’.103  For the purpose of this thesis they represent the 
development of the UN as a ‘post-conflict’ organisation and at the stage at which 
most UN or other deployed missions are functioning in a post-conflict manner 
they are in practice usually functioning as second-generation missions.  Doyle, 
when talking about the UN’s need to develop policies that enhance consent 
defines second-generation operations thus: multidimensional operations that 
involve the implementation of complex, multidimensional peace agreements 
                                                 
100 Michael W. Doyle (2006), Making War and Building Peace: United Nations Peace Operations, 
p 14. 
101 Doyle (2001), op. cit.  p 532.  
102 The point is repeated Ibid.,  p 26. 
103 Boutros Boutros Ghali, An Agenda for Peace Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-
keeping, 
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designed to build the foundations of a self sustaining peace and have been 
utilized primarily in post civil-war situations.104  
With the development of the second-generation UN missions most of the 
elements of a ‘modern’ post-conflict operation become apparent.  There are foci 
on, often complex, nation-building activities, governance and capacity building, 
often in a two-stage process with ‘transitional authorities’ and, almost inevitably, 
‘transitional figures’, such as will be identified in the thematic chapters which 
follow.  In addition, typical components include the cantonment and 
demobilization of armed forces linked to comprehensive DDR programmes and 
the restoration of order and civil liberty, in particular the restoration of police 
primacy in most if not all crime-prevention activities.  Finally, there will be work 
involving refugee and Internally Displaced People (IDP) which may well evolve 
over time from the provision of basic housing needs to the restoration of private 
property and the establishment of property rights.  All of this is usually achieved 
by a complex inter-working of a lead agency usually the UN and a network of 
International NGOs (INGO), International Organisations (IO), contributing nations 
and, as time goes on, the increasing involvement of local NGOs and community 
groups.  Most of these components of post-conflict missions will be examined in 
the thematic chapters which follow, but it is clear from the ‘Agenda for Peace’ 
and the second-generation missions that the focus has moved from purely that of 
humanitarian intervention and peacekeeping to one of liberal intervention where 
the continuing post-conflict deployment is designed not only to rebuild the state, 
                                                 
104 Doyle (2006), op. cit., p 14. 
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but often, if not always, to develop it in such a way that it resembles that of some 
unspecified international ‘model’ or ‘ideal’.  One indicator of this liberal 
interventionist approach is the insistence upon democratic elections and 
democracy.  Although this is a ‘Western’ ideal, democratic elections are often not 
a traditional or even accepted method of government in those countries where 
the UN or other IC actors are intervening. Cambodia has been one recent 
example and perhaps the Yemen will be another.          
Third-generation Peacekeeping operations have been defined by their 
humanitarian focus.  The UNPROFOR mission in Bosnia and the US intervention 
in Somalia are often cited as examples of such missions.  As such, third-
generation missions should fit neatly into the area of humanitarian operations, 
but as complex multidimensional operations that is not always immediately clear, 
as they always incorporate elements of second, and fourth-generation missions 
within them.   What is clear is that third-generation missions within the UN are 
always Chapter VI or Chapter VII operations105 and include a strong war-fighting 
or war-making component.  It is also clear that they have only been deployed 
when the state has ‘collapsed’, or there is an unwillingness or inability of the state 
to protect its own civilian population.  Given their mandate and the likely scenario 
of the deployment there is little scope for the wide range of activities considered 
under second-generation missions and if anything is possible other than the 
protection of life and the delivery of humanitarian aid, it is likely to be a limited 
amount of often transitional state building.  In most cases Somalia perhaps 
                                                 
105 UN Charter, op. cit. 
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excepted, the third-generation mission itself is a transitional phase and will at 
some later stage, as conflict dies away, metamorphose itself into a first-
generation or more likely second-generation mission.  This process will be 
examined in more detail in the context of Bosnia in the next chapter.  Soon after 
its inception realisation came that the third-generation mission was not in itself a 
solution particularly in terms of the transition to post-conflict. This led very rapidly 
to the evolution of the fourth-generation peacekeeping model. 
Fourth-generation Peacekeeping missions are described as peace enforcement 
operations, a term coined by Chapra,106 Doyle,107 and others from the mid-late 
1990s.  Coleman describes the context in which fourth-generation missions are 
deployed as follows: virtually all contemporary peace enforcement operations 
take place within the framework of an international organisation108 and describes 
the content of peace enforcement operations as forcible military interventions by 
one or more states into a third country with the express objective of maintaining 
or restoring international, regional or local peace and security by ending a violent 
conflict within that country.109  Coleman goes on to say that such missions differ 
from invasions in that they do not overtly seek to alter the political or 
geographical status quo to the invaders’ benefit.110  Two of the statements made 
by Coleman go to the heart of much of the controversy over fourth-generation 
interventions in the twenty first century.  That is, her assumption that virtually 
                                                 
106 The author attended a lecture on this topic, at the United States Army War College by Dr 
Chapra whilst he was there on other business in May 2009. 
107 Doyle (2006), op. cit. 
108 Katharina P. Coleman, International Organisations and Peace Enforcement: The Politics of 
International Legitimacy, p 4.    
109 Ibid. 
110 Ibid. 
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all111 of the missions will be carried out by International Organisations (IO), has 
proved to be not the case for at least two major missions112 and the fact that they 
do not ‘overtly’113 alter the status quo to the invaders’ benefit.  
For the UN, however, fourth-generation operations give them the ability to use 
force under a Chapter VII mandate.  They ensure the protection of the civilian 
population in a way that a third-generation mission was unable to do, for example 
Bosnia in the case of Srebrenica, in which context Archibugi, succinctly describes 
the fatal weakness of the third-generation missions.114  Fourth-generation 
operations also favour state building and capacity building through complex 
operations in co-ordination with multiple actors IOs, INGOs, and local 
stakeholders while following the recommendations made in the Brahimi Report in 
2000.115  In describing fourth-generation missions Archibugi argues for a 
humanitarian intervention based upon cosmopolitan principles116 and having 
already witnessed unilateral interventions, outwith the direct authority or control 
of the UN, opts for UN led interventions.  These he says should follow the 
regulatory precepts based upon what he describes as the five pillars of the just 
war doctrine117 as proposed by Farer118.     
                                                 
111 Ibid. 
112 Those mounted in Iraq and Afghanistan. 
113 Ibid. 
114 Daniele Archibugi, The Global commonwealth of Citizens: Toward Cosmopolitan Democracy, 
pp 184-6. 
115 Brahimi, op. cit.  
116 Archibugi, op.cit.  pp 192–205.   
117 Ibid. p 193. 
118 Tom Farer, Cosmopolitan Humanitarian Intervention: A Five Part Test, pp 211-20. 
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Typical examples of fourth-generation UN led missions are the UN Stabilization 
Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) and the UN Stabilization Mission in the Democratic 
Republic of Congo (MONUSCO).  As with the second, and third-generation 
missions, fourth-generation missions have tended to be large and manpower 
intensive119.  They have also, as with the third-generation missions, tended to 
take on long-term attributes.  As such they are very expensive.  The annual 
budget for the MONUSCO mission in 2008 was US $1 billion of which the USA 
contributed US $330 million120 while MINUSTAH cost US $836 million in 
2010/2011.121  Additional to this, the USA donated a further US $700 million in 
direct aid to the DRC in 2008. 
 
UN Mandated but IC led interventions 
 
Interventions of this type include the First Gulf War, BiH, and Kosovo.  Those 
which depend upon UN mandates for their legitimacy, but which are not 
themselves UN led, have become increasingly popular since the end of the ‘Cold 
War’.  There are a number of reasons for this.  The first is that a number of 
states, led by the USA, have recognised that the scale and nature of the 
interventions needed are beyond the scope of the UN as envisaged by the IC in 
1945 and often it would appear beyond their capabilities.  If during the early 
                                                 
119 By the financial year 2010-11 this had swollen to US $1.369 billion according to the official 
budget request to the UN.  See MONUSCO website.   
120 Ibid.  The mission had 23,542 personnel as at 31 January 2011 of whom only 2,785 were local 
civilian staff.  
121 Ibid. 
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phases of the ‘conflict – post-conflict – nation building’ cycle, war fighting in 
particular is needed then the UN would appear to be ill-equipped as a body to 
carry this out and certainly to manage the process.  This is because the UN lacks 
the Command, Control, and Communications (C3) facilities to do so.  The UN 
also lacks an intelligence management organisation and by reason of its charter 
a formal mechanism for collecting and assessing intelligence.  These are 
potentially fatal weaknesses in armed conflict, particularly when allied to the fact 
that it rarely has Operation Control (OPCON) of the national troop contingents 
under its command, given that the national troop contingent commanders have 
the ability to refer back to ‘capitals’ before operations and then potentially to opt 
out of them.  Finally, there is also the vexed question of the Rules of 
Engagement (ROE) for UN missions.  These are often insufficiently robust to 
deal with an emerging situation on the ground and were one of the key reasons 
for the ‘failure’ of the UNPROFOR mission in Bosnia.  All of these issues will be 
examined in more detail, in the context of the thematic chapters, particularly that 
on Bosnia.    
 
The second issue is that the UN mandates themselves have often been 
perceived to be weak or poorly implemented by the deployed UN missions.  This 
issue will also be examined in the thematic chapters.  In addition, the quality of 
the troops deployed and, in particular, their equipment has often been found, at 
least by ‘Western’ nations to be inadequate.  Finally, for the US there was the 
critical issue that being a UN troop contributor meant that US troops would not be 
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under national command.  This was not acceptable to the US and was a critical 
issue in the change of policy as the US had not been a troop contributor to 
previous UN missions, with the sole exception of Korea. 
 
Operating under a direct UN mandate, but led by one of the ‘participating states’ 
or even another IC entity such as NATO,122 these interventions have enjoyed a 
greater degree of flexibility than most UN missions and have tended to be of 
shorter duration.  If the mandate is very broadly worded, as for example during 
the UN mandated intervention during the Libyan crisis, then the mission has 
considerable scope for flexibility so as to adjust to changing conditions ‘on the 
ground’ and in particular to adjust the ROE.  Typically, these missions have 
operated as ‘coalitions of the willing’ and, with one exception to date,123 under 
US leadership.  In every case the stated case for international intervention was 
one of liberal interventionism and humanitarian interventionism to right visible 
wrongs, in particular threats and attacks upon the civilian population either of the 
state concerned or a neighbouring state or states.  This stated justification would 
appear to be valid in the case of Bosnia and Kosovo, where there were no major 
economic reasons for engaging and for the First Gulf War and the related 
operations,124 which were precipitated by the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait.  The 
motivation for the Second Gulf War where the UN mandate itself would appear to 
                                                 
122 Those operations which are being conducted under NATO management in the skies over 
Libya would be a good example. 
123 Libya. 
124 Such as the involvement in Operation ‘Provide Freedom’, which was directed towards the 
Kurdish areas of northern Iraq. 
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be only a partial justification and the Libyan air campaign would appear to be 
somewhat less clear.    
 
Non-UN Mandated IC-led interventions 
 
The US-led intervention in Afghanistan is an example of a non-UN mandated IC-
led intervention.  While the mission was deployed into a conflict zone, it was 
clearly intended initially to transform the conflict in Afghanistan to one of post-
conflict and nation building.  Indeed, in the midst of the ongoing conflict much 
work that we would recognise as ‘post-conflict’ activity has been carried out.  This 
includes the management of elections, education, and school-building projects.  
However, the situation on the ground has never reached the post-conflict phase 
countrywide.  As with the occupation of Iraq following the war of 2003, it is 
difficult to see the intervention in Afghanistan sitting within any of the UN 
‘generational’ models. Post-conflict activity has been piecemeal and not, it would 
appear to an external observer, following any long-term strategic plan.  Indeed, in 
the Iraqi conflict the detailed post-conflict plan which had been prepared by the 
US State Department and which took advantage of the ‘lessons learned’ from 
earlier conflicts was discarded before the war-fighting phase commenced.  Given 
that both the interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan were primarily focused upon 
‘winning’ conflicts, which in one case is still continuing, this thesis will not go into 
more detail at this stage except to state that neither would appear to meet the 
criteria for liberal or humanitarian interventions as described in an earlier chapter, 
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nor would they appear to represent examples of cosmopolitanism.  Of all the 
interventions so far examined these two interventions come closest to the 
definition of imperialism, although even that is difficult in terms of describing the 
events which have taken place. 
 
Single state interventions  
 
There have over the years been a number of sole state interventions such as 
those by the USA125 and Syria into Lebanon and those of France on at least two 
occasions into Cote D’Ivoire.126  The methods and the motivations for these 
interventions have varied widely, but in some cases they do permit us to examine 
the difference in effectiveness between ‘sole state intervention’ and interventions 
into the same country by the UN.  Most sole state interventions, the USA 
excepted, have been into the territories of neighbours, such as Syria into 
Lebanon or by a former colonial power into a province or territory which it once 
controlled.  This being the case, one immediate advantage that a sole state 
intervener has over a UN mission, is a knowledge (often very detailed) of both 
the people and the terrain.127  
 
                                                 
125 The US military intervened in Lebanon in 1961.  
126 The large-scale interventions (by up to 150,000 troops on some occasions) by Turkey into 
Iraqi Kurdistan have been in the nature of ‘punitive raids’ and are not relevant to a consideration 
of post-conflict.  
127 There are echoes of this in the IFOR intervention in Bosnia in a following chapter and also in 
the KFOR operation in Kosovo where certain states possessed detailed ‘historical’ knowledge of 
the terrain, the infrastructure, and the population.    
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If this implicit advantage is accepted then the effectiveness of a time-bound, 
tightly–focused, single state intervention can be contrasted with that of the UN.   
One example of such a successful intervention was the UK intervention in Sierra 
Leone and this will be used to demonstrate the ‘ideal’ process for a single-state 
intervention in support of the ‘UN mission’, albeit some time after the deployment 
of the UN mission.  The UK deployment took place because, in part, the UN and 
its troop contingents had become part of the problem with widespread allegations 
that the Nigerian battalions assigned to the UN, in particular, were involved in 
diamond smuggling in north-eastern Sierra Leone an activity which was amongst 
other things providing funding for the continuing civil war not only in Sierra Leone 
but also in neighbouring Liberia.  Until the UK deployed, very little was being 
done in terms of post-conflict work as the country was too unsafe to permit such 
activity and the UN troop contingents128 were generally restricted to maintaining 
a presence in a few urban areas.  It is perhaps significant that the first UK 
‘firepower’ demonstration was presented not to the warring factions within Sierra 
Leone but to the commanders of the various UN national troop contingents.129 
 
Following the UK deployment, the war-fighting phase lasted less than eighteen 
months and the operation moved into a post-conflict and nation-building phase.  
For the population the key emphasis was on DDR and particularly in rebuilding 
the technical skills base of the country.  There was also an emphasis on the 
creation of several, often low-level, infrastructure projects and a detailed 
                                                 
128 The UN forces deployed in Sierra Leone at that time totalled over 9,000 soldiers. 
129 This would appear to indicate that the UK saw certain of the UN troop contingents as the 
primary threat to the peace and stability of Sierra Leone rather than the warring factions. 
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assessment of the infrastructure that remained from the handover at the 
conclusion of the colonial period in 1961.130  At the stage where elections had 
taken place and the reconstruction of the police and the new Sierra Leonian 
military were well underway, the UK once more withdrew from the process and 
handed over to the UN and a range of INGOs and increasingly local NGOs to 
carry on the process.  This included, as it had done fifteen years earlier in South 
Africa, a ‘Truth and Reconciliation Commission’ which was run by the local 
people through what was effectively an NGO.  As such, the UK intervention in 
Sierra Leone was a success.  A limited contingent never exceeding 4,000 men 
over a period of less than three years brought a conflict to a close, carried out an 
effective DDR process, and assisted the country to the point where, with only 
limited external assistance and finance, it can again manage its own affairs 
without outside intervention and, importantly, without internal conflict. 
 
In retrospect it can be see that the UK intervention in Sierra Leone was 
disinterested liberal interventionism, spurred by the need to prevent a 
humanitarian disaster and further destabilisation of the coastal region of West 
Africa.  Once the mission was completed the UK withdrew, just as the UN had 
done in Cambodia in 1993.  At the time, however, there were many in the IC who 
                                                 
130 The railway network handed over upon independence in 1961 which connected most parts of 
the coastline from East to West had been allowed to deteriorate to a point where it was not 
possible to reconstruct it.  The journey from the Liberian border to Freetown which was eight 
hours by either road or rail in 1961 takes an average of twenty seven hours by road in 2011.  The 
river port facilities and regional airport at Kenema, the nearest major town to the crossing point 
are also unusable.  Most of the infrastructure described above was put in place to support the 
‘groundnuts scheme’ in the period from 1947 to 1951. 
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wondered if the UK intervention was simply interference in a former colony131 
and would be open ended.  Indeed, some looked nervously at the continuing 
French military presence in Cote D’Ivoire in the same region, as an example of 
what might happen elsewhere and with other European former colonial powers. 
 
It is of particular note that the French and UK military presences in Sierra Leone 
and Cote D’Ivoire were, in the late 1990s, providing the ‘military guarantees’ for 
the UN force in Liberia during the closing stages of the Liberian civil war, with the 
French in particular maintaining a small presence within Liberia itself.   
 
‘Frozen conflicts’  
 
Frozen conflicts are those conflicts which have usually been through a ‘hot’ 
conflictual phase and which have now died down to an uneasy truce without any 
formal cessation of hostilities.  They are always at risk of re-igniting as there is no 
mechanism in place with which to conclude the conflict.  Examples of frozen 
conflicts include: Moldova – Trans-Dniestria, Nagorno-Karabakh and Georgia-
Abkhazia.  As an example of how a frozen conflict can repeatedly go from ‘hot’ to 
‘cold’, one can also look at Lebanon in the 1990s and early years of the twenty-
first century. 
 
Post-conflict intervention in these situations is often difficult, particularly with the 
‘weaker’ or simply more remote of the two parties, in these cases Moldova – 
                                                 
131 Sierra Leone is also a member of the British Commonwealth.  
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Trans-Dniestria, Nagorno-Karabakh and Georgia-Abkhazia.  Often one party to 
the dispute has no or only limited status as a nation state and no or only limited 
recognition of its state structures.  There is also often no access across the inter-
state boundary and by definition any state structure that may exist is likely to be 
‘temporary’ in nature, although in practice ‘temporary’ may transpire to be a 
significant period of time.132  The transitional nature of the ‘conflict’ and the fact 
that one party to the conflict may not be recognised as a legitimate state often 
makes the implementation of many of the processes typically found in post-
conflict activity, such as the elements of ‘nation building’ and the provision of 
training and facilities in security sector reform, including the training of the police, 
etc., difficult in the case of one or more of the actors.133  In contrast, humanitarian 
intervention is always possible and may take several forms, from the delivery of 
relief aid and accommodation and facilities to refugees,134 the provision of 
medical facilities and education to the marking and clearing of minefields.  In 
general, frozen conflicts are characterized by first-generation peacekeeping 
operations which focus principally on ensuring the demilitarization of the 
immediate zone of conflict.  Within the wider the Moldova – Trans-Dnestria135, 
                                                 
132 It could be argued that Cyprus is a ‘frozen conflict’ in that a UN operation (UNFICYP) is still in 
place patrolling the ‘green line’ between the two states, only one of which is recognised by the IC.  
The Turkish invasion of Cyprus took place 37 years ago. 
133 Particularly if one of the two entities is not recognised e.g. Trans-Dniestria.  In the case of 
another ‘frozen conflict’ where both of the actors are now recognised as states by the majority of 
nations represented at the UN, that of Palestine and Israel long-term nation building and security 
sector reform activities are possible. 
134 In Nagorno-Karabakh where the climate is extremely hostile for much of the year, 
portakabins™ have been deployed to provide longer-term housing solutions for those whose 
houses have been destroyed by shelling etc. 
135 In the case of Moldova-Trans-Dniestria there is no monitoring mission as such.  The OSCE 
maintains a mission in Moldova with field offices in both halves of the state. 
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Nagorno-Karabakh and Georgia-Abkhazia136, peacekeeping operations are 
managed on behalf of the IC by the OSCE and the numbers of peacekeepers 
employed are extremely modest.137  Other frozen conflicts such as that in Cyprus 
and the Middle East are overseen by the UN on behalf of the IC and the numbers 
involved are substantially larger.  
 
Special Cases and ‘transformations’ 
 
The EU intervention in Aceh would be an example of a transformation mission in 
post-conflict although complicated by the fact that it was initiated by a large-scale 
humanitarian disaster.  Initially the intervention by the EU was in common with 
those of the other members of the IC, purely humanitarian, in that it was a direct 
response to the tsunami that had overwhelmed the north-west coast of Sumatra.  
As with the other members of the IC, the EU recognised that there had been a 
long-standing religiously-based conflict between the Christians in the north of the 
island and the Muslim-dominated government in Jakarta and were concerned 
that the tsunami would either de-rail the ongoing peace talks between the two 
sides or, alternatively, provide a pretext through the involvement of the 
Indonesian army in the post-tsunami clean-up with an opportunity to re-start 
operations.  As an immediate result of the EU presence on the ground and their 
active political involvement, not only did the ceasefire, which had been ‘stalled’ 
since 2002 move ahead, with EU-sponsored talks hosted in Finland in the last 
                                                 
136 Again, following the removal of the border monitoring mission, the OSCE maintains a field 
operation in Georgia and a field presence in each of the breakaway regions. 
137 See n 16, ch 1. 
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week in January, but the talks moved to a successful conclusion on 15 August 
2005  which led to the creation of an EU ceasefire monitoring mission -  the Aceh 
Monitoring Mission (AMM) - which was deployed in Aceh from 15 September 
2005 until 15 December 2006138 with the support of some Association of South 
East Asian Nations (ASEAN)139 countries.  The critical question regarding the 
AMM ‘model’ as Schulze points out was: 
whether the AMM Model and Experiences made are transferable to other 
conflict scenarios, if there are lessons learned and recommendations for 
the EU and international Actors which might improve future Monitoring 
Missions.140   
Although Schulze does not say so in her article, a second and perhaps equally 
critical question for the UN and the IC who provide its funding, is why was this 
particular mission an EU operation and not a UN-led one given that the UN Office 
for the Co-ordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) regional hub for South East 
Asia is based in Jakarta?  One may ask whether this is an issue of 
responsiveness and ‘agility’ and this is something that will be examined in the 
chapter which looks at EU operations in post-conflict.  Whilst there are other 
special cases of post-conflict response, some of these will be addressed in later 
chapters and the other cases simply go to demonstrate that the UN no longer 
has a monopoly in the field of post-conflict or disaster response.141 
                                                 
138 Kirsten E. Schulze, Mission not so Impossible The Aceh Monitoring Mission and 
Lessons learned for the EU. 
139 Indonesia is itself an ASEAN member. 
140 Schulze, op. cit. 
141 The ICs response to the Japanese tsunami is another indication of this increasing trend.  The 
principal UN involvement has been through the provision of nuclear experts and advice through 
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The ‘shaping’ of post-conflict intervention 
 
Moving on from typology, the use of previous experience by the UN and the IC to 
shape activities in a new theatre of operation will now be examined.  This could 
be referred to as the one size fits all concept, or indeed as an ‘evolutionary’ 
concept.  It is possible from reading through the history of the last two hundred 
years to take this back to the colonial era in terms of examples.142  The use of 
indentured labour in the British Empire might be one such.  A more recent 
example will be the use of the same election management formulae (and key 
staff) in Cambodia, Mozambique, and BiH.143  For the UN the most recent 
obvious examples of this was the move of the top 3 – 4 people from BiH to 
establish the UN Mission in Liberia, as referred to in the previous chapter and for 
the British and the French144 throughout the period from the 1960s to the 1990s 
                                                                                                                                                 
the International Atomic Energy Authority (IAEA), an affiliated body.  Even within this specialist 
field the US and the Europeans have been more active. 
142 One obvious and well-known example would be the continued use made by the British Empire 
of the Wolseley ‘ring’ for colonial campaigns, in the late nineteenth century in Africa.  For this 
specific example see Maxwell Leigh, Ashanti Ring.  Niall Ferguson, op. cit. and others have many 
similar examples, particularly relating to the various campaigns in India.    
143 Many of them were later used for East Timor, Kosovo, Iraq, and Afghanistan amongst others.  
Jeff Fischer the Vice-President of IFES and the Head of Elections in BiH in September 1996 ran 
the East Timor referendum and later elections as well as advising on the others mentioned.  (The 
author in conversations with Jeff Fisher).  
144 The French Deputy Commander of IFOR in 1996 suggested that the ballot might be coloured 
‘green’ for the Muslims as this was a propitious colour for them.  He had remembered this from 
his service as a Lieutenant in Algeria, when the French had deliberately coloured the ballot for 
continued union with France green in the referendum, as the majority of rural Algerians were 
illiterate.   
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to think of post-conflict interventions as analogous to colonial or other recent 
missions.145 
 
It is clear that previous experience of what does and does not work is useful, 
particularly if post-conflict activity is being carried out in an adjoining state or 
space and at a very similar point in time.  The cases of Bosnia and Kosovo show 
many examples where this is the case.  However, to move successful techniques 
from one continent to another is often very difficult and frequently counter-
productive.  To take a simple example the inking of fingers or indeed the 
immersion of the whole lower arm in a bucket of dye to show that someone has 
voted is a simple, cheap, effective, and indeed often a popular methodology in 
sub-Saharan African elections.  It is not popular in ‘developed’ countries and was 
disliked in the Western Balkans even when the ink was applied only to the cuticle 
of the finger and was not visible to the naked eye.146  In Afghanistan such 
measures could even prove fatal for electors in areas where the Taliban had 
‘forbidden’ local people to vote.  This example serves to indicate that the use of 
precedent has to be judiciously and carefully considered and may require 
consultation with local residents before it is introduced.  It also requires an 
awareness of local culture that might not be available to those undertaking post-
                                                 
145 A uniquely British problem in BiH was convincing the military that this was not like Northern 
Ireland and that the approaches that worked there did not always work in BiH.  British officers and 
soldiers reading the history of the area was very useful (Rebecca West Black Lamb and Grey 
Falcon – A Journey through Yugoslavia, and Fitzroy Maclean Eastern Approaches).  Ironically, 
post-July 1999 when the Kosovars attempted to drive out the remaining non-Kosovars (including 
the Roma and Gorani), Kosovo was indeed somewhat similar, if on a larger scale and more 
violent than Northern Ireland and the previous expertise did become relevant. 
146 Hand-held infra-red scanners were supplied to polling station staff so that they could scan the 
hands of potential voters.  
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conflict nation-building given the pressure to produce ‘quick results’.  As will be 
shown in a later chapter, it is those managing elections who are often under most 
pressure, as the requirement to ‘seal the peace’ leads to pressure for early 
elections.147 
 
Post-conflict development models 
 
As can be seen from the above, both the UN and the IC talk in terms of 
‘generations’ of peacekeeping and post-conflict.  These could be regarded as 
‘models’, as they have attempted to assign particular characteristics to each of 
the generations of post-conflict operations.  As both the UN and academics such 
as Doyle148 have already discovered, these distinctions are very difficult to make 
as the models overlap each other in time and function and the third generation, in 
particular, almost always contains elements of  either or both of the second and 
fourth generation.   A further difficulty and one that is particularly relevant when 
talking to post-conflict practitioners is that the people ‘on the ground’ when the 
mission was deployed did not think in terms of ‘models’ and that in many cases 
and, particularly, for the earlier UN missions, the ‘models’ have been developed 
‘post-facto’ to illustrate what happened, rather than being practically 
implemented, as if from some template, at the time.  This was particularly so for 
                                                 
147 The Rambouillet proposal, had the talks been successful, was that elections in Kosovo were to 
have been held within 120 days of the peace agreement having been signed.  The Yemeni 30:60 
deal negotiated by the Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC) in 2011 is even more ambitious and 
foresees elections within 60 days of the agreement being signed.  Given that the elections in 
Yemen are to be managed and overseen by foreigners, the time for acculturization will be very 
limited indeed. 
148 Doyle (2006), op. cit., p 10. 
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UN missions prior to 1992 when the UN deployment structure was less well co-
ordinated.  Following the formation of the UNDPKO with its internal planning 
structures it is likely that for UN missions at least, senior personnel will know that 
they are embarking on a third or fourth generation post-conflict mission, when 
they deploy.  
 
This chapter has related crucial contextual, theoretical, and typological material 
as a lead in to the research examples.  In the following chapters this thesis will 
illustrate how the IC’s management of ‘post-conflict’ in Bosnia and Kosovo 
differed from what went before and indeed in two of the major campaigns which 
succeeded them, in Afghanistan and Iraq.  They will also demonstrate how the 
lessons learned in Bosnia and Kosovo have been adopted and adapted by the 
UN and others and implemented elsewhere. The thematic chapters will also 
demonstrate how the IC’s ‘model’, if that is what it is going to be called, was 
adjusted over time to take account of perceived deficiencies, e.g. the 
development of the pillar structure for Kosovo.  The chapters will also debate 
whether there was a ‘model’ at the strategic level149 in each case which provided 
a ‘blueprint’ for each of the two post-conflict interventions under discussion.  
 
 
 
                                                 
149 There is no question that there are models for specific thematic activities and that these have 
been in use for at least the last 20 - 30 years.  The management and layout of refugee camps is 
one specific example.  Similarly there are specific NGOs which specialise in one specific area of 
post-conflict and which are acknowledged experts in the field.  The Dublin Rape Crisis Centre has 
already been mentioned as one such example. 
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Frontispiece to the Thematic Chapters on Bosnia and Kosovo 
 
Having examined the typology of international engagement in conflict and post-
conflict, the following two chapters focus upon the Western Balkans in the 1990s.  
Both the historical overview and the typology demonstrated that the IC had 
developed an evolutionary approach to post-conflict, but that this dynamic was, 
while not even, increasing in pace up and until the mid-1990s.   It was during this 
period that the UN intervention process was marked by rapid change.  In 
particular by the UN’s willingness to become involved in combat so as to be able 
to deliver humanitarian assistance, the so-called ‘third-generation’ missions and 
then almost immediately the transition into the ‘fourth-generation’ missions, which 
aimed to support the broader issues of post-conflict.  Furthermore, it was the 
perceived failure of the third-generation missions and hence of the UN in Bosnia, 
which led to the development of the complex IC rather than UN-led 
peacekeeping and post-conflict missions which are seen today and of which the 
Intervention Force (IFOR) mission in Bosnia was the first.    
 
The conflicts in the Western Balkans which broke out as a result of the collapse 
of Yugoslavia are inextricably linked.  All of the conflicts were, whilst as ever 
political, essentially ethnic conflicts as defined by Horowitz1 and others, and 
revolved around the desire by the Serbs under the leadership of Milosevic and 
with the assistance of the Serb-dominated Yugoslav army and security forces to 
                                                 
1 Horowitz (1985), op. cit., p 8. 
 237 
retain their hegemony over areas of Yugoslavia where they no longer retained or, 
perhaps never had,2 the demographic majority.  In these circumstances and in 
the face of increasingly militant nationalism, Horowitz states that the parties have 
three options: Fight, Negotiate or Flee.3  It is the aftermath of the decision to 
fight, that these chapters will examine.   
 
This author agrees with Horowitz’s generalised definition of ethnic conflict, but 
not with the more detailed argumentation of Stefan Wolff who attempts to 
compare the conflict within Bosnia4 with that which occurred almost 
simultaneously in Rwanda and reaches the unfounded conclusion that they were 
comparable both in origin and scope.  In Rwanda armed conflict and attacks by 
militias from rival groups had been a fact of life since the effective end of colonial 
rule in the late 1950s and Rwanda was therefore visibly a conflict waiting to 
happen.  Additionally, the massive preponderance of Hutus in the country, some 
85 percent,5 made the likely outcome of any more generalised conflict inevitable.  
This could not be said of the former Yugoslavia, except perhaps Slovenia and 
Kosovo, but certainly not Bosnia where no ethnic group in 1991 enjoyed an 
                                                 
2 For example in Slovenia, the most ‘European’ and wealthiest of the Republics within the former 
Yugoslavia and the scene of the first Yugoslav conflict in 1991, there were few if any ‘ethnic’ 
Serbs.  In the Yugoslav 1991 census for the Republic of Slovenia out of a population of 2.2 million 
less than 100,000 people in the Republic originated from the Republic of Serbia.  Of these some 
50,000 were Kosovo Albanians who of course were technically citizens of the Serb Republic 
within Yugoslavia.    
3 Horowitz (1985), op. cit., p 227. 
4 Stefan Wolff, Ethnic Conflict – A Global Perspective.  See pp 27–32 in particular, for the 
comparison between Rwanda and Bosnia. 
5 Ibid., p 28. 
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absolute majority despite the Bosniacs being the largest single group.6  There 
were also no clear attempts to commit ‘genocide’ by any of the participants in the 
Balkan conflicts of the 1990s although there was a significant amount of ‘ethnic 
cleansing’.7  There was also mass murder and dispossession but, perhaps, with 
the sole exception of the Srebrenica8 and Zepa pockets in Eastern Bosnia,9 no 
wholesale attempts at slaughter or deportation and even here this was restricted 
to the adult male population.    
 
The conflicts in the former Yugoslavia were also the first major conflicts to take 
place on European soil since the military operations which flowed out of the 
Second World War and which were described by Woodhouse10 and others. The 
Bosnian conflict led to the first long-term international engagement in conflict 
resolution and post-conflict management since the collapse of the Soviet Union 
and the ending of the bi-polar, ‘superpower’ world order in 1989.  This alone 
                                                 
6 And one which had been increasingly so since the 1950s due to their higher birth rate, which at 
3.5 remains one of the highest in Europe.  The changes in population distribution between the 
ethnic groups can be accurately tracked across Bosnia, even at the level of individual 
municipalities, through the decennial census returns.  
7 For example by the Croats who managed to clear almost the entire population from the Serb 
ethnic ‘Krajinas’ and Slavonia and from north-western Bosnia in the area around Drvar during  
‘Operation Storm’ in 1995.  In comparison the ethnic cleansing carried out by the ‘internal’ 
participants in the Bosnian War, were relatively minor in comparison.  
8 Archibugi (2008), gives a more detailed statement of the implications of the Serb elimination of 
the safe havens, in particular its impact upon the UN.  Op cit.  pp 185–6. 
9 The 'Zepa pocket' which was in an isolated wooded area of Eastern Bosnia and which was 
guarded by the Ukrainians, was overrun by the Serbs in the days before the assault on 
Srebrenica.  It disappeared almost without trace with almost none of the men surviving.  Due to 
the absence of any media (or UNHCR) this appears to have become a forgotten episode in the 
war.  The site which was many miles from a surfaced road was still abandoned and mine infested 
when it was visited by the author in 1997 to see if there were any electors remaining. 
10 This included the so-called ‘Bandit War’ in Greece from 1945 to 1949. This was fought by the 
Greek government assisted by the UK against the communist partisan movement.  This and the 
events which led up to it is described authoritatively and in detail in C.M. Woodhouse and Richard 
Clogg The Struggle for Greece, 1941-1949.  Woodhouse was the head of the British Mission to 
the partisans in 1943-4 and lived in Greece post-war. 
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marked them out as landmark events, in terms of post-conflict management, but 
the fact that within this the UN peacekeeping structure was also widely perceived 
to have failed11 and to therefore need replacing, or at the very least 
supplementing, was a further indicator that the methodology to be employed in 
post-conflict would differ radically from those conflicts which had preceded them 
in the period since the Second World War.  The mechanisms which were used to 
manage the UN and the post-conflict intervention in Bosnia and Kosovo will be 
discussed in more detail in the Kosovo chapter, as it was at that stage that the 
mechanisms became more formalised in the ‘Quint’12 process and which later 
formed the basis of the structures used in a number of current post-conflict 
activities such as that in Dharfur and Iraq.  The evolution of these mechanisms, 
which go beyond the regular meetings of P5,13 which covers the period from 
1993 to 2001, but having been found useful, but exclusive to the UN members 
concerned, continued.  
 
For the USA at least and possibly also for the Nordic states their involvement in 
both the Bosnian and Kosovo conflicts has been described as a classic act of 
‘humanitarian intervention’.14  The truth perhaps is rather more complicated, and 
it could perhaps be argued that although within the states themselves there was 
little in the way of mineral resources to fight over, nor did they pose a direct 
                                                 
11 William Shawcross (2000), op. cit., for a discussion of the public perception of the UN’s 
incapacity. 
12 The Quint effectively managed the post-conflict process in both Bosnia and Kosovo.  The 
members were the USA, Germany, Great Britain, France, and Italy. 
13 They have been studied in a doctoral thesis and a later book by Jochen Prantl, The UN Security 
Council and Informal Groups of States – Complementing or Competing for Governance?. 
14 As defined by Gary J. Bass (2000), op. cit. 
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military threat, a failure to intervene by the IC, in particular by the Western 
Europeans, could have led to potentially catastrophic consequences.   
 
The signing of the ‘Dayton Agreement’, can perhaps retrospectively be seen as 
the ‘high water mark’ of US influence in the region and perhaps globally, as the, 
at that time, sole ‘superpower’ and with a Europe largely divided in its response 
and generally unwilling to risk large-scale military intervention.  Although for a 
significant proportion of the time under review the USA maintained a dominance 
in decision making not only in capital cities and in the international organisations, 
but also at the senior operational levels within both Bosnia15 and Kosovo. The 
continuum of the management of post-conflict in both Bosnia and Kosovo will 
demonstrate the increasing confidence, authority, and reach of the EU and the 
other purely European structures.  It will also demonstrate that, conscious of this 
changing shift in power between Europe and North America, the USA positioned 
itself and used the presence of the international organisations such as NATO, the 
OSCE, and even ironically the UN,16 so that it always maintained at least one 
seat and often more at the decision-making tables when post-conflict 
management and the future ‘trajectory’ of the post-conflict states was discussed.  
This change in emphasis and influence can most clearly be seen in the Kosovo 
                                                 
15 From 1996 to 1999 the SRSG, the Head of the OSCE, and the Deputy High Representative in 
Bosnia were all US appointees.  The Head of the OSCE remains a US post in 2011. 
16 The USA pushed for the appointment of Jacques Klein a former US Air Force Brigadier as 
SRSG in Bosnia.  It also attempted to have him nominated for the SRSG post in Kosovo in 1999, 
but failed.  Previously Klein had been head of the UN Mission in Eastern Slavonia and post-
Balkans became the SRSG in Liberia during the conflict there. 
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‘pillar’ structure as can the resurgence of the UN from its ‘low point’ of 1995-6 
and will again be discussed in the chapter relating to Kosovo.   
 
A further indicator of the change in influence was the willingness of the 
Europeans to not only match but to exceed the USA in terms of donor support, 
something which the potential recipients were very quick to observe.  Whilst this 
change, in part because Europe remains in general unwilling to commit large 
numbers of troops to peacemaking and peacekeeping, it is willing to demonstrate 
its support of other people’s military efforts, not only in the Western Balkans.  
One further factor which is perhaps ‘unique’ to the region17 is the possibility of 
eventual and in the case of Croatia imminent, EU membership.18  This again will 
be discussed in the chapter on Kosovo. 
 
Many of the other topics, such as the role of the international military force, 
elections and within that particularly civil and voter registration, along with the 
developing role of the ICTY, will be discussed in both chapters.  So too will be 
the role of the indigenous military, para-military, and police forces post-conflict as 
well as the role of neighbouring or ‘parent’ states.  Finally, the evolution of both 
the technology of post-conflict and the methodology was very rapid and 
demonstrates significant changes between the model for Bosnia in January 1996 
                                                 
17 It could conceivably also be relevant to Moldova which is now being referred to as an 
unresolved conflict.  Moldova could also at some future unspecified date become eligible for 
membership of the EU as it adjoins two existing EU states, Romania and Hungary. See the report 
on the speech by Ambassador Ian Cliff to the IISS on 3 July 2009 on ‘The OSCE and the future of 
the European Security Architecture’.  The situation in Georgia in July 2008 demonstrated that 
‘frozen conflicts’ the previously preferred term, could become ‘unfrozen’ in a very short space of 
time. 
18 Croatia and Albania are already members of NATO. 
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and that for Kosovo in July 1999, although many of these later developments 
were later ‘retro-fitted’ into the Bosnian model.  The development of 
communications, in particular the ability to record, transmit, and store data such 
as biometrics, also advanced dramatically during the period under consideration, 
indeed to such an extent that technical advances introduced in Bosnia in 1997 
and 1998, were already becoming irrelevant in Kosovo by the time that most of 
the people who were to be involved in the management of post-conflict Kosovo 
deployed in late 1999.  
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Chapter 6 
 
Post-Conflict Operations in Bosnia 
 
Introduction 
 
This chapter will not attempt to discuss the entirety of the wide range of issues 
which faced Bosnia in the post-conflict period.  The aim will be to describe and 
analyse a selection of specific but disparate issues.  These, whilst critical to the 
reconstruction effort will serve to provide insight into those unique elements 
within the post-conflict Bosnian scenario which are worthy of comment.  The 
topics were also selected as being relevant examples of issues which have been 
identified as key concerns in a wide range of post-conflict states and the chapter 
will provide insight into why some, if not all, of the issues have proved so 
intractable.   Many of the areas covered in this chapter were either discussed at 
the Dayton negotiations or are the subject of specific provisions in the Dayton 
Agreement,1 due to the critical nature of their impact upon the post-conflict 
environment.  There were added complexities to the post-conflict responses to 
Bosnia.  In some cases these came about because they related to the need to be 
cognisant of, and interact with, the IC’s conflict and post-conflict responses in the 
former Yugoslavia.  This was most notably the post-conflict activities in Eastern 
                                                 
1 General Framework Agreement for Peace (1995), op., cit. 
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Slavonia and the Krajinas2 throughout the period from 1996 and then Kosovo3 
and the emerging conflict within Macedonia (fYROM) from 1999.  These issues 
will be dealt with in detail in the chapter relating to Kosovo.  
 
This chapter will examine the following topics in detail.  It will first examine:  
• The elections process, as this has become an essential early part of the 
peace-building process.   
• The role of the military and then information operations will follow, as 
these are also critical elements in all IC post-conflict operations. 
The post-conflict development of the Bosnian armed forces.   
• The ‘internet revolution’ and its impact upon post-conflict operations.  
• The role of the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia (ICTY) and 
will question whether this is an effective ‘blueprint’ for subsequent 
operations.  
• The IC’s involvement in the field of education in post-conflict states as this 
is not only particularly relevant to states which have been involved in 
internal ethnic conflict, but has also been the most neglected area of post-
conflict reintegration as the Northern Ireland conflict4 can testify.   
                                                 
2 Which in these places were UN-led, as opposed to Bosnia which was ‘managed’ by the Contact 
Group and the IC directly. 
3 Both the emerging conflict in Kosovo from 1997 to 1999, and the later post-conflict activities. 
4 And on the mainland of Great Britain the continuing disorders in Strathclyde where the 
schooling system is also largely segregated by religious background. 
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• The impact of neighbouring states on the post-conflict process - this is 
critical to success not only in Bosnia but also in many post-conflict states.5 
• It will also briefly note some other relevant areas of interest in the IC’s 
management of post-conflict, which will not be examined in detail in this 
thesis, either because they are Bosnia specific or for reasons of space. 
 
All of these topics are critical to IC governance in post-conflict.  Most, indeed, are 
relevant to every post-conflict intervention that the IC has made or is likely to 
make in the future.  Others such as the role of education are perhaps relevant 
only to those post-conflict missions which are attempting to resolve disputes 
based around ethnicity or religion, but are ones where the IC has either 
consistently failed to generate an adequate mechanism for resolving the issue, or 
too often has simply failed to address the issue at all.6  In consequence, the 
detailed accounts of the cases given in this chapter will serve to draw out the 
wider issues about the nature of IC governance.   
 
Understandably, in addition to their pertinence as continuing issues for the IC’s 
global management of post-conflict the examples, as they are based upon 
empirical evidence, will also naturally focus upon those areas where the author 
has had direct exposure or has expertise.   
                                                 
5 In many cases it is the role of neighbouring states in ethnic conflicts which has initially triggered 
the violence.  States with weak governance may also be subject to spillover from neighbouring 
states.  There are numerous examples of these phenomena, in particular in Africa.  The Central 
African Republic (CAR), for example, has spillover in the north of the country from the 
combatants in the Dharfur crisis as well as from the forces of Chad who are trying to stop the 
conflict spreading into their territory. In the east and within CAR territory there is continuing 
conflict between the Lords Resistance Army (LRA) and the Ugandan army. 
6 As have the government of the UK and the ‘assemblies’ of Northern Ireland and Scotland. 
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The Management of Elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina  
 
Introduction 
 
As with Cambodia, Mozambique, and Georgia earlier in the decade, the holding 
of ‘free and fair’ elections within a designated time period, in Bosnia’s case within 
one year of the signing of the agreement, were a key element of the Dayton 
peace negotiations.  As such, meeting this deadline and the requirement for ‘free 
and fair’ elections were a critical element in not only bringing closure to the 
conflict, but also in ensuring the longer-term stability of the country.  In Bosnia as 
in many other post-conflict states the primary purpose of the elections was to 
obtain, in effect, a widespread public endorsement of the peace process and to 
‘seal it in’.  Given this requirement the elections process in post-conflict states is 
a generic and usually early part of the post-conflict nation-building process. 
Given the timing and the pressure for them to be completed as early as possible, 
they are also often ‘flawed’ in terms of typical Western European processes.  The 
elections in Bosnia in 1996 were indeed, even if successful in their overall 
purpose, flawed.  This section will explain why this was and was always going to 
be so. It will also demonstrate why it is always likely to be the case in post-
conflict intervention, that the first round of elections at least are flawed and so 
why an analysis of the electoral process in Bosnia is of relevance to the wider 
questions posed by the thesis.  Additionally, this narrative will attempt to address 
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briefly some of the arguments as to why the Dayton Agreement specified that it 
was a Bosnia-wide general election which had to be held in the first instance and 
not, as in some other cases elsewhere.7 municipal or other level elections.      
 
The Elections 
 
US direct involvement with ground troops in Bosnia was presented to the 
domestic US audience by the Clinton Administration in 1995, as both a 
humanitarian intervention and a one-year ‘time limited’ operation.  While 
diplomats and military commanders knew that it was going to be unlikely that the 
USA could disentangle itself from Bosnia within one year, for domestic political 
purposes as American public opinion did not favour this commitment [of US 
troops].8 this was how the scenario had to be presented.  Right from the outset a 
general election in Bosnia to ‘seal in’ the ‘Dayton Agreement’ was seen as a key 
element within the overall US exit strategy.  It was also a key element in the 
overall strategy of Alija Izetbegovic, the only one of the three key Bosnian 
leaders to be present at Dayton.9  While it was generally agreed by the 
protagonists at Dayton that municipal elections should also be held ‘if possible’ 
within twelve months, these were not mandated.10  At the time of Dayton and 
                                                 
7 E.g. Guatemala in 1997.  
8 Sidney Blumenthal, The Clinton Wars, p 154. 
9 The Bosnian Croats and Serbs were represented by: Franjo Tudjman, the President of Croatia 
for the Croats and Slobodan Milosevic the President of the Socialist Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia (SFRY), for the Serbs. 
10 See Marco Mazzera, Michael Pavicic, and Leontine Specker, Comparisons of the Impact of 
Peace Agreements: Fundamental Elements of State and Peace Building?. 
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indeed until late October 199611 it was clearly the intention of the US 
administration that municipal elections should take place later in 1996 following 
the general election. 
 
A number of assumptions were made both during Dayton and for some months 
afterwards about the essential pre-requisites for managing elections.  In 
particular, the repeated annual declarations by the SFRY12 to the UN regarding 
such issues as adult literacy, record keeping, and the decennial census 
appeared to have been implicitly accepted as true.13  Secondly, it would appear 
that electoral advisors, led by Jeff Fisher, the Vice-President of the International 
Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES), briefed the US team at Dayton that not 
only would a general election be easier to run in practical terms, but that it would 
also be much less contentious than a local election.  In this, Fisher, who was to 
be the US nominee in 1996 to manage the elections, was undoubtedly correct. It 
is clear that whether or not elections took place in say Srebrenica, Gorazde, or 
indeed any one of the 157 municipalities, a nationwide general election could be 
declared as valid, whereas the inability to hold a successful municipal election in 
any single municipality would have been a clear indication of the failure of the 
whole process, thus invalidating even the ‘free and fair’ ones.  Therefore the 
                                                 
11 Ambassador Frowick, the Head of the OSCE Mission to Bosnia retained staff and continued 
with Municipal Elections planning until 21 October 1996 at which point the elections were 
‘postponed’.  ‘Elections Canada’ staff had been specially flown in to prepare for the municipal 
elections in early October 1996.   
12 These were made over decades throughout the majority of the ‘Tito era’ from the 1960s 
onwards. 
13 For a list of these assumptions see Alex Finnen Managing Elections in an International 
Environment.  
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rationale for holding early national rather than local elections was followed 
subsequently in Kosovo, Iraq, and Afghanistan.    
 
At the insistence of Alija Izetbegovic, and critically the others present at Dayton, it 
was agreed that the 1991 census, organised by the SFRY in the dying months of 
its existence, should act as the basis for the electoral roll.14  Unfortunately the 
1991 census was itself a flawed document in that its primary purpose was to 
serve as a military mobilisation register and it did not represent a full, true, and 
accurate record of the citizenship of Bosnia in 1991.15  Any issues concerning 
residency qualifications from 1991 were understandably ignored during the run 
up to the elections of 1996, as was the issue of those ‘eligible electors’ who were 
simply not included on the 1991 census as they had been overseas, the majority 
as gastarbeiter in Germany.16  Given the large numbers of displaced people and 
refugees who almost certainly represented over thirty per cent17 of the electorate 
in 1996, it was decided that these groups were simply too difficult to include in 
the electoral roll. 
 
                                                 
14 See amongst others, Richard Holbrooke, To End a War, op cit. 
15 See Alex Finnen (2009), op cit.  This gives some examples of people who were intentionally 
excluded from the 1991 census.  Note also that any census, including those run by the SFRY, 
records all people who were present at a particular date, not simply those that are citizens and 
hence eligible to vote, or even those who possessed SFRY identity documentation.  When a state 
is fragmenting as the SFRY was, this is a matter for serious concern if the census is then used for 
purposes other than those originally intended. 
16 At the time of reunification in Germany (1989), it was estimated that there might be as many as 
600,000 gastarbeiter (literally: guest workers) from Yugoslavia in the Federal Republic of 
Germany (FRG) and a further significant number in Austria.  A significant minority of these would 
have been legally entitled to vote in Bosnia. 
17 The number of Bosnian electors resident as ‘refugees’ in Germany alone approached 600,000 
or 25% of the electorate in 1996, so that it is quite possible that this figure could have been as 
high as 40%, but it was never quantified by the OSCE who were responsible for administering the 
election.. 
 250 
Proof of identity and registration 
 
Of more concern were the issues of the proof of identity of voters and what 
documents would count as valid ‘identity documents’ as there were plenty to 
choose from.  Given that each of the entities within Bosnia had issued their own 
identity cards during the conflict, that ‘in date’ Socialist Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia (SFRY) ID cards and passports remained valid and that displaced 
people and refugees who had lost their personal documents, might also have 
been issued with documents from the UNHCR, the ICRC or indeed be in 
possession of documents and passports from a third state to which they had fled.  
As it was to transpire, as long as their name was on the 1991 census and they 
could produce ‘some’ documentation, then on the day they were likely to be able 
to vote.  Given that the President of the Republika Srpska (RS) Committee of the 
Red Cross was Ljiljana Karadzic18 and that the RS Red Cross were responsible 
within the RS for issuing some of the identity documents, this might have given 
some cause for concern had this fact been known at the time of Dayton.   
 
A late start-up by the OSCE and the whole of the civilian side of the post-conflict 
architecture,19 also hindered the electoral process, as did the limited access to 
some areas particularly those close to the Inter-Entity Boundary Line (IEBL) 
where there was considerable landmine contamination.  Perhaps surprisingly, 
                                                 
18 Ljiljana Zelen-Karadzic is the wife of the wartime leader Radovan Karadzic.  She became 
President of the RS Red Cross in 1993, and remained in that position until 12 December 2002.  
Radovan Karadzic was later indicted and is currently on trial at the ICTY. 
19 The Office of the High Representative (OHR) was particularly backward in this regard.  It did 
not even secure a headquarters building in Sarajevo until late February 2006. 
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some nations were also less than cooperative when it came to identifying and 
communicating with the Bosnian refugee population within their country, often for 
purely domestic political reasons.  Other countries such as the FRG while 
extremely cooperative and forthcoming used the election registration exercise as 
a means of identifying just how many Bosnian refugees there were and used the 
data thus gathered to begin their repatriation to Bosnia.  This made it difficult to 
secure the involvement of the Bosnian diaspora20 in future elections, in particular 
the municipal elections in 1997 where, with the lower voter numbers for 
municipalities, the diaspora vote was often critical to the result.21 
 
From early 1997 onwards the Elections Division of the OSCE also came under 
pressure to release voter registration data and other information to the ICTY, so 
as to assist their prosecutors with the cases against a range of war criminals.  
Much data was already public, the voters list in 1996 for example was simply a 
reprint of the 1991 census, but as the electoral system progressed the data 
maintained by the OSCE became more accurate, broader in content,22 and 
therefore potentially more useful to the ICTY.  This placed the OSCE in a difficult 
position as it wished to encourage the broadest possible representation while of 
course being required within bounds to support the ICTY.  The introduction of the 
                                                 
20 This term is used intentionally, as the impact of the German decision was to dramatically 
reduce participation not only amongst the refugee population, but also amongst the longer term 
Bosnian ‘gastarbeiter’ population even though, in most cases, they had residence papers.  
21 Srebrenica would be an example of where the DP and refugee vote would completely overturn 
the result of the ballots cast within the municipality. 
22 While the register was based upon only the census data, a record was kept of in which polling 
station every voter had voted.  This was then maintained on a computer database so as to be 
able to plan the distribution of polling stations for later elections.  Such data was clearly of 
potential use to the ICTY. 
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‘secret indictment’23 in March 1997 made the situation much worse for the 
OSCE, as many people who in fact were never to be indicted by either the ICTY 
or the local courts were fearful that they may be arrested and therefore wished to 
‘drop out of sight’ as much as possible.  They, of course, took steps to ensure 
that they neither featured on a civil register nor on the voter’s list.24 
 
The ICTY was also, perhaps understandably, unwilling to share information with 
the OSCE and yet wished the OSCE to provide information in a way in which 
either the processes which they were managing, or in some cases their staff, 
might be compromised.  The ICTY were also quite prepared to challenge 
information legitimately gathered by the OSCE should it contradict the ICTY’s 
desired ‘end state’.  An example of this latter was the discovery by the defence 
counsel for Serb indictees on trial for their part in the administration of the 
Omarska ‘concentration’ camp (1992-4), that some of the Bosniac victims for 
whom there had been testimony provided and which stated that they had been 
murdered at the camp, were in fact very much alive.  Two of them had not only 
registered to vote, but had in fact also voted in the 1996 General Election from 
the Netherlands.25  
 
                                                 
23 The nature of the indictment from the ICTY was only disclosed to the indictee at the time of, or 
in practice immediately after, his or her detention.  
24 Simo Drljaca who died while resisting arrest in Prijedor on 10 July 1997, was one such.  
25 The OSCE elections division found numerous examples of people (mostly men) who had been 
claimed as dead but who were in fact living and working in Western Europe and who had in most 
cases abandoned their families and in some cases (bigamously) remarried. 
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The pressure upon the OSCE in Bosnia and then later in Kosovo as the primary 
source for population data, from the ICTY and the judicial system in general, was 
often strong and frequently accompanied by high-level political pressure from 
people who were either too busy or simply unwilling to listen to the technical 
arguments from both sides.  In Kosovo, where the OSCE-led civil registration 
process involved the collection of biometric data such as fingerprints, the 
inclination of many male Serbs simply to stay away from the process, for fear of 
incriminating themselves, was often quite considerable and it was difficult for the 
OSCE to counter allegations that information collected for one purpose might 
easily be used for another.  Again, this is an issue that will confront all such 
workers in the field of post-conflict in the future, as the mobility and utility of data 
which has been captured electronically, is so widely understood even by those 
who cannot afford to use such devices themselves. It was in Bosnia, however, 
and particularly in the relationship between the OSCE and the ICTY that such 
difficulties with electronic data capture were first encountered and where the 
need to establish ‘lines’ beyond which data could not be exchanged needed to be 
identified.26    
 
 
 
 
                                                 
26 As far as the author is aware there is still no recognised convention for how to handle such 
exchanges of data.  The authorities in Albania, who were in 2009 in the process of creating an 
electronic civil register and through that issuing biometric Identity (ID) cards, faced a similar 
problem.  
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Elections implementation 
 
The topic of Elections Implementation has been discussed in detail elsewhere,27 
but it is important to mention that Bosnia was the first occasion28 where action 
was taken to ensure that effective implementation of election results - notably for 
elections at the municipal and to a lesser extent at the regional level - took place.  
This action followed an apparently successful round of municipal elections in 
1997.  It was discovered two years later, immediately prior to the following round 
of municipal elections, that the councils of two municipalities, Prozor and 
Srebrenica, had never met and that in four other cases they had only met in the 
last six months before the end of their term.  It was decided in advance of the 
1999 municipal elections to establish municipal implementation teams to follow 
up on the elections and to ensure that the appointments of new councils led to 
practical results.  The requirements varied but at their most extreme, in, for 
example, Srebrenica, it involved the OSCE in providing transport and security to 
mayors29 and councillors from the majority but now ‘exile’ communities to council 
meetings.  Ideally, it would also involve finding suitable property so that the newly 
elected mayor could live in his or her municipality in a safe manner and finally it 
                                                 
27 Carrie Manning and Miljenko Antic, The Limits of Electoral Engineering, pp 45-59.  See also; 
Alex Finnen (2009), op cit. 
28 This could be seen as surprising, as the UN had discovered in Cambodia that obtaining a 
particular election result, did not always lead to the party or coalition with the most seats 
achieving power (see comments in the historical overview chapter).  There was, however, even 
five years later still a view at the highest levels of the IC that the critical event was polling day and 
not what followed afterwards.  
29 Following his election in 1999, the Bosniac mayor entered Srebrenica in a vehicle driven by the 
OSCE Field Officer.  Whilst this was initially acceptable it was important that the mayor made his 
own travel arrangements as soon as possible, so as not to be seen as a tool of the IC and at the 
earliest safe moment, secured accommodation for himself in the town. 
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involved the provision of training and oversight so that the council and 
municipality could function effectively.  This was expensive both in terms of time 
and manpower and at one stage over thirty international staff were directly 
involved in this process, with a further sixty to eighty, plus a significant number of 
national staff, providing additional assistance.  The scheme was effective in the 
short to medium term and was able to be reduced to a more modest level by 
about 2002.30  This concept was also adopted and enhanced within Kosovo 
where this became the municipal governance scheme, which will be discussed 
later.  
 
The roles of the International Community’s military  
 
Introduction 
 
This section will examine the role of the international military force in Bosnia, the 
Intervention Force (IFOR) and its successor from 1 January 1997 the 
Stabilisation Force (SFOR).  It will look at the force not only as peacekeepers 
and in what might be regarded as a ‘generic’ post-conflict role, but will also 
examine those other activities which it could be argued were Bosnia-specific.  
 
                                                 
30 Many of the staff were then moved by the OSCE into the ‘education project’ where similar 
mediation and negotiation skills were required. 
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The military were arbiters in determining the exact location of the IEBL31 between 
the Bosnian Federation and Republika Srpska (RS).  While this latter activity 
within the last two decades32 has been specific to Bosnia, it can perhaps be 
described as typical of the often unique and specialist tasks which have been 
and will continue to be assigned to military peacekeeping forces in post-conflict 
environments, for the most part, because of the absence of any other authority 
competent to carry them out.  As a result, a wide range of what are now seen as 
‘generic’ military activities33 in support of the peace process will also be studied 
within the Bosnian context.  These ‘generic’ activities, have even, as in the case 
of Rhodesia in 1971, included the organisation and running of elections.34  
 
Although within Bosnia many of the ‘military’ activities described below were 
undertaken reluctantly, due to the vacuum created by the lack of deployed 
civilian capacity, particularly in late 1995 and the first quarter of 1996, others 
                                                 
31 A specific task laid down for the military in the Dayton Agreement.  Op. cit., Annex 2 Article IV. 
32 It has, however, been a traditional role for military forces especially in the colonial era, but also 
later in what might be referred to as the ‘UN period’ delineating the borders in Cyprus and 
between Ethiopia – Eritrea.  For the colonial period a good example would be Colonel 
Younghusband’s marking of the borders between Tibet and China for which see Peter Hopkirk, 
The Great Game: On Secret Service in High Asia. 
33 See also the military’s, in particular the US military’s concerns about the so called ‘mission 
creep’, which appears to be an intrinsic part of the military’s involvement in post-conflict 
operations.  Amongst others a paper by Anthony D. Garcia, The Strategic Expeditionary 
Command: Filling the Interagency Void.  This describes the situation faced by the military in 
Bosnia. 
34 Amongst others see Alex Finnen, The Military’s Involvement in Elections: Lessons from the 
Past.  This is based upon presentations given to the UK military prior to the first round of elections 
in Iraq following the second Gulf War.   These presentations were delivered to the Joint Staff 
College (JSC) and in somewhat more detail to the military planning staff for Iraq and the UK Civil 
Affairs Group (CAG).  Similar presentations were given prior to the UK’s involvement in elections 
in Afghanistan and an e-mail ‘helpline’ was provided to the UK ‘civil affairs’ team in Helmand 
province. 
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were overtly political in nature or had a political intent35 such as PsyOps. These 
specific issues are of direct relevance to a wide range of post-conflict 
environments and, indeed, go to the heart of the issue, as to what the role of a 
military organisation should be within a post-conflict environment.  This will be 
demonstrated through reference to the military’s demarcation of the IEBL, their 
role in PsyOps, and civil affairs.  This section will conclude with an examination 
of the rapidly increasing capability of communications during a period of rapid 
technical transition, which widely impacted upon both the IC’s and the indigenous 
population’s management of conflict and post-conflict.  
 
The Inter-Entity Boundary Line (IEBL) 
 
One role of the military which was specified in the Dayton Agreement was not 
unique to Bosnia in post-conflict terms, but was perhaps unique because of its 
complexity there.  This was the role given to IFOR in delineating the IEBL.36    By 
its very nature this required rapid and indeed ‘rough and ready’ decisions by the 
military, even if these were then adjusted, often after much tortuous negotiation, 
later on.  While the Dayton Agreement stated in Annex 2 Article IV that:  
The line on the 1:50,000 scale map to be provided for the Appendix 
delineating the Inter-Entity Boundary Line, and the lines on the 1:50,000 
                                                 
35 One example, see below, will be the IFOR/SFOR targeting of the infrastructure support 
campaign in Sanski Most and its impact upon Mayor Alagic. 
36 The General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina (GFAP).  This was 
initialled in Dayton on 21 November 1995 and signed in Paris on 14 December 1995.  The 
agreement on the IEBL formed Annex 2 of the Agreement, while Annex 2, Article IV made the 
commander of IFOR responsible for the delineation of the boundary line.  
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scale map to be provided for Appendix A to Annex 1-A delineating the 
Inter-Entity Zone of Separation and the Agreed Cease-Fire Line and its 
Zone of Separation, which are accepted by the Parties as controlling and 
definitive, are accurate to within approximately 50 meters,  
the reality was somewhat different.  At Dayton the discussions between the three 
leaders and Richard Holbrooke, the envoy of US President Clinton, had focused 
upon a tabletop-sized map which had then been marked by felt-tip pen.  The 
approximate width of the line marked on the map, which had been discussed and 
agreed, represented a width of some six hundred metres on the ground.  
Furthermore at that meeting, only the Bosniac President Alija Izetbegovic was a 
native and resident of Bosnia,37 so understood the detail, at least as far as 
Sarajevo was concerned, and could perhaps visualise what the line on the map 
would actually look like on the ground. 
 
Delineating boundaries could be regarded as a traditional task for the military 
from the colonial period forward38 and even within Europe it had been the military 
who had first delineated the boundaries between what was to become the FRG 
and the GDR in 1945.  In almost all recent cases after 1945, however, the 
boundaries thus delineated had followed either earlier and/or in most cases39 
subordinate boundaries, so that all that was required was for the military to 
                                                 
37 Apart from Holbrooke and Izetbegovic, the only other participants at the meeting where the 
‘line’ was decided were Tudjman (of Croatia) and Milosevic (of Serbia). 
38 Hopkirk (1990), op cit.  Hopkirk describes both the delineation and marking of the Indian border 
with Tibet and the Indian border with Iran.  
39 This was the case with the border between India and Pakistan in 1947. 
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delineate an already known and recognised line on the map.40  The boundary 
agreed at Dayton, however, followed no such logic and indeed in many cases, 
even cut through polling station district boundaries whilst also leaving fifteen or 
twenty ‘rump municipalities’, for electoral officials to ponder over and 
administer.41  Within Sarajevo the line ran through the centre of blocks of 
apartments and just to the east of ‘Tito’ barracks, the major military complex in 
the centre of the city.42 
 
Annex 2, Article IV of Dayton metaphorically and, literally, placed the IFOR force 
in the middle of a minefield.43  Given the imprecision with which the line had been 
originally drawn there was no question of simply marking a line and declaring it to 
be the IEBL.  In due course each section of the IEBL would have to be 
negotiated with local and national community leaders on both sides and agreed.  
In the interim hasty decisions would have to be taken and imposed, as within 
ninety days of the signing of the Dayton Agreement it was mandated that the 
opposing forces would withdraw from their front lines and that no long-barrelled 
weapons were to be permitted within 800 metres of the IEBL.  Therefore in the 
                                                 
40 In the case of the Inner German Border (IGB) for example, the boundary followed the line of the 
pre-war state boundaries and these in many cases had been marked in the early nineteenth 
century and in Germany as almost everywhere else the boundary thus marked, ran almost 
exclusively through rural areas. 
41 Two examples of ‘rump municipalities’ may suffice: Srpski Drvar, the rump of Drvar with an 
electorate of 61, consisting largely of primary forest and Srpski Mostar a rump of  Mostar with an 
electorate of less than 20 and consisting primarily of barren hillside. 
42 For the details of the IEBL in Bosnia generally see the IFOR IEBL map and the IFOR Sarajevo 
city plan.  Similar plans were drawn up and published for other cities affected, specifically Mostar 
and Brcko. 
43 Large tracts of the IEBL designated at Dayton were mined and particularly in urban areas 
booby trapped.  Within the area of Sarajevo alone there were at the conclusion of the survey over 
2,500 individually identified and mapped minefields and Improvised Explosive Device (IED) sites. 
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short term a decision had to be taken as to where that 800 metre limit lay on 
either side of the line, even if the IEBL itself had yet to be formally agreed.44 
 
The implementation of Annex 2 of Dayton required the military to take an overtly 
political role and one which not only did they find distasteful, they arguably 
should not have had.  Not only did they have to negotiate with the local politicians 
and the entity leaderships, but they had to negotiate with the other international 
elements managing the post-conflict environment in Bosnia.  The OSCE 
elections division was one such, but as far as they were concerned they basically 
only required a clear decision so as to proceed with their planning.  Elements 
within the UN, however, were often concerned to have specific roads or railways 
within a particular entity and, especially at the local level, tended to act as the 
‘advocate’ for one or other side in the dispute. This was something from which 
the other agencies within the IC were also not immune and which General Sir 
Michael Walker the IFOR Commander and his staff found hugely frustrating.45   
 
That the delineation of the IEBL at the Dayton talks was a requirement and 
perhaps the most contentious issue at the talks is not in doubt.  That Holbrooke 
was in need of a solution that would satisfy Alija Izetbegovic, the only man 
present with a direct interest in the specifics of the ‘line’ is clear, as Holbrooke 
                                                 
44 The Bosniac Armija refused to withdraw from Tito barracks on the basis that it was their 
principal military strongpoint and was not on the IEBL.  Only after the threat of direct conflict with 
IFOR on the night of 19/20 March 1996, at the expiry of the ninety-day deadline, did they 
withdraw.  
45 General Walker, who later went on to become chief of the UK defence staff, has yet to publish 
any material on his time in command of IFOR.  The comment here is made on the basis of his 
personal comments to the author and others whilst the author was acting as the IFOR liaison 
officer to the OSCE in 1996.  
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himself states.  This was achieved by simply talking the IEBL out, over a meeting 
which lasted well into the early hours of the morning and that with an agreement 
in sight Holbrooke acknowledges that he simply refused to agree the ‘deal’ until 
the line was drawn.46  What was wrong was that, given that the USA did not want 
any active involvement in the post-Dayton process from the UN,47 that Annex 2, 
Article IV was made the responsibility of the military.  This may be deemed an 
experiment on behalf of the IC and one which has yet to be repeated elsewhere.  
 
Information operations 
 
Introduction 
 
In terms of the military’s involvement in the post-conflict process, the information 
campaign and what are currently referred to as ‘perception operations’,48 also 
formed a key part of the IC’s post-conflict activities in Bosnia in the period from 
1995 to 1998.  Again, while some of these activities might appear to be Bosnia 
specific, the vast majority of perception operations activities, such as mine 
awareness and support for the elections process, can be seen to be generic 
within a post-conflict environment and relevant to military post-conflict and indeed 
peacekeeping or even war-fighting49 operations elsewhere.  Indeed, perception 
                                                 
46 Holbrooke (1999), op. cit. 
47 Elsewhere it is likely that the task of negotiating the detailed line of the IEBL would have fallen 
to UN Civil Affairs (UNCA). 
48 During the period up until 1999, this was known by the title of ‘psychological operations’. 
49 Provision of mine awareness materials and Presidential election information was a task of 
amongst others the International Stabilisation Force (ISAF) and the other military components 
within Afghanistan in 2009.  
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operations are not only in use as this thesis is being written, in Iraq and 
Afghanistan, but can even be delivered in countries where the conflict continues 
and there are no IC ‘boots on the ground’, Libya being a case in point.   
 
The role of Perception Operations in Bosnia 
 
Perception operations, referred to at the time of the Bosnian conflict as 
Psychological Operations or ‘PsyOps’, were perhaps the second most 
contentious element of the military’s involvement in post-conflict Bosnia.  That is 
the military’s attempt to, as they would characterise it, ‘shape the battlefield’,50 by 
using primarily the electronic and print media to influence the ‘enemy’ using non-
kinetic means.51  In this case the primary target audience was the entire 
indigenous population of Bosnia.   The scale of the US PsyOps task force52 in 
Bosnia, with a total of some 215 men in Sarajevo alone, serves to provide an 
indicator as to how important these activities were.  The US forces were 
equipped with ‘light’ and ‘medium’ print facilities at the Olympic Stadium53 in 
Sarajevo plus a small headquarters and ‘light’ print facilities in each of the Multi 
                                                 
50  For a definition see amongst others John F Kirby, Shaping Todays Battlefield: Public Affairs as 
an Operational Function, Report number A545873, US Naval War College, Newport, Virginia, 
USA, 2000.  PsyOps falls within the ‘operations’ area (J3) of the military command structure.  
51 PsyOps operations are not always restricted to non-kinetic or non-lethal means, particularly 
when it plays a role in war fighting.  In both the Bosnian air campaign of September 1995 and the 
Kosovo ‘air war’ of 1999 there were significant PsyOps components, some of which resulted in 
significant casualties to Bosnian Serb and Serbian combatants.  These war-fighting uses of 
PsyOps were heavily influenced by the experiences of the First Gulf War in 1991. 
52 This was an entirely US-manned brigade level formation which was answerable directly to the 
commander IFOR, who was at the time, a US general. 
53 See, amongst others Steven Collins, Perception Conflict in the ‘Modern’ Balkan Wars, pp 191-
201 in Alan D. Campen and Douglas H. Dearth (eds), Cyberwar 3.0: Human Factors in 
Information Operations and Future Conflict. 
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National Divisions (MND).54  By early 1996 PsyOps was producing three weekly 
newspapers supplemented by monthly magazines for teenagers and children55 to 
be distributed across Bosnia.56  All of these products supported one underlying 
message, that of ‘unity’ and of Bosnia as a unified nation state.  That de facto in 
many areas, these newspapers were the only printed materials, particularly 
during the first six months of the post-conflict period, reinforced their effect. As far 
as the electronic media was concerned, military financed radio stations57 were 
established in Sarajevo, Tuzla, and Banja Luka and approved military scripts 
were distributed to local radio stations nationwide.58  In addition, there were 
programmes run on local radio stations which took advantage of ‘free’ materials 
provided by the military.59  The ‘free’ materials were also provided to bars, cafes, 
                                                 
54 PsyOps in MND South West (SW) consisted of seven men at the HQ plus interpreters, with 
additional dedicated teams in each Battlegroup (BG), 126 men in total including interpreters.  The 
PsyOps establishments in MND (N) and MND (SE) were both larger, that in MND (N) 
considerably so. 
55 A women’s glossy magazine was also included at a later date.  This was recognised later by 
the military authorities as a critical omission in their overall PsyOps campaign plan.  For children 
a ‘Superman’ comic was produced by the US but distributed Bosnia wide while the Germans 
produced ‘Mirko’ magazine for teenagers.  The UK produced the women’s magazine as an 
independent national initiative.    
56 45,000 copies of the UK newspaper Mostovi (‘Bridges’) were distributed free of charge on a 
weekly basis across the MND (SW) area.  The banner at the head of the front page of Mostovi 
was a photograph of a different bridge each week, which had been built by IFOR/SFOR and 
which linked two ethnically diverse communities within the MND area.  It also featured a weather 
map of Bosnia, which was significant, as all of the locally produced media showed weather maps 
of their own regions e.g. the Bosnian Croat maps showed Croatia plus ‘their’ part of Bosnia whilst 
the weather maps on the Bosnian Serb media showed the FRY plus Republika Srpska (RS). 
57 As well as the local but militarily funded radio stations in Sarajevo and Banja-Luka, there was 
also the British Forces Broadcasting Service (BFBS) and Virgin Radio. Although in English these 
were listened to by many local people, because of the music and the quality of the programming.  
Virgin Radio was ‘piped’ by a ‘live feed’, so included traffic information from the London area!  In 
addition, military funded equipment and facilities were donated to many of the independent media 
outlets, this in turn gave the military more leverage with these stations. 
58 In the MND (SW) area in early 1997 this resulted in the placing of about 75 separate messages 
per week with perhaps several hundred airings. 
59 For example the ‘desert islands discs’ programme aired weekly on ‘BIG Radio’ the largest radio 
station in Republika Srpska (with an audience of 300,000 in both the RS and eastern Croatia).  
The guests were always from the UK, spoke in English, and the ‘messages’ were tightly scripted.  
Often the guests were Olympic sportsmen and women, the music was usually the latest Western 
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discos, etc., in the form of free cassette tapes or DVDs, with the latest music60 
and containing embedded messages which could not be erased without 
destroying the cassette or DVD.  These were distributed to literally hundreds of 
venues along with beer mats, hats, calendars, ‘T Shirts’, and other items: one of 
the most popular being small reflectors to tie onto the satchels of young children, 
who had to walk along the unlit roads to and from school.  Each item, of course, 
had the obligatory ‘messages’, all of which had to be personally approved by the 
commanding general in Sarajevo.   
 
PsyOps and the Internet Revolution 
 
PsyOps, in particular within Bosnia, was for the first time able to ‘benefit’ from 
having significant ‘reach back’ to the USA.  Given this capability it is important to 
discuss both the benefits and limitations of such support, oversight, and control.  
This is particularly relevant as in the period from 2007 the use of such ‘reach 
back’ in a number of areas, not just that of PsyOps, has formed an element of the 
UK and now NATO doctrine,61 in both war-fighting and post-conflict operations. 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
Pop i.e. the ‘Spice Girls’ (1997) and so not generally available in Bosnia.  As a result the 
programmes were attractive and listened to by all ages, particularly those who wished to improve 
their English.  
60 The PsyOps teams in Bosnia were directly assisted in all of this by the media industry and had 
the rights to use all of the latest music from, for example, Time Warner free of charge.  In the field 
of newspapers and print magazines all of the women’s and family health articles were taken, with 
permission, free of charge from ‘Women’s Realm’ and ‘Women’s Weekly’ in the UK, while the 
‘Sun’ newspaper also permitted all of their print material and images to be used free of charge, 
this greatly assisted the UK military in their production of articles on, for example, pop groups and 
with calendars for the various Bosnian armed forces. 
61 Within the NATO military intelligence community the doctrine of reach back will be formally 
enshrined in a new doctrinal pamphlet which the author believes was due to have been published 
in Autumn 2009. 
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It was the advent of the internet revolution and in particular access to satellite 
broadband communications which permitted the USA for the first time to ‘reach 
back’ from Bosnia to the continental USA for the scripting, product development 
and some printing of materials to the Fourht PsyOps ‘group’ at Fort Bragg, North 
Carolina, USA.62  This development was particularly attractive to the Clinton 
administration as it permitted them both to reduce the number of ‘boots on the 
ground’ and to retain tighter (US national) editorial control of the products 
produced. To the USA these advantages were greater than the disadvantages of 
a closer engagement with the local community and, as in the later campaigns in 
Iraq and Afghanistan, they relied upon focus groups of ‘exiles’ in the continental 
US,A for quality control and to assess the appropriateness of the product.63 
 
Civil Affairs 
 
Both US PsyOps and US Civil Military Co-operation (CIMIC) form part of US 
Special Operations Forces (SOF) and are grouped together as Civil Affairs and 
Psychological Operations Command (CAPOC) within the US military structure.64  
Along with US Special Forces (SF), both PsyOps and CIMIC form part of the 
                                                 
62 For a detailed bibliography of all US PsyOps operations from the Second World War to date 
see; Herbert Friedman and Edward Rouse, Psychological Operations Bibliography and 
recommended reading list.  The motto of the Group is; ‘Persuade. Change, Influence’. 
63 Not only did this lead to delays in production, but it also led to significant local difficulties as the 
exile communities in no way reflected local public opinion or attitudes, a problem also identified 
later in both Iraq, with for example the Ahmed Chalabi group, and again in Afghanistan.  
Throughout the Bosnian and Kosovo campaigns and despite having numerous Bosnian refugees 
within the UK which they used for military pre-deployment training etc., the UK military always 
used locally produced product and focus groups. 
64 An undated but early 2000s US military document describes the organisation and tasks of 
CAPOC. 
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SOF ‘triad’65 and all are headquartered at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, which is 
also the home of the John F. Kennedy Special Warfare School.  Both 
organisations are heavily involved in counter-insurgency66 as well as post-conflict 
operations.  
 
The concept of CIMIC operations which prior to Bosnia had been a solely US 
concept67 and which within the US forces were the responsibility of ‘civil affairs’, 
the second major component of CAPOC has, in part as a result of the Bosnian 
operation, now spread across NATO68 and beyond69 and now forms part of the 
standard military mechanism for both post-conflict and humanitarian disaster.70  
As such, Bosnia can be considered the precursor of the current military approach 
to post-conflict operations in this area.71  Inside Bosnia by 1996, there was a 
                                                 
65 This is a uniquely US grouping and is not replicated in, for example, the UK. That said, within 
the UK all three elements have been since June 2005 ‘tri-service’ and fall under the control of the 
Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff (Commitments) (DCDS(C)).  For logistical purposes, 15 
PsyOps Group (UK) is administered by the Intelligence Corps and Joint CIMIC Group (JCG) by 
the Royal Engineers while the Directorate of Special Forces (DSF) answers directly to the MoD. 
66 Current examples of ‘non-combat’ deployments include Colombia and Honduras 
67 And which in US terms were fundamentally developed during the Vietnam conflict. 
68 The French formed a national tri-service CIMIC group with the acronym GIACM in 2001. 
69 This includes for example the Russians, who formed part of the CIMIC architecture in both 
Bosnia and Kosovo.  There is now also a standard NATO military doctrine for CIMIC and CIMIC 
is taught as a subject in the NATO military schools and colleges.  It was this CIMIC doctrine 
which formed part of the theoretical ‘underpinning’ of the Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) 
concept when these were established in Afghanistan. 
70 The UK deployed a military CIMIC team as its immediate contribution to the Tsunami in Aceh, 
Indonesia in 2005.  The CIMIC team was based at the principal air disembarkation point or 
airhead and was specifically tasked with coordinating the delivery of the UK relief effort and with 
keeping ‘Whitehall’ informed about the rapidly evolving situation in Aceh.  A UK CIMIC team was 
also deployed to East Timor, but arguably with a more ‘political’ mandate. 
71 For UK CIMIC, Bosnia has been described as ‘the seminal NATO deployment of 1996’ 
(Williams, op. cit.,  pp 54-9) and it led directly to the formation of the UK Civil Affairs Group (CAG) 
in 1997.  Since that date the CAG and from June 2005 the Joint CIMIC Group (JCG) has been 
deployed on every UK overseas operation: Bosnia, Kosovo, fYROM, Albania (refugee crisis), 
Sierra Leone, East Timor, Iraq, Afghanistan, Aceh, and Dharfur.  All of these operations have 
been supported by a mixture of regulars and reservists as have been CAG activities in support of 
the ‘foot and mouth’ epidemic in the UK in 2001 although the numbers, compared with the US are 
very small, as UK Joint CIMIC Group only totals some 125, from 2004 comprised of 25 regular 
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small CIMIC team within each of the ‘BGs’ plus a CIMIC staff at each MND and 
by 1999, at least one CIMIC ‘house’ with six to twelve men in each BG area, 
about 500 troops in total.  While less overtly ‘political’ than PsyOps, CIMIC in 
addition to providing an access point to the military force for the local civilian 
population and being the manager of small-scale local Quick Impact Projects 
(QIP) also acts as the local commander’s interface with the municipal and 
regional political leadership.  As such their (unstated) primary role was to act as 
the military commander’s ‘antennae’ in terms of changes of public opinion, local 
political direction and the opinions of local NGOs, INGOs, and other international 
partners locally.72  In most, if not all, cases the local CIMIC teams held weekly or 
fortnightly NGO/IO meetings so as to coordinate, or at least so that everyone 
could be ‘all informed’ on NGO and IO73 activities in the area.  These also served 
to give the local partners information about IFOR/SFOR activities and helped to 
influence international opinion locally.74   Although these activities have now 
been codified within both NATO and the EU, the principles for these operations 
both in the conflict and post-conflict phases75 were established in Bosnia.76 
                                                                                                                                                 
and 90 reservists.  The US CIMIC groups by contrast total some 22,000 of whom some 90% are 
reservists.  
72 In many cases the views of the regional staff of UNHCR, UNICEF, etc., differed from that of the 
staff in the HQ where they were under more direct international political influences.  
73 There were in 1998 some 1,400 NGOs and INGOs declared as working in Bosnia, plus others 
at the local level.  These included everything from Islamic NGOs such as the Iranian ‘Merhamet’, 
the ‘Iranian Red Crescent’, and the Sudanese ‘Third World Relief Agency’ which were outside the 
umbrella of international coordination, to the International Youth Hostel Federation (of which 
Bosnia was a member). 
74 In this they were assisted not only by their supplies of resources such as the only accurate 
maps of the country, but also because the military supplied the medical cover, evacuation plans, 
and security for the majority of the IOs in country.  They therefore were able to exert considerable 
influence.  
75 During the conflict phase of the Bosnian operation and while working under the UNPROFOR 
mandate the ‘CIMIC’ role formed part of the tasks of the Joint Commission Observers (JCO). 
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An example of the role of what would now be regarded as PsyOps and CIMIC 
operations working together to shape the battlefield in Bosnia would be the 
campaign to undermine the influence of Mayor Alagic77 in Sanski Most in 1997.  
Alagic, one of the few experienced generals in the Bosniac wartime army, had 
captured Sanski Most from the Serbs in 1995 as the head of the Bosniac VII 
Corps.  In the transition following Dayton, Alagic left the Armija and took political 
control of this strategically important area as Mayor of Sanski Most.  In parallel 
he developed (or perhaps further expanded) his links in terms of organised crime 
using his network of former military contacts within not only the Armija, but also 
abroad in countries such as Switzerland.  Furthermore, Alagic’s adherence to 
Alija Izetbegovic had been based upon his strong Islamist beliefs and his links to 
the ‘Mujahideen’ through his military command appointments in central Bosnia in 
1993-4.78  Clearly locally in Sanski Most, Alagic was seen as the liberator, the 
‘enforcer’, through his control of the police and the military and as a ‘benefactor’.  
                                                                                                                                                 
76 The functionality and doctrine for UK CIMIC operations have been spelled out in a RUSI 
occasional paper  by Michael J. Williams and Kate Clouston (eds), Comparative Perspectives on 
Civil Military Relations in Conflict Zones. Three useful elements within the paper are: 
• pp 54–9.  An explanation by an unknown author from UK Joint CIMIC Group, of their role 
and doctrine 
• pp 60–73.  Howard Mollett, No space for Humanitarianism?  NGO perspectives on Civil 
Military Relations and the Comprehensive approach. 
• pp 74–80.  Joachim Bruns, Civil-Military Capabilities Development within the EU. 
77 Exceptionally amongst the Bosniac military commanders, Mayor Alagic had been a senior pre-
war regular officer in the J(Y)ugoslav National Army (JNA) and had served with the JNA as both a 
brigade commander and as commandant of the military academy in Banja-Luka.  Having 
commanded the Armija III Corps in Central Bosnia, he was appointed commander of the Armija 
[Bosniac] VII Corps in 1994.  He was believed by IFOR/SFOR to be ‘non-compliant’ politically and 
to be not only a war criminal, but also to be involved in organised crime using his former military 
links.  He was forced to resign as mayor in July 1999 by the High Representative (HR) Carlos 
Westendorp and was finally indicted as a war criminal in The Hague in 2001.  He died on 7 March 
2003 whilst still indicted, but by this stage had already been convicted of abuse of power and 
corruption by the Bosnian courts. 
78 It was on the basis of his command responsibility for Bosniac troops in Central Bosnia in 1993-
4 and in particular the 7 ‘Muslim’ brigade that he was indicted by the ICTY. 
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Through his wealth Alagic was in a strong position politically and despite 
international pressure he and his close advisors were consistently supported and 
he was re-elected as mayor by the local population. 
 
The UK military through their command structure at MND (SW) and of the local 
(UK) troops on the ground attempted to work against Alagic in a number of ways.  
Apart from directly intervening through their commanders with Alagic and other 
local political actors to indicate that change was desirable, they targeted any 
economic and social development that was either under military control or their 
influence into areas that were opposed to, or independent of, Alagic within the 
region.  When Mayor Alagic dismissed a schools director for being ‘too 
independent’, or in reality, for failing to apply a sufficiently ‘Islamic’ curriculum,79 
then both SFOR funding and the reconstruction work on school buildings by 
SFOR units, were halted.  In parallel, PsyOps messages through both the local 
radio and ‘Mostovi’ made sure that the local populace knew why the aid funding 
was being stopped within Sanski Most, but not in other nearby municipalities in 
this field, and what they the local populace would have to do if they wanted to 
see aid funding and public building works reinstated.  In other words, they should 
vote for someone else.  Similar action was taken in other areas within Sanski 
Most and on each occasion PsyOps was used to inform the population what 
‘would happen’ if they took certain actions and why certain things then happened 
when they did not.  In parallel, CIMIC worked not only to channel funding to 
                                                 
79 This last point was the most significant.  Although Sanski Most was predominantly a Bosniac, 
i.e. Muslim area, it was not exclusively so and there were pockets of both Bosnian Serbs and 
Croats in the area. 
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support these ‘messages’, but also to influence the international agencies and 
NGO community so as to ensure that, for example, UNICEF did not step in and 
initiate a schools programme when the programme had been deliberately 
suspended by SFOR or the Office of the High Representative (OHR).  
 
The development of the Internet, and a period of rapid change in 
communications 
 
The post-conflict IC military and civilian activities within Bosnia were the first80 to 
be directly influenced by widespread access to the internet and especially e-mail 
which gave the ability to a wide range of IC actors at all levels to communicate 
rapidly both within and without the post-conflict environment.81  As such, the 
operations in Bosnia could be described as the first of the modern military and 
humanitarian interventions and a model for those that have followed. 
 
                                                 
80 An argument could be made that the first such occasion was during the Soviet invasion (1981) 
and occupation of Afghanistan, when in the period immediately prior to the Soviet withdrawal, the 
military leadership in Moscow could communicate directly to individual platoon commanders, 
responsible for say 30 men deployed in Afghanistan.  This definitely was not ‘post-conflict’ and 
involved solely the passing of ‘orders’, nor were these facilities available to non-military actors. 
81 These issues, particularly in so far as they affect the military, are the topic of an intense debate 
within the US military system.  Of particular relevance to the origins of these current concerns 
was the development of new technologies within Bosnia both in the conflict and post-conflict 
arena.  These are specifically discussed in Brendan C. McPherson, More Than a Hand Shake: 
Synchronizing Public Affairs Operations with Information Operations in the 21st Century.  
Although McPherson’s paper deals specifically with their impact upon the military’s ‘Information 
operations’ and particularly the public affairs component within that, it would appear that the 
specific concern in this case is the inability of the military either to control the flow of information, 
or to compete with the speed of release by the civilian authorities, private individuals, and the 
media.  As a very simple example, the military are struggling to be ‘first with the news’ when a 
next of kin is informed of an injury or death, now that most soldiers have mobile telephones or 
even Satphones and can call home directly themselves.  The current military response in 
Afghanistan has been to ban the carriage of personal communications devices on air trooping 
flights.  Whether this position is sustainable in the longer term remains to be seen. 
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The development of the internet, which occurred throughout the period of the 
Balkan Wars, together with the spread of mobile and ever more affordable and 
portable Satellite Telephone (Satphone) technology has had a major impact upon 
all post-conflict operations from Bosnia onwards.  The role of the Satphone and 
instant imaging as a confidence builder82 and in empowering the voices which 
were previously unheard as being ‘too remote’, has had a significant impact not 
only in Bosnia but also in, for example, South Sudan and Dharfur.  This new 
technology and particularly satellite video teleconferencing and geo-location had 
been pioneered commercially, most notably by Salomon Brothers the merchant 
bankers during their commercial operations in former Soviet Central Asia in the 
                                                 
82 The role of the Joint Commission Observers (JCO) in Bosnia was fundamentally grounded in 
this new technology.  Small teams of UK personnel were co-located with the political leadership 
and military commanders of all of the warring factions within Bosnia in the period 1992 – 2001 
equipped with Satphones and later as the technology evolved, satellite e-mail and other systems.  
Ceasefires, prisoner and body exchanges and political discussions between the warring parties 
all took place using this newly developed and evolving technology.  The command and control of 
the JCO organisation was transferred from the UK to the USA within the Bosnian theatre in 
December 1996 and according to a paper written by Col Charles T. Cleveland at the US Army 
War College in Carlisle, Pennsylvania, in April 2001, for the US military:  
The JCO program provides the SFOR Commander with a means to gain access to local, 
regional and even national level leaders of the warring factions and other influential 
actors. Initiated during the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) period, these 
military observers gave the Commander a flexible force that could act as informal 
emissaries or call in air strikes. For U.S. Army Special Forces (SF) the JCO mission was 
[in December 1996] a doctrinally new role…[and one which] …also identified weaknesses 
in the current training regimen for Special Forces battalion commanders and staffs.   
This may be assumed to be an accurate interpretation of the US doctrine for JCOs at least, as 
Col. Cleveland was, in December 1996, the Deputy Commander of 10 Special Forces Group who 
were responsible for all US operations within the European Command (EUCOM) area and later 
became Special Operations Commander Europe (SOCEUR) in the late 1990s.   In the 
introduction to his paper Colonel Cleveland goes on to say:  
Their success in Bosnia was later affirmed by their subsequent deployment to Kosovo. 
The development of a JCO planning methodology was key to their success.   
He gives a detailed description of the training and exercises required to maintain this capability.  
Cleveland refers in his paper to taking over the role from ‘UK volunteers’.  These were in fact UK 
Territorial Army Reservists from the Territorial and Army Volunteer Reserve (T & AVR) and it was 
the UK who had been responsible for ‘the development of a JCO planning methodology’ in the 
first place.  
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early 1990s,83 whilst satellite voice communication and geo-location had started 
somewhat earlier during the 1980s and was used by, amongst others, the De 
Beers organisation to keep in contact with and maintain ‘overwatch’ of diamond 
prospectors and their own employees who were attempting to stop the leakage of 
diamonds from remote locations in Eastern Angola during the civil war in the 
1980s.84  
 
NATO, and the UK military in particular, was interested in this technology in the 
very early 1990s given the changed situation within Europe from 1989 and the 
likelihood that, as it was then thought, any future confrontation with the Soviet 
Union would take place on a line from the Pripet Marshes to the Carpathians and 
perhaps further south in the Caucasus on the borders of Georgia and Azerbaijan 
with Ossetia.  The technology was further developed militarily during the first Gulf 
War, which immediately preceded the Balkan conflicts.    
 
First-generation satellite technology was bulky, could not be operated on the 
move, and required specialist operators, hence the JCOs in Bosnia.  That said, it 
                                                 
83 Discussed with the author and demonstrated during a study day at the Eccleston Road, Victoria 
headquarters of Salomon Brothers™ in Spring 1991.  This technology was originally developed 
from late 1989 for use around the periphery of what was then the Commonwealth of Independent 
States (CIS).  The critical element for Salomon Brothers™ was that they did not want to risk, nor 
occupy the time, of key staff who even at that time were earning up to £650,000 per year, in high-
risk environments.  Using satellite video-conferencing technology they were able to deploy 
relatively low-paid staff equipped with a camera, microphone, and satellite transceiver so as to 
conduct a remote interview and negotiations with London.    
84 Personal conversations by the author with Mr George Burne, a main board director of De 
Beers™, who discussed the interest of the company in tracking the ‘leakages’ of diamonds from 
amongst other places Angola and former Soviet Central Asia in the period 1986 – 92.   The De 
Beers™ requirement was somewhat different to that of Salomon Brothers™ and highlighted for 
De Beers™ one of the problems of satellite communication and geo-location technology namely 
that it does not work very well through the canopy of primary jungle. 
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was quickly recognised by the combatants as well as the peacemakers as a key 
tool.  The more isolated the combatant the more important was satellite 
technology, not only to command, control, and arrange the resupply for your 
men, but critically to get your ‘message’ out to the wider world.  In the Bosnian 
War Karadzic, in Pale, and Fikret Abdic, fighting in an isolated pocket north of 
Bihac, were initially perhaps the principal beneficiaries.  It was also used 
extensively by Karadzic during Operation ‘Deliberate Force’85 as it was about the 
only means of communications which was not and could not be attacked by 
NATO at that time.  
 
For the peacemakers, primarily UNPROFOR, portable satellite technology 
provided a mechanism whereby they could attempt to control the 
communications between the warring parties and attempt in controlled conditions 
to bring about dialogue. At the tactical level satellite technology enabled the 
implementation of local ceasefires and such necessary processes as body 
exchanges.  At a more strategic level it was one of the tools used to facilitate the 
movement of UNHCR relief convoys and helicopter medical evacuations.  
 
During the conflict satellite technology continued to evolve so that towards the 
end of the Bosnian conflict the technology was able to offer text messaging and 
then voice and text messaging on the move using a small beacon on the roof of a 
                                                 
85 Operation Deliberate Force was the aerial bombing campaign conducted by NATO against 
Republika Srpska between 30 August and 14 September 1995.  See Julian Lindley-French and 
Katja Fluckiger,  A Chronology of European Security and Defence 1945–2007. 
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vehicle86 and, finally, viable Video Tele-Conferencing (VTC) facilities to major 
locations such as the Republika Srpska capital in Pale.  All of these facilities 
were available and being used at the time of the Dayton negotiations in 
November1995. 
 
VTC can be said to have come of age as a practical medium during the Balkan 
Wars of the 1990s, but the size and relative fragility of its technology, along with 
the cost of broadband satellite rental, meant that its use was restricted to pre-
scheduled very high-level meetings which were conducted in a studio-like 
environment and therefore from within only the largest headquarters.  These 
limitations made it of very little use as an emergency planning tool, but did permit 
senior politicians in to interact with the principals and military commanders on the 
ground87 and to be shown relatively simple Powerpoint™ slides.  VTC technology 
was not yet mature enough to ‘stream’ live video feed, now a standard feature it 
was not immune to regular failures with approximately one conference in three 
being aborted.  
 
The ability to send Short Message Service (SMS) texts over both satellite and 
mobile phone technology greatly facilitated the rapid development of the third 
and perhaps key innovation during the Balkan Wars - use of the internet.  The 
                                                 
86 This was installed into EUMM vehicles, but not into UN vehicles.  ICRC was by this stage using 
the geo-location facility to insert ‘trackers’ onto their vehicles, but for communications were still 
using Skywave HF radio relayed through a base station in Budapest. 
87 In Bosnia this included only the three Divisional Commanders and the Commander 
IFOR/SFOR. 
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UN Via Satellite (VSAT),88 telephone system for fixed locations was fully 
functional by the time of the Balkan conflicts, was capable of taking internet 
traffic, and was continually increasing in capacity.  In parallel, the various military 
contingents were also introducing their own VSAT systems and many of these 
were capable of interfacing with the UN system and with other military systems.  
By 1996 most of the major agencies had at least one internet terminal at each of 
their field stations and many more at their headquarters sites.  Where these were 
dependent upon VSAT or other satellite systems they were extremely slow and in 
many cases restricted to what were effectively SMS messages, but as the 
technology developed so the capabilities improved.89  The use of, and access to, 
the internet enabled written reports created in the field, in often very austere 
conditions, to be read overnight in the capitals and instructions to be sent back in 
time for action the next day. 
 
Such speed of communications radically altered the way in which business was 
done in a post-conflict environment and dramatically reduced the scope for 
manoeuvre and individual initiative by managers on the spot, although it was not 
for some time that those directly engaged became aware of just what an impact 
this might have.  Critically it was now possible for decisions to be taken by 
                                                 
88 The UN provided a number of ‘satellite islands’ using VSAT via telephone exchanges and 
satellite dishes positioned at fixed key locations such as Sarajevo and Kiseljak.  They did not 
provide countrywide coverage or coverage on the move.  This was provided both for UNPROFOR 
and most if not all of the other agencies by a Motorola VHF radio network with an extensive 
series of transmitters.  Unlike the satellite communications these were vulnerable to jamming by 
the warring parties when it suited them to do so.  
89 Most providers were offering VSAT broadband by 2004 and by that date there were some 
countries where all of their communications, including their ‘landline’ telephone links, were by this 
mechanism, e.g. the Falkland Islands who use a system provided by Cable & Wireless.  
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relatively junior staff in capitals, sometimes four thousand miles away, which 
would radically impact affect on the ground.  Furthermore, it was also possible 
and, indeed often the case, that these decision makers had never been to the 
conflict area, nor even, in the case of many US staff, to Europe.  This access to 
information by what have been described as ‘armchair warriors’ meant that not 
only was it possible to obtain advice from afar, but also that those practitioners 
on the ground had to spend an increasing amount of their time briefing and 
replying to questions from capitals, many of little or no relevance.90  In many 
cases this was to the detriment of the work being carried out.  In most cases the 
routing of decisions via capitals slowed the process down and in many cases did 
not add value.  In some cases due to the lack of knowledge of the environment it 
led to wrong decisions being taken.91   
 
                                                 
90 In one particular instance the NATO HQ in Brussels wished to brief the Supreme Allied 
Commander in Europe (SACEUR) on UK casualties in Bosnia in February 1996.  One signaller 
had broken his leg falling from a tree whilst stringing an antenna and Brussels wished three days 
after the event, to know which leg!  By that time, the soldier, a reservist, was in the Glasgow 
Royal Infirmary and the whole question was irrelevant, but HQ NATO genuinely expected the HR 
staff in theatre to talk to the National Health Service (NHS) to establish which leg he had broken.   
91 All US PsyOps products (and, in theory, all NATO products) were referred to Washington and 
to the headquarters of US PsyOps at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, prior to their being printed and 
disseminated.  This created a two-week product-creation cycle with the material for the US 
weekly ‘newspapers’ being produced ten days in advance, so that they could be sent to 
Washington.  As a result US PsyOps material tended to lack relevance and currency.  US military 
PsyOps locally had particular problems dealing with issues concerning youth, in particular the pop 
music columns etc., as most of the phenomena of interest to youth in Europe and particularly in 
the Balkans were unknown in the US, e.g. blockbuster Balkan entertainers or Italian pop 
vocalists. 
As an example of a ‘wrong decision’ being taken due to a lack of local cultural awareness one 
need not look further than one US PsyOps product, the ‘Superman’ comic.  This comic showed 
Superman saving a child from a minefield, the intent being to demonstrate that minefields were 
dangerous and should therefore be avoided.  Children in Bosnia, however, ‘interpreted’ the comic 
as meaning that if you were in a minefield Superman would save you.  When they attempted to 
disseminate the comics US PsyOps teams met a furious response from ‘Save the Children’ and 
other IO/INGO and the UK-led PsyOps teams destroyed all of the comics that they were given 
un-issued.     
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Different nations and organisations reacted to the evolving new technology in 
different ways.  The USA used the technological capability to increase the 
centralised control of decision making in exactly the same way as the Soviet 
Union had used the newly evolving satellite technology in Afghanistan, from the 
late 1980s, to increase direct control and micro-management from Moscow.92  
The UN, somewhat slower to introduce the technology, focused its attention 
primarily on using the internet to support its logistic and administrative functions 
as well as to increase or alter the method of the reporting requirement.  For day-
to-day decision making it took the very wise decision to leave that in the hands of 
the head of the organisation in the theatre, the Special Representative of the 
Secretary General (SRSG), a practice it has followed to this day.  The UK, at 
least in Bosnia and in the early days in Kosovo, also tended to follow the UN 
model, whereas NATO, with a very large headquarters in Brussels and at the 
time of Bosnia only one operation to supervise, in general, took a US approach.93 
 
The success of VSAT in the Western Balkans in the early to the mid-1990s led to 
the development of a ‘fly-away’ pack which could be deployed rapidly as soon as 
any UN involvement in a conflict or natural disaster was being planned.  Under 
                                                 
92 There are recorded instances of Russian Military commanders in Moscow, ‘skipping’ the chain 
of command to issue tactical orders by satellite phone directly to company and even platoon 
commanders in Afghanistan on combat operations.   
93 It is relevant to note that at this time NATO headquarters with some 4,000 personnel was 
engaged solely on the operations in Bosnia.  In the week in which they queried the ‘broken leg’, 
only nine soldiers had been injured anywhere in the NATO area and there had been no fatalities.  
The emphasis may well have changed by 2011 at a time when NATO is engaged in several 
concurrent operations.  
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the control of UN Office for the Co-ordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA),94 
the fly-away pack consisted of: 
• a satellite communications system.  
• a 750 (later 1,500) line broadband-capable satellite telephone system. 
• a single technician to set the equipment up/ 
This could be delivered anywhere worldwide in any airframe or helicopter which 
could carry two one cubic metre pallets, together weighing less than one tonne 
and,  as such, a satellite ‘island’ with lines for both telephone and internet 
access, could be established anywhere worldwide within hours of a crisis arising.  
A version of this system was used in a post-conflict environment in East Timor in 
1999 and in Aceh in Indonesia in a disaster relief role in December 2004.95    
 
A further attraction of satellite technology is that it was very difficult to intercept.  
As a result, for those not amongst the IC and without access to satellites 
themselves (and for most, in the 1990s, this meant access to US-controlled 
satellites), it was impossible for them to use the technology without, potentially at 
least, US ‘oversight’ and more importantly neither could they interfere with those 
who were using it. 
 
                                                 
94 This system was demonstrated by UN OCHA at a communications conference in Geneva in 
2003. 
95 The impact of the tsunami in Aceh enabled the EU to deploy a force of monitors to help 
observe the ceasefire between the Indonesian Government and the Christian separatist rebels in 
Aceh, so that the international engagement in Aceh could be regarded as a humanitarian 
deployment followed by a post-conflict intervention.    
 279 
While the internet was evolving and the means of communicating were 
progressing rapidly, other linked technical innovations were also being developed 
and deployed in a post-conflict environment for the first time.  Optical Character 
Reading (OCR)96 software and hardware was used to produce not only 
‘scannable’ ballots, so as to increase the speed of counting, particularly of 
absentee ballots, but also to scan in data collected at remote sites as part of the 
voter registration process.  This data could then be stored electronically and then 
later electronically mailed using the internet to the ballot printer often located far 
away in western Europe.97  This was far in advance of the technology being used 
for the same processes in many of the countries of western Europe98 and many 
Bosnians felt, perhaps not unfairly, that they were being used as ‘guinea pigs’ to 
trial ‘unproven processes’99 for possible later use elsewhere. 
 
While the technology was rapidly developing for assembling and transmitting 
much greater amounts of data in a post-conflict environment than had ever been 
possible before, the issues of data management and data security were matters 
of critical and increasing concern in Bosnia, particularly as at this stage most 
                                                 
96 The technology was not new, having been used commercially from the mid 1970s and in such 
areas as Foreign Office communications networks since 1978.  It was its use in this particular 
area that was innovative.   
97 The OCR software was developed for use in the Bosnian Elections by Data Research Systems 
(DRS) of Milton Keynes, UK and the scannable ballots were printed in Milton Keynes by them.  
The software for the voter registration exercise was modelled on that used in the UK for the 
Standard Assessment Tasks (SAT) test in schools, the forms for which were also produced at 
that time by DRS. 
98 At this time the use of scannable ballots and electronic counting in the UK were unlawful.  DRS 
were able to cite their experience in Bosnia when mounting the winning bid for the first ever 
scannable ballot in the UK, at the first London Mayoral elections. 
99 There was nothing new in this.  Both electric trams and electric street lighting were introduced 
in Sarajevo by the Austro-Hungarians in 1895, four years earlier than in Vienna.  This was so that 
the new technology could be trialled and any problems eliminated before they were used on the 
streets of the capital. 
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electronic data had to be backed up by a paper hard copy.  To put this into 
perspective it is worth noting that the OSCE Mission repository in Rajlovac held 
over 300 cubic metres of scannable registration data forms following the 
registration process in 1998.  This increased over time to more than 2,000 cubic 
metres.  All of these forms contained highly personal data which would permit 
others either to impersonate the individuals100 or to use the data to track them 
down if they were from a different ethnic group.  The Rajlovace warehouse in 
which they were located, while now located within the Federation area of Bosnia, 
had already been attacked and burned in January 1996101 and remained 
vulnerable to theft and arson.  Should conflict break out anew, it was estimated 
that at least four, and later up to twenty-five, articulated lorries would be required 
to remove these sensitive materials as to destroy them by burning would not be 
possible102 in the time available.  
 
Senior OSCE staff in Sarajevo remonstrated with the headquarters in Vienna and 
suggested that as the information had been collected for an electronic register it 
should be stored only in an electronic format, but at more than one location. They 
also protested about the storage of national and local electoral candidate’s 
declarations of financial information which were again being held both in soft, and 
                                                 
100 Critical information for people wishing to move illegally to western Europe or elsewhere, as the 
data forms included those from people already legally settled abroad but still, under the terms of 
the Dayton Agreement, registered Bosnian voters, i.e. they appeared on the 1991 census for 
Bosnia.  
101 It had been burnt at the time when the Bosnian Serbs had been made to evacuate that area 
as part of the Dayton peace process.  It had been at that time the principal UNHCR food store for 
the city. 
102 The fire following a bomb attack at the British Embassy in Dublin on 2 February 1972 
demonstrated that closely packed and boxed papers would not burn and that whilst singed 
around the edges the contents would remain readable. 
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hard-copy form.  By the year 2000 these occupied the entirety of the basement 
and the roof space of the OSCE main building and contained sensitive financial 
and commercial data not only about the candidates, all 21,000 of them, but also 
that of their immediate blood relatives and significant partners.  OSCE officials in 
Bosnia wanted such hard copies as had to be maintained kept outside the 
conflict zone, preferably at the OSCE archive in Prague.  In the event there were 
no obvious major breaches of security in post-conflict Bosnia, but it did not take 
long for one to occur elsewhere.          
 
This again involved the OSCE and was in Kosovo in March 1999.  Throughout its 
brief existence from November 1998, the human rights officers of the Kosovo 
Verification Mission (KVM) had been collecting evidence of rapes and other 
human rights abuses by the various Serb forces stationed within Kosovo.  This 
information had been carefully catalogued and stored in both hard and soft copy 
within the offices of the KVM in the ‘Jugobanka’ building in Pristina.  When the 
KVM was hurriedly evacuated from Pristina on 20 March 1999103 as a result of 
the failure of the Rambouillet talks, immediately prior to the NATO air 
bombardment.  Whilst the files had been sensibly destroyed, all of the 
computers, most of which were not properly password protected were left behind 
in the Jugobanka building which was immediately re-occupied by the Serbs.  Had 
back-ups been taken and the originals deleted, or even the hard drives removed 
from the computers, then not only could the data have been saved and would 
have been available for some of the subsequent war crimes trials, but also the 
                                                 
103 See amongst others J. R. Michel Maisonneuve, The OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission. 
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witnesses who had told their stories in good faith to trusted confidants would not 
have been put at risk.  Finally, and presumably so as to add insult to injury, the 
computers were again left, this time when the Serbs withdrew, so that the 
returning OSCE could return and then work out what had happened.  Whether 
any of the women were directly targeted by the Serb authorities as a result of the 
information that they had provided to the OSCE is not clear and given the turmoil 
of the eleven weeks of the NATO air campaign the OSCE will probably never 
know, but it is a salutary lesson in how not to store sensitive data in a zone of 
conflict.  
  
War crimes 
 
Introduction 
 
This section will examine the decision to pursue and to prosecute war criminals 
at the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia (ICTY) in The Hague as 
opposed to trials either within the local court system or, at least, held on Bosnia 
territory104 and the subsequent decision to permit local trials, initially within 
Croatia, later in Bosnia and finally Serbia. It will also compare and contrast that 
approach with the one taken in Guatemala as a result of the ‘Guatemala Peace 
Agreement’105 which fell chronologically in the period immediately after the 
                                                 
104 As with the ‘Nuremberg’ tribunals in Germany after the Second World War. 
105 The ‘Agreement on a Firm and Lasting Peace’, 29 December 1996, negotiated under the 
auspices of the UN and signed by Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali on behalf of the UN.  
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Dayton Agreement and before the Kosovo conflict and which, as with the Dayton 
Agreement for Bosnia, was largely US brokered.   
 
Bosnian war crimes and the ICTY 
 
In examining the ICTY this thesis will not attempt to replicate the work of Rachel 
Kerr106 which looked at the detail of the workings of the ICTY and its place in the 
IC’s management of post-conflict in Bosnia and Kosovo.  It will instead focus 
upon those unique features of the ICTY as they related to Bosnia and the 
conclusions that can be drawn in terms of how the ICTY was perceived by those 
to whom it was trying to demonstrate that justice would be done and in terms of 
lessons for the future.  This section will also highlight those significant changes in 
jurisprudence, which delineate the ICTY from the Nuremberg tribunals to give but 
one example.  It briefly will allude to those areas such as racketeering and (large-
scale) weapons smuggling, which could perhaps have fallen within its compass, 
but which were not followed up by the ICTY although important work had been 
carried out in these areas by both the OHR and the OSCE.107  Whilst in some 
respects it can be claimed that the ICTY has failed to deliver, it is important to 
note that throughout the process the assumption has been that all bar the most 
                                                                                                                                                 
There had been an earlier failed ‘Guatemala Peace Agreement’ under the US Reagan 
Administration in 1987. 
106 Rachel Kerr, The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia – An Exercise in 
Law, Politics and Diplomacy. 
107 Both the OHR and the OSCE had large international forensic audit teams looking at the 
funding of ‘parallel structures’ and the funding networks for war criminals.  The raids on the 
Bosnian-Croat ‘Hercegovacka Banka’ were initiated as a result of some of these investigations 
and in some cases successful prosecutions have followed in the Bosnian courts.  As far as the 
author is aware the ICTY showed little interest at an official level in these investigations and there 
was little interaction between the two teams of investigators. 
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serious cases would be tried by the courts of the successor Yugoslav states, in 
particular, those of Bosnia and Herzegovina.  This was, perhaps, an overly 
optimistic assumption.       
 
The ICTY was the first war crimes court created by the UN and the first 
international war crimes tribunal since the Nuremberg and Tokyo tribunals in the 
1940s immediately following the Second World War. It was established by the 
UNSC in accordance with Chapter VII of the UN Charter108 and was established 
on 25 May 1993 by UNSC resolution 827 which established:  
an international tribunal for the sole purpose of prosecuting persons 
responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian law 
committed in the territory of the former Yugoslavia after 1 January 
1991.109   
The statute for the court was created at that time and has been amended on 
several occasions since, with the most recent significant amendments being in 
2003.  In essence, the ICTY was created as a result of a political decision by the 
UN to enforce another set of international laws, those relating to the use of force, 
not only in an inter-state conflict, but also in an intra-state conflict.  In part, such a 
change was possible at this period, both due to the overwhelming revulsion at 
the crimes being seen, to be being committed in the former Yugoslavia (courtesy 
of the medium of television) and due to the political weakness internationally at 
that time of Russia, Serbia’s traditional backer.  As Kerr has already explained, 
                                                 
108 From the UN website. 
109 From the ICTY website. 
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There was no change in the legal framework.  The change was in the 
interpretation of the powers and the responsibilities of the Security Council under 
the Charter and was a product of political will.110  According to the ICTY itself its 
objectives were and are: 
to try those individuals most responsible for appalling acts such as 
murder, torture, rape, enslavement, destruction of property and other 
crimes listed in the Tribunal's Statute111  
and given that further definition of its own role, it can be seen that there was 
never the intention to try any but the most serious cases and most senior 
defendants at the ICTY. 
 
The war crimes prosecutions for Bosnia are also important in that they, to a great 
extent, differentiated between grave crimes, mass murder, and other crimes.112  
In that context they can perhaps be seen as representing an evolution of the 
‘Nuremberg’ trials in that rather than make an attempt to identify and 
aggressively pursue all war criminals113 they would focus solely on the key 
actors.  Certainly no attempts were made by the post-conflict international 
administration to arrest or to even investigate large numbers of people who may, 
                                                 
110 Rachel Kerr (2004), op. cit.,  chap 2, p 13. 
111 Ibid. 
112 Ibid. 
113 An example of this approach may be seen in the context of the Bosnian-Serb run Omarska 
detention camps near Prijedor (in RS), the ethnic cleansing and, in some cases, the almost 
complete demolition using hand tools of some of the Bosniac suburbs of Prijedor.  The guarding 
of the camps probably employed several hundred people over time and the large-scale 
expulsions and demolition of whole areas of the municipality perhaps thousands, and yet only a 
handful of people have either been prosecuted or declared as ‘Persons Indicted For War Crimes’ 
(PIFWC) as a result. 
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in other contexts, have been considered as ‘war criminals’.114  In this context the 
approach taken in Bosnia was radically different to that taken, in say, Iraq and 
Afghanistan, where tens of thousands have been detained,115 often for years 
without trial.  
 
Critically, the approach was also radically different from that taken in Guatemala 
in 1996, following the intra-state conflict there. In Guatemala the decision was 
taken not to prosecute war criminals and instead to go for a policy of 
reconciliation.  Essentially, this decision was taken by the same US Clinton 
administration that was responsible for pushing through the two peace 
agreements in Bosnia and Kosovo116 and for lobbying for the creation of the 
ICTY.  The Guatemalan decision, which was made in early 1996, only a few 
months after the Dayton peace talks had been concluded, has been very 
controversial,117 particularly for those European states which were most affected.  
Indeed, the Slovenian presidency of the EU in 2008 conducted a whole 
international conference on the issue.118  Furthermore, the fact that the 
recommendations of the report of the (Guatemalan) Historical Clarification 
                                                 
114 Such as many (but not all) of those who used rape as a weapon in the conduct of ‘ethnic 
cleansing’. 
115 The Headquarters of MND (SW) at the ‘metal factory’ outside of Banja-Luka had a detention 
facility capable of holding only 4 - 6 ‘persons indicted’ in 1996-7, despite the fact that it was 
responsible for some 37% of the land area and 34% of the population of Bosnia.  This can be 
compared with the estimated 30,000 detainees solely under US jurisdiction within Iraq in 2005.   
116 Dayton, in the case of Bosnia, and both the US proposals for ‘Rambouillet’, and the later and 
final post-conflict agreement with Milosevic in the case of Kosovo. 
117 In particular as most of those who potentially could have been indicted in Guatemala would 
have come from the regime’s police and army, organisations which were consistently supported, 
trained, and equipped by the USA throughout the conflict. 
118 Crimes Committed by Totalitarian Regimes, Reports and proceedings of the 8 April 2008 
European public hearing on crimes committed by totalitarian regimes organised by the Slovenian 
presidency of the council of the EU and the European Commission. 
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Commission119 in 1999 have yet to be followed up and action taken, continues to 
provide cause for comment and to provoke international concern.120  That said, a 
not dissimilar approach was later taken when dealing with all but the highest level 
war criminals in Sierra Leone and in other states within the African continent, 
including Burundi, although in these cases the USA was less directly involved.     
 
Another first for Bosnia was that unlike Germany in the Second World War, or the 
majority of the other conflicts which have followed, the IC was a direct participant 
observer throughout both the conflict and post-conflict period.  Not only were 
there UNPROFOR troops on the ground throughout all but the very earliest days 
of the conflict, but there were also United Nations Military Observer teams 
(UNMO), European Union Military Monitors (EUMM), the UK Liaison Officers 
(UKLO), and the JCOs who were assigned to the various commanders on all 
sides of the battlefield.   
 
Additionally, during the later stages of the conflict, there were US liaison officers 
assigned to Croatian and perhaps some Bosniac headquarters, for example that 
of the Croatian General Gotovina during Operation ‘Storm’ in August 1995.  
These were in place in order to coordinate US air strikes and ‘fire support’ with 
the Croatian advance into Serbian-held territory there were also instructors from 
the US private military company Military Professional Resources International 
(MPRI) who not only provided training, but also went forward with the advancing 
                                                 
119 Report of the Historical Clarification Commission of Guatemala. 
120 See for example the Amnesty International press release on the tenth anniversary of the issue 
of the Historical Clarification Commission’s report on 25 February 2009. 
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Croatian Hrvatska Vojska (HV) units on the ground to provide Forward Air 
Control (FAC) and Forward Artillery Observation (FOO).  Additionally, in return 
for intelligence being provided to the US by the Croats, there was an 
‘arrangement’ whereby US Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV) were based within 
Croatia so as to be able to operate across the Balkan conflict areas.121  As part 
of this arrangement the USA was supplying the HV with detailed and up-to-date 
imagery of the battlefield122 throughout the latter half of the conflict. 
 
Given that, unlike in almost any other conflict, there was so much detailed 
observation by highly qualified military and, in many cases, legally trained123 
observers of what was in fact taking place, the exact details of many of the 
‘crimes’ for which war criminals were subsequently indicted were known almost 
immediately.  Similarly, the names of the perpetrators or of those who had 
‘command responsibility’124 for them were in most cases also known as soon as 
the crimes themselves took place.  This has been confirmed by conversations 
                                                 
121 The USA maintained a second similar base on Sazan Island in Albania. 
122 See for example an article by Ivo Pukanic, US Role in Storm. 
123 Examples of legally-trained observers included the UNHCR ‘Protection Officers’ who were 
stationed at many of the most critical points in the country.  
124 This point is relevant as a great many of those indicted by the ICTY were in fact charged with 
‘command responsibility’ rather than with direct personal involvement in the war crimes 
concerned.  Alagic has already been mentioned, but Ante Gotovina and Ratko Mladic are also 
both indicted under these charges.  The principle of ‘command responsibility’ as a justification for 
criminal indictments has been in existence since the US Civil War in the middle of the nineteenth 
century, but was first used in the trial of Emil Muller in 1920.  It was first explicitly codified in the 
Hague Conventions of 1907 Section IV (Laws and Customs of War on Land) and was further 
codified in Additional Protocol 1 (1977) to the Geneva Conventions of 1949.  It is specifically 
included within the ICTY Statute (Article 7 (3)) and has been developed since then by the ICTY 
through ‘case law’ with more significant commentary being added as a result of the Halilovic case 
in 2005.  For further details of how the issue of ‘command responsibility’ has evolved in Bosnia 
see the draft paper by Allison Marston Danner and Jenny S. Martinez, Guilty Associations: Joint 
Criminal Enterprise, Command Responsibility, and the Development of International Criminal 
Law. 
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with UK members of the EUMM, JCO, and UKLO teams who were present125 in 
places such as Stupni Do126 in central Bosnia,127 Srebrenica, and Gorazde128 
and by members of the UNCA in Zepa and UNHCR in Gorazde129 as the events 
unfolded around them.  Certainly by the time of Dayton, the exact details of 
certain atrocities130 and war crimes and of those who had carried them out were 
known to the IC participants at the talks.  
 
In the light of the facts above, it must be assumed that the only reason that 
Mehmed Alagic, Naser Oric, Ante Gotovina, and others, all of them amongst the 
Bosnian Federation and Croatian military leadership, were not indicted before, or 
                                                 
125 The fall of the Zepa pocket in July 1994 is a significant exception to this.  The small Ukrainian 
troop contingent was largely ineffective and many of the UN relief agencies had already 
withdrawn from the smallest of the three Bosniac pockets in Eastern Bosnia before it fell to the 
VRS.  (UNCA, however, had remained and the author is grateful to one of the civil affairs officers 
who was in the pocket, Ed Joseph, for this information on the incident.)  There were no detailed 
IC reports and no international media witnesses (as they were all fully engaged in reporting on 
the fall of Srebrenica which had just taken place) to the events which took place there and no 
accurate records of how many of the possibly 16,000 survivors subsequently perished.  
Unfortunately for the victims of Zepa the lack of media coverage and the greater atrocities 
committed virtually under the glare of the international media spotlight shortly before in 
Srebrenica, means that very little is known of the detail of what happened although the atrocities 
at Zepa did form part of the indictments against VRS Generals Mladic, Miletic, and Tolimir.  The 
area remained heavily mined and deserted in 2009.   
126 The local HVO commander responsible for the Stupni Do massacre, Ivica Rajic, was indicted 
in August 1995 and finally arrested on 5 April 2003 in Split.  He pleaded guilty and was sentenced 
in May 2006 to twelve years imprisonment.  There were 37 confirmed victims at Stupni Do and 
possibly as many as 50. 
127 Conversations held between the author Jeremy Fleming (EUMM) and Richard John (OSCE), a 
former UKLO officer, in 1996-7.  Fleming subsequently was a witness at the ICTY tribunal of the 
HVO Commander in Central Bosnia General Blaskic (sentenced on the basis of ‘command 
responsibility’), whereas John’s testimony was never used by the ICTY.  
128 Conversations held with the JCOs and the EUMM. 
129 The author’s conversations with Craig Jenness.  At the time of the Gorazde ‘pocket’ Jenness 
was the UNHCR ‘protection officer’ in Gorazde and later the OSCE Bosnia’s head of human 
rights.  He subsequently served as Deputy Head of Mission (DHM) for the OSCE in Kosovo and 
then as OSCE Head of Mission (HOM) in Macedonia. 
130 The summary execution on a river bank of two out of three UNHCR convoy drivers (all UK 
citizens) on a riverbank alongside the road south of Zenica by members of Seventh ‘Mujahiddin’ 
brigade is a case in point.  The third driver, who escaped by falling forward when shot and by 
feigning death in the river, made a detailed report of the incident to the UK upon his return.  As a 
former Royal Marines warrant officer he was a credible witness – personal conversation by the 
author with ‘Mac’ McCourt, the survivor of the incident in May 2002. 
 290 
indeed for many years after Dayton, was specifically because it would have 
hindered the Dayton peace process and perhaps ‘confused’ the general public, 
particularly those in the USA, who had been given a clear message by the US 
media as to who the ‘goodies’ and the ‘baddies’ were.  For example, clear 
evidence of the ‘successes’ of those ‘federation’ military advances which followed 
the Srebrenica massacre in June 1995, such as the HV and HVO operations in 
Western Bosnia,131 in terms of ethnic cleansing, were all observed and gathered 
by impartial international observers at the time.  Yet they are only now, almost 
fifteen years later, being aired at the ICTY.  In a similar vein the public indictment 
of Jadranko Prlic, the wartime ‘prime minister’ of the Croat Republic of Herceg-
Bosna (CRHB),132 had to wait until 2 April 2004,133 whilst his wartime activities 
were known to all.  In the interim, Prlic had been allowed to have a successful 
post-conflict political career, even for some time in the late 1990s, representing 
Bosnia and Herzegovina as its foreign minister. 
 
Practical support was provided to the ICTY not only by their own investigators on 
the ground and the exhumation teams, but also by the UK troops134 deployed 
within Bosnia who spent their years from late 1996 largely targeting war 
criminals, not only within the UK sphere of operations but Bosnia-wide.  The UK 
                                                 
131 In particular during Operation Storm, on which occasion, officers in FRG army uniform, were 
also observed to be in attendance. 
132 Extensive evidence was also gathered on the continuance of the structures of the CRHB for 
several years into the post-conflict period, in part, by the forensic audit teams within the OHR and 
OSCE referred to earlier, as well as by both IFOR and SFOR. 
133 UN Press Release issued by the ICTY on 6 April 2004. 
134 For the reasons why many NATO troops were less active in this regard, particularly those of 
the US, see Kerr (2004), op cit., pp 154-161 and Gary J. Bass, Stay the Hand of Vengeance: The 
Politics of War Crimes Tribunals. 
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were the most successful force within IFOR/SFOR in that regard.135  The last UK 
troops left on 26 March 2007, almost fifteen years to the day since the first UK 
troops deployed to Bosnia in March 1992, but by that stage only some 130 
persons had been convicted by the ICTY and a handful of others had been 
convicted in cases derogated to the lower level courts within Bosnia. The 
introduction of the ‘secret indictment’ in March 1997 reduced the risk to both 
those indicted and the arresting party, in that the indicted person would not know 
that he/she had been indicted until the moment of his or her arrest.136  It also 
increased the nervousness of those that felt that they had ‘something to hide’.  
Bosnia was the first occasion in which the secret indictment system was used 
and the conclusion drawn from its use, both by the ICTY137 and those more 
generally involved with the process138 was that it was an extremely successful 
innovation.  That said, the incident on 10 July 1997 in Prijedor when two arrests 
were attempted, illustrated some initial flaws in the process.  In particular, at 
exactly the same time that some of the arresting officers were engaged in a 
shoot out with the wartime police chief Simo Drljaca, others arrested the hospital 
director and former wartime Prijedor Mayor139 Milan Kovacevic, who along with 
Drljaca had been charged with genocide.140  This arrest demonstrated that 
                                                 
135 See the Joint statement by UK Foreign Secretary Robin Cook and Minister of Defence Geoff 
Hoon on 25 June 2000. 
136 Reduced but not eliminated.  Simo Drljaca the wartime Chief of Police for Prijedor was 
arrested by UK members of SFOR whilst fishing at a lake near Prijedor.  He opened fire with a 
handgun on the arresting party wounding one in the leg.  In the ensuing exchange of fire Drljaca 
was killed. 
137 Carla Del Ponte and Chuck Sudetic, Madame Prosecutor: Confrontations with Humanity's 
Worst Criminals and the Culture of Impunity. 
138 Kerr (2004), op. cit. 
139 Kovacevic had been the mayor of Prijedor in 1992 and was indicted.  
140 ICTY indictment of Drljaca and Kovacevic, Case IT-96-24. 
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despite, or perhaps of in this case because of, the ‘secret indictment’, more 
careful briefing and above all legal oversight needed to be provided to the 
arresting unit.  In this case, JCOs, who had been living in the ‘team house’141 in 
Prijedor had been in the habit of visiting the hospital director on a regular basis to 
discuss his medical requirements for the hospital and the situation in the town 
generally.  On this occasion they or their colleagues arrived at Prijedor hospital 
carrying a ‘Red Cross’ parcel and asked to see the hospital director.  Upon being 
ushered into his room they drew their weapons and arrested him.  Kovacevic 
surrendered and was removed to The Hague, but before he even arrived there 
the Commander SFOR was the recipient of a furious complaint from the ICRC 
who stated, quite correctly, that the internationally recognised symbol of the ‘Red 
Cross’ had been abused.  There was here, as the ICRC pointed out, the 
possibility of a long-term increase in risk to their staff,142 worldwide for what in 
practice was a very short-term gain. 
 
Kerr comments on the poor co-operation between the ICTY and IFOR/SFOR on 
the ground, but her commentary on this topic appears to be based solely on 
contacts with members of the judiciary and certain selected military officers, such 
as Ben Barry,143 who were not directly involved in the detail of managing the 
                                                 
141 The JCOs lived in ‘team houses’ of four to six men, in about twenty towns and cities across 
Bosnia.  In Prijedor the JCO team house was alongside the ‘Field Offices’ of both the EUMM and 
the OSCE, which served to reduce their profile somewhat. 
142 The risk to the ICRC has indeed increased worldwide, but not solely because of this incident.  
There were also several examples of the abuse of the ‘Red Cross’ by combatants, later in 
Kosovo.  
143 Ben Barry, A Cold War – Front-Line Operations in Bosnia 1995-1996.  Brigadier Barry was the 
Commanding Officer of a BG of about six hundred men at the time that the Dayton Agreement 
was signed. 
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ICTY’s Bosnian presence.  To say that the military ‘would not guard exhumation 
sites’,144 reflects a very simplistic approach to the problems involved.  The 
difficulty was that particularly in the early days, IFOR/SFOR could not always 
spare the manpower first to guard exhumation sites that were effectively worked 
on part-time; secondly. escort the convoys of mechanical handling equipment 
(MHE), often on a daily basis, to and from their secure compounds in 
IFOR/SFOR bases, and thirdly guard the hotels where those involved in the 
process of exhumation were housed.   
 
Kerr145 also mentions that the passage of intelligence to and from the ICTY by 
the agencies was problematic.  This was in large part due to the fact that the 
ICTY investigation teams had no permanent and trustworthy presence within 
Bosnia and the investigators themselves often were only present in Bosnia for a 
few days per month.  As Kerr146 mentions, the ICTY had liaison officers located 
in Sarajevo and Belgrade, but many of the ICTY’s own investigators 
circumvented these liaison officers as they were regarded as indiscreet - the one 
in Belgrade exceptionally so and because their movements and who they met, on 
for example the local diplomatic ‘cocktail circuit’, were well known not only to the 
international community and to the local authorities but also in many cases to the 
‘targets’ of the ICTY’s investigations.   
 
                                                 
144 Kerr (2004), op cit.,  p 136. 
145 Ibid. 
146 Ibid. 
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There appeared to be unwillingness by some in the most senior management of 
the ICTY147 to recognise that other people also had busy roles to play in post-
conflict management.  In addition there appeared to be a reluctance to accept 
that there were also others, amongst the IC involved in post-conflict, who needed 
to gain and maintain the confidence of the local population, such as those 
involved in civil registry148 and who could not afford to squander their ‘credit’ for a 
short-term gain or a one paragraph statement, at an ICTY trial.  This was 
particularly so in the cases of technical witnesses, many of whom were employed 
by the IC and who were permanently resident in Bosnia, but, unlike ICTY staff did 
not have the luxury of personal protection or bodyguards.  Many of the problems 
identified above could have been overcome had the tribunal been located within 
Bosnia, the scene of the war crimes it was investigating, and not The Hague.  
This, too, was a break with the past and a surprising one as the infrastructure of 
Bosnia was in no way as damaged as that in either Nuremberg or Tokyo, or even 
that of Beirut149 at the same time.  Whilst The Hague may have been appropriate 
whilst the war was in progress, there appeared to be little reason, apart from the 
comfort of the judiciary, why the whole process could not have been moved to 
the Law Courts in Mostar which had been restored at considerable expense by 
the EU.  The complications of operating out of The Hague by the investigators 
have already been referred to and arguably the isolation and lack of awareness 
                                                 
147 Confidential interviews between the author and senior members of the IC in Bosnia regarding 
the interventions of Chief Prosecutor Carla Del Ponte in particular. 
148 Conversations held between the author, ICTY personnel, and civil registration staff. 
149 That was because in general the largest calibre weapons in use against for example Sarajevo 
were only 76-82 mm and relatively speaking there were few of them, compared to the conflict in 
the Lebanon. 
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of the situation on the ground by both the investigators and prosecutors was 
compounded by the fact that they were only ever ‘visitors’,150 and in some cases 
very occasional ones at that, to the area with which they were dealing.  
Furthermore, this geographical separation removed the ‘directness’ and reduced 
the impact of the ICTY upon the Bosnian people, both those who needed to see 
justice done and those to whom the ICTY represented a threat.  Similarly, the 
decision to detain those convicted in prisons scattered around Europe, rather 
than in a place or places of detention in Bosnia was a new departure and 
perhaps an unwelcome one, particularly given that the criminals and the crimes 
for which they were convicted all took place within that country.151  The suspicion 
must remain that the conditions within a Dutch, Norwegian, or Swedish place of 
detention were perhaps rather better152 than those conditions which many of the 
Internally Displaced Persons (IDP), were enduring in the period 1996-9 and for 
whose displacement some of those convicted were responsible.  
 
The ICTY has charged 161 persons from the Balkans153 and currently thirty-four 
people are still before the Court, thirteen on trial and twenty-one appealing 
against their sentences.  The last of those indicted, Goran Hadzic, the former 
President of the Republic of Serb Krajina, remained at large until 19 July 2011.  
Perhaps of significance in relation to the time between the alleged crimes were 
                                                 
150 Personal conversation held between the author and an investigator for the ICTY.  The 
investigator had previously served as a military intelligence officer in Bosnia. 
151 This was not the case for many of those convicted as a result of the Nuremberg and Tokyo 
processes. 
152 The author in conversations held with ICTY investigators.  Even when IDPs or refugees 
returned to their original homes, conditions were often extremely poor with no running water, 
electricity, and heating etc. 
153 This includes those indicted as a result of the Kosovo conflict. 
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perpetrated and the arrest was the fact that Hadzic had not even been indicted 
by the ICTY until 16 July 2004, although in mitigation, it has to be stated that 
neither the ICTY nor the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) were 
given any idea of how long their mandates were to last until UNSCR 1503 was 
approved on 28 August 2003.  This stated:  
the ICTY and the ICTR to take all possible measures to complete 
investigations by the end of 2004, to complete all trial activities at first 
instance by the end of 2008, and to complete all work in 2010.   
As the Chief Prosecutor of the ICTR has stated:  
for institutions which had seemingly operated on the basis of an indefinite 
life-time, these deadlines proved challenging immediately, notwithstanding 
that the benchmarks had been formulated in consultation with the tribunals 
themselves.154   
 
Following this decision the ICTY completion strategy was renegotiated and 
outlined in UNSCR1534 of 2004.  The ICTY itself estimated, in its six-monthly 
report to the UNSC in February 2009, that it would not complete its work until 
2013 and this estimate did not take into account the possible trials of Hadzic and 
Mladic who were at that time still at large.  Again, according to the ICTY:155 
the Tribunal is working towards the completion of its mandate. The ICTY 
aims to achieve this by concentrating on the prosecution and trial of the 
most senior leaders, while referring a certain number of cases involving 
                                                 
154 Justice Hassan B. Jallow, Chief Prosecutor of the ICTR at a guest lecture at the T. M. C. 
Asser Institute in The Hague, Netherlands on 4 October 2006. 
155 Ibid. 
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intermediate and lower-ranking accused to national courts in the former 
Yugoslavia. This plan, commonly referred to as the Tribunal's 'completion 
strategy', foresees the Tribunal assisting in strengthening the capacity of 
national courts in the region to handle war crimes cases.   
However, during the period it has been operating, the tribunal has been costing 
over US $100 million per year and its principal concern was in terms of staff 
retention according to the report by ICTY President Patrick Robinson on 24 
November 2008 to the UNSC156 and in May 2009 it was in the payment of 
permanent judge’s pensions, even for those supplementary judges who had 
been hired on a temporary basis due to the overrunning of cases.  By the time 
that the court winds up in 2013, after twenty years, it will have tried an average of 
slightly less than eight people per year and cost in the order of US $2 billion.   
 
Whilst the international community may question whether that represents value 
for money, it is likely that the victims of the Balkan wars in Croatia, Bosnia and 
Kosovo will be asking the rather more fundamental question of whether that 
represents justice, particularly when they can see some of those they ‘know’ to 
have been involved in war crimes such as Naser Oric,157 living a millionaire’s 
lifestyle and still taking their money.158  Kerr,159 describes in some detail, the 
                                                 
156 Letter from Robinson to the UNSC dated 24 November 2008 enclosing the Tenth Annual 
report of the ICTY.  The ICTY is required by its statutes to submit a six-monthly report to the 
UNSC. 
157 Oric was indicted and tried by the ICTY.  In 2006 he was sentenced to two years imprisonment 
on the basis of command responsibility for the deaths of five Serb prisoners in custody.  On 3 July 
2008 the appeals tribunal of the ICTY overturned the earlier sentence and acquitted Oric.  
158 For the antecedents of Naser Oric and particularly the period when he was commander of the 
Bosniac forces in Srebrenica and Zepa see Kerr (2004), op. cit..  Her material, however, appears 
to be abstracted from the indictment of Oric by the ICTY and understates his ‘commercial’ 
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background to the indictment of Oric and the subsequent trial, but the intricacies 
of legal procedure will not have been understood by those people, all from rural 
areas, who were directly affected by Oric’s activities.   
 
For the international community the original plan as stated in the mandate of the 
ICTY had been to derogate the vast majority of the less egregious war crimes 
cases to the domestic courts of the countries concerned.  This has not been seen 
to be effective,160 even in places where due to ethnicity the courts are potentially 
hostile to those being charged.  A further issue is that whilst the UN was willing to 
engage in the prosecution of war criminals within their own state of origin, it has 
in general interpreted this as being the conviction of people engaged in crimes 
against another ethnic group.  Whilst it is possibly necessary to impose 
limitations, if only because of the capacity of the courts, upon the nature of the 
cases to be tried, this did not represent justice for the full scope of the atrocities 
which were committed, of which some were by various members of one group 
upon other members of the same ethnic group.161  Unfortunately, it would appear 
                                                                                                                                                 
interests.  Even while still within the Srebrenica pocket the Bosniac leadership there were running 
an operation bottling shampoo, which had been ‘confiscated’ from the UNHCR and ICRC 
supplies being delivered to the people trapped within Srebrenica.  This shampoo was then sold to 
the Serbs.  The profits, presumably from this and other business interests, were in turn invested 
in three restaurants in Sarajevo, one at least of which was opened while the war was still in 
progress.  In addition to the above and the fitness centre described in the indictment, Oric now 
owns the largest supermarket in Tuzla.  A parallel example amongst the Serbs would be Ratko 
Markovic the Deputy Prime Minister under Milosevic who now appears on the ‘Forbes Rich List’. 
159 Kerr (2004), op. cit. 
160 One possible exception is Serbia, where even prior to the election of Boris Tadic, no fewer 
than twenty convictions had been obtained against citizens of Serbia for crimes committed in 
Kosovo and elsewhere other than the territory of the current Serbian State.  Arguably these 
convictions have occurred for political reasons as Serbia wishes to demonstrate its compliance 
with the EU and accelerate its progress towards EU membership. 
161 For example in Bosnia, where three Serb villages within the Gorazde ‘pocket’ sided and fought 
with the Bosniac ‘Armija’ against the RS, or in Orasje where Bosniacs isolated in the Croat pocket 
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that the Bosnian precedent may, in this regard, be being followed, as in Liberia, 
by other, later, UN, or IC, mandated war-crimes tribunals.  
 
The derogation of the cases involving all but the highest leadership within the 
Bosnian conflict, was a fundamental assumption in the establishment of the 
ICTY, an assumption that was clearly misplaced. 
 
Finally, another lesson which may have been learned by those indicted and by 
those that may be indicted at some stage in the future is that, generally, those 
who are tried first receive the most severe sentences in comparative terms.  This 
was true of the Nuremberg trials where those tried in 1947-8 received a 
disproportionately large number of death sentences, even if they were not major 
figures within the Nazi apparatus, whereas those, such as concentration camp 
guards and members of death squads, the so-called ‘Einsatzkommando’ who 
were only identified and tried by the German judicial system in the late 1950s and 
1960s received much lesser sentences.  In some cases only three to six years 
upon conviction for multiple murder.  This general ‘tapering off’ of the length of 
sentence can again be observed in relation to the ICTY, where for example 
Tihomir Blaskic the HVO commander previously mentioned, received an 
‘exemplary’ sentence of thirty years for his complicity in the Stupni Do massacre 
                                                                                                                                                 
again fought with their Croat neighbours in the HVO.  Similarly in Kosovo, during the period of the 
insurrection against Yugoslavia 1998-9 a vicious civil war took place within the Kosovar 
population, as it did later amongst the Albanian Macedonian population.  Much of this involved 
‘informing’ upon opposition groups to the Serb police, military, and para-military.  None of this 
was followed up by the domestic courts, in part because often the ‘winners’ of these struggles are 
now in power.  However, ‘tit for tat’ revenge killings continue to take place.  There were also 
numerous examples of same-ethnicity rape and the forced ethnic cleansing of the same ethnicity 
to gain access to agricultural land etc.    
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whilst Rajic the commander on the spot who actually ordered and carried out the 
murders, but who was indicted and convicted only in 2003, received a sentence 
of only twelve years.  
 
The size and role of the Bosnian military from 1996 
 
Introduction 
 
The future of the various Bosnian armed forces and police forces and their 
transition to a post-conflict structure was a major issue for the IC.  The IC took a 
conscious decision to reduce the various warring factions by incremental steps 
and then to integrate them, built upon its own experience of the often drastic 
reductions in troop numbers which had taken place within the militaries of 
Western Europe since 1989.  They also deliberately eschewed using the years of 
experience gained in these processes by the UN.  Although the process adopted 
may be unique to Bosnia, a comparison of the process can be made here not 
only with that undertaken in Kosovo but also subsequently in Iraq.  The process 
of DDR is also one that is relevant to all post-conflict operations.  
 
Dayton and beyond. 
 
As a ceasefire rather than a peace treaty, the Dayton Agreement specifically 
permitted the retention of the various Bosnian armed forces and police forces, 
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but required that the ‘paramilitaries’ be rapidly disbanded.162  The Agreement 
also stated that all foreign forces should be ‘withdrawn’,163 but although it would 
be true to say that the units containing ‘foreign fighters’164 were disbanded it is 
likely that many of the key personalities from those units, remained within 
Bosnia.165 That the combatant element of the warring factions were retained was 
clearly a political necessity to get agreement and, one might suspect desired by 
the Bosniacs perhaps even more than by the other two combatants.166  All that 
was done at Dayton was to set a proportionality167 to the size of the armed forces 
which could be retained, whereby the forces which could be retained in the RS 
were to be half of those jointly retained by the Bosniac Armija and the Croatian 
HVO in the federation.  There was no requirement within Dayton to integrate 
either the units or the command arrangements across Bosnia.  The situation was 
therefore different to that at the end of the Second World War, or even that at the 
end of the Kosovo conflict, where the JNA was forced to withdraw from Kosovo 
as part of the agreement. 
 
The task facing the military in IFOR/SFOR was to reduce the armed forces to 
manageable and sustainable proportions, while not flooding Bosnia with 
                                                 
162 GFAP (1995), op. cit.,  Annex 1-B Article II. 
163 GFAP (1995), op. cit.,  Annex 1-A Article III. 
164 Most of whom were the so-called ‘Mujahiddin’. 
165 Various confidential conversations with US and other military officers within IFOR/SFOR 
implied that, critically, it was the C3 which had been retained.  One mechanism which was used 
was for foreign fighters to marry Bosniac women.  Under Bosnian law this granted them 
immediate Bosnian citizenship and as they were no longer ‘foreign’ they could remain. 
166 The Croats did at one stage, post-conflict, offer to reduce the HVO to zero provided the other 
two sides made similar commitments.  That would have left the Bosniacs defenceless whilst the 
Croats would still have the substantial military forces of the HV in Croatia and the Serbs the JNA 
in Serbia.  Unsurprisingly, the Bosniacs rejected the proposal.    
167 GFAP (1995), op. cit.,  Annex 1-B Article IV. 
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unemployed soldiers and weapons.168  In practice, IFOR/SFOR needed to retain 
the units in place, or at least the cadre of the units, until the weapons could be 
withdrawn and made safe.  A start was made on this by withdrawing all ‘heavy’ 
and ‘air defence’ weapons,169 to weapon collection sites by a date not later than 
180 days after the signing of the agreement.  In addition IFOR/SFOR recognised 
within the former combatants the ability, and indeed laid upon them a 
requirement, to make a start on the lifting of the 30 million or so mines170 which 
had been laid across Bosnia. 
 
In redefining the roles of the various Bosnian armed forces the IC attempted to 
persuade them to begin cooperating with one another and to identify the  roles of 
the military in terms of defining the external ‘threat’ to Bosnia,171 the potential for 
taking part in overseas deployments with the UN, and the military’s role in civil 
emergency response.  All of this was accompanied by improved training locally 
and joint courses at such locations as the NATO school at Oberammergau. 
 
The difficulty with this approach was that it was consistently undermined, not only 
by the fact that two of the ethnic groups had organisations where they could 
receive training locally and moreover work in their own language, namely the 
Croats and the Serbs, but also because individual members of the IC who 
                                                 
168 In conversations held between the author and Ms Sophie da Camara Santa - Clara Gomes, 
who was the Head of the UN DPKO DDR programme in New York, and her Deputy Cornelis 
Kees Steenken.  UN DPKO did offer to run DDR programme for Bosnia in 1996, but this was 
rebuffed by the ‘contact group’ as was a similar proposal for Kosovo.  Any DDR programmes 
introduced in Bosnia did not follow the UN DPKO model or guidelines.  
169 These were defined in the GFAP (1995), op. cit.,  Annex 1-B Article IV sub paras 2 & 3. 
170 The information was provided by the Mine Action Centre (MAC), Sarajevo, Bosnia.  
171 Which it was immediately recognised was very limited. 
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undertook training and supplied equipment and resources.  This appeared to 
work against the policies of the IFOR/SFOR plan.  The USA, for example, 
deployed MPRI to provide technical support and training in a wide range of 
disciplines to the Bosniac Armija and to a very limited extent the Croatian HVO 
but not to the Serb VRS.  They also delivered substantial amounts of equipment 
including M-48A5 Main Battle Tanks (MBT) and M-113 tracked Armoured 
Personnel Carriers (APC), but only to the Armija.  The Turks, likewise, provided 
training and M-48A5 MBTs and it was alleged,172 handed over substantial 
amounts of spares from their own M-48A5 fleet based in Zenica.  For the Serbs 
and Croats such support was rather more discreet, but Russian support in Serbia 
and German support in Croatia could be observed from the equipments used by 
both forces, in particular the fact that much of the HVO armour was former GDR 
T-55AP MBTs and still had the instructions in German painted on the inside of 
the turrets.173 
 
As such, the post-conflict military model which evolved in Bosnia was probably 
unique.  Neither a total demilitarization as in Germany in 1945 or Iraq in 2003, 
nor a fully worked out methodology for downsizing and restructuring took place 
within Bosnia.  Rather, the discussion by the IC of the future size and role of the 
Bosnian military (or militaries) displayed an ad-hoc and stop, start approach 
which it would not be recommended to replicate elsewhere. 
 
                                                 
172 Conversations held between the author and US Military Officers at MND (N), Eagle Base, 
Tuzla. 
173 The author’s conversations with JCOs and the author’s personal observation. 
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The para-military and police from 1996 
 
The police post-Dayton fared somewhat better.  There appeared to be no 
alternative to the formation of a UN Police Mission, as at that stage the UN were 
the only organisation with post-conflict policing and police-training experience 
through their management of previous UN Civilian Police (UN CIVPOL) missions.  
Moreover, they already possessed significant Balkan expertise and a ready 
supply of well-qualified policemen who were both willing to deploy and who were 
funded by their own states.  The ‘contact group’, however, thought that the force, 
although under day-to-day management of the UN, should be led by 
commanders appointed by itself and should be focused on training and 
mentoring rather than acting as a substitute police force, as had hitherto often 
been the case.  From the first, the International Police Task Force (IPTF) of some 
1,800 officers initially, was headquartered in Sarajevo but deployed down to 
police-station level across Bosnia and employed a standard methodology.  This 
meant that although they were dealing with three separate forces the 
benchmarking, training, and standards expected were identical for all three 
forces. 
 
Efforts were made over time, to reduce the size of the police forces and to 
ensure that the police who were retained met certain basic standards and were 
receiving training appropriate for their rank.  Initially at least no attempt was 
made to integrate the forces, which whilst problematic was less so in RS than in 
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the Federation where the jurisdictions of the Bosniac and Croat contingents often 
abutted or overlapped.  Initially, too, the various forces were effectively mono-
ethnic, although over time some limited efforts were made to change this.  These 
moves, however, proved difficult as it was not solely employment which was an 
issue, but also such essentials as housing, education for policemen’s children, 
and so on.  Furthermore, service in the RS police was unpopular amongst 
policemen living in the Federation as the salaries were lower and often paid up to 
a year in arrears. 
 
Neither the armed forces nor the police are fully integrated as at 2011,174 which 
is one of the key factors hampering Bosnia’s move towards EU membership.  
Additionally, the police from two of the three ethnic groups still receive assistance 
and training from their neighbouring forces in Croatia and Serbia.  DNA and 
forensic evidence for example, if not analysed locally, is sent from Banja-Luka to 
Belgrade, where also higher-level police training is carried out.  For the Croats 
similar relationships exist with Zagreb.  Some of these problems could have been 
avoided if the IC had funded, built, and trained the staff for a fully equipped 
forensic laboratory in Sarajevo, as they have now done for example in Albania, 
but they did not do so.  Perhaps this was because of the ‘six month’ and ‘one 
year’ philosophy which pervaded the IC involvement in both Bosnia and Kosovo 
in the late 1990s and the early twenty-first century.175 
                                                 
174 The armed forces are not integrated at battalion level and below. 
175 The forensic laboratory in Albania and the associated training had been funded for seven 
years, primarily by the UK.  The first PhD level Albanian forensic scientist graduated from London 
University in June 2009.  
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A further failing of the UN CIVPOL and initially of the IPTF was the absence of 
any counter-riot or public order function.  Clearly it was inappropriate to retain the 
indigenous ‘special police’ organised into battalions who were such a feature of 
the former Yugoslavia, particularly as they were responsible for many of the 
atrocities in the early part of the conflict.176  This left a capability gap,177 between 
using the police and using the military.  Up until the end of 1997 this gap was 
filled by UK and French soldiers using dogs and pick-helves, backed up, in the 
UK case, by Czech troops in cannon-armed APCs.  This was clearly 
unsatisfactory so the decision was taken to form the Mulit-national Specialist Unit 
(MSU) under an Italian ‘Carabinieri’ framework and supported by companies of 
Carabinieri from Romania and Argentina. Although technically under SFOR 
control178 the MSU functioned well in its role as an anti-riot unit, being configured 
for that task and fully equipped with all of the specialist equipment needed.  The 
idea was later replicated in Kosovo and could serve as a useful model for 
ethnically-charged post-conflict situations elsewhere, as an integrated riot police 
will probably be amongst the last institutions to be created in the post-conflict 
transition following an ethnic conflict. 
 
                                                 
176 One of their former commanders Milan Lukic was sentenced to life in jail by the ICTY on 20 
July 2009. 
177 In particular, it left a gap within the US-controlled area in MND (N).  This was exploited by the 
RS.  As a result of the shootings of students during an anti-war riot in 1968 by US National Guard 
at the Kent State University, the US military were prohibited from undertaking any anti-riot or 
public order training.  They were also not issued with non-lethal anti-riot equipment.  This policy 
has now been ‘adjusted’ and limited numbers of members of the US Marine Corps (USMC) now 
receive anti-riot training and equipment at a centre near Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, USA.  
178 The Italian Carabinieri, as with the French Gendarmerie, is an agency of the Ministry of 
Defence. 
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There is no doubt that the changes to the standard UN model made by the IPTF 
were effective and various IPTF commanders who had previously served as the 
head of UN CIVPOL missions said this openly.179  There were still problems and 
much of the UN ethos remained, but it is true to say that some of these occurred 
because officers were posted in to a European environment where even post-
conflict the residual resources and training of the police were often far greater 
than they enjoyed in their home country.180  Much of the training and mentoring 
work done by the IPTF and the models developed for this have now been 
adopted by the EU Police Assistance Missions deployed across the Balkans and 
further afield and are now taught on the EUPOL courses at the police academies 
in Munster (FRG) and elsewhere and which will be covered in more detail in a 
later chapter.          
 
Education – ‘Two Schools under one Roof’181 
 
In the immediate aftermath of the conflict little attention was paid to the education 
system.  Yes, the IC poured in money and United Nations Childrens Fund 
(UNICEF) was busy rebuilding schools and buying books and computers, but 
little was done to examine what was happening to the curriculum and what 
language was being used in the classroom.  Serbo-Croatian had been a broadly 
unified language, but with recognisable regional dialects before the war.  It had 
                                                 
179 At least one such former IPTF and UN CIVPOL Commander said this at the NATO School in 
Oberammergau in 2001. 
180 This was particularly true for officers from the smaller sub-Saharan countries such as Ghana 
and even Kenya, where rural police forces often do not have basic equipment such as radios. 
181 Ambassador Douglas Davidson, Why Two Schools under one Roof must go. 
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always existed in two scripts, which in pre-conflict Yugoslavia had been taught on 
alternate weeks, so that everyone could read both Cyrillic and Latinic script.  In 
the aftermath of the conflict the language was being ‘used’ as an indicator of an 
ethnicity, a marker that the user ‘belonged’ to one or another ethnic group.  
Similarly, history was being used to reinforce stereotypical views of the different 
ethnic groups, nowhere more so than in the study of the Second World War, 
where in very general terms the ‘Serbs’ fought against the Germans and their 
allies which included the Croats and the Bosniacs.182  Although these problems 
were recognised by early 1997 little was done by the OHR and the OSCE until 
2000 to establish and push through an agreed curriculum and to enforce the joint 
teaching of all students of whatever age group together.  In most ethnically 
‘mixed’ areas in the period 1996-9 what in practice had happened was that one 
ethnic group occupied the school in the morning with their teachers and was 
taught in ‘their’ language and to ‘their’ curriculum, while the children from the 
other ethnic group received their tuition, separately, in the afternoon.  From 2001 
the OSCE established, in the absence of any other agency, a department to work 
on this issue and to try to break this pernicious phenomenon by using its field 
office network throughout Bosnia.  As the article indicates,183 it continues to 
prove an extremely complex topic to deal with and in particular the desire by 
some elements within some communities, post-conflict, to receive an Islamic 
curriculum has not made the situation any easier.   
                                                 
182 The Waffen SS ‘Handzhar’ Division which fought in Bosnia in 1944 was comprised of Bosniac 
troops and the Croats were responsible for the removal of almost the entire Jewish population of 
Bosnia to the Jasenovac concentration camp in Croatia as well as the ethnic cleansing and 
destruction of the Serb-populated town of Bosanska Dubica. 
183 Davidson (2005), op. cit. 
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At the tertiary level there are similar problems of ethnic segregation within 
Bosnia, but these are much more difficult to deal with and may prove impossible.  
Within Bosnia itself Bosnian Croats go to university in Mostar while Serbs go to 
Banja-Luka.  Within the Bosniac community there is more choice with universities 
in Sarajevo, Tuzla, and Bihac.  The truth is, however, that these institutions are 
largely mono-ethnic.  In addition many Croats go to Zagreb for their first-level 
degree and at the higher levels almost all go there, or elsewhere in Western 
Europe or North America.  The same is true for Bosnian Serbs except that in 
their case they will go to study in Belgrade.  
 
The education project being run by the OSCE is an innovative one and could 
serve as the pilot for similar projects elsewhere during the post-conflict phase of 
any ethnic conflict.  That the education project in Bosnia is in many senses a 
‘first’ could perhaps be explained by the reluctance of the UNICEF to become 
involved, or indeed to be the lead agency within Bosnia.  While it is happy to 
disperse funds and become involved in the provision of teacher training, the 
multi-cultural approach adopted by the UN agencies in general and indeed the 
multi-cultural nature of their staff probably makes these specific elements within 
education - language, religion, and history - difficult topics for it to become 
involved with.  
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The impact and role of the neighbouring states   
 
Introduction 
 
The impact and role of neighbouring, and perhaps what might be called ‘parent’ 
states, will be discussed in this section as a political issue, but as outlined below, 
the details of the practical impacts of these neighbouring support structures, 
particularly in terms of service provision, will not.  While Bosnia might be an 
extreme example,184 the role of ‘friendly’ and ethnically similar (at least to one 
participant in the conflict) neighbours has often and will continue to play a key 
role in ethnically or religiously-motivated conflicts worldwide and it is therefore 
important that this issue is examined in the context of the management of post-
conflict.  The IC, specifically the USA, implicitly and perhaps, in retrospect, 
unintentionally, emphasised the importance of the neighbouring states in the 
Bosnian conflict by not even inviting the Bosnian Croat and Bosnian Serb 
leaderships to the Dayton peace talks, preferring instead to talk to Presidents 
Tudjman of Croatia and Milosevic of Serbia. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
184 Say, for example, in comparison with the Tamil areas of Southern India which abut the 
essentially Tamil – Sinhalese conflict in Sri Lanka, but where they are able to exert little practical 
or even political impact upon developments in Sri Lanka.  
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The role and influence of Croatia, Serbia, and Montenegro in Bosnia 
 
If the neighbouring state to the conflict was an important factor in the conflict, 
then it is important that the IC remain closely engaged with that state throughout 
the ongoing post-conflict operations and this was the case in Bosnia and later 
Kosovo.185  Throughout the post-conflict period in Bosnia it was essential that 
both the Croatian and FRY Governments co-operated with the IC over such 
issues as the running of elections for the Bosnian Croat and Bosnian Serb 
diaspora in their own countries and the management of refugee ‘return’.  
Additionally for Croatia, which permitted the Bosnian Croat population to vote for 
‘overseas’ constituencies in the Croatian assembly, it was essential that they co-
operated with the Bosnian authorities and the IC if those elections were to take 
place.186  In many cases, and Bosnia would be a good example, the issue of 
‘dual nationality’ for non-resident members of the appropriate ethnic group is also 
an issue and this was particularly the case with the Bosnian Croats who were 
also entitled to claim Croatian citizenship.  The ‘high representatives’, in 
particular Paddy Ashdown, attempted to force the Bosnian Croats to choose 
between either Bosnian citizenship or that of Croatia and passed an order that 
the retention of Croatian citizenship would mean the forfeiture of Bosnian 
citizenship and citizenship rights within Bosnia.  These threats largely failed as 
                                                 
185 While Bosnia is an obvious example a similar relationship existed between India, in particular 
between the Indian state of Tamil-Nadu and the Sri Lankan Government during the long-running 
conflict there.  Indeed, the Indian decision to support the Sri Lankan Government, in particular the 
enforcement of the naval blockade, was critical to the Sri Lankan’s eventual success in resolving 
the conflict. 
186 The Croatian authorities were legally permitted to run elections within Bosnia, but within their 
own sovereign space, for example consulates. 
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the IC was in a very weak position, particularly as the post-war Croatian 
economy gathered pace.  In central Bosnia where the resident Croatian 
population was already under pressure,187 it increased the ‘voluntary’ removal of 
Bosnian Croats either to the Croatian ‘borderlands’ on the coastal fringes of 
Bosnia or into Croatia itself.   The financial implications of remaining ’Bosnian’ as 
opposed to ‘Croat’ also told against this policy, as for example state pensions 
and disability allowances in Croatia were approximately 400 percent of those in 
Bosnia and residency within Croatia was not a requirement for their receipt.  
Finally, Croatia remained impervious to the IC’s threats that they should permit 
their displaced Serb populations188 to return in significant numbers and instead 
encouraged the transfer or exchange of  Serb-owned properties at heavily 
discounted prices to returning ‘Croats’ (and others)189 with the result that this 
policy in effect contributed to the ‘sealing in’ of ethnic cleansing within Croatia.  
The impossibility of enforcing the policy, so as to make the Bosnian Croats drop 
their ‘dual nationality’, led to it quietly being ‘dropped, after 2001.   
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
187 From 1996 to 2001 it is estimated that the Bosnian Croat population of Zenica municipality fell 
from about 14,000 to about 9,000, i.e. from about 10% to just over 6%. 
188 While this primarily relates to the homes of the 650,000 Serbs from the Krajinas, much of the 
Serb owned property on the Dalmatian coast and on the islands consisted of holiday homes for 
the Serb upper and middle classes from Belgrade.   
189 Many Western Europeans who have bought holiday villas etc. along the Dalmatian coast and 
on the islands have in effect done so, by buying formerly Serb-owned property which has been 
sold to them through Croatian ‘middle men’. 
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Further elements for consideration regarding the IC’s involvement in post-conflict 
within Bosnia 
 
A brief list of those elements of post-conflict within Bosnia that were not covered 
in this chapter are included below.  Whilst the list is by no means exhaustive 
these are important issues, but have been omitted on the grounds that they are 
either less critical than those issues which have been covered or are Bosnia-
specific.  They do, however, merit detailed consideration elsewhere.  
 
Residual Assets and Debts 
 
The allocation of social housing and in particular the accommodation formerly 
belonging to the JNA190 and other issues relating to the compensation of the 
residual elements of the SFRY, later the FRY, for the loss of control over these 
assets.191  It is worth noting here that the way that the issue of residual debts and 
obligations was treated was significantly different to the approach taken to the 
same issues within Kosovo following the Kosovo conflict,192 where no 
                                                 
190 The amounts of JNA-owned ‘social housing’ in for example Sarajevo were significant.  In one 
block alone, completely undamaged by the war, there were 650 ‘officer’ apartments.  Within 
garrison towns, such as Trebinje or Bileca, JNA-controlled accommodation or barrack units 
comprised a sizeable minority of the accommodation available at the end of the conflict. 
191 In practice, much of the accommodation which ‘belonged’ to the SFRY was ‘bought’ from the 
Milosevic regime in Belgrade by the US Government and then handed over to the Bosnian 
government control.  The Bosnian Government then promptly sold most of it on to pre-war ‘sitting 
tenants’ (at least in Sarajevo).  As with the payment of the Milosevic regime for the management 
of elections within SFRY, which amounted to some US $250,000 per round of elections, these 
US-funded transfers were not much publicised at the time, perhaps because the SFRY was still 
under a UN-sanctioned embargo.  
192 This was in part due to the fact that Kosovo formed an integral part of the SFRY, which in 
practice ceased to exist following the Kosovo conflict.  In other words unlike Bosnia, Kosovo was 
already in effect a ‘shareholder’ in the property concerned.    
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compensation to the SFRY was provided for the loss of assets.  Linked to this 
issue there is also the whole issue of the ‘inheritance’ and proportionality of the 
obligations for the share of the national debt of the FRY which could be alleged 
to be one of the principal original drivers193 of the conflicts in the Balkans. 
 
Freedom of movement 
 
The broad issue of ‘Freedom of Movement’ (FoM) has only been discussed in so 
far as it related directly to policing issues.  There are a whole range of other 
relevant issues including such items as international travel documentation, 
access to services, and employment.  There are also those useful and practical 
FoM innovations from Bosnia such as a countrywide harmonised vehicle licence 
plate system.194 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
193 In very general terms, the development, particularly of the infrastructure of the FRY, was 
funded largely by increases in government borrowing and hence debt in the 1970s and 1980s.  In 
terms of tax receipts both Slovenia and Croatia were net contributors to the FRY, whilst Serbia 
(less Kosovo) contributed as much as it benefited.  Both the republics (within the FRY) of 
Macedonia and Montenegro were modest net beneficiaries whilst the principal beneficiaries per 
capita were Bosnia and Kosovo.  For evidence of the impact which this had, particularly upon the 
subsequent conflicts see Misha Glenny, The Fall of Yugoslavia: The Third Balkan War, and Mark 
Thompson, A Paper House – The Ending of Yugoslavia.  
194 This was designed to be fully ‘randomised’ so that the licence plates which were in the format 
111 – A – 111, were issued in a scattered manner so that certain blocks of numbers and letters 
e.g. 123 - K – 999 could not be identified with specific geographic areas such as villages, or even 
across entities.  As the coding system by which the licence plates were issued could not be 
issued to the various entity police forces, at least in the early days, this had the unplanned for 
effect of making it extremely difficult to check for stolen vehicles and hence as a by-product of this 
system the number of vehicles stolen, particularly across the IEBL, increased.  
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Access to services 
 
While education has been discussed above, the whole issue of access to 
services such as health provision195 and the role of neighbouring states as 
alternative service (and for example old-age pension) providers,196 has not.  It is 
accepted that these are key components of the integration process and of nation-
building but they have been omitted due to a lack of space. 
 
Finally, the whole issue of the evolving role of the EU within post-conflict and 
particularly in the Bosnian context will not be discussed and, in particular, the 
EU’s role as a political lever upon the governing classes within Bosnia and 
elsewhere within the Balkans as this will be covered in detail in a later chapter. 
 
Conclusion 
 
While Bosnia has formally ceased to become a ‘post-conflict’ country the Bosnian 
story in terms of the conflict is still not over and indeed new twists in the story 
keep emerging.197 The European Union Force (EUFOR) was cut from 6,000 men 
                                                 
195 Even as late as 2002 and within the staffs of the IC organisations such as the OSCE, it was a 
truism that Bosnian Croat staff based in Sarajevo would go for optical and dental treatment to 
Zagreb whilst the Bosnian Serb staff would go to Belgrade for the same treatment. 
196 For those who opted to retain Croatian citizenship whilst continuing to reside within Bosnia not 
only was the ‘state’ (in this case Croatian) old-age pension greater than that provided by the 
Bosnian state to their Bosnian neighbours but similar discrepancies applied to veterans and 
disability pensions and access to prosthetic appliances.  
197 The EU decision on visa liberalization for the Western Balkans announced on 15 July 2009 is 
one such.  The only countries excluded from this new round of liberalization are Albania, Kosovo, 
and Bosnia.  In practice, that means that only the Bosniacs are excluded, as the Bosnian Croats 
carry Croatian passports, whilst the Bosnian Serbs carry Serbian passports and hence can 
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to 2,500 in the Spring of 2007, but a residual military, police and international 
presence remains.  In 2009 Bosnia is seen to be making little or at best limited 
progress despite an international investment in development and reconstruction 
of some US $5.1 billion by 2000.  The country remains divided, politically, 
economically, and, to a great extent, ethnically, and there is an increasing fear 
amongst the IC that Bosnia may yet either slip back into the abyss of civil war or 
worse still become an Islamic enclave within Europe and a staging post or even 
spawning ground for terrorism.   
 
Despite this Bosnia in post-conflict terms was the first occasion where the 
wholehearted engagement of the EU as a player on the world stage took place 
and the first post-conflict environment which was not dominated by two 
superpowers, Russia and the United States.198  The role of the EU in post-
conflict will be dealt with in a later chapter.   
 
Furthermore, the wars in the former Yugoslavia, of which Bosnia was the 
longest-running example, were the first internal conflicts which had involved 
large-scale fighting within Europe itself since the Second World War.  It was 
unique in that it was in general managed by the ‘contact group’ which was ‘of the 
UN’ but outside of its formal structures.  In consequence, Bosnia was the first 
major multinational post-conflict involvement since the beginning of the Cold 
                                                                                                                                                 
benefit from the liberalization of the visa regime whilst the Bosniacs cannot.  See Nenad Pejic, 
Tearing Bosnia Apart one Decision at a Time, and Anes Anic, Bosnians got what they voted for.  
It is perhaps significant that both writers are Bosniacs. 
198 The First Gulf War which took place in 1991 falls into a different category.  
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War, where the IC was active on the ground throughout the post-conflict phase 
but was managed outside of the UN structures.199  It was also the first non-UN-
managed post-conflict engagement to take place within an environment where 
other post-conflict activities were going on in the states alongside200 and where 
the build-up to a further conflict was also taking place in an adjoining state.201  
 
The holding of early elections had been seen as a mechanism for resolving 
conflicts in the early 1990s both in long-running conflicts such as those in 
Cambodia and Mozambique and the rather briefer conflict in Georgia202 which 
formed a part of the break up of the Former Soviet Union (FSU).  The holding of 
elections formed a key part of the Dayton Agreement and was seen as a way to 
bring a quick closure to the conflict and therefore rapid troop withdrawals.  
Unfortunately, had the US negotiators at Dayton paid more attention to their own 
‘religious right’ within the USA, they might have discovered that ‘politics is war by 
other means’203 was also part of the fundamental beliefs of the then emerging 
right-wing ‘neo-con’ group204 and they might have discovered that the ‘neo-cons’ 
had been anticipated in this approach by the ethnically based Bosnian political 
party structures.  The Bosnian political elite also shared another one of the neo-
cons favourite slogans ‘Politics and war share the same primary goal: control of a 
                                                 
199 The conflict was managed within a UN mandate but without a UN lead. 
200 Croatia and Serbia. 
201 In this case, the Kosovo crisis within Serbia. 
202 This led to the Georgia independence referendum in 1991. 
203  Carl Von Clausewitz, On War. 
204 See amongst others Pat Dollard, Politics Is War by Other Means: ACTIVE’s Core Manifesto on 
Rightwing Political Strategy. 
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territory’205 and were the first to attempt to implement it.  As a result of this failure 
to anticipate the Bosnian elite’s ability to manipulate the electoral process, the 
elections in 1996 did not bring closure and re-unification but only further, but at 
least non-military, conflict which has continued to this day.  It would take a further 
real tragedy in 1999, on another continent, to finally bring home the message to 
the IC and the USA, in particular, that simply holding an internationally 
supervised and therefore ‘fair’ election or referendum does not guarantee 
peace.206  In that sense the Bosnian conflict can be seen to mark the beginning 
of the realization that elections of themselves are valueless, they are simply a 
step in the post-conflict process and it is the implementation of elections which 
are the critical element.  
 
The Bosnian conflict was from 1996 also the first multinational military 
intervention outside the UN umbrella and was also the first occasion where a 
major military force was deployed beyond the boundaries of the NATO alliance, 
but effectively under the control of NATO and using NATO structures.  In terms of 
post-conflict management, it was for many of the nations contributing troops the 
first time that they had used the military as an integral part of the post-conflict 
                                                 
205 Ibid. 
206 This was the referendum on whether East Timor should be independent from Indonesia.  This 
was organised and run by IFES with US funds and carried out on behalf of the international 
community.  The referendum on 30 August 1999 produced an over 90 percent result in favour of 
independence.  However, Indonesian Army backed militias then massacred approximately 1,400 
people including several UN international employees and pushed approximately 300,000 
refugees over the border into (Indonesian) West Timor.  During the massacres most of the 
infrastructure of the state was destroyed.   Jeff Fisher, a Vice-President of IFES and the Elections 
Director for the referendum, told this author in October 1999 in Pristina, that while the outcome 
was widely known and planned for, neither he nor the other US advisors had ever considered the 
likely Indonesian reaction to the referendum result.  Critically this affected much of his and IFES’s 
decision-making processes during the first round of Kosovo elections in 2000. 
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nation-building process.  It was perhaps not surprising therefore that part of the 
problem with the development of for example, military PsyOps within Bosnia, 
both in terms of product and delivery was the belief by some states that the 
military ‘simply do not do this sort of thing’.207  The need for the military to cover 
capability gaps in policing, particularly in the areas of the use of non-lethal force 
and riot policing were again alien to the principles of many of the participating 
states, in particular the USA.  Following Bosnia, the need for the military to 
become engaged in these processes has become widely accepted, but Bosnia 
was for many the first experience of ‘modern war’ and indeed the much-
discussed, but perhaps then not fully understood, ‘asymmetric warfare’. 
 
That the Balkan conflicts and in particular that in Bosnia also occurred at a time 
when electronic communications and in particular the use of satellites and the 
internet were radically altering the way in which the world did its business, means 
that the IC’s response to the Bosnian conflict in particular can be seen to be the 
first iteration of the IC’s management of post-conflict in the twenty-first century.  
Many of the solutions and possibilities opened up by the internet and satellite 
revolution in the field of post-conflict also brought with them a new range of 
problems and whilst many, but by no means all, of these problems, such as the 
security of data and communications, were identified during the Bosnian conflict, 
                                                 
207 Canada for example did not permit its military forces to engage in PsyOps until the rules were 
changed as a result of the Bosnian conflict in early 1997. 
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it would take some years and several further post-conflict interventions before 
these issues were successfully, for the most part, resolved.208   
 
The creation of the ICTY in 1993 was the first attempt since the Nuremberg War 
Trials to provide a full, legal, and internationally recognised court system to deal 
with war criminals and, in particular, the first ever international court which tried 
defendants who were the citizens of a state and who had been engaged in the 
prosecution of a civil war within their own state.  As such it was the precursor to 
the trials for the Rwandan genocide,209 the attacks in Sierra Leone in 1999-2000, 
and even the indictment of the president of the Sudan,210 all of which have 
followed logically on from the precedent set by the ICTY.  Furthermore, the ICTY 
clarified and developed the law on the definition of ‘command responsibility’ and 
then went on to use this concept211 to secure convictions of not only military 
commanders but also members of the wartime civilian leadership.    
 
That the ICTY should perhaps have gone further in terms of its mandate to look 
at crimes committed within the confines of particular ethnic groups is now clear, 
but understandably perhaps this could not have been anticipated at the time of its 
creation when the conflict had still three years to run.  That the speed at which 
                                                 
208 The development of larger mass storage devices and the ability to connect these highly 
portable devices using Universal Serial Bus (USB) to computers means that the storage of large 
quantities of personal data, even in non-conflict, areas remains an area of concern. 
209 The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda ICTR was established as a result of  UNSCR 
955 in November 1994 
210 He was indicted on 4 March 2009. 
211 In the case regarding Jadranko Prlic and five other former members of the wartime 
government of the Croat Republic of Herceg-Bosna (CRHB) this has been referred to as ‘criminal 
responsibility’.  
 321 
justice was delivered was too slow is only now generally understood and also the 
fact that there was, and may often remain, only a limited willingness within those 
states which themselves were a party to the conflict to push for retributive justice 
in the way in which the IC would have wished. The citizens of those states would, 
in general, wish to put the conflict behind them even if that meant that justice was 
not necessarily done. 
 
The IC attempted to put into practice many of the ‘lessons learned’ from Bosnia 
into its post-conflict intervention in Kosovo and then to apply those that they 
could, retrospectively to the Bosnian model. Arguably, however, in terms of the 
development of the ideas of post-conflict management Kosovo was in large part 
a continuum of the Bosnian scenario with many of the same key players212 and 
ideas, a point which was brought out by the Independent International 
Commission on Kosovo (IICK).213  It would therefore have to wait for the post-
conflict interventions of the twenty-first century for the Bosnian model of post-
conflict intervention to be significantly developed further. 
 
This brief review of a limited number of the most relevant developments in the 
management of post-conflict which took place in Bosnia demonstrate that the 
Bosnian intervention was the first of the twenty-first century post-conflict 
interventions.  In some ways it could be described as traditional in that it was for 
                                                 
212 Including both the first deputy high representative and deputy head of the OSCE Mission, both 
of whom moved from the same post in Bosnia.  As was mentioned earlier, the USA had wished 
that the UN SRSG in Bosnia fulfil the same function in Kosovo.  
213 IICK, Kosovo Report – Conflict, International Response, Lessons Learned. 
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the most part a genuine ‘humanitarian’ intervention214 on the part of the IC, in 
that few, if any, of the participating states entered upon it, either because they 
were directly threatened or for commercial or strategic gain.  On the other hand, 
the intervention following Dayton was unlike any other since the formation of the 
UN in 1945,215 in that it was neither the action of a colonial (or even former 
colonial) power, nor was it under the blue beret and mantle of the UN.  
 
                                                 
214 Roderick Moore, The Limits of Humanitarian Intervention.  
215 The United Nations officially came into existence on 24 October 1945 – UN Fact Sheet at: 
http://www.un.org/en/. 
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Chapter 7 
 
Post-Conflict Operations in Kosovo 
 
Introduction 
 
The IC’s involvement in Kosovo should be considered, in UN terms at least, as a 
fourth-generation peace-enforcement mission which was transformed post-
conflict, into a second-generation, complex, nation-building operation.  Although 
operations during the peace-enforcement phase were mandated by the UN,1 
they were carried out by NATO under strong US leadership.  The post-conflict 
phase was carried out in the manner of a UN second generation mission.  The 
essential difference at the highest management level being the appointment of a 
‘high representative’ and with the UN, in the form of the UN Mission in Kosovo 
(UNMIK), leading the strongest ‘pillar’ of a multi-organisational ‘pillar structure’.  
These structures were based upon the mandate provided for in UNSCR 1244.2  
The public portrayal, particularly by the USA, of the IC’s intervention in Kosovo 
was glossed as a mission founded upon humanitarian intervention and 
disinterested liberal interventionism.  Indeed, in 2004, President Clinton claimed 
that in March 1999: 
                                                 
1UNSCR 1203 adopted 24 October 1998 mandated the conduct of a chapter VII operation in 
Kosovo, should that prove necessary.  Fourth-generation ‘peace enforcement’ operations require 
a chapter VII mandate in order to operate.  NATO based both its military and post-conflict 
engagement in Kosovo upon a series of UNSCR resolutions.  See NATO, NATO’s Role in 
Kosovo: Key documents. 
2 This was adopted by the UNSC, 10 June 1999. 
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we were moving toward another Balkan War, this time in Kosovo.  The 
Serbs had launched an offensive against rebellious Kosovar Albanians a 
year earlier killing many innocent people.3   
As will be demonstrated later, the reality at least as far as the US was concerned, 
was rather less disinterested and humanitarian than it was publicly portrayed.  
 
As with the preceding chapter on Bosnia, this chapter will not attempt to examine 
all of the issues surrounding the ongoing Kosovo post-conflict deployment, but 
will focus on specific issues which are of importance in the wider sphere of post-
conflict management and particularly those which are still relevant in 2011.   The 
aim is both to illustrate new approaches to the IC’s involvement in post-conflict 
and to illustrate persistent and repetitive weaknesses in the IC’s involvement 
which can be demonstrated using the experience of Kosovo.  These arguments 
follow logically from those of the previous chapter and its discussion of the 
Bosnian post-conflict mission.  Given their close proximity in both time and 
space4 it might appear logical that in the IC actions post-conflict, Kosovo would 
have benefited from the lessons learnt in the Bosnian engagement.  In some 
cases that was true and this chapter will examine the ‘pillar structure’ which was 
developed for Kosovo and later ‘retrofitted’ to the Bosnian post-conflict 
architecture. This was designed to improve the efficiency of the IC and also 
attempted to prevent the duplication of effort amongst the various agencies 
                                                 
3 Bill Clinton, My Life,   p 848. 
4 At their closest points, the borders of Kosovo and Bosnia are less than 100 kms apart. 
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involved.5  In other areas, however, it would appear that little was learned from 
Bosnia and that the IC entered the Kosovo post-conflict phase somewhat more 
disorganised than it had in Bosnia.  The thesis will initially examine this issue of 
unpreparedness as this will underpin and inform the remainder of the discussion 
on the Kosovo mission.  The chapter will examine whether the IC has achieved 
‘reconciliation’ among the various communities post-conflict - a pre-requisite for 
any exit strategy and for a lasting peace.  Finally, the chapter will examine 
Kosovo as a post-conflict model and will attempt to identify not only whether the 
process can be judged ‘successful’, but also whether the investment made in 
both time and resources is worth repeating in future post-conflict missions, 
particularly in states which may be significantly larger in scale.   
 
Strategic overview – the build up to conflict and the post-conflict mission 
 
The failure of the IC to plan adequately for the post-conflict phase whilst 
conducting the conflict phase of the mission6 would appear to be one obvious 
                                                 
5 As with the US CIMIC directory of IOs, INGOs and NGOs working in Bosnia, a similar, but 
somewhat smaller volume, was produced for Kosovo.   
6 This occurred most spectacularly in connection with the Second Gulf War, campaign.  By the 
time that the planning for an Iraq ‘operation’ had started sometime late in 2001, elements within 
the US administration had recognised the need to plan in detail for the post-conflict phase and the 
reconstruction of Iraq.  An expert team was established within the US State Department to look at 
and plan for the reconstruction of Iraq that would be required following the overthrow of the 
Saddam Hussein regime.  This planning effort was largely negated when the Bush administration 
moved the responsibility for the management of the Iraq operation from the State Department to 
DoD control.   From that point on, not only were the plans made earlier by State not used, there 
was also no alternative detailed contingency planning for the post-conflict phase carried out 
either. Iraq is perhaps the best illustration to date of the implications of late decision making and 
of the consequently rushed and inadequate planning decisions within post-conflict operations.  
While in both Bosnia and Kosovo it was arguably ‘rushed’ because of late IC decision making, in 
the case of Iraq the US took this concept one stage further and assumed direct control of the 
post-conflict phase of the operations themselves, in part because of the lack of a UN mandate 
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example of a repetitive failure on its part.  The matter of exit strategies, or the 
failure to effectively plan for them, continues to be relevant not least with regard 
to Libya in 2011 and perhaps Yemen, where despite the IC not being involved in 
what is arguably a ‘conflict phase’,7 they will undoubtedly be required ‘post-
conflict’. 
 
Before we examine the post-conflict developments in Kosovo it will be relevant to 
examine the lead up to the conflict itself, as Kosovo demonstrated some marked 
differences to Bosnia in this regard.  Despite being part of the Ottoman province 
of Western Rumelia, having had an ethnic Albanian majority for many years, and 
having been liberated by the Albanian partisans in late 1944, Kosovo had since 
the Congress of Berlin in 1878 formed an integral part of the Serbian kingdom 
and later the Republic of Serbia within the former Yugoslavia.  The Serbian-run 
administration was liberalised somewhat in the later Tito years, but following the 
election of President Milosevic and the passing of new legislation in 1986 
suffered from an increasingly repressive Serb-run leadership.  The province was 
rigidly Serbian controlled with Serbs occupying 95 percent of police posts and all 
                                                                                                                                                 
and the lack of consensus for the Iraq operation in the first place.  Whether any serious attempt 
was made to engage with the UN in terms of providing administrative support to post-conflict 
operations in Iraq prior to the conflict is still not clear, but the failure to do so and to employ those 
with adequate skills and experience to run such operations was again manifestly clear.  As was 
the case with Kosovo, not only was the post-conflict plan for Iraq incomplete but it, consciously on 
some occasions, ignored the hard-won lessons of the past.  As with Bosnia and Kosovo earlier, 
the USA ignored the lessons and advice from the DDR specialists within the UN as to the best 
approaches to DDR and took a series of rapid decisions in the immediate post-conflict period to 
demobilise all of the existing members of the military and police immediately without any further 
thought as to who was going to maintain law and order in the medium to long term.  They also 
failed to assess what the impact would be of making unemployed hundreds of thousands of men 
with firearms training and often still with their issue weapons.   The background to this failure is 
clearly explained in David L. Phillips (2005),op. cit.  
7 It is still not clear in July 2011 whether there will be a ‘conventional’ conflict phase in Syria and 
perhaps Bahrain.  Nor what the eventual outcome may be.  
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posts within the judiciary.  The Albanian response to these pressures, under the 
Liberal Democratic Union (LDK) and its leader Ibrahim Rugova, was one of 
passive resistance and attempts to establish effective ‘parallel structures’ of 
governance and administration.  That the Serbian authorities took no action, 
given the pressures on the regime elsewhere, not least with the war in Bosnia is 
perhaps not surprising.  In parallel with these developments the collapse of the 
Albanian communist regime in 1993 led to an increasingly open border with that 
state and indeed the informal provision of services by the Serbian State, through 
the LDK’s parallel structures, to the impoverished rural areas of north-eastern 
Albania.8  
 
The increasing independence of the Kosovar Albanians through their parallel 
structures of government and their increasing experience in ‘self administration’, 
was tolerated by the Serb authorities through the period from 1991 to 1997.  At 
this point, the more aggressive Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), led by Hashim 
Thaci and other young leaders opposed to the ‘softly-softly’ approach of Rugova 
and the LDK, appeared.  The KLA was aided by having an open border with 
Albania, and by there being an Albanian leadership with strong interests in 
                                                 
8 For example primary schoolchildren from six villages in Albania were being educated in village 
schools in Kosovo in the mid-1990s and this educational provision continues.  The fire service for 
Bajram Curri and Krume in Albania and surgical operations for the residents of Bajram Curri were 
also being provided from the town of Djakovica (Gjakova) in Kosovo, during the Milosevic era.  
These provisions are ongoing, as is the provision of tertiary education for students in the north -
east of Albania.  In order to reduce the stress on the Gjakova hospital outpatients department, the 
Kosovar authorities have for some years deployed two doctors and some nurses to the hospital in 
Bajram Curri (Albania) where the operating theatre is unusable. 
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Kosovo particularly around Djakova,9 and US support.  Indeed, it was the 
provision of safe havens and equipment by the Albanians and of military training 
by the USA and to a lesser extent by others,10 which was to be critical to the 
KLA’s success. 
 
As stated earlier, former president Clinton would like to see his administration’s 
intervention in Serbia portrayed as liberal interventionism and a form of 
humanitarian intervention,11 but the reality is that the USA was providing military 
training and assistance to the KLA in 1997 before the KLA campaign and the 
Serbian countermeasures really got underway.12  The reality would appear to be 
that the Clinton Administration had by this date decided that the only way to 
make progress in the former Yugoslavia was to remove Milosevic and that the 
mechanism to do so would be for there to be a confrontation in Kosovo.13  As 
such, the actual US policy was not one of liberal interventionism, nor was it linked 
to humanitarian intervention. By emboldening the KLA at the expense of Rugova 
                                                 
9Sali Berisha, then the Albanian president and currently its prime minister, is the clan chief of the 
Berisha clan.  The historic clan area of the Berishas includes both Bajram Curri and Djakova.  
These two cities are on a natural routeway and were closely linked throughout the Ottoman 
period.  The Berisha clan was the source of much of the KLA’s arms and its other warlike 
materials during the Kosovo conflict and also provided safe havens and training areas for them.  
10 The KLA lacked the skills initially to operate support weapons such as mortars and other 
communications equipment.  The training for these equipments was provided in north-eastern 
Albania by foreign military instructors. 
11 Clinton (2005), op. cit. 
12 Even as late as May 1998 the author was able to drive around the province with one colleague 
in a red-painted VW Golf with OSCE stickers and with limited problems.  There were occasional 
checkpoints, but the team was able to enter the province from Nis and to drive via Pristina, 
Vucitrn, Kosarska Mitrovica, and on into Montenegro over a two-day period.    
13 Although the conflict was portrayed in the Western media as both an ethnic (Serb – Albanian) 
conflict and a religious (Christian – Muslim) conflict, religion played little part.  Some 25 percent of 
the Kosovar Albanian population are Roman Catholic, as are the clans in the immediately 
adjoining areas of Albania.  This simplistic approach also masks the fact that there were 
significant numbers of Gorani, Vlach, Roma, and other non-Serb groups in the province.  These 
effectively supported neither side.  There were also some 50,000 Bosnian Serb refugees present 
from 1995.   
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and the LDK, the US policy in the province caused the humanitarian situation to 
deteriorate, and that the misery caused by the large-scale expulsions and the 
damage to the national infrastructure caused by the air campaign could perhaps 
have been avoided.  The US policy was one of ‘imperialism’ and one where the 
administration’s objective was to achieve ‘regime change’.  In this case it was 
more effectively masked than that by the subsequent Bush Administration during 
the invasion of Iraq.  It was the increasingly aggressive Serb countermeasures to 
the KLA campaign in western Kosovo in the summer of 1998,14 which led to the 
threats of international intervention.15 These threats and the Serb response led 
directly to the failed Rambouillet peace talks and the subsequent NATO air 
campaign. The Serbian response was to drive the Kosovars from their homes 
and was the immediate precursor to the post-conflict situation in which the IC 
then found itself.  The build-up to the conflict and the conflict itself have been well 
documented by Tim Judah,16 and Noel Malcolm17 and will not be covered in this 
thesis which will focus instead on key elements within the post-conflict period.     
 
 
                                                 
14 It is worth noting that in September 1998 the security situation was still sufficiently under control 
by the Serbs that the OSCE mission in Bosnia was running four internationally supervised polling 
stations in Kosovo for Bosnian Serb refugees.  They had earlier run four voter registration centres 
from May to July 1998, each of these centres had at least one UK member of staff who lived 
locally in the community.  The registration and polling centres were in; Pristina, Kosarska 
Mitrovica, Prizren, and Pec.  The author visited all of them by VW Golf during the registration 
period, but not in the polling period as he was then fully engaged in the elections in Bosnia and 
the Kosovo Verification Mission (KVM) had been deployed.  
15The final trigger for decisive action being the ‘Racak incident’ of 15 January 1999 where 45 
Kosovo-Albanian were allegedly murdered or otherwise killed in the village of Racak.  The actual 
cause of their deaths remains disputed, in particular as the evidence was not fully ‘tested’ by the 
ICTY due to the death of former President Milosevic whilst on trial at The Hague.  
16Tim Judah, Kosovo – War and Revenge.  
17Noel Malcolm, Kosovo – A Short History.   
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Planning and preparation for post-conflict operations 
 
One might have thought that the delays in deployment and the scramble to pull 
the Bosnian operation together would have led to the OSCE developing a 
sophisticated planning group or, in military parlance, ‘cell’ which could plan for 
future operations.  This could perhaps have been based upon a reduced model 
of the UN’s DPKO and utilised the recommendations of the ‘Brahimi Report’.18  In 
practice, this did not happen.  OSCE HQ, driven in part by a desire by the 
participating states to economise, remained at a modest size of between 125 and 
175 personnel,19 throughout the period 1996–9. Even in the field missions, 
despite some having over 800 staff,20 did not acquire a ‘planning officer’ or 
planning cell until 1999, by which time, arguably, all of the major decisions had 
been taken.  This ‘just-in-time’ approach, continued throughout the first decade of 
the twenty-first century in that for example the OSCE Secretariat had not by 2009 
developed a permanently established planning team, the sole exception being 
the High Level Planning Group (HLPG) which has been focused purely on the 
frozen conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh.21  For operations such as the move into 
Kosovo in mid-1999 the OSCE put together an ad hoc planning staff of about 
twenty-five people, including staff from the Secretariat, neighbouring missions in 
the region, and those who might be deployed on the operation.  Within the OSCE 
at least, and unlike the UN which amongst other mechanisms, has the DPKO, as 
                                                 
18 Ibid. 
19 OSCE Annual Reports. 
20 OSCE Annual Reports. 
21 The HLPG has generally been a seven-man multi-national planning team led by a Brigadier. 
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late as 2006 this was still how the planning mechanism was understood to 
function as part of the OSCE’s Rapid Expert Assistance and Co-operation Teams 
(REACT)22 strategy.  Given the increasing marginalisation of the OSCE and 
consequent reduction in funding in real terms, it is likely that any future 
operations in which they are likely to be engaged, possibly future involvement in 
Central Asia, will continue to depend upon ad hoc and short-notice planning. 
Mistakes made earlier, therefore, stand every chance of being repeated. 
 
Across the IC however it was recognised that such an impromptu approach as 
had been adopted for Bosnia would not be adequate for future post-conflict 
operations within the Western Balkans and elsewhere.  An apparent consensus 
developed that, subject to there being time available, more detailed planning and 
preparation would have to be carried out. But many of these good intentions 
were swept aside in the late 1990s as the situation in Bosnia continued to 
improve and other areas of activity began to draw upon resources.  UNHCR for 
example, with its focus upon refugees and crisis resolution, had reduced its 
overall staffing levels to about 150 throughout the Western Balkans by the time of 
the NATO campaign in Kosovo.  
 
                                                 
22  The REACT strategy was based upon the concept that an ad hoc team could be assembled to 
support the planning for a future deployment.  This team would be composed of key staff 
recruited for the new mission, selected personnel from the OSCE HQ, and experts drawn from 
the ‘deployed’ and usually neighbouring missions.  REACT was born out of the Kosovo 
experience and this was exactly the approach adopted for the Rambouillet talks, less the key staff 
for the new mission.  
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That there was some limited improvement in the Kosovo operation in 1999 was, 
in part due to the planning that occurred in and around the Rambouillet talks 
which, had they been successful, would have required the running of a general 
election within one hundred and twenty days of signing.  For example, the outline 
electoral plan was drawn up over a five-week period in early 1999 largely in 
Vienna by Hrair Balian of the OSCE-ODIHR, who was primarily responsible for 
the legal aspects, and the author, who was responsible for identifying the 
staffing, administrative, and logistical planning requirements.  Following the 
NATO air campaign and the return of the OSCE to Kosovo this plan formed the 
basis of the initial recruitment for the elections department of the OSCE Mission 
to Kosovo and was used for detailed planning purposes until late October 1999, 
by which point it had become clear that it would be impossible to run an election 
in 1999.  For elections, as for other elements of the OSCE’s work, the OSCE was 
also better placed than it had been in Bosnia in that not only had it by now gained 
more experience in the operation of field missions,23 but it also had the benefit of 
the experience on the ground of the OSCE KVM to draw upon and even pre-
designated locations, for an HQ and Field Offices (FO), which provided they were 
not bombed or otherwise destroyed or assigned to another IO such as NATO, 
could immediately be reoccupied.24 
 
                                                 
23 At the time of its deployment the OSCE Mission to Bosnia was seven times larger in personnel 
terms than all of those OSCE field missions which had preceded it put together. 
24 Critically it also had a staff list of people who could also be re-recruited once the conflict had 
ceased and they had returned to their homes. 
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In parallel with the elections work, planning on the design for an independent 
Kosovo police force was being carried out by police experts at the OSCE HQ in 
Vienna.  This too was an element within the Rambouillet proposals and used 
staff from the OSCE Croatia mission.25  Beyond that, little appeared to have been 
done and the issue of which agency was to manage each element within the 
post-conflict reconstruction was still being discussed at a round-table conference 
which the author attended26 in Carlisle, Maryland, USA27 in late May when the 
‘air campaign’ was well underway.  Indeed, the question of who was to be the 
lead agency had already been an issue, at least amongst the members of the IC 
at the time of Rambouillet, with the USA at this stage favouring the OSCE for this 
role.  That the UN would have primacy was only agreed in May 1999 and was the 
result of what may, in retrospect, be seen as a US error of judgement, or at least 
that of one of their senior officials in the region.  Although he had been one of 
those pushing for direct US involvement in the Kosovo crisis,28 the change in 
approach by the USA followed an opinion piece written by Ambassador Robert 
Barry, Head of the OSCE Mission to BiH in April 1999,29 which stated that the 
OSCE would be better at the task than the UN in part because of its strong US 
                                                 
25 Where an extensive OSCE police-training mission had been developed following the 
withdrawal of the UN from this role.  Many of the UN personnel were transferred en bloc to the 
OSCE Mission to Croatia. 
26 Other attendees included the UN SRSG in Bosnia Jacques Klein and the Deputy High 
Representative (DHR) for Bosnia and US DHR designate for Kosovo, amongst others.   
27 Carlisle is the home of the US Army War College and the US Army Peacekeeping Institute the 
PKSOI. 
28Washington Post, 18 September 1998, p A23. 
“Nothing could be dumber than pulling out of this prematurely," said Robert Barry, 
chairman of the Bosnian mission of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in 
Europe. "It would bring renewed ethnic conflict and waste a lot of money on both the 
civilian and military side”.  
29Although a version of Barry’s opinions appeared in an ‘opinion piece’ in the Washington Post 
(1999), op. cit.  The substantive proposals were laid out in the Centre for OSCE Research 
(CORE), OSCE Annual Handbook, pp 49 – 57. 
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component.  This article created an immediate backlash in favour of the UN 
amongst European states30 and its influence is still being felt within the USA,31 
where two schools of thought have now developed as Barry continues to press 
his viewpoint.32 
 
By the time that the Carlisle Conference took place only broad thematic areas 
had been developed, such as the idea that the OSCE would be responsible for 
‘training’.  This led to the OSCE taking control of the police-training programme, 
which had elsewhere in Bosnia, and Croatia33 earlier, fallen within the remit of 
the UN. 
 
As with Bosnia earlier,34 the USA ignored the lessons and advice from the DDR 
specialists within the UN as to the best approaches to DDR and took a rapid 
decision to demobilise all of the existing members of the military and police 
immediately without any further thought as to who was going to maintain law and 
order in the medium to long term or what the impact would be of making 
unemployed tens of thousands of men with firearms training and often with their 
weapons.        
 
                                                 
30  Both Western and Eastern European states responded negatively to Barry’s attack upon the 
UN and the assumed US ‘leadership’ of the OSCE, to which the USA is the single largest donor. 
31Cato Institute, Policy Recommendations for the 108th Congress, p 531; which in the heading to 
Chapter 52, ‘Moving on in the Balkans’ states’ states that the USA should, “resist the urge to tell 
the Europeans, and the Balkan peoples themselves, how to govern the region”. 
32Robert L. Barry, The Future of the OSCE. 
33 See above.  Upon their departure the UN had handed over the policing mission in Croatia to 
the OSCE. 
34 Later, the error was repeated during the operations in Iraq. 
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Kosovo is an example, at least as far as the USA is concerned, that one reason 
for the lack of a coherent planning policy in Kosovo was that it was mostly driven 
by the liberal-interventionist and cosmopolitan views of politicians and that 
political plans and statements were made and commitments entered into, before 
the appropriate agencies within the government or the IC were even aware that a 
plan would be required.  If these premises are agreed then Kosovo is not the only 
example of such a politically-driven liberal-interventionist, but ultimately 
unplanned strategy, Nor is this solely a US phenomenon.  This can be illustrated 
by three relatively recent UK examples of making policy statements preceding 
concept planning. The first of these proposed UK-led operations pre-dated by a 
few months the deployment of the UK-led IFOR force into Bosnia in 1995.  This 
was the proposed return of the Tutsi refugees from Zaire to Rwanda35 in the 
                                                 
35The IC  led by the EU had decided that in order to promote the return of the Tutsi survivors who 
were now living in camps mostly around Goma in Eastern Zaire, it would encourage them to 
make the journey back in to Rwanda on foot, along pre-designated trails, with water, feeding, and 
medical stations en route.  In addition, awaiting them in their villages would be the tools required 
and seeds to plant the following year’s crops, plus food subsistence to keep them alive until the 
next harvest.  For this plan to work, it had to be completed in time for the planting season and for 
the people, many of whom were widows with children, to be given instructions, not only at the 
start of their journey, but also at each stage along a route which in some cases, was over one 
hundred miles in length.  The lack of planning was exemplified by the fact that some people in 
capitals in Europe were unaware that there was no written form of the national language ‘Keena-
Rwanda’ and that the allegedly 5% of the population who spoke French were almost all located in 
Bukavu, the Rwandan capital, which is on the Zairean border and who in any event formed a tiny 
proportion of the refugees.  A team of which the author formed a part, based upon the UK 15th 
Psychological  Operations Group (15 POG) was given the task in September 1995 of coming up 
with an information campaign to support this planned mass movement and it was then intended 
that 15 POG should deploy to Rwanda to support the move.  In the event, because of the delays 
for the most part caused by the need to plan at a late stage, this operation did not take place in 
advance of that planting season.  Not of itself a cause of the delay, but an indicator of the 
unanticipated problems encountered, was that there was also very little progress being made in 
designing the posters and leaflets that were required to support such a move, due to the lack of a 
written form of Keena-Rwanda and hence an inability to use text in any messaging.  One problem 
was how to indicate distance say to a water point and, given that the work was being done in a 
‘vacuum’, i.e. in Folkestone, Kent and not in Goma, what symbol would a Tutsi widow recognise 
for water?  Certainly not a tap as many, if not most, villages did not have taps. In the event, the 
move took place in the following year and made extensive use of airlift, utilising the large airfield 
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period immediately following the Rwandan genocide.  The second example, was 
the proposed relief operations into Eastern Sierra Leone in the period 1996-8 
which immediately pre-dated the Kosovo conflict and which preceded UK 
intervention in the internal conflict within Sierra Leone.  These operations were 
related to the ‘spillover’ of Liberian refugees from the internal conflict there to 
Sierra Leone.36  The third was the announcement by the Prime Minister that the 
UK should take a leading role in Western Darfur in 2003.37   
                                                                                                                                                 
at Goma, as well as vehicle-borne convoys.  There were at that time an estimated 600,000 
refugees in the Goma area. 
36The UK held what it believed to be, detailed documentation of the infrastructure of Eastern 
Sierra Leone.  This was principally from the time of independence in 1961.  The principal town in 
Eastern Sierra Leone, Kenema, had been left with a functioning airport, a jetty, and extensive 
warehousing which was associated with the rail terminal connecting the town to the capital 
Freetown.  In addition there was also a good road connection.  The majority of this infrastructure 
was a product of the ‘ground nuts scheme’ of the first post-war Labour Administration and so at 
independence was only about 10 years old.  In practice, all that remained by the late 1990s was a 
single dirt road to Freetown which in good weather required a journey time of 18 – 27 hours.  
Furthermore the spread of HIV in Western Africa, the nature of which was not fully understood by 
the rural population, had left the peoples of Eastern Sierra Leone terrified of infection by 
‘outsiders’, even those who, as in this case, were members of the same tribe and who were 
separated from their kin solely by an artificially drawn late nineteenth-century boundary.  A study 
period held by the UK CAG in January 1999 and in which the author participated determined that 
the provision of an adequate amount of aid to what was now such a remote area would be 
extremely difficult without either significant infrastructure improvement or considerable investment 
in specialist transport.  In practice, the proposed relief programme was quickly overtaken by the 
developing internal conflict within the country. 
37 The potential Western Dharfur operation was also preliminarily reviewed in a study period, at 
which again the author was a participant, by the CAG in January 2004 and this too demonstrated 
that the military commitment required would be extensive and the logistic implications almost 
certainly unworkable, for any ‘lead nation’ except perhaps the USA.   Historical research 
determined that there had been large-scale communal conflict in Dharfur and evidence of famine 
throughout the inter-war period.  It also demonstrated that despite Dharfur having formed part of 
the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan until 1956, there had been no meaningful colonial administration, nor 
indeed colonial presence.  There had for example been no ‘district officer’ system within Dharfur, 
despite the fact that this had been a typical feature of British local colonial administration 
throughout Africa and Asia.  The one railway line into Darfur province was seven days journey 
from Khartoum and a further three days from the unloading docks on the Red Sea.  While Dharfur 
Province was the size of Western Europe the railway terminated at the eastern edge of Western 
Dharfur, a territory that on its own is the size of France.  Even such a cursory study, 
demonstrated that a UK Force of 5–8,000 men, which was approximately the size of the force 
deployed by the UK to Helmand in 2007-8, would be unable to effectively occupy Western 
Dharfur, nor would it be able to sustain itself logistically without the province becoming the sole 
focus of UK military operations for some considerable period.  Again, it is perhaps fortunate in 
retrospect, that no significant UK commitment was made in either political or practical terms, and 
that the current substantial commitment remains purely financial. 
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As a final point, relatively little effort was made by the IC in the planning process 
to utilise the knowledge and experience of those who had previously served in 
Kosovo in either a humanitarian or developmental capacity.  For example, one 
NGO, International Mercy Corps (IMC), had by the time of the Kosovo crisis been 
working in Kosovo for eleven years.  IMC and two other INGOs also continued, 
despite their US origin, working in Kosovo throughout the NATO air campaign 
and were therefore potentially invaluable in informing some of the post-conflict 
decisions that the IC were making, particularly in the early period of deployment.  
As with the KVM, most of whose members were repatriated to their home 
countries shortly after their evacuation, their experiences were largely ignored,38 
by those implementing the IC’s policy for post-conflict.  At a more junior level the 
author found their experiences to be relevant and informative, as indeed the 
author’s own had been,39 and the subsequent missions would have undoubtedly 
benefited from having their experience40 at the early planning stages.  
Observation of both previous and subsequent IC post-conflict missions 
demonstrates that there is a consistent failure to make use of the information 
resources available, particularly by governmental or transnational agencies and 
especially in their linkages into the NGO sector.41 
 
                                                 
38 There were no representatives of the KVM at the Carlisle Conference for example, despite the 
fact that its head Ambassador William Walker was a serving US diplomat. 
39 In running voter registration and polling for Bosnian refugees in Kosovo in 1997 and 1998.  The 
author had also visited the province much earlier in 1973 from the British Embassy in Belgrade. 
40 Many former members of the KVM were subsequently reassigned to the OMIK mission. 
41 The military are, perhaps unsurprisingly, particularly bad at these ‘sideways linkages’ into the 
NGO community.  For their own part the NGO and in particular the humanitarian agencies are 
also very wary of any engagement with the military. 
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Preventable failures during the conflict phase and in the transition to post-conflict 
 
Kosovo provides several examples of the apparent reluctance on the part of the 
military and, government services generally, to learn from what is essentially the 
private sector42 and to incorporate this work within their own planning and 
operations.  Numerous examples of failures of this kind occurred in the Kosovo 
refugee crisis in 1999, when two critical errors were made, one by the civilian 
implementing agencies and the other, primarily but not exclusively, by the NATO 
military forces.  Both of them were lessons which had been learned previously 
and which were to impede critically not only the refugee return process but also 
the efficient functioning of the election and civil registry systems which were key 
components of the post-conflict process. 
 
The first ‘unlearned lesson’ was the layout of tented refugee camps.  In many 
cases these were laid out in straight lines and not in ‘community clusters’.43  
Classic examples of the linear ‘unit lines’ type military tented camps were those 
                                                 
42 In particular to note the advice of the established members of the INGO and NGO 
communities. 
43 In practice much ‘generic’ planning for what might be referred to as the standard components 
of post-conflict has been carried out, in particular by the aid agencies.  For example Oxfam’s 
Field Engineering Guide has widespread applicability in post-conflict disaster relief and similar 
situations and has extensive descriptions of the optimum design and layout of refugee camps and 
for the provision of sanitation systems.  This publication was used by the UK CAG to calculate 
space and stores requirements for refugee camps in Sierra Leone and forms an essential part of 
their ongoing ‘tool-kit’.  Additionally, many agencies have developed niche specialisations, as in 
this case Oxfam, and are recognised as having strong practical expertise in a particular area.  
These skill sets are often ‘sub-contracted’ by other agencies such as UNHCR when creating 
refugee programmes. 
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established by the US Marine Corps (USMC)44 along the Albanian coast.  Given 
their location, far from the Kosovo border, many of these sites were either not 
occupied or only briefly so.  Furthermore refugees were allocated to camps 
based upon time of arrival and not upon location and clan grouping within 
Kosovo.  This mistake made it impossible for village elders to remain in control of 
‘their’ people and to act as a conduit for information and instructions from the IC, 
thus reinforcing their positions within the community.  In addition, within the 
military-run camps, the erection of the tents, clearance of rubbish, etc., was 
carried out by the military and not the occupants themselves.  This has been 
shown to increase dependency and apathy amongst the refugees and again to 
weaken the position of the traditional leaders.   
 
The second avoidable mistake, in particular as it was a problem that had been 
anticipated by professionals on the ground, was that no standardised refugee 
registration form was used throughout the Kosovo crisis, despite the fact that 
UNHCR had used such forms previously.45  There was extensive discussion on 
the use of such a form by UNHCR (the lead agency), IOM, and the OSCE as the 
                                                 
44 A brigade-size Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) on a routine deployment in the Mediterranean 
was diverted to this task at short notice.  The USMC learned quickly from the Albanian 
experience and when the MEU was deployed, a few months later to assist with refugees following 
the earthquake in Turkish Anatolia, these mistakes had been rectified - Briefing by the 
commander of USMC CIMIC to the author and other members of UK CAG at Camp Lejeune, 
North Carolina in September 1999.   
45 Needless to say, the Turks, acting as an independent nation state, from the outset established 
an effective documentation system for refugees from Syria in 2011. 
 340 
crisis unfolded,46 but no agreement was reached at a political level47 and so no 
forms were produced except in draft.   
 
It was clear to those working ‘on the ground’ that this unwillingness on the part of 
the Kosovar Albanians, both refugees and those who remained in the country, to 
be accurately documented was inspired centrally by the KLA.  The KLA realised 
that if they were able to destroy the legitimacy of the remaining databases they 
would perhaps be able to inflate the total percentage of Kosovars within the 
overall population and also possibly the number of casualties incurred, hence, 
scoring what they would see as a propaganda victory, much as they believed the 
Bosniacs had done with Srebrenica.48  It would also remove control of the 
records from Rugova’s LDK  and the ‘parallel structures’ and in the best case 
move it into the hands of the KLA or at least the IC. 
 
Both the Serbs and the Kosovars had learnt, as a result of the experience of the 
Bosnian War, which had ended only some thirty months earlier, that the removal 
and destruction of identity documents, particularly those of refugees, would act 
                                                 
46   Some of which is documented in an e-mail correspondence between Harry Leefe the UNHCR 
coordinator for Kosovo and the author.  
47 There was clear agreement from all those working ‘in the field’ of the need to implement a 
registration process, preferably under UNHCR leadership.  This advice was ignored.  
48 The Bosniacs had always insisted that over 10,000 men had died at Srebrenica.  They secured 
a cemetery for that number and an appropriate number of marker stones.  The reality was that 
between 7,000 and 8,000 probably perished, a dreadful total, but significantly less than that 
claimed.  What is not so well known is that the Bosniac army, the ‘Armija’, received daily strength 
and casualty returns from all of its formations.  This would have included even those units which 
were ‘surrounded’ such as the 81st Division, which was commanded by Naser Oric and was the 
‘garrison’ of the Srebrenica ‘pocket’.  The Bosniac leadership consistently overstated its 
casualties for propaganda purposes.  This information came to light, following extensive 
negotiations on the repatriation of the bodies of ‘war dead’ between the three former combatants 
led by the OSCE, in the late 1990s. 
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as a severe hindrance to reintegration and to the establishment of such things as 
accurate voters’ lists.  In the event, both sides in the conflict extensively 
employed a range of activities such as the burning of police stations and public 
record offices so as to destroy the base documents from which personal 
documentation was created.  At the central level the Serb authorities withdrew 
the entire population registration archive to Belgrade, where it remains.  The 
Croats had previously done likewise in Bosnia, removing the parish rolls and all 
available registration documentation to which they had access to the central 
archive in Zagreb.  Despite an awareness by electoral professionals of what was 
taking place, the destruction of document centres by the Kosovars,49 was 
permitted to continue for some weeks after the expulsion of the Serbs and indeed 
until such time as all documentation had been brought under KFOR control.  
KFOR exacerbated the situation shortly after their arrival in the country by 
mounting pilot raids on three police stations to retrieve documentation, thus 
drawing attention to their importance and giving warning that a larger operation 
was likely to follow.  Given the hint provided by KFOR, the KLA made certain that 
all the other documentation had been removed from or destroyed in police 
stations across the province, prior to the major KFOR campaign to retrieve 
documentation some week or two later.   
 
 Despite the destruction of the documentation, had an efficient refugee 
registration system been organised upon arrival at the camps, or even at the 
border-crossing points either as the refugees left Kosovo, or possibly even upon 
                                                 
49 In this case, document centres were destroyed by both Kosovo Serbs and Kosovo Albanians. 
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their return, then much extremely valuable data for the subsequent civil 
registration programme would have been gathered. 
 
Identity cards and voter registration – too ‘high tech’? 
 
It will be appropriate now to continue with the theme of the identity of citizens and 
voter registration, given that the IC failed to prevent the destruction of the existing 
identity documents and the comprehensive database50 which underpinned it.51   
A decision was taken following the author’s departure from Kosovo in October 
1999 that the new identity documents and voter registration process should 
incorporate the latest technology in the form of ‘scannable’ registration forms and 
an early generation of ‘biometric data’ incorporating fingerprint information.  
Although the author was not involved in the decision to implement this process, 
he was able to observe the impact of its implementation throughout the voter 
registration process through frequent visits to OMIK and to field registration 
centres. 
 
                                                 
50 The central database was computerised and the registers and identity-card system could 
almost certainly have been recreated from this database.  The database was held in Belgrade 
and the IC did not have access to it. 
51 The system used for identity documentation in the former Yugoslavia was based upon the FRG 
system and used the same coding and algorithms.  It was therefore both secure and effective.  
Using the algorithm which was/is a 12 – 16 digit numerical code (it varied depending upon the 
republic within Yugoslavia), it allowed a trained observer to read: the cardholder’s gender; date of 
birth; republic and municipality of birth; and, in some cases, the municipality of residence when 
they were first registered (at 16 years of age).  
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OMIK and SRSG Bernard Kouchner52 were advised on the technical details of 
the electoral process from late 1999 by a team from IFES led by IFES Vice-
President Jeff Fisher.  They pointed to the success of the ‘scannable form’ 
system in Bosnia and went on to explain that the technology had now improved 
to the stage where the data from these forms could be linked by computer to a 
portrait photograph and a fingerprint in a field registration office using portable 
equipment.  This equipment would fit into two large boxes and could be 
transported in the boot of an estate car and so could be assembled and 
disassembled daily and removed for safe overnight storage elsewhere, thus 
reducing the risk of theft and the need to guard registration centres.  As for data 
entry and data ‘cleaning’, the senior officials were persuaded that this could be 
done more efficiently, not locally, as had been done in Bosnia, but in professional 
data entry centres in India.  
 
As Bosnia had already demonstrated, this process, with its emphasis on ‘high 
tech’ solutions, neither led to long-term self-sustainability in terms of identity 
documentation and electoral processes, nor the ability to run registration and 
electoral processes where all of the component parts of the process could be 
generated within the country itself.53 In particular, the emphasis on computer-led 
                                                 
52 The first SRSG appointed to Kosovo, Bernard Kouchner, was a former French Minister of 
Health and one of the founders of the NGO ‘Medecins Sans Frontieres’ (MSF) in 1971. 
53 At the simplest level there were at that stage no printing companies in the former Yugoslavia 
who were able to generate ‘scannable forms’ with close enough print registration to work 
properly.  All scannable forms used were printed elsewhere and imported.  The nearest country 
able to produce forms to the tolerances required by the scanning machines was Hungary.  In 
practice forms were printed at various stages in Hungary, Austria, and the UK, where the 
scanning machines were also produced.  This meant that both the registration forms and the ‘by 
mail’ ballots were also dispatched from those countries and then mailed back to a collection point 
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technology meant that, as in Bosnia, the process could not be administered at 
the local level54 and hence could not form part of the transition to full local control 
which, allegedly, was part of the IC’s exit strategy.  In this case, by taking data 
entry and cleaning and placing it in another continent, direct local oversight, 
transparency and local control were yet further removed.  Additionally, these IT-
heavy solutions were extremely expensive and could only be operated for so 
long as the IC was prepared to fund them.55  Once IC funding is withdrawn the 
nation concerned has to find another solution and invariably will revert to the 
manual method of record keeping it had previously employed, perhaps then 
‘computerising it’ by entering that data on a central database in a rolling 
programme. 
 
A further difficulty in the case of Kosovo was that the technology was not yet 
sufficiently robust.  Numerous problems occurred in the field registration centres 
because the portable equipment failed usually due to the failure of connectors or 
fibre-optic cables. Although ‘portable’ they were not designed for daily assembly, 
disassembly, and packing over a period of three months. Additionally, there were 
                                                                                                                                                 
in Vienna which was run under contract by IOM.   ‘Observation’ of the process by the political 
parties was obtained by flying party representatives to the printing plant to observe a ‘snapshot’ of 
the printing and dispatch process and by flying them to Vienna to see the receipt of the completed 
forms and to observe their onward movement to Bosnia or Kosovo. 
54 Several of the ‘rump’ municipalities in Bosnia, for example Srpski Drvar and Srpski Mostar, did 
not have access to mains electricity, nor to microwave relay repeaters (for mobile phones), so 
would be unable to run IT systems effectively, even if they possessed individuals with the skills to 
do so. 
55 In neither Bosnia nor Albania were the governments able to fund the software maintenance 
agreements once the IC withdrew the funding.  Although here the example is focusing on ‘identity 
software’, the same argument held across a range of areas where technology had been brought 
to bear.  Police and financial intelligence systems are other areas in particular where progress 
has been hampered not only because of the cost of the maintenance agreements and the annual 
renewal fees for software licences.  
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difficulties with the remote data entry and data cleaning, partly because of the 
Indian data-entry operators unfamiliarity with Albanian and also because of the 
many accent marks used in Albanian which were not recordable on the 
scannable forms.56  These problems could have been identified in advance if 
extensive trialling had been possible,57 but given that these systems had been 
introduced specifically to save time that was not possible.  
 
The new technology had one further fatal flaw that could also have been 
foreseen.  It was being introduced at a time when the IC on behalf of the ICTY 
was arresting people for war crimes.  It was going to be difficult enough to 
persuade the remaining Kosovo Serbs to take part in elections which they knew 
they would lose due to a lack of numbers, but if, as was the case, to that was 
added the requirement to provide a full-face photograph and their fingerprints in 
order to do so, then the likelihood of them boycotting the process was made 
almost inevitable.  This is exactly what happened.  The author visited a Serb 
voter registration centre in the spring of 2000 in the municipality of Gnjilane 
where, having been opened daily for six weeks, they had registered precisely 
three people.  This was despite the fact that the centre itself had six local staff,58 
that there was 100 percent international supervision, and a permanent police59 
                                                 
56 Given that a similar problem had been identified in Bosnia, it was surprising that this particular 
problem had not been foreseen. 
57 In the immediate aftermath of the bombing campaign and when perhaps such trials might have 
been possible, Jeff Fisher, who had previously overseen trials in Bosnia, was in East Timor 
overseeing the independence referendum as discussed in Chapter 6. 
58 The Bosnian Croats were able to maintain similarly effective almost 100% boycotts.  The 
author once visited a polling station near Livno where the station manned by seven local staff had 
recorded two votes. 
59 A Kosovo Serb policeman, so there were no security issues. 
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presence.  Although it was likely that the Kosovo Serbs may have boycotted the 
elections in any event, the reasons for so doing were made all the more 
compelling because of the technology that the IC were using.  Instead of 
recognising that the technology would of itself undermine the electoral process, 
the IC resorted to ‘threats’ by saying that unless people registered they would not 
be able to vote and later to gain services, register property, etc.  As with the 
Bosnian Croats earlier, over the subject of Bosnian citizenship, these threats 
backfired. 
 
‘Know Your Enemy’;60 or at least the people you are working with 
 
In post-conflict, even more so than in conflict, it is important to understand the 
psyche of those with whom you are dealing and to maintain a high degree of 
cultural awareness.  What the episode over voter registration in 2000 
demonstrated was that after nine years of continuous engagement with the Serbs 
in the Western Balkans the IC continued to have limited understanding of the 
Serb mentality.  As with other Slavic groups such as Russians, the Serbs have 
traditionally a sense of ‘victimhood’, a strong sense of the past and particularly 
their own history.  The Serbs also have a culture which, in addition to finding the 
issue of ‘face’ vitally important, is unlikely to envisage ‘compromise’ as the best 
option in any negotiation.  The Bosnian and Kosovo Serbs are perhaps the most 
‘developed’ in a Western sense of the groups of whom Horowitz has said: 
                                                 
60 Sun Tzu, translated by Lionel Giles, The Art of War.   
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Those groups which are increasingly excluded…usually do not cease to 
exist. They may, on the contrary, fight to the death.61   
Whilst that is not true in a physical sense, it appropriately sums up the mentality 
which lies behind these two groups of increasingly isolated peoples.  
 
This lack of perceived balance and fairness as far as the Serbs were concerned 
was reinforced by the IC’s decision to produce much of their material in only one 
local language, Albanian.  This was in direct contrast to Bosnia where all 
documents were carefully translated into each of the three variants of Serbo-
Croat that were in use, despite their very close similarity.62   In Kosovo this was 
not the case, despite the very valid Kosovo Serb point that while all genuine 
Kosovars could speak and read Serbian, it having been the medium of 
education, the Kosovo Serbs could not for the most part read or speak Albanian.      
 
By 1999, 120 years of recent Balkan history had taught the Serbs to mistrust the 
West, a mistrust that was deliberately fuelled by the Milosevic regime.  Any 
attempts by a third party to extract personal information from Serb communities 
was likely to be difficult, as Bosnia had already demonstrated, and if that activity 
was combined with a lack of transparency, as in the case of voter registration in 
Kosovo, then a Serb boycott was almost guaranteed. 
 
                                                 
61Horowitz (1985), op. cit., p 104. 
62 In particular all Bosnian Serb texts were produced in Cyrillic script. 
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Any student of Serb history would realise that these avoidable errors would not 
only make the immediate task in hand more difficult, or even perhaps impossible, 
but would also lead to long-term resentment and a feeling of injustice and 
mistrust.  The wider concern in terms of the IC’s management of post-conflict 
was that this failure to understand the groups with which the IC was interacting, 
occurred with all of the ethnic groups in the Balkans and over a sustained period 
of time.  Given their proximity to Western Europe and the large numbers of 
people of Balkan origin who had been resident in some Western European 
countries,63 this must give rise to concerns about how culturally aware the IC are 
of the history, traditions, and behavioural attributes of the people with whom they 
are working, in more remote areas of the globe.  
 
The ‘pillar structure’ in Kosovo. 
 
The decision to group the activities of the IC in Kosovo into a pillar structure post-
conflict was designed to streamline the work of the post-conflict authorities and to 
make them more efficient, a fact which some, particularly in the NGO community 
would dispute.64  Others such as Brand point to the discrepancies between the 
UNSC peacekeeping mandate for Kosovo and the ‘principles of democratic 
governance such as accountability, lawfulness and constitutionality.65 
                                                 
63 As previously stated there were somewhere between 600, 000 and 650,000 Yugoslavs in the 
FRG in the 1980s.   A population of at least 50,000 and perhaps as many as 100,000 Albanians 
were resident in Switzerland in the same period. 
64 Monica Llamazares and Laine Reynolds Levy, NGOs and Peacebuilding in Kosovo. 
65 Marcus G. Brand, Institution-Building and Human Rights Protection in Kosovo in the Light of 
UNMIK Legislation,  pp 461– 88.  
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In Kosovo a structure consisting of four pillars was established with the 
responsibilities for functions and leadership as follows: 
Pillar I - Initially Humanitarian Affairs (UNHCR).  This was phased out in 
June 2000.  A new Pillar I - Police and Justice (UN led) was introduced 
from May 2001. 
Pillar II – Civil Administration (UN led). 
Pillar III – Democratization and Institution Building (OSCE led). 
Pillar IV – Reconstruction and Economic Development (EU led). 
There was also effectively a fifth pillar in the form of KFOR.  Although not 
nominally under the control of the SRSG it was clear from the outset that the 
KFOR commander would be required to liaise closely with him.  In addition to its 
purely security functions KFOR was responsible for DDR and later for the 
formation, training, and equipping of the Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC).66 
 
While the divisions above appear clear-cut the allocation of institution building to 
the OSCE led from the outset to some anomalies, although these were certainly 
not evident in the period immediately after the Carlisle conference.  One key area 
in which they were immediately present was in the development of the new 
Kosovo police force, which might be assumed from the list above to be a Pillar I 
function.  ‘Institution building’, it had been agreed, would include all 
                                                 
66 Which was the IC ‘approved’ para-military structure that effectively succeeded the KLA and 
other similar organisations post-conflict. 
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responsibilities for training, less those which would naturally fall to KFOR.67  As a 
result of this decision, police training and the management of the police school at 
Vucitrn, was to be an OSCE responsibility while the management of the police 
and their overall development would be the responsibility of the UN under Pillar I. 
 
While this worked relatively well, due to the co-operation of all involved, it added 
an unnecessary layer of complication.  For example, the implementation of police 
regulations and rules of procedure was a UN responsibility, but the police training 
manual was written by and for the OSCE by UK-seconded police officers and 
incorporated significant elements from the UK’s Police and Criminal Evidence Act 
(PACE)68 legislation.  In parallel, operational regulations and rules of procedure 
were drafted on behalf of the Kosovo Police Service, a UN managed 
organisation, by police from primarily US backgrounds - a totally different policing 
culture.69  A logical step would have been to have separated out specific 
governmental functions, such as policing, and then to have allocated each of the 
functions to a specific pillar.  There would still have been points in the process 
where the functions may have abutted each other, as, for example, between the 
                                                 
67For example KFOR was responsible for training the KPC in ordnance disposal. 
68Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (PACE) and it’s accompanying codes of practice.  
69 Similar problems had also arisen in Bosnia, where specialist courses would often be allocated 
to jurisdictions on a rotational basis and hence policemen of the same specialities and serving in 
the same area, would go to different European states for training and learn different procedures, 
incompatible with that of their colleagues.  A similar problem exists today with regard to the 
provision of analysis for DNA evidence as there is no European-wide standard and hence the 
training provided is not standardised.  
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police and the judiciary,70 or the prosecution service, but these would probably 
have been easier to deal with.  
 
A second side-effect of splitting responsibilities71 was that it exacerbated the 
‘bidding war’ for staff, between the various pillars.  In this case international 
police could either be seconded by their host nations to either Pillar I or III or 
even perhaps appear as a directly hired member of the Pillar I (UN) staff.  All had 
separate pay scales and allowance schemes and international staff would 
migrate between the Pillars until they found the most beneficial package, whilst a 
similar activity was being carried out by their national staff.  This was not 
conducive to the long-term development of the mission nor to morale. 
 
The fact that the pillar structure excluded KFOR was another failure in the model.  
Originally NATO had wished it to be included, but US Commanders were hesitant 
about signing up to a structure which might see US troops commanded in any 
way by a non-US citizen.  This led to DDR, for example, being in a separate pillar 
from policing and yet the source for almost all of the recruits to the Kosovo Police 
Service (KPS) would come from the ranks of the KLA and the other former 
‘fighters’.  Similarly, the responsibility for monitoring Kosovo’s borders fell initially, 
                                                 
70 Both the police training manual and the KPS regulations and procedures were drafted by teams 
who came from a ‘common law’ system, but the policing system they were creating was 
answering to a ‘roman law’ based judiciary. 
71 One of the less obvious difficulties of splitting responsibilities was the need to harmonise the 
translation of technical terms from other languages into Albanian.  The author had created an 
English to Bosnian, Bosnian Croat, and Bosnian Serb elections dictionary and that was used as a 
model for other similar products in Kosovo and later for the elections teams in Albania.  A similar 
product was developed for those working with the police.  
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at least, to KFOR and yet under the European model were soon to become a 
responsibility of the KPS. 
 
To continue with this theme, there was a logic to making the DDR process part of 
a military ‘pillar’, but the body of expertise and corporate knowledge in this area 
worldwide resided with the UN and specifically within the DDR team in UN 
DPKO.  As DDR in Kosovo fell to what was effectively ‘Pillar V’ (KFOR), this 
expertise was not utilised and, as in Bosnia, many lessons of which the UN were 
already aware had to be re-learnt. 
 
The most effective of the pillars at the outset was Pillar IV.  It had a clearly 
defined scope of work whose only real overlap with that of the other pillars was in 
the field of local governance, for planning permissions, infrastructure 
development, and so on.  It also benefited from having a generous and well-
defined funding stream.72  Despite this Pillar IV has over the years produced very 
disappointing results.  Much of Kosovo’s electrical power-supply generation and 
distribution system was damaged during the conflict and twelve years on 
sustained electrical power outages are still the norm particularly in the winter, 
even in central Pristina.73  Given that power shortages were not a feature of the 
pre-conflict Yugoslav-run Kosovo these outages are ascribed by the population 
                                                 
72 It is worth noting that both in Bosnia and again in Kosovo, elections for example were reliant 
upon so-called ‘voluntary contributions’, to carry out certain elements of the programme.  In 
practice, a certain amount of senior management time in these areas was taken up with writing 
proposals and lobbying for funds etc.  During the author’s stay in Kosovo August – October 1999 
for example the author was responsible for raising US $four million to support the elections 
department start up.  
73 Power outages of up to 48 hours are not unusual in rural areas. 
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to the failure of the EU to restore the original damaged power station or to 
develop new capacity domestically.  
 
Although the pillar structure did work, it was inefficient, unwieldy, and resulted in 
a certain amount of ‘over administration’ by the IC.  The pillar structure certainly 
weakened the influence of the UN in Kosovo, as it was now only one of three or 
four (counting KFOR) international missions.  Although Kouchner and his 
successors functioned as the SRSG, they were also de facto ‘double hatted’, as 
the ‘High Representative’ and hence more responsive to European and USA 
concerns through the ‘quint’74 group than that of the UN administration in New 
York.  There was no doubt that it was an improvement on the original IC 
administrative model for Bosnia and as such was following its implementation in 
Kosovo, retrofitted to Bosnia. 
 
What by removing some of the areas of activity from the UN the pillar structure 
did not do, was to harmonise the approaches taken in designing the 
administration for a new state.  As already alluded to in respect of the police and 
the judiciary, what Kosovo needed was a homogeneous model on which to 
develop the mechanisms of the state.  It did not matter whose system was 
adopted as the model for the new state so long as it was one system.  Instead 
what Kosovo received, at least initially, was a melange of guidance and training 
which overlaid the structures from the Yugoslav era, many of which at least at the 
                                                 
74 The quint effectively managed the process on a day-to-day process.  
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local level continued to function unchanged,75 even in the Kosovar areas,76 in the 
new era.  This non-homogeneous model was a direct result of the pillar structure. 
 
Unlike Bosnia where most, and in some cases all, of the pre-war administrative 
structures and personnel survived the conflict, in Kosovo this was not the case.  
There was no pre-war structure of a state to rebuild and in a wide range of areas 
virtually no experienced ‘human capital’ upon which to build.  Given these facts, 
Kosovo would have benefited from a fresh start and a purpose-built unified 
administration, based upon the most effective and sustainable model77 available, 
for a small state of only 1.5 million people.   
 
Although in theory the pillar structure still exists, with the assumption in 2008 of 
most of the UNMIK functions by the European Union Rule of Law Mission in 
Kosovo (EULEX), the pillar structure, with the exception of a much-reduced Pillar 
III, has largely been subsumed by that mission, while the role of UNMIK has 
been largely diminished to one of co-ordination.78  In part the retention of UNMIK 
has been justified by the numerous UN agencies currently working in Kosovo.79  
                                                 
75 For example, the ‘houses of books (dom knigy)’ or village reading rooms.  These were a 
product of the Tito era Yugoslavia and are still functioning throughout Kosovo.  They are a purely 
Yugoslav phenomenon and do not exist in, for example, Albania. 
76 Where possible the Serb-controlled areas maintained as many of the pre-conflict structures as 
were possible. 
77 The Norwegian model for example is very effective but not sustainable for a country with the 
limited resources of Kosovo. 
78Despite retaining a symbolic ‘leadership’ of the other pillars, in particular Pillar III (OSCE) and 
KFOR. 
79 Including: UNMIK, UN Development Programme (UNDP), UNHCR, UN Human Settlements 
Programme (UN-HABITAT), UNICEF, UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), UN World 
Health Organization (WHO), UN Volunteers (UNV), UN Population Fund (UNFPA), UN Entity for 
Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women (UN Women), the United Nations Office for 
Project Services (UNOPS), International Labour Organization (ILO), the International Monetary 
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Even to maintain this diminished status and two field offices in Peja and 
Mitrovica, plus liaison offices in Skopje and Belgrade, UNMIK still as at 
December 2010 requires a staff of 418 of whom 182 are international 
personnel.80     
 
Post-conflict and reconciliation – lessons from Kosovo 
 
A critical part of the post-conflict effort following an ethnically based conflict, must 
be to promote reconciliation for without that the state cannot be re-unified and 
long-term peace assured.  In its absence the best that can be hoped for is a 
temporary ‘truce’ which may last months, years, or perhaps even decades, as 
has been noted by Fisk,81 Bass,82 and others with regard to Lebanon, but it will 
be a truce and not a peace nonetheless.  An alternative and often acceptable 
solution is the partition or sub-division of the state, a solution most recently 
adopted by the IC for South Sudan.  Partition is an acceptable option where the 
two groups are geographically distinct and where the subsequent ‘new state’ is a 
viable entity in its own right.  But often, as Ferguson83 and others demonstrate 
with India and Pakistan in 1947, the partition of a state where the population has 
been historically intertwined will often lead to massive bloodshed and human 
dislocation.  Given that both Bosnia and Kosovo were themselves both already 
                                                                                                                                                 
Fund (IMF), International Organization for Migration (IOM), The Office of the High Commissioner 
for Human Rights (OHCHR),World Bank (WB).  This is available at UNMIK online. 
80 Ibid. 
81Robert Fisk (1991). 
82 Ibid. 
83 Ibid. 
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sub-divisions of a state, partition was not a realistic option and so the ICs post-
conflict plans for both missions required reconciliation to be successful for both 
states to have long-term stability and for the IC to be able to withdraw. 
 
In this context the thesis will now examine the situation in Kosovo so as to 
illuminate a familiar problem which occurs in many post-conflict missions.  As 
with Bosnia the ‘NATO’, but in reality US, air campaign was directed exclusively 
against the Serbs.  The Serbs were therefore defeated by NATO air power and 
not the KLA.  But in the aftermath of their ‘victory’, the KLA and the Kosovar 
Albanians in general targeted the residual Serb population and their historic 
monuments such as the cathedral in Pristina.  The murders of Serbs, or indeed 
anyone who spoke a Slavic language,84 meant that Pristina and all bar a few 
enclaves within Kosovo were rapidly emptied of Serbs post-war, but after the 
arrival of the IC post-conflict missions.85  This ethnic cleansing occurred, 
effectively while the IC missions looked on and while some contingents within 
KFOR, such as those from the UK and Italy, attempted to halt the process, even 
going so far as to guard individual families and to guard places of worship, the 
expulsion of the Serbs was in general ‘allowed to happen’.  
 
                                                 
84 Amongst those murdered was the Bosniac manager of the Kosovo A and B power stations who 
had been resident in Kosovo for twenty years and a Bulgarian international mission member who 
was murdered at a petrol station as he spoke in Bulgarian (which is intelligible to Kosovars and 
similar to Serb).  Some of the difficulties with the electrical power supply may even be traced back 
to the murder or expulsion of the key staff who managed the plants. 
85 Exactly as had happened to the Bosnian-Croat population in Zenica, and as has now happened 
with the Bosnian-Serb population of Brcko where their numbers have dwindled from almost 40% 
to 7% in the last twelve years. 
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Compounding this state of affairs was the recruitment of Kosovar Albanian staff 
to what transpired to be key positions, which were unsupervised within the IC 
missions, such as switchboard operators and door security personnel.  Within a 
short space of time, if unchecked, these personnel could ensure that the only job 
applicants and other clients who could communicate with IC staff by telephone, 
or visit them for interviews, would be Kosovar Albanians.  Finally, if this did not 
work and the organisation concerned insisted on having a more ethnically varied 
staff,86 then they could always be murdered.  This happened to a Kosovo Serb 
member of the OSCE elections staff who was lured outside of his office and the 
OSCE compound during a lunch break.  The failure to break this pernicious circle 
of discrimination and violence meant that the Serbs either retreated into their few 
remaining enclaves and stayed there or left Kosovo altogether.   
 
What the IC did not realise initially was that the discrimination and persecution 
being meted out to the Serbs, which some could claim was somehow ‘justified’, 
was also being meted out to all of the other minorities in Kosovo87 and 
particularly the Roma,88 so that apart from the enclaves and one small Gorani 
dominated municipality at Dragash, Kosovo along with Croatia and Albania can 
now claim to be one of the most ethnically ‘pure’ states in Europe.  From an initial 
                                                 
86 The OSCE achieved this by bringing staff from Serb enclaves in armoured buses protected by 
KFOR troops. 
87 In addition to the Serbs and Roma, these include the Gorani, Vlach, Ashkali, Turks, and 
‘Egyptians’ (the Egyptians are a variant of the Roma who believe that unlike the Roma, who are 
of Indian origin, that they come from Egypt.  They generally speak Albanian and were as 
numerous as the Roma in both Kosovo and Albania where there are now about 50,000).    
88 Many of the Roma retreated into Serbia and could be found living in improvised tents and 
shacks around the Belgrade ring road and other major cities etc in 1999 – 2001.  They had 
suffered similar discrimination from all sides throughout the Bosnian conflict. 
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population which was roughly balanced at the end of the conflict 80:20 in the 
ratio Kosovo Albanian to Kosovo Serb, the population balance as at 2010 is now 
92 percent Albanian and 8 percent all others89 including Serb.90 
 
Given their treatment post-1999, and the behaviour of the IC missions in terms of 
their failure to protect them, perhaps an impossible task, and in their creation of 
the new administrative and electoral structures,91 it is now unlikely that it will ever 
be possible for the IC Missions to be seen as ‘honest brokers’ by the Serb 
community.  If that is the case then it will be difficult for the IC to withdraw so long 
as the Serbs are able to maintain their enclaves and their longstanding claims to 
protect their ‘holy sites’.  Permission to protect the ‘holy sites’ formed a 
paragraph of the peace deal with Serbia in 199992 and one which was never 
honoured by the IC.  The situation will become yet more complex, were either 
Serbia or Macedonia93 to join NATO94 or be able to accede to the EU, as they 
would then have the power of veto over the actions of those organisations.  The 
situation will also become highly problematic if, as is possible, conflict were to re-
                                                 
89 Unlike in Bosnia, the Jewish population of the province pre-1941 were mostly hidden and 
rescued by the Albanians and moved to Albania.  This was an act for which the Albanians were 
made a member of ‘the righteous’ by the state of Israel.  Following the opening of Albania’s 
borders in 1993, almost all have now moved to Israel. 
90 “CIA World Fact Book 2011”.  Op. cit. 
91 It would for example have been possible to have reserved seats for minorities in the assembly 
as is done in a number of countries around the world.  This was the formula adopted in Zimbabwe 
for the white population for example.  Additionally great efforts were made to encourage Bosnian 
diaspora voters to vote and later Iraqi and Afghan diaspora, but similar efforts were not made for 
the Serbs in the immediate aftermath of the conflict through the period from 1999 to 2001.  
Whether the Serbs would have used the voting opportunity provided, is another issue.  
92 The ceasefire agreement permitted Serbia under Milosevic to protect the Serb cultural 
monuments and to keep a limited number (2,000) troops in Kosovo for that purpose.  This part of 
the agreement was never honoured by the IC. 
93 At least while it is under Macedonian-Serb leadership. 
94 Macedonia was expected to get NATO membership in 2008, but their accession was vetoed by 
Greece over the issue of the country’s name.  
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emerge in Macedonia, which is abutted in part by the southern Serb enclaves 
within Kosovo and where again the ethnic Albanian population now outnumber 
the ethnic Serbs at the ballot box. 
 
As with the UN the broader IC has found itself unable to bring reconciliation to 
either Bosnia95 or Kosovo.  It has also come to realise that without that 
reconciliation it is effectively impossible to either withdraw or to make progress.  
The failure of Kosovo to have its statehood recognised by a majority of the IC will 
leave the state in ‘limbo’, as has now happened for a decade with Palestine, and 
will stifle the inward investment and development which it needs.  In the interim, 
and perhaps for many years to come, Kosovo will continue to exist as an entity 
which is unable to sustain itself economically, nor to feed and power itself from 
within its own resources.  In turn, Kosovo will continue to be dependent upon the 
EU for financial support and indeed for the European Central Bank (ECB) to 
continue to underpin its ‘national’ currency96 and will be dependent upon food 
and energy imports which it cannot itself afford to pay for.  As a result while 
Kosovo clearly meets the requirements for ‘statehood’ as stated in the 
Montevideo convention: 
                                                 
95 And where as at May 2011 there is now no functioning central government. 
96 The (K)Convertible Euro (KE), which is maintained at a parity with the Euro.  Bosnia has a 
similar system with the (K)Convertible Mark (KM), which is similarly underpinned by the European 
Central Bank (ECB).   
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The state as a person of international law should possess the following 
qualifications: (a) a permanent population; (b) a defined territory; (c) 
government; and (d) capacity to enter into relations with the other states.97  
and its’ existence as a ‘state’ may be denied in the UN and elsewhere for purely 
political reasons; a theoretician may argue, as Forji has done for Palestine,98 that 
Kosovo as an entity fails99 to meet the definition of a state due to the fact that it is 
not independently viable. 
 
Kosovo as a post-conflict ‘model’. 
 
Given its very limited geographic size100 and a population101 of about two 
million,102 does the IC’s post-conflict intervention in Kosovo serve as an effective 
model for future post-conflict missions?  While some work has already been 
carried out by Yesildag103 and others on whether the amount of personnel and 
funding applied to UN post-conflict missions has had any impact upon the 
success rate of those missions, these studies have tended to compare global 
figures and have paid little attention to the numbers of personnel and amount of 
                                                 
97 Montevideo Convention 1933, Article 1.  The first sentence of Article 3 is also relevant in the 
case of Kosovo: The political existence of the state is independent of recognition by the other 
states.’ 
98 Amin George Forji, Is Palestine a State?.  
99 Kosovo is also patently incapable of defending itself, without assistance from NATO.  The 
ability to defend oneself is also often taken as one of the criteria for statehood. 
100With an area of 10,887 sq. km.  CIA World Fact Book 2011 (2011), op. cit.  
101 Ibid.  1,825,632 (July 2011 est.). 
102 Geographically Kosovo is slightly smaller than Yorkshire and with approximately half the 
population. 
103MugeYesildag, The United Nations Peacekeeping Operations – Does the Amount of IN 
Peacekeeping Personnel and Funding Significantly Affect the Success of the UN Peacekeeping 
Operations?  
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funds expended in relation to population size or geographic area.  Additionally, 
the factor of ‘duration’ forms a critical part of the comparison of effort made.  For 
example, Cambodia post-conflict required 22,000 people, but only for eighteen 
months, as compared to Bosnia and Kosovo where the international presence 
continues in considerable numbers some fifteen and twelve years respectively, 
after the conflict.104 
 
If we examine Kosovo taking population size and geography105 into account, then 
with the exception of the IC’s Brcko arbitration regime106 in Bosnia, the IC effort 
in Kosovo can be demonstrated to represent the greatest investment in both 
human and financial resources per capita of any of the post-conflict missions to 
date. The effective cost of the first round of elections in Kosovo was in the order 
of US $135 million and was perhaps a direct result of the ‘expense is no object, 
just get it done’107 philosophy which was adopted.  With an electorate of 
approximately 1.4 million and a turnout of about 900,000, the true cost of each 
ballot cast was approximately US $150.  Not only is that not a sustainable figure, 
                                                 
104 The next iteration of the EULEX mandate runs until June 2012 and is likely to be extended. 
105 Due to its relatively well-developed infrastructure, no populated areas in Kosovo, are more 
than one and a half hours drive from Pristina. 
106 At one stage in 1998 the total IC international civilian effort in Brcko amounted to 720 civilian 
personnel supported by a 600 strong US Armoured Cavalry Squadron (ACR) from SFOR at the 
McGovern base.  These 1,300 plus internationals were deployed in support of a civilian 
population which by that time probably numbered less than 40,000. For further details on the 
Brcko arbitration and population details see the UNHCR website.  
107 During the discussions on the ‘Rambouillet’ election plan, the author and Hrair Balian were 
asked by the US Ambassador to the OSCE if the timeline for the election could be reduced from 
120 to 90 days if the amount of funds provided were doubled.  He was told that regardless of the 
funds available, 120 days was the minimum amount of time required, if the diaspora were to be 
allowed to vote.   
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as Kosovo can in no way afford to fund future elections108 at such a cost, neither 
would anyone else in a developed country dream of paying anything like so much 
for an electoral process.  The cost of a general election in the UK with an 
electorate of 45,844,691109 would on the basis of the Kosovo model be in the 
order of £4.18 billion,110 whereas for the 2010 General Election it was 
estimated111 to have cost some £92 million.  
 
One reason for the excessive costs in Kosovo is the lack of transparency over 
budgets.  With elections, costs come from the OSCE core budget, ‘voluntary 
contributions’, bi-lateral donations, and then ‘contributions in kind’, either from 
other organisations and ‘pillars’ in particular KFOR or from nations.  This is 
typical of many projects run under the ‘pillar’ system, or outside the overall UN 
structures112.  Even more worrying is the cost of projects which then fail to deliver 
a result.  One example is that of the contracts placed over the years from 1999 to 
2002 to restore the generation capacity of the Kosova A and B thermal power 
stations in the area of Obiliq/Kastriot close to Pristina.  The contracts were 
                                                 
108The total budget for Kosovo as passed in parliament for the ‘Draft Law on Kosovo Budget 
2010’ was EUR 1.461 billion. Source: Kosovo Parliament website. 
109 The figure is as at 15 October 2010.  The source is the Office for National Statistics: UK 
Electoral Statistics 2010. 
110 Based upon the Kosovo election model the potential costs for running an election for the 
Ukraine, at that time a country which was thought by some to have been in need of IC assistance 
at some time in the future, was calculated at approximately US $6.0 billion. 
111 Conservative research department quoted in the Daily Telegraph of 16 April 2011.  The figure 
was raised as part of the debate on the cost of using the Alternative Vote (AV) system.  Even the 
most pessimistic forecasters said that with AV the cost of a UK General Election would be about 
£300 million.   
112 Due to bad weather in 1998 the OSCE spent US $660,000 on chartering helicopters to get 
ballot papers and other essential materials to polling stations on time.  These costs charged by 
SFOR were unplanned and did not show within the overall elections budget.  
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awarded to German companies,113 the money was spent and yet not only was 
full generation capacity not restored, but the plants when operational produced 
huge amounts of pollutants114 and contributed to serious health problems115 in 
the Pristina suburbs.  
 
The USA had provided military trainers for the KLA in the run up to and during 
the conflict.  These were mostly retired US military personnel hired as contractors 
through intermediary companies such as MPRI and Dyncorps International.116  At 
the conclusion of the conflict the USA awarded the contracts to identify and 
recruit their seconded personnel to the same companies.  MPRI and Dyncorps 
promptly re-hired the same personnel to act as police advisors to the nascent 
KPS,117 and for the US contribution to the UN International Police Task Force 
(IPTF) post-conflict.  This and similar recruitment practices such as the 
recruitment of ethnic Albanian US citizens into ‘international’ positions, 
contributed to the suspicion with which the OSCE in particular was regarded by 
the Kosovo Serbs, post-conflict.  Such recruitment practices could have been 
                                                 
113 The power stations were built by the Russians in the 1950s and 1960s.  An East German 
company was awarded the contract because they were familiar with this design of power station 
which burned brown coal (lignite) as do the power stations in the former GDR. Lignite is the only 
fuel source which occurs within Kosovo.  
114 As the old Russian installed filters were not replaced and in some cases were worn or 
unusable, the Kosova A power station emitted around 2.5 tons of dust per hour, which exceeds 
the European standard by some 74 times, according to a report issued by the Kosovo Ministry of  
the Environment in May 2003.  
115 These included a large number of cancers and stillbirths.  Ibid. 
116 Dyncorps are also responsible for the recruitment and payment for all US staff seconded to the 
OSCE.  They define their mission as follows: ‘DynCorp International (DI) is a global government 
services provider in support of U.S. national security and foreign policy objectives, delivering 
support solutions for defense, diplomacy and international development. DI operates major 
programs in logistics, platform support, contingency operations and training and mentoring to 
reinforce security, community stability and the rule of law.’ 
117 These personnel were hired through Dyncorps as they were working as part of the OSCE 
police training project, whilst those hired as part of the UN IPTF were hired through MPRI. 
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overcome had the missions not been so large and if the OSCE in particular had 
not been dependent upon the secondment system whereby nations effectively 
‘vouched’ for their own personnel.   
 
This problem had first been noted in Bosnia and where a second and related 
problem was also identified.  As an example, the elections officer in Drvar was a 
German secondee, but was a first-generation German citizen who originated 
from the area of Drvar118 and another German secondee, also of Croatian origin, 
was operating in the Croatian area at Orasje.119  This problem was also acute in 
Kosovo and was to occur again in the OSCE mission in Albania where the author 
was offered numerous Austrian and German staff of Albanian extraction.120    
Critically, for post-conflict missions, they consist of both ‘national’ and 
‘international’ staff.  In those posts for which international staff are recruited, they 
are recruited either because they are Subject Matter Experts (SME) and their 
expertise is not available locally, or because the mission is attempting to ‘shape’ 
some aspect of the local behaviour, such as attempting to bring about 
reconciliation.  If the mission’s international staff, particularly in such sensitive 
posts as for elections and democratisation officers are seen to be closely allied to 
                                                 
118 When the Serbs were able to return to Drvar they set fire to the town hall and burnt down her 
office.  The elections officer had to be rescued via a side window. 
119 This German secondee served as the ‘international’ democratization officer, but was it 
transpired a ‘dual national’, as the OSCE discovered when it ‘nationalised’ the post.  The 
‘international’ applied for the post of ‘national’ democratisation officer and remained as a national 
staff member in post. 
120 The author always rejected such candidates and when challenged by the seconding states on 
their candidates, the author was invariably told by them that they had been selected ‘because 
they could speak the Albanian language.’ 
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one or other faction whether by ethnicity or by their previous employment,121  
then it will be impossible for the mission to act as a mediator and to drive the 
process of reconciliation and integration forwards.  
 
The allotment by the UN of the tenders for most if not all of the IT hardware used 
in the first round of elections to Thompson-CSF of France and of the international 
telephone linkages to a company based in Monte Carlo, was the cause of some 
raised eyebrows, given that the SRSG was himself French.  They are, however, 
illustrative of the issues that are discussed amongst the ‘chattering classes’, 
when the tendering and procurement processes are as opaque as the sources of 
funding.  For Kosovo to have served as a model, then these processes would 
have to have been far more open, as would the accountability for equipment 
purchases during the mission start-up phase.  Given the way in which the 
Kosovo post-conflict mission was deployed, much new and additional equipment 
was ordered and delivered, in particular to the OSCE and EU pillars even when 
existing stocks of equipment could have been used.  Some hundreds of brand 
new Jeep Cherokee 4 x 4 vehicles were shipped from the USA when alternative 
and significantly cheaper European products were available.  Additionally a study 
of the road network of Kosovo, even post the ‘air campaign’, would have shown 
that in most cases an ordinary saloon car, such as was used by the Kosovars 
themselves, would have been more appropriate.     
 
                                                 
121 Or, indeed, by marrying into one or other element within the local community, another difficulty 
identified in both Bosnia and Kosovo. 
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For the Kosovo missions there also should have been more stringent rules on the 
management and security of equipment once it had been delivered.  To cite but 
two examples, the OSCE Mission to Bosnia delivered 2,200 Motorola handheld 
radios to the OMIK mission for the first round of elections in 2000.  In 2001 the 
Bosnian Mission delivered a further 800 radios and ten trailer-mounted 
generators to compensate for the unaccounted losses of radios within OMIK in 
the previous year.  Additionally they convoyed twenty-one vehicles to Kosovo 
that were ‘urgently needed’ and were hence stripped out of the Bosnian mission 
only for them to lie unused for many months in the open as they were ‘second 
hand’.  Such profligacy and an insistence on ‘new’ equipment are not suitable 
models for future post-conflict deployments and are also not typical of many UN 
missions.122 
 
Finally, there was a lack of clarity in the IC position on the future of Kosovo and a 
number of differing viewpoints from the participating states which throughout the 
development of the Kosovo post-conflict  mission, served to highlight the 
weaknesses of the architecture at the higher levels of the participating 
organisations.  The UN is weakened by the power of the veto of any one of its P5 
members and this was evident in the way that the UN approached some of the 
issues in Kosovo.  The OSCE is weakened by the need to achieve unanimity less 
                                                 
122 The Nissan pick-ups which the OSCE Mission in Bosnia used on loan from the UN in 1996-99, 
had first seen service with the UN Mission in Cambodia in 1992.  These vehicles came from the 
UN’s own large regional logistics hub at Brindisi where unused equipment is held prior to reissue 
elsewhere.  The same source was used to procure a generator formerly deployed to the UNTAET 
mission in the mid 1990s and now providing a back up power supply to the Albanian police 
academy. 
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one in order to be able to issue a mission mandate at the permanent council and 
the fact that, as in the UN in the case of Kosovo, a number of its members had 
considerable sympathy for the Serbs.  The EU and NATO both have similar 
drawbacks when dealing with post-conflict issues which occur within the wider 
European space, whether it be on the fringes of Russia and the Ukraine for the 
EU, or even in the Transcaucasus for NATO, as in most, if not all cases, they will 
require unanimity, if even only one member state wishes to take action, but to do 
so under an EU or NATO ‘banner’.123  The accession of Albania and Croatia into 
NATO and the imminent accession of Croatia into the EU, will only serve to 
exacerbate these problems if there is any future conflict in the Western Balkans, 
for example, in Kosovo or Macedonia of which the latter is itself an aspirant 
member of both organisations.  What the Kosovo operation has demonstrated is 
that the higher-level architecture of many of the regional organisations is 
becoming unwieldy and increasingly ‘not fit for purpose’. 
 
Conclusions 
 
The role of the European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX) will be 
discussed in the next chapter which will consider the development of the EU as 
an increasingly important actor on the post-conflict stage.  The build-up to the 
Kosovo conflict and the perhaps misleading public portrayal of the IC’s position 
during that phase of their involvement has been typical of much of the IC’s 
                                                 
123 A good illustration of this has been the lobbying that was required in order to persuade non-
participating NATO states to permit the go ahead of the UN mandated ‘NATO led’ air campaign 
against Libya.  
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engagement worldwide during the last twenty years.  This has led to increasing 
cynicism, particularly from people in the Third World as to the motives of those in 
the developed world when they become embroiled in conflict and post-conflict.  
On some occasions this is justified, or at best perhaps just badly enunciated, 
such as the reasoning why the ‘West’ has become involved militarily in Libya and 
not in Bahrain, Syria, or Yemen for example.  This questioning over the real 
justification for the IC’s intervention in the conflict phase makes it more difficult 
for the IC to act as an impartial arbiter during the post-conflict phase, as the 
situation in Kosovo and across the Western Balkans more widely demonstrated.  
If in addition to that, executive decisions are taken, such as to print most of the 
legislative and other materials in one language and in so doing to demonstrate 
what can be perceived as ‘bias’, then the situation for the members of the IC ‘on 
the ground’, becomes even more difficult.  In this respect the post-conflict 
deployment in Kosovo marked a backward step from Bosnia.  
 
The planning and preparation for the post-conflict phase in Kosovo, despite the 
almost three-month preparatory phase provided by the NATO bombing 
campaign, was bedevilled by a lack of clarity in the early stages about who 
should have primacy and what the structure of the mission should be.  This was 
compounded by a series of unrealistic expectations as to what could be achieved 
in the time available, for example elections in late 1999124 and about the time 
                                                 
124 Similar over-optimism in Bosnia led to the pressure to run local elections in late 1996, 
immediately following the General Elections.  Ambassador Frowick of the OSCE was still under 
pressure from Washington to run these elections in November 1996, long after the weather had 
meant that this had ceased to be a viable option.  They were eventually held in Summer 1997. 
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when it would be feasible to draw down and eventually remove the IC presence.  
A similar lack of planning and realism over the scope of the commitment has 
bedevilled most of the ‘post-UN’ post-conflict missions, but it is particularly 
surprising in the case of Kosovo given that the IC remained heavily engaged in 
Bosnia in 1999.  In part this is because of the lack of courage by the participating 
states which are unwilling to tell their electorates that ‘nation building’ is a long-
term and potentially very expensive exercise.125 
 
The failure to plan, and to have contingency plans in place, led to a whole series 
of ‘preventable’ failures.  It could have been anticipated that there would have 
been population displacement from Kosovo.  Even had Milosevic not expelled the 
Kosovar Albanians, either they or the Kosovo Serbs may still have fled, 
particularly if there had been ground combat or even simply because the food 
supply chain had broken down.  That no contingencies were in place was in part 
because of a failure of the ‘combatants’, to engage with the key IC ‘non-
combatants’ such as the UNHCR.  While security was undoubtedly a concern, 
and will probably remain so, the impact of these planning failures during 
conflict126 upon the post-conflict phase of the operation are often so severe as to 
suggest that a mechanism should be established for dealing with them.  Again, 
and as Iraq so graphically demonstrated, these are repetitive failures, particularly 
for those missions which are not UN-led. 
                                                 
125Bill Clinton (2004), op. cit. 
126 Given that the ‘air campaign’ was widely known to be the ‘next step’ a discussion with the 
UNHCR about likely population displacements this scenario and how that should be managed, 
would probably have been helpful. 
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The implementation of high-tech solutions, instead of ‘low tech’ and potentially  
cheaper solutions,127 is another repetitive problem, illustrated by the examples 
given here for both Bosnia and Kosovo, but replicated across a wide range of the 
more recent post-conflict missions, but most notably those which are US-led, 
such as Iraq and Afghanistan.  
 
The implementation of the pillar structure was initially a response by the IC and 
particularly by the ‘quint’ group to the late change of plan over who was to have 
primacy for the management of the post-conflict mission.  In general it worked 
well, but suffered from a range of organisational issues, some of which have 
been described in this chapter.  Additionally, rather than just one administrative 
headquarters in Pristina there were now three, or four including KFOR, and that 
increased the number of international and national staff required.  Additionally, 
more senior level liaison was then required to ensure that plans were dovetailed 
together.  The ‘pillar’ structure has not been replicated outside of the Western 
Balkans, perhaps because it has not been needed, nor have the staffs been 
sufficiently large to warrant it.  Additionally, where the UN has been engaged on 
a joint mission with another regional organisation outside of Europe such as the 
AU the response has been to form a joint integrated mission such as UNAMID in 
                                                 
127 Turkey for example ran a very effective and accurate countrywide voter registration system in 
the 1990s.  They did this without using computer databases, except at regional hubs.  This was 
effective for a population of 80 million and could easily have been replicated in both Bosnia and 
Kosovo.  The added advantage for Kosovo being that a significant number of educated people in 
Kosovo spoke Turkish as a product of having been a (relatively recent) part of the Ottoman 
Empire and of the Turkish private schools which were present in Kosovo. 
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Darfur.  This is probably a cheaper solution and moreover has a much clearer 
Command, Control and Communications (C3) chain.  
 
Patently, the IC’s attempts at reconciliation in both Bosnia and Kosovo have 
failed and in the case of Kosovo failed both ‘internally’ and ‘externally’ in the 
wider international arena.128  The failure to resolve ethnic conflict in particular has 
led first the UN and now the wider IC into long term and increasingly expensive 
open-ended missions.  As with the UN mission in Palestine, some of these 
missions may well have to continue for fifty years or more if some form of 
reconciliation is not achieved.  Additionally, as well as high costs, full progress on 
statehood and governance will not be possible and there will be a continuing risk 
of the conflict breaking out again.  In the interim, the complex post-conflict 
missions continue to incur casualties129 and it is perhaps significant that fully 
2,000 of the 2,900 fatalities incurred by the UN in peacekeeping missions have 
occurred in the period from 1992 to date.130  If to that the casualties of the other 
peacekeeping and enforcement missions such as those in the Western Balkans, 
Iraq, and Afghanistan were to be added, it will be seen that these post-conflict 
missions have become even more costly both in terms of lives lost and the 
political capital expended domestically in order to maintain their continued 
                                                 
128 As at 1 May 2011 only 75 out of 208 member states of the UN had recognised Kosovo as a 
‘state’.  UN, op. cit. 
129 On 27 May 2011 UNIFIL suffered one dead and four injured from a roadside Improvised 
Explosive Device (IED) near Sidon in Lebanon.  All of the victims were members of the Italian 
peacekeeping contingent.  Sources; Reuters, Daily Star (Lebanon) and other print media. 
130 UN DPKO, op. cit. 
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presence often in areas of the globe, that the general public in the West may feel 
are peripheral to their lives.  
 
The previous point leads on to whether these post-conflict missions are providing 
‘value for money’ or perhaps enough ‘value’ more widely for their IC sponsors.  
As nation-building takes on ever more complex forms and particularly so when it 
is employed in first or second-world countries such as the wider Europe, the 
Levant and perhaps soon, the Maghreb, post-conflict missions will require ever 
more sophisticated131 and hence more expensive staff132 to operate and given 
the casualty rates, increasingly they will need Close Protection (CP) teams to 
look after them.  What is certain is that the scale of resources devoted to Kosovo 
cannot be replicated elsewhere as the per capita costs, both financially and in 
skilled manpower terms, would be prohibitive.  As such, as with the pillar 
structure, the Kosovo ‘experiment’ will prove to be a blind alley in developmental 
terms.   
 
Unfortunately for the EU it only has their experiences in the Western Balkans, 
Bosnia, Kosovo, and Macedonia upon which to base its operational experience 
                                                 
131 In Sierra Leone post-conflict, legal advice at the District level on the provision and training of 
magistrates and the running of district courts etc. was on occasions provided by relatively junior 
UK policemen (constables, sergeants, and inspectors) as an additional duty to their police training 
functions. 
132The latest tranche of UK secondees to be deployed to the EULEX mission includes the 
following: a criminal judge at the supreme court, two judges at district court level, legal officer at 
district court level, court recorder, chief of EULEX prosecutors, two prosecutors, head of the 
special prosecutors task force (SPRK) office, task force liaison officer, and a legal officer.  The 
minimum qualification for the most junior post was an MA in Law and five years previous 
overseas experience.  Source: EULEX Kosovo - 2nd Call for Contributions 2011, via E-Mail from 
DfID, 31 May 2011. 
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of running and managing complex post-conflict missions.  With that as the 
background the thesis will move to looking at the developing role of the EU in 
post-conflict. 
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Chapter 8 
 
The EU and Post-Conflict 
 
Introduction 
 
This chapter will examine the increasingly greater profile of the EU in the IC’s 
management of post-conflict.  The aim of this study will be to examine the impact 
of the EU upon post-conflict developments in the Western Balkans, in particular 
within the last decade and to demonstrate how the EU has now subsumed the 
post-conflict missions into the accession process.  In the wider context the 
chapter will demonstrate why the EU is now so important in the field of post-
conflict globally and how this has and continues to alter the emphases in post-
conflict development. 
 
From a modest start, as European political co-operation from the 1970s and as a 
funding donor in the early 1990s, the EU developed during the next decade to 
the point where, in Kosovo in 1999, it ran one of the pillars of the IC’s 
management of post-conflict.  It had been the Europeans inability to collectively 
manage the various Balkan crises of the early 1990s and the need to depend 
upon US assistance that had provided the spur to develop the Common Foreign 
and Security Policy (CFSP) which was enshrined in the Maastricht Treaty of 
November 1993.  Since Maastricht the role of the EU has continued to grow so 
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that now it not only delivers aid and manages specific post-conflict issues, but 
also runs autonomous policing missions and military deployments.1  This chapter 
will chart this rise to prominence and then look at the impacts of the ‘arrival’ of 
the EU upon the post-conflict scene. 
 
What started out as libertarian and humanitarian interventions on the part of the 
individual EU member states has now, clearly, become an instrument of EU 
economic and political policies.  The EU is now trying to shape the future 
development of the states concerned to fit the ‘model’ which it deems most 
appropriate.  In its actions relating to the near abroad, whether strictly post-
conflict or not, the EU policy can be seen as similar to that of the Roman policy 
towards client states.2  It is creating a series of satellite dependent states3 that 
are either awaiting membership of the EU or are, and will remain very closely 
associated with it4 because of their geography.  In Kosovo the EU initially 
participated and is now managing the running of what could best be described as 
a crypto-colony or ‘protectorate’. These developments would place the role of the 
                                                 
1 For example, the European Union Force Democratic Republic of Congo (EUFOR RD Congo).  
This was a short-term EU military deployment in 2006 in support of MONUC during the general 
elections in that year.  The deployment had been mandated by UNSC 1671 of 25 April 2006 and 
the force was withdrawn on 30 November 2006.  
2 That is, that although the states were nominally independent, for the time being at least they 
had to conform to the Roman way of doing things, so as to receive Roman protection and to 
remain independent.  The role of a client state is clearly described in N. G. L. Hammond and F. 
W. Wallbank, A History of Macedonia. Volume III: 336-167 BC: 336-167 B.C. Vol 3.  While the 
concept of ‘cliency’ originated in the Republican era, the classic British examples occurred in the 
Imperial era.  For example, the Iceni and somewhat more successfully for both parties to the 
relationship, Cogidubnus on the south coast of England who was both a client king and a ‘legatus 
augustii’ or Roman senator in the 70s AD.  For the background to these events see; Barry 
Cunliffe, Fishbourne Roman Palace, p 166.    
3 In EU terms the ‘accession’ and ‘associated’ states such as Croatia and Albania (accession) 
and Norway (associated).  
4 Norway and increasingly Switzerland. 
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EU much closer to an imperialist and colonialist model rather than a 
dispassionate and compassionate liberal-interventionism model.  
 
When originally established the UN and the wider IC could afford to regard the 
European Economic Community (EEC) and later the EU as yet another regional 
international institution, with much the same status, economic, and political 
influence within its region as the Association of South East Asian Nations 
(ASEAN).  This chapter will attempt to clarify whether that is what the EU 
remains, or whether, to the world beyond the current borders of the EU, it has 
now become a worldwide economic power with an increasing desire to reach out 
and influence worldwide development politically if not militarily.  Alone, of all the 
regional bodies under the UN5 the EU has developed ‘state-like’ institutions,6 
including its own political and foreign services and, unlike the UN, its own police7 
and military forces.  It has also demonstrated its willingness on occasions to 
deploy them.  Moreover, the EU sees the ‘ideal’ for all states as being modelled 
on its own concept of the Western European ideal model, even though that has 
not yet been implemented amongst the existing EU member states.8  Whilst the 
                                                 
5 For example, ASEAN, the Arab League, the AU, or the OIC.  Even for that matter the Council of 
Europe (COE), the OSCE, and NATO.  
6 The AU has deployed military force from time to time, e.g. in the Sudan and Somalia, but there 
is no permanent structure and doctrine underlying them and they usually depend upon funds from 
elsewhere. 
7 The spokesman for EUROPOL announced on 23 July that EUROPOL had ‘assembled a team 
of 50 experts’ ready for dispatch to Norway, a non-EU state, in the wake of the atrocities there in 
order to ‘assist them’.  This it would appear is in advance of any ‘request’ having been received.  
This is presumably based on the assumption that the Norwegians would be unable to cope on 
their own.  
8 In part, this is because the EU member states only had to comply with EU regulations as they 
existed at the time of their own admission to the EU.  These requirements have become more 
demanding as time progressed.  Additionally, existing EU member states have either been 
permitted to retain their existing structures and institutions under ‘grandfather rules’, or have been 
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attraction of developing nations post-conflict based upon the Western European 
or the North American ‘ideal’ model has been a widespread problem for all 
organisations, including the UN, none have been so insistent upon it, even down 
to the smallest details, as the EU.  An example of this was the EU’s insistence of 
states in the Western Balkans passing anti-smoking legislation even though 
those same states continued to have considerable problems with basic 
legislation such as gun control and the management of weapons within the 
state.9 
 
It is also relevant in this context that the EU is by far the largest aid donor for all 
post-conflict states, whether the EU is directly involved on the ground or not.  
This is now a significant consideration not only for the governments of the states 
concerned but also for the other IC participants in the post-conflict process, given 
that the EU now contributes more than half of all development aid worldwide.10  
This chapter will also examine the issues of the ‘conditionality’ of EU aid and the 
political impact of how and where this aid is directed.11      
 
                                                                                                                                                 
granted ‘opt outs’.  A good example of this in action is the EU regulations on the roles of the 
‘coastguard’ and the ‘navy’.  This is discussed later in the chapter.  
9 According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) AK-47 automatic 
rifles were available in the market place in Albania for US $100 in the period 2006–09; that is a 
lower price than for the same weapon than in Angola, itself the cheapest purchasing point in 
Africa. The price per weapon is typically a good correlation with availability.  
10 The amount of EU Aid delivered in 2009 was, according to the EU, some €49 billion accounting 
for some 56% of the world’s total.  This included bilateral aid from member states.  Source: EU 
development portal. 
11 See, for example, Open Europe, EU Aid: is it effective, May 2007. 
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The other issue about the EU that will need to be covered is its increasingly 
stringent rules and requirements for admission.12  This is particularly relevant to 
the Western Balkans as all of the states within that region are aspirant members 
for EU accession; furthermore it is the EU’s ambition to integrate them within the 
Union.13  The requirements for membership become more detailed with every 
tranche of new accessions, as they reflect the increasing complexity and the 
centralisation of processes through the EU.  As stated earlier, these entry criteria 
do not always reflect the current conditions within the existing EU membership.  
To give just one example with which Albania, a neighbour of Kosovo and a 
potential EU accession state, is wrestling with at the moment.  The EU requires 
that police action on the high seas for example, the arrest of fishing boats fishing 
illegally, is conducted by a coastguard, subordinate to the Ministry of the 
Interior14 and not by either the navy or a coastguard subordinate to the Ministry 
                                                 
12 It was a requirement to be considered for accession that Albania pass much more stringent 
legislation on ‘money laundering’ in terms of the amounts of cash that could be handed over for 
goods received. This ignored the fact that in many areas there were simply no banks in which to 
conduct business and that often cash was the only option. 
13 The integration of three of the Western Balkans states is also important for geo-strategic 
reasons.  Both Serbia and Macedonia sit astride the Vardar corridor into Greece, along which the 
road and rail links from the remainder of the EU flow.  The oil and gas pipelines from the Black 
Sea coast into the western European partners of the EU run through Serbia and Croatia, while 
the gas supply pipelines from the Ukraine and Russia run through Serbia and Macedonia into 
Greece.  Greece is also a net recipient of electrical energy from Bulgaria, which also runs on 
power lines through Macedonia, while finally the Rhine-Danube waterway flows through both 
Croatia and Serbia and permits the movement of 4,000 tonne barges from the Black Sea coast to 
the North Sea.  In contrast to Croatia, Serbia, and Macedonia the sole strategic requirement for 
Bosnia, Kosovo, Albania, and Montenegro is for them to remain ‘stable’; however that may be 
defined.  
14 The UK Maritime and Coastguard Agency (MCA) reports to the Department of Transport, which 
would not be an acceptable structure, were the UK to be an ‘accession’ state.  The EU has also 
not apparently covered the issue of ‘subsidiarity’ as, for example, in the UK where the Scots 
maintain their own maritime protection agency, funded and answerable to the Scottish Assembly.  
Similar gaps exist in the EU’s strategic concepts in many other areas, particularly in regards to 
‘devolved’ powers in states which have ‘federal’ structures.   
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of Defence.15  This is a requirement that is being imposed upon new members 
and is not a requirement for existing member states16 but will force most potential 
accession states to either: 
 
a.  Set up two maritime control structures at considerable expense and with 
some duplication of effort as has been done for example in Croatia; 
b. or to abandon the concept of a navy altogether and have only a 
coastguard as has been done in for example Slovenia. 
 
Having established that the EU is increasingly demanding of people and 
countries beyond its borders, this chapter will also discuss the impact of the EU’s 
Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), or indeed its absence, as, for 
example, exemplified in the recent Lebanese crisis, upon the IC’s management 
of post-conflict.  It will also be pertinent to compare and contrast the difference 
between the IC’s treatment of BiH and Kosovo with that of a state without conflict 
                                                 
15 This is a topic with which the author was closely engaged in the period from 2007 to 2009 and 
one which was discussed extensively with Ole Bjornoy the Norwegian Charge D’Affaires in Tirana 
and himself a former coastguard officer, and with Doug Adams at that time the acting Head of the 
EU PAMECA police mission in Albania.  Albania is heavily influenced by the USA and US policy 
which on this specific issue was completely at odds with that of the EU.  In the USA the 
coastguard forms part of the armed forces within the DoD.  The US had coastguard officers on 
site in Albania and was supplying coastal surveillance radars for the entire coastline.  It was a 
condition of this donation that the radars should remain under the control of the Albanian Ministry 
of Defence and so should or perhaps ‘when’ the navy have become a ‘coastguard’ they would 
have lost control of this asset.  Given what was potentially going to happen with ‘their’ navy and 
the officers within it, the Albanian MOD refused to share the data gathered using the radar 
system with the Ministry of Interior and hence the police: not only does the UK not follow the 
‘approved’ European model, neither do the French, Italians, or most of the existing EU member 
states. 
16 Who in this, as in most other matters, are allowed to operate with what are described as 
‘legacy’ structures. 
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in the formal sense17 in the Western Balkans for example Albania, to see 
whether the EU’s treatment of post-conflict states such as Kosovo varies from its 
approach to other ‘dependent’ states.  Such issues as the limitations on where 
TV programmes can be bought, the EU’s ‘Free Television’ regulation, are 
examples that will be examined; given that the impact of the regulation is quite 
the reverse of that in its title; as it prevents those countries at which it is directed 
from acquiring TV products from outside of the EU.  
 
Finally, for both Bosnia and Kosovo, future membership of the EU has shaped 
the entire IC intervention and has been presented as the ‘end state’, almost a 
‘nirvana’, to which the nationals of those two areas can aspire.  It will therefore be 
covered in some detail.  For elsewhere in the region EU participation in post-
conflict can also be seen as one stage in their evolution towards normality and 
their eventual goal of EU membership.  Increasingly, one must question whether 
the eastward expansion of the EU is now just the goal of EU elites, rather than 
that of its citizenry, or of the populations of the accession states concerned, as 
both the EU and the leadership of Croatia are currently discovering.   Whatever 
the outcome this chapter will examine the impact upon the post-conflict model of 
post-conflict interventions in states who are moving towards future or potential 
accession to the EU. 
 
                                                 
17 The violent collapse of the Albanian state in the wake of the ‘pyramid shares’ scandal in 1998 
was not technically a conflict, even though there was widespread fighting and armoured vehicles 
were deployed on the streets.  The looting of some 750,000 long-barrelled automatic weapons 
during that period gave rise to long-term internal security problems and fuelled the supplies of 
weapons in the conflicts in both Kosovo and Macedonia.  
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The early days and the EU as a ‘spectator’ in post-conflict 
 
Through the period from the formation of the EU until 1993, the EU was basically 
a spectator when it came to the IC’s efforts in post-conflict.  Although increasingly 
and, particularly after 1989, the EU provided some central funding for missions 
engaged on post-conflict these were relatively small and both financially and 
politically,18 the EU on the international stage was only effectively represented by 
its member states acting bilaterally.  The EU’s own efforts at funding democracy 
initiatives in this period were described by Santiso (2002) as:  
 
‘a series of scattered initiatives’ [which since the mid-1990s] ‘has gradually 
become a more systematic endeavour’.19  
 
In a similar way, and notwithstanding the European Political Cooperation (EPC) 
process that was introduced in the 1970s, it was not until the fall of the Berlin 
Wall and particularly the Balkans crises of the early 1990s, that a unified 
‘European voice’ began to be enunciated in foreign-policy terms.  This new 
willingness to intercede in conflict and to prepare for post-conflict meant that for 
                                                 
18 There were also no integrated EU police or military structures and these were entirely 
represented by the bilateral states.  
19 Carlos Santiso, Reforming European Union Development Cooperation: Good Governance, 
Political Conditionality and the Convention of Cotonou, p 7. 
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the first time the EU was able to appear as a significant actor on the world stage 
in its own right.  Even now though it was not acting independently, but as part of 
a duopoly with the USA, so that David Owen became the EU’s peace negotiator 
acting in tandem with Cyrus Vance of the USA to create the ‘Vance-Owen plan’ 
and the other initiatives of that period.  What the negotiations by Owen and 
Vance revealed, and as Owen points out throughout his memoirs,20 was their 
weakness as negotiators in that they had only a limited amount of inducements 
on offer and no real ‘levers’ as the EU, in particular, had no meaningful ‘threats’ it 
could make to the warring factions.  Holbrooke, on the other hand at a later stage 
in the conflict, was the personal envoy of one man, the President of the USA, and 
did have the threat of US (and to an extent NATO) air power which, as he 
explains in his memoirs,21 he could and did use to bring the warring factions to 
the negotiating table.   
 
This weakness in the EU’s and indeed NATO’s position, without the leadership of 
the USA, was not lost upon Romano Prodi, Javier Solana,22 and others at the 
time as they, along with the European Commission (EC) within the EU, worked 
over the following five to ten years to strengthen the position of the EU so that it 
could become an effective actor upon the world stage.  While the EU23 had from 
1975 adopted some novel and innovative approaches to ‘north-south’ aid 
provision, these initiatives were increasingly replaced in the 1990s by a policy of 
                                                 
20 David Owen, Balkan Odyssey. 
21 Richard Holbrooke, To End a War.   
22 Solana was directly involved in the Bosnian conflict as the Secretary-General of NATO from 
1995-9.  
23 At that stage it was known as the European Economic Community (EEC). 
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aid provision which was tailored to the political goals of the EU as a world actor.  
At the same time, the amount of funds being allocated directly to the EC by the 
member states and, in addition, being granted as bilateral donations by the 
member states, was rapidly increasing, so that by 2002 this already amounted to 
some 36 percent of the development aid funds available worldwide.  In parallel, 
the implementation of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), the 
successor to the CSDP, could ensure that both the aid and the political direction 
of the EU could be harnessed together for maximum impact while at the same 
time the appointment of a pro-European, Secretary General (SG) of NATO, 
Javier Solana, ensured that this was broadly supported by the world’s single 
largest military alliance.  
 
The EU as a ‘stand alone’ actor on the post-conflict stage 
 
The appointment of Solana to three key, but interlinked, posts in Europe during 
1999 as the EU's High Representative for the CFSP,  SG of the Council of the 
European Union, and SG of the Western European Union (WEU), with an 
enhanced budget, marked the start of a new phase in EU foreign policy and 
particularly in post-conflict.  Solana’s appointment to these posts, following on 
immediately from his appointment as the SG of NATO, meant that for the first 
time the EU had an effective manager who had come to the organisation with 
previous experience of managing a major multilateral organisation.  That Solana 
then proceeded to hold all three posts for the next decade meant that he was 
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able to develop processes and personally manage them across the institutions of 
the EU without being hampered by any infighting or political rivalry.  He was also, 
almost uniquely for a politician at such a level at that time,24 able to see projects 
through from the initial conception phase to delivery.  As a result of the 
appointment of Solana to these three posts, the EU very rapidly went from an 
organisation where decision making was opaque and sometimes confused to 
one where the USA did indeed have a ‘number to call’25 whenever they wished to 
discuss issues with the Europeans and moreover one that had increasing 
confidence and experience in dealing with global issues. 
 
Solana had, as SG of NATO, been directly involved in the NATO air campaign 
over Kosovo.  In his new posts he was now involved in the post-conflict phase of 
the operations and the supervision of the EU pillar of the operations there.  
Solana saw that, in order for the EU26 to be able to assume control of the IC 
missions in Europe’s backyard, the EU would not only have to generate the wide 
range of specialists necessary, the ability to run elections, but would also need 
deployable police27 and military contingents.  These developments initially 
                                                 
24 It is perhaps as a result of their experience with Solana as effectively their ‘chief executive’ for 
international affairs, that most EU senior appointments subsequently have been for either five or 
ten years, for example the recent appointment of Baroness Ashton as Vice-President of the 
European Commission and HR of the EU for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HR FASP). 
25 Henry Kissinger, a former US Secretary of State famously said of Europe in an aside at a press 
conference in 1970: ‘Who do I call when I want to speak to Europe?’.  He was explaining that it 
was difficult to speak to the EEC (as it was then) on European issues and to include them as a 
body in discussions on wider issues. 
26 And the ‘European’ states, as opposed to the transatlantic OSCE and NATO. 
27 As opposed to EUROPOL which was formed in 1995 and which is in practice a central criminal 
intelligence agency.  In practice, apart from duplicating the work of INTERPOL in Europe 
EUROPOL was under the first protocol signed in 2000, given responsibility for money laundering, 
while under the second protocol signed in 2002 has given it competencies to take part in joint 
investigations undertaken by member states.  The third protocol signed in 2003 mandates it to 
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concerned the USA, which had not replaced the UN as a major player in post-
conflict operations within the Western Balkans simply in order to see agencies, in 
which they were voting members and had a veto, replaced by an organisation 
such as the EU where they had no representation.28  
 
The continuing conflicts in the Balkans, including the civil war in Macedonia in 
2001 and commitments in the run-up to the Iraq conflict, led to a change of 
opinion within the USA and hence within NATO.  With NATO support the EU 
commenced its first military operation with EUFOR on ‘Operation Concordia’ in 
Macedonia on 31 March 2003.  Whilst uniquely this was not mandated by a UN 
or UNSC resolution it was specifically requested by the Macedonian 
Government.  ‘Concordia’ was a small force of some 300 lightly-armed men, but 
it demonstrated that the EU itself, as opposed to an EU contribution through 
NATO, could successfully conduct military operations29 in a post-conflict 
environment.30  Just two months earlier the EU had also launched its first police 
mission in Bosnia.  The European Union Police Mission (EUPM) was the first 
mission launched under the ESDP and benefited from the fact that most, if not 
all, of its command structure had previously served in Bosnia under UN CIVPOL 
and that a large number of officers, currently serving with the UN in Bosnia, were 
                                                                                                                                                 
liaise with bodies outside of the EU and to have competencies over a further range of crimes as 
yet to be specified.  See; Professor Steve Peers, The final step in the creation of an “Investigative 
and Operational” European Police Force, pp 1 – 3. 
28 See for example Robert Barry (2003) and (2004), on future roles for the OSCE. 
29 At least for a limited period.  ‘Operation Concordia’ ran until 31st December 2003. 
30 This was thanks to the ‘Berlin plus’ arrangements.  These permitted the EU to draw upon 
NATO assets and capabilities in particular NATO’s intelligence capabilities.  For a discussion of 
these issues see; Annalisa Monaco, Operation Concordia and Berlin Plus: NATO and the EU 
take stock. 
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simply ‘rolled over’ to the new mission31 even if they had not originally been 
seconded by EU member states.32   
 
The EU launched a second and significantly larger33 short-term military operation 
in June 2003, ‘Operation Artemis’.  ‘Artemis’ was deployed to the Democratic 
Republic of Congo (DRC) and represented the first EU deployment outside of 
Europe and indeed beyond the ‘near abroad’.34  Also at this time the EU evolved 
a European Security Structure (ESS) and this attempted to set the boundaries for 
European military engagement, in particular those activities beyond the 
boundaries of the ‘wider’ Europe. Within the ESS and the ESDP35 the EU 
adopted and in practice limited itself36 to the Petersberg37 tasks.  These tasks as 
described by Howorth38 cover humanitarian response, peacekeeping and 
peacemaking.  These operations as defined by the Petersberg tasks permit EU 
intervention, but state that the nature of any intervention must be delimited by the 
principle of ‘just war’39 although peacemaking in particular could potentially 
require very robust military action.  
                                                 
31 The mandate of the EUPM has been repeatedly extended and is now due to expire on 31 
December 2011, according to the EUPM website.  
32 For example Norwegians, Russians, and Ukrainians, 
33 The total manpower involved was about 2,000. 
34 NATO has a policy of engagement with the state beyond its boundaries, so for example 
Armenia, Azerbaijan, Iran, and Syria (via Turkey).  The OSCE likewise has partnering 
arrangements with its ‘near abroad’ through schemes such as the Mediterranean dialogue which 
involves, amongst others, the states of the Maghreb. 
35 Following the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty the ESDP is now the Common Security and 
Defence Policy (CSDP) of the EU. 
36 In theory the ESDP and later the CSDP ‘includes’ the Petersberg tasks, but in practice it is 
unlikely that, at least for the foreseeable future, that the EU will step beyond those bounds. 
37 The ‘Petersberg tasks’ were first formulated by the WEU during a meeting of the council of the 
WEU at the hotel Petersberg, near Bonn, in June 1992. 
38 Jolyon Howorth, Security and Defence Policy in the European Union, p 15. 
39 Ibid., p 54. 
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On 2 December 2004 the EU launched a third military operation, ‘Operation 
Althea’ in Bosnia.  The EU did so on the basis that, unlike Macedonia, this was to 
be a permanent replacement for a NATO force and that this change would be 
mandated by the UN.40  While still supported by the ‘Berlin plus’ arrangements, 
which remain in force in 2011, the force was significantly larger and more 
capable than that deployed in Macedonia or the DRC at 7,000 men.  Over time, 
this force has been significantly downsized and reduced to 2,500 men in 2007, 
supported by ‘over the horizon’41 forces based in EU member states. 
 
In parallel to these military and policing developments, the EU was also 
increasing its share of the world’s development aid.  It applied pressure to the 
ever-increasing number of member states to donate most, and ideally all, of their 
individual aid budgets through the EU mechanisms.  While these later 
exhortations have been only partially successful,42 the EU is now collectively in 
an immensely powerful position when funding post-conflict operations.  From 
2005 onwards the EU has directly or indirectly controlled approximately 50 
percent of the world’s development and hence post-conflict aid, a percentage 
which continues with slight hiccoughs43 to rise. 
                                                 
40 UNSC Resolution 1571 of 4 November 2004. 
41 Over the horizon forces are troops which are stationed in their home countries but which are 
immediately ready for deployment to the post-conflict (or other) mission area in times of 
emergency. 
42 It has for example resulted in the anomaly that the Netherlands claimed for several years to be 
the single largest ‘aid donor’ in Europe, as it continued to give most of its aid bilaterally, whereas 
other larger EU member states placed a far greater proportion of their aid through the EU 
mechanisms. 
43 The figure temporarily dropped to 49% in 2009, in large part due to the world banking crisis. 
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The fact that the EU can now mount autonomous, complex, post-conflict 
operations across the globe, and regularly does so; combined with the direct and 
indirect control of a development aid budget in the order of €56 billion, has given 
the EU enormous potential power in the field of post-conflict.  With the 
appointment of  Baroness Ashton as the HR FASP44 and the development of an 
EU foreign service, the European External Action Service (EEAS) and the ability 
to speak, but not yet to vote, in its own right at the UN, the EU’s capacities have 
been expanded yet further.  With a staff of some 7,000 and a budget running to 
billions of €s, the EEAS will be several orders of magnitude larger than the 
foreign services of even the largest member states.  How these extensive powers 
have been used, may be used in the future and to what ends will be examined 
below.  In particular the relationship between development and post-conflict with 
foreign policy and political objectives.  These are issues which have already been 
hotly debated in the European Parliament (EP) where Baroness Ashton 
presented her proposal for the EEAS on 25 March 2010. Of particular concern to 
the EP was the division of responsibilities between the HR FASP and the 
Commissioner for Development.  Key elements in this debate revolved around 
control of human rights policy and responsibility for the delivery of humanitarian 
aid.45  
 
                                                 
44 She is the first occupant of this position and also serves as a vice-president of the European 
Commission (EC). 
45 See for example the article by Heidi Hautala, The European Parliament wants a genuinely 
European foreign policy. 
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The EU as a regulator and the proponent of the ‘Western Ideal’ 
 
Leaving aside the ‘conditions for entry’ to the EU the ‘acquis communitaire’46 
which is the body of law which must be adopted by aspirant states and which 
must be implemented into domestic law47 prior to admission into the EU, there is 
also the EU’s pursuit of the western state ‘ideal’ in those post-conflict missions 
where the state is unlikely or is ineligible for membership of the EU.  As for the 
determination of these ideals, there appears to be no one set of guiding 
principles laid down in a handbook or manual to which the potential accession 
states can refer.  They appear to consist broadly of an assumption that accession 
states must adopt a wide range of legislation which has been approved by the 
EU, even if it has not been adopted or perhaps implemented by the existing 
member states.  For existing members this is often on the grounds that it has 
been deemed too expensive to do so.  These ideals are encapsulated in wide-
ranging regulations which run across the whole spectrum of governance from 
biometric identity cards to health and safety in the running of abattoirs.  For some 
accession states the regulations are unworkable or make their existing practices 
non-competitive.  That these requirements are increasing can easily be 
demonstrated.  When Croatia started the accession process it was required to 
                                                 
46 These are EU Laws which have either direct or indirect effect upon the member states.  These 
laws and regulations automatically override domestic provisions in law as soon as they are 
implemented. 
47 For Croatia this consists of over 600 different regulations which have been divided into 35 
chapters in the acquis. 
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pass some 450 pieces of new parliamentary legislation.  The figure for Albania, in 
2009, was 610 pieces of legislation and the total continues to grow. 
 
For many years prior to accession and not directly related to the accession itself,  
adherence to these ‘ideals’ can cost money and can distort or delay project work, 
even if the EU is not directly involved but one of its member states is.  For 
instance, where a donor to a project, or the organisation which is implementing it 
on the donors behalf, is either headquartered within the EU or has the majority of 
its staff deployed there, the EU will demand that all work is carried out to a 
standard which meets EU norms and which adheres to EU ‘Health and Safety’ 
(HS) regulations.  In a country such as Albania, or Kosovo, such standards often 
cannot be met, or if so, only at a very high cost.   What is particularly galling for 
both the donor and the recipient is that in many cases the EU will demand that 
the standards which have to be achieved are not met within some of the longer-
serving member states themselves.  
 
One example of this desire to ‘improve’ and to adopt the European ideal which 
appears to act as both a form of benchmarking and a set of philosophical or 
normative principles, are in the areas of HS legislation and social accessibility 
and often lead to a disproportionate cost in the implementation of projects and/or 
a lack of sustainability.  OSCE missions in post-conflict areas have to conform to 
EU HS requirements, as the organisation is headquartered in Vienna on the 
territory of an EU member state.  The resultant additional costs, which in some 
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cases are considerable, are taken from the mission budgets and hence reduce 
the delivery of development programmes on the ground.   In Bosnia there was in 
one round of elections an EU-funded project where registration forms and later 
ballot papers were taken by a small team equipped with a ballot box to disabled 
voters in their own homes or in hospital.  This was done rather than encouraging 
voters to attend a polling station or alternatively to exercise their right to have a 
postal ballot.  This is an extremely time consuming and manpower intensive 
process48 which is not carried out in many, if any, EU countries, but which had to 
be implemented following a recommendation by an EP parliamentarian, so as to 
qualify for EU funding for the elections.49  At the time that this exercise was being 
carried out in urban areas there were several rural municipalities which had 
neither running water, electricity or telephones, but these were of course beyond 
the visibility of the visiting elected EU officials.  Similar exercises have been 
carried out elsewhere in other second world post-conflict missions.  These 
include the fitting of disabled access ramps for wheelchair users and braille 
‘masks’ to fit over ballot papers for blind voters, particularly in high profile urban 
areas, capital cities, and so on.  Again these are provisions that are not made 
across the EU and certainly not in the UK, where a provision exists for disabled 
voters at polling stations lacking access to vote, but these are made either 
outside the door of the polling station or in the car park.50  
                                                 
48 In particular, as each team had to be accompanied by an international observer. 
49 It was while carrying out this exercise that one international observer during the registration 
process was called to a house in Pale where the ‘disabled voter’ was discovered to be Radovan 
Karadzic.  The observer duly registered the ‘voter’ and once safely outside the guarded 
compound contacted the authorities. 
50 In these cases both the ballots and the ballot box are carried out to them by the chairman of the 
polling committee, whilst for blind and partially sighted people there is a provision for them in UK 
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The furtherance of the EU ‘ideal’ is not restricted to high-cost, unsustainable 
regulation and while the point has been illustrated with electoral examples, there 
are numerous other cases.  In many cases the structure and culture of the state 
being assisted in a post-conflict mission is not conducive to the implementation of 
policies which are being decided thousands of miles away, often by people who 
have not been outside of Western Europe except perhaps as tourists.  If one 
examines the role of women in elected political office as an example, whilst the 
introduction of gender quotas is laudable, it has to be done in a manner which 
does not discredit the process and in conjunction with a change in public 
attitudes towards gender;51 a process that can only be carried out through the 
medium of public education.  If a gender quota for women is required, as was the 
case in Bosnia for the municipal elections in 1997, and if then, for the sake of 
greater democracy, the IC choose to operate an open list52 system that results in  
no women getting enough votes to gain a seat, what steps are available?  The 
solution adopted in Bosnia by the HR was to impose the female candidates and 
                                                                                                                                                 
electoral law to vote with the aid of a ‘helper’.  See, the ‘Representation of the People Acts’, 
(amended) in (1989) and the accompanying subordinate regulations.  These are under 
continuous revision.  The latest proposed amendment still in draft bill stage, would permit those 
people already in the queue to vote who are within the ‘precinct’ of a polling station to be issued a 
ballot, provided that they were in the queue before the official closing time of the polling station.  
The definition of a ‘precinct’ is left to the polling station chairman.  This follows the crowding at 
polling stations in 2010 and would if passed into law go some way to bringing UK legislation into 
line with common practice worldwide.    
51 The provision of gender training to the OSCE’s national and international staff in the field 
missions by OSCE experts from the ‘gender unit’ at the OSCE HQ in Vienna was, the field 
missions discovered, a good way of imposing a ‘reality check’ on some of the OSCE’s own 
programmes which were being rolled out across the missions.  The OSCE gender unit welcomed 
the opportunity to come and field test their programmes, but the author saw no indication of this 
approach being adopted by the EU or elsewhere in the IC, except within USAID.  
52 In a closed list system the parties candidates are ‘ranked’ by the party and the voter does not 
get any choice as to who is elected.  In an open list system the voter can ‘rank’ the party list, or 
even, if the list is completely open, vote for candidates from different party lists.  
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to insist that they were elected to the positions regardless of the numbers of 
votes cast.  The electorate could then see for themselves that ‘Western’ 
democratic values and the principle of ‘one man one vote’, were deeply flawed 
and were instead skewed in favour of ‘Western’ values of political correctness.53   
 
Similar ‘quick-fix’ solutions were adopted for increasing, and, in some cases, 
having the first, female police officers in a state and then accelerating their 
promotion so that within a very limited space of time, often only two to three 
years, there were female police inspectors.54  Again, the effect of these and other 
‘quick-fix’ solutions applied not only to women, but also, for example, to 
minorities such as the Roma, served often to weaken cohesion, or to discredit 
the women or minorities, as they often failed in the posts to which they were 
appointed as they had not been given adequate training, or that simply they did 
not have the experience required to do the job.  Thus, what was achieved was 
often the reverse of what was intended, particularly if the post-conflict mission 
and the IC either withdrew from a country or withdrew from a particular sector.55         
 
 
                                                 
53 The mistake was not repeated the following year.  The representatives of the IC insisted that a 
closed list system be adopted and that the electoral code forced the political parties to appoint 
one-third female candidates, evenly spread throughout the list.  The end result was that Bosnia 
had a higher proportion of female MPs than the UK and of most countries within the EU.  
54 The RS in Bosnia and Albania would be two European examples. 
55 In Albania considerable pressure was applied to the authorities to get female police officers out 
of secretarial duties and in to other areas.  This included the traffic branch, but also specialist 
units dealing with rape and other serious sexual assaults, along with assaults and sexual attacks 
on minors.  As an inducement to follow this ‘Western’ model, significant amounts of money, were 
spent refitting and decorating police stations in the major cities and in establishing ‘rape suites’, 
which were comfortable interview rooms for the victims of assault etc.  Within eighteen months 
inspections by the OSCE ‘Presence in Albania’ established that these facilities often no longer 
existed and the women employed in them had been transferred back to other duties.   
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The impact of the EU ‘Brussels-centric’ bureaucracy, on post-conflict programme 
development and delivery 
 
All international organisations tend to be headquarters centric.  Likewise, bilateral 
post-conflict funding programmes are influenced, to a greater or lesser extent, by 
the impressions gained of post-conflict states, not by people deployed ‘on the 
ground’ in the state concerned  but by the civil servants working in their capitals 
in Western Europe and North America.  These policy decisions made in third 
countries influence IC post-conflict mission members, particularly at a senior 
level and affect the ways in which they deliver their programmes.  The 
organisation with the highest percentage of its staff in key posts within its’ HQ,56 
who also have extensive field mission experience in post-conflict countries,57 is 
the UN.  That is particularly so in the key departments which control and manage 
all of their field missions.  Additionally, given their global recruitment policies the 
UN has staff from every country where they deploy and apart from their national 
staff within missions, will also have other international staff from neighbouring 
states in the region both within the field missions and in the HQ.58 
 
                                                 
56 At its’ HQ in New York. 
57 In contrast to those of the bilateral donors whose largest diplomatic missions are always in the 
states of their allies and neighbours.  In the UK case, the average size of a diplomatic mission 
overseas is now seven people and that will often include immigration officers and other 
secondees. 
58 The OSCE does likewise, but prohibits staff from neighbouring states from serving in the 
adjoining missions on a permanent basis (it does permit neighbouring states to send short-and 
long-term election observers however).  
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This headquarters centric view, based for the EU upon the perception of the civil 
servants in Brussels, is particularly relevant to the Western Balkans given the 
centralised decision-making processes within the EU.  It is exacerbated by the 
EU’s tendency to post relatively junior staff to the field missions, which as a result 
reduces their influence with the more senior staff at the HQ.59  Whilst the large 
budget for travel can compensate to some extent, by allowing senior staff to visit 
frequently, it cannot provide the level of knowledge that can be provided by staff 
permanently based within the country. 
 
All field missions are located in, or close to, the capital of the state or entity 
concerned and in almost all cases the most senior staff are usually deployed to 
the senior posts in the HQ.  Given the size of some of the states with post-conflict 
missions, it is understandable that many of these may rarely, if ever, get out into 
the ‘field’.60  Many post-conflict field missions compensate for this, by having an 
extensive network of regional centres where there are usually at least some 
senior staff and the missions often also staff field offices at the local level as 
well.61  The EU has done likewise where it is manning field missions and, 
particularly in such cases as EULEX where it is the lead mission, the field 
deployments are extensive with field teams allocated to each municipality. 
                                                 
59 The UK on a bilateral basis does not do this.  It has in July 2011 announced that it is posting 
the Prime Minister’s national security advisor, Sir Peter Ricketts, as the bilateral Ambassador to 
France. 
60 For example in the DRC where transport between major field deployment locations is by air 
given the distances involved. 
61 The OSCE in Bosnia for instance had four regional centres and 24 field offices.  In Albania 
there were no regional centres, but at one time 21 field offices.  These were appropriate figures in 
the immediate post-conflict period where there had been severe dislocation of the transport 
infrastructure, with travel times often exceeding twelve hours from the capital city.  Also in both 
countries no travel was possible after dark for security reasons.    
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The EU as a global presence 
 
By 2007 the EU had become a global presence and, according to Duddridge, 
had delegations in 118 countries62 and had negotiated ‘country strategy papers’ 
with 140 countries.63  By this stage the EU had therefore effectively negotiated 
country strategies for all save64 those countries in the first world65 and declared 
its intent effectively to have a mandate to operate worldwide.  The House of 
Lords concluded that this gives it a global perspective shared by very few 
member states,66 but in retrospect even this can be seen to have been an 
understatement.  It is clear from the trajectory of EU foreign policy, as shown 
above, that even before the creation of the EEAS it had become an effective 
competitor to the UN in terms of development assistance and post-conflict.  It 
had also taken up the mantle of  two of the pillars67 of the Bretton Woods68 
system,69 in that it was both funding major infrastructural projects such as 
highways and dam construction and by 2007 using up to 30 percent of its’ ‘aid’ 
                                                 
62 James Duddridge et al.  EU Aid: is it effective, p 41.  Duddridge was referring to the situation in 
2005-6. 
63 Ibid., p 41.   
64 This total excludes North Korea and one or two other isolationist states. 
65 The EU, for example, has had a delegation in and a ‘country strategy’ for Brunei since at least 
2006.  The per capita income for Brunei, given its small population size and oil revenues, 
exceeds that of some ‘developed’ countries.  For details see CIA World Fact book, op. cit.  
66 House of Lords’ select committee on the EU, thirty-fourth report, June 2006. 
67 The other two pillars were the World Trade Organisation (WTO) and the General Agreement on 
Trade and Tarriffs (GATT). 
68 The Bretton Woods Agreement on a post-war financial system was signed at Bretton Woods, 
New Hampshire, USA in July 1944.  The whole structure was underpinned at that time by the US 
dollar. 
69  Armand Van Dormael, Bretton Woods: Birth of a Monetary System. 
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budget in providing direct budgetary support to target countries.70  As such, it 
was a direct competitor and an alternative to both the World Bank (WB)71 and the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF).  For third world countries the EU is in an 
unassailable position in that it is effectively a single-source supplier of both 
development aid and budgetary support.72  Additionally, for many countries in the 
third world, the EU is also a major market for their produce and for most a major 
source of commercial Foreign Direct Investment (FDI).   Finally, by establishing 
itself as an effective competitor to the UN, the IMF, and the WB the EU has 
inadvertently in the last decade empowered countries in the second and the third 
world,  giving their leaderships additional leverage by once again73 providing 
them with a choice as to which international organisation should provide funding 
and support.  This is a fact which the more astute amongst the third world 
leadership have not been slow to recognise.  They have though been somewhat 
less aware that, in return, the EU increasingly expects an adherence to Western 
values.  This is a perceived ‘weakness’ in the western European approach which 
others, notably the Chinese74 with their ‘string of pearls’75 policy, initially in 
                                                 
70 Duddridge (2007), p 39. 
71 At the time of Bretton Woods this pillar was represented by the International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), which now forms a part of the WB.  
72 Apart from its projects in the health sphere in Albania, such as hospital refurbishment and 
construction, the EU was providing some 52% of the Ministry of Health’s budget in direct 
budgetary support in the period 2005-7. 
73 Similar to the choice they often had during the ‘Cold War’ when they could bargain between the 
USA and the USSR for donor funds.  
74 For a description of Chinese policy see; Bert Chapman, Geopolitics: A Guide to the Issues 
(Contemporary Military, Strategic and Security Issues), in particular pp 5 and 60-1 for the ‘string 
of pearls’ strategy, which Chapman describes as a ‘nexus of hot spots’ (p 61). 
75 This term was first used in the US DoD to refer to the establishment of Chinese strategic sea 
communications.  The use of the term was rapidly expanded to incorporate China’s rapidly 
growing FDI, particularly into the sources of strategic minerals on the African continent.  
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Africa,76 have been quick to exploit.77  They have also become a direct 
competitor to the EU and the USA in the wider global arena.78  The only area of 
common ground between the EU and China is that they are both willing to 
intervene in, or on, the periphery of a state when their investments are directly 
affected.  In these circumstances - and countering Somali piracy is a case in 
point - they are prepared to work jointly.79 
 
Beyond those countries in which it is running post-conflict field missions, the EU 
has generally restricted its deployments to the capital cities despite often having 
extensive funding commitments within particular post-conflict states.  
Additionally, the staffing levels in these field missions have traditionally tended to 
be extremely modest,80 with individual project staff covering a wide range of 
portfolios.  Given the steadily increasing projects, the field staff have in general 
adopted two strategies:  first, to generally increase the size of the projects 
                                                 
76 Within the last five years China has also significantly invested in strategic mineral resources in 
Australasia and Latin America.  Since 2008 Chinese FDI in Latin America has exceeded that in 
Africa by a factor of ten times.  
77 China was willing to invest in the oilfields in South Sudan and the coalfields in Zimbabwe at a 
time when the EU was condemning these states for their human rights records etc.  The Chinese 
policy is that ‘business is business’, and that they will not attempt to interfere with the internal 
management of states, but only so long as their investments are not affected. 
78 The Chinese underpinned the Argentinian peso by a ‘currency swap’ arrangement with the 
Remnimbi in 2009, effectively guaranteeing the currency.  As such they too are now directly 
competing with the EU, the IMF, and WB in certain discrete circumstances.   See amongst others; 
http://www.slideshare.net/jamesvinall/where-to-invest-in-2009-1440963, accessed on 27 July 
2011 and for a wider discussion of the economic impacts of this change in the balance of 
economic power; Johnny C Chiang, Impacts of East Asian Economic Reintegration on (Asia 
Pacific Economic Forum) APEC – Taiwan’s Role and Strategy. 
79 The EU Naval Force (EUNAVFOR) is engaged in anti-piracy patrols off Somalia and the Horn 
of Africa, a campaign in which both the Chinese and the Russians are also taking part. 
80 In Albania the international EU staff typically numbered between 14-11, with numbers dropping 
over time to 2009, and this despite the fact that the budget was increasing.  This can be 
contrasted with the 80 US based staff in the US Embassy to which could be added another 18-20 
US based staff within the United States Agency for International Development  (USAID) which 
was located in the same compound. 
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financially by concentrating upon elements such as infrastructure and secondly  
to appoint someone else to oversee the project, often one of their own police 
missions, and to trust to their stringent audit procedures to ensure that the EU 
and its citizens receives value for money.  
 
The EU is also at a disadvantage compared to most bilateral funding missions in 
that, until the creation of the EEAS, it had an exiguous political component within 
its delegations.81  This meant that the Head of Mission (HOM) and Deputy Head 
of Mission (DHM) often had to spend the majority of their time engaged upon the 
diplomatic round at the expense of time and effort that could have been spent on 
higher-level project management. 
 
In the circumstances the approach adopted in the field is sensible as all major 
project decisions are referred back to Brussels where they are examined in detail 
and often significantly amended.  There are, however, two major drawbacks to 
this: first, the size of the projects which bidders have to submit in order to obtain 
funding.  The EU is not alone in this.  The Netherlands Embassy as a bilateral 
donor in Albania refused to consider projects which were costed at less than 
€100,000.  The Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA) 
had similar problems, in that SIDA HQ in Stockholm, required their long-term 
project funding to be audited by a reputable international company such as 
Touche Ross or Deloittes on a six-monthly basis.  This, at a minimum charge of 
                                                 
81 This consisted of one international staff member in the case of the EU mission in Albania in 
2009. 
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€5,000 per year, was extremely wasteful as far as small projects were 
concerned.  The most flexible and often the most effective were the Norwegians 
who once offered the author €3,000 in cash, to fund a small but effective rural 
development project.  The OSCE mission had to turn down the money as the 
OSCE system required it to be made as a bilateral ‘pledge’ in Vienna.  This was 
a process that often took months and required the ‘vetting’ and evaluation of the 
project proposal by ‘officials’ in Vienna.  This is exactly the same problem, 
although on a smaller scale, as affects the EU delegations.  
 
The second drawback is the degree of control exerted by Brussels.  Rigid 
adherence to the delivery of standard packages of hardware resulted in a fleet of 
vehicles arriving for the Albanian police82 without the diesel with which to run 
them.  Why was the provision of diesel not a condition of the donation?83  The 
inability of Brussels to modify or radically alter proposals from the field once the 
project funding has been cleared politically in Brussels has unintended 
consequences; hence the supply of totally inappropriate genteel cabin cruisers to 
counter cross-border smuggling across Lake Ohrid carried out on fast, highly 
manoueverable RIB’s. This, despite a visit by EU ‘experts’ who could have seen 
                                                 
82 Fourteen vehicles, which included a bus, were delivered to the police academy in Tirana.  
These sat in the car park until their tyres went flat. 
83 At the same time the OSCE was delivering a large twenty tonne container sized generator, to 
provide back-up electrical power to the police academy.  The generator, moreover, was a priority 
for the police, given the frequent power outages and diesel was found for this item as an 
alternative source of electrical supply was essential to the smooth running of the college.  This 
equipment the OSCE had obtained free of charge from the UN in Croatia where it was redundant. 
The total cost of the generator to the OSCE, including its installation at the police college, 
probably did not exceed €1,500, whereas the contribution of the EU to the refurbishment of the 
college had cost over €2 million. 
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for themselves that punt-type boats were more appropriate to negotiate the 
extensive shallows and reed beds which surround the lake.84   
 
The emphasis on ‘big ticket’ state of the art systems and the volume of giving are 
often hallmarks of donor organisations and not just the EU.  Aid organisations, as 
with other businesses, for the most part measure their effectiveness by the size 
of their budgets.85  For aid organisations, that translates as the volume of 
donations that you make.  For the EU, however, this emphasis is also a function 
of the volumes of development money with which it is dealing and the limited 
staffs available to manage it, as mentioned earlier.  An example of this and the 
‘carrot and stick’ approach adopted by the EU was the introduction of biometric 
ID cards to Albania.  In this case the OSCE was adopted as the implementing 
                                                 
84 Not only were these craft significantly more expensive than PAMECA had intended, but they 
were also less capable.  Furthermore on Lake Ohrid, the cruiser, with only a limited number of 
places to moor and a high profile out of the water, could be clearly seen at all times using 
binoculars from the Macedonian side of the lake.   Given that neither craft was fitted with radar or 
night vision equipment, they were also of extremely limited use at night.  The Albanians were 
pleased with the vessels as they were ideal for entertaining and undoubtedly more impressive in 
terms of display to foreign visitors than a RIB would have been, but the fact remains that in the 
first six months of their operation they detained not one smuggler, which was their primary 
purpose.   
The failure to supply Image Intensifying equipment (II) and Night Vision Goggles (NVG) in this 
case, was another result of EU inflexibility.  The difficulty in detecting fast-moving, low-signature 
vessels at night had already been identified some months before the craft were delivered, but 
because the project funding had been ‘cleared’ politically in Brussels it proved impossible to 
change the specifications for what was required.  In this instance and in a similar case with the 
border police the EU worked closely with the OSCE locally to resolve the issue, but elsewhere 
outside of the OSCE’s areas of operation that is often not possible.  In this case the OSCE 
transferred some redundant II and sophisticated long-range Thermal Imaging (TI) equipment from 
the OSCE border mission in Georgia and ‘loaned’ this equipment to the police.  The OSCE also 
‘loaned’ two instructors from the Georgia mission to provide training in its use and maintenance to 
the Albanian police.  With this equipment the effectiveness of the marine patrols was dramatically 
increased and smuggling was drastically reduced.   
85 The Head of UNICEF in Albania in conversation with the author when referring to ‘other’ IOs in 
Albania. 
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partner and staff provider.86  The author was directly involved as both the overall 
project manager within the OSCE and the OSCE representative on the joint 
steering board with the EU and the Albanian Government.  The project originated 
in the Albanian desire to have greater access to the EU87 through a visa abolition 
agreement.  The EU responded by saying that such an agreement would not be 
possible until such time as Albania had biometric passports and that this would 
not be possible unless they were linked to a biometric database of all adult 
citizens through biometric ID cards.  The system specification called not just for a 
biometric system, but a state of the art system using new technology which 
would give Albania the most advanced ID card system in Europe.  The OSCE 
suggested a scheme based upon the Maltese model.  It is biometric and amongst 
the three most advanced systems in Europe, and is suitable for a small country 
with limited resources to implement and, more importantly, to sustain financially 
over the coming decade.  This less-costly proposal was rejected and the ID card 
and passport tender was eventually won by a group consisting of the French 
company SAGEM™ and a US consortium.  ID card issue commenced in January 
2009 and whilst ‘relatively’88 cheap to the user at €10, the overall cost of the 
project was some US $4 million, with substantial ongoing running costs.  The real 
cost to the Albanians is that it is yet another part of their government architecture 
which they are unable to run themselves due to the lack of suitably trained 
                                                 
86 For which the OSCE contracted specialist long-term experts. 
87 Given that the immediate impact of such access would be large-scale emigration by the 
majority of the country’s youth, as confirmed in numerous public opinion polls, the Albanian 
authorities were presumably largely concerned with increasing the already substantial volume of 
remittances. 
88 Up to 60% of the rural population of Albania subsist on US $2 per day or less. 
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personnel and, moreover, one which gives both the EU89 and the USA 
substantial oversight of the entire Albanian population should they wish to 
exercise it at some future date.  Indeed, the human rights issues, particularly 
those of foreign oversight of a domestic population, should give significant cause 
for concern.  
 
The impact of these and other projects worldwide, binding the recipient state to 
the EU, are matters which should be of concern to the states concerned and to 
their regional organisations such as the African Union (AU) and the Organisation 
of the Islamic Conference (OIC).  That they are not yet so, is perhaps a 
consequence of the EU’s late arrival on the world stage and by the continuing 
fixation of these organisations on the policies of the USA and to a lesser extent, 
countries such as the UK and France.  Whether this ‘happy’, at least for the EU, 
state of affairs will continue is yet to be seen, but it is likely that it will not.  The 
apparent willingness to give the lead in post-conflict reconstruction in Libya to the 
UN may be a reflection of the fact that, in this instance, the EU through the 
involvement of the UK and France is too closely involved in the conflict, or 
recognises that its direct involvement, even in the post-conflict phase, may be too 
controversial. 
 
The emphasis on large projects is unfortunate as it is often the smaller projects 
which are more valuable, particularly amongst small and vulnerable communities.  
The Vlach and the Gorani have already been mentioned in the context of Kosovo 
                                                 
89 Through the French-based company SAGEM™. 
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and the Vlach in particular are to be found in scattered, small, and isolated 
pockets in rural areas throughout the region.90  Because of the scattered nature 
of their settlement they are in danger of losing their culture and particularly their 
linguistic heritage.  This has been exacerbated by standard schooling syllabuses 
and, in particular, by radio and TV programming which invariably is in the 
majority languages of the regions in which they live.  One medium in which the 
use of the language can be maintained is print, particularly if this is directed 
towards weekly or monthly newspapers91 which can discuss common Vlach 
issues and then be distributed in small numbers, but over wide geographical 
areas.   Unfortunately, this is just the type of project which the EU and the other 
major donors are unwilling to support as the funds required are extremely small.  
For the smaller donors on the other hand, such as the Romanians and the 
Poles,92 the project is equally unappealing as it implies a long-term monthly 
commitment, which they are in no position locally to guarantee.  As a result, 
policies to which the EU is strongly committed in principle do not receive support 
and, in this case, the Vlach continue to remain isolated and become increasingly 
absorbed into the surrounding populace.  In contrast within Kosovo the EU 
                                                 
90 Historically the Vlach were associated with shepherding throughout the mountainous areas of 
the Balkans, hence their low density of population. 
91 A decade ago there was a monthly Vlach language newspaper in southern Albania and 
Macedonia, printed in Gjirokastra.  The local funding for this proved insufficient and the paper has 
now closed due to a lack of international donors.  The funding requirement was something of the 
order of €500 per issue in order to sustain the paper.  There was of course no interest shown in 
providing support to minorities by the Albanian Government as support for the Vlach, would have 
led to requests to provide support to the Roma and ‘Egyptians’, which would definitely have not 
been acceptable to them. 
92 Neither could it be funded by using ‘local’ UK Embassy funds as there was no guarantee that 
‘year on year’ funding would be available.  Each UK Embassy typically receives between £75,000 
to 150,000 for ‘local’ small projects.  This money can be spent at the discretion of the local 
Ambassador effectively without reference to London (although it is carefully audited).  
Unfortunately this budget, whilst extremely useful, is the most vulnerable to any economy 
measures and therefore cannot be guaranteed for multi-year projects. 
 405 
funded and ran a TV channel and radio stations, as the funding requirements for 
these were of a scale that could be comprehended by Brussels and of a size that 
could be effectively managed and audited by their staff in the resident mission.93  
Similar structural difficulties in the EU’s implementation of such policies 
undoubtedly exist elsewhere, although beyond the difficulties of communicating 
messages in Rwanda, the author is unaware of them.  Undoubtedly elsewhere, 
particularly in Africa, these difficulties are compounded by a lack of literacy, the 
large number of language groups which may exist within a state, and the lack of 
a written form of the language.94      
 
The impact of potential EU membership on the post-conflict model 
 
Whilst those states which have been the beneficiaries of EU assistance and 
funding in post-conflict can revert to their old methods of working once the EU 
withdraws, those seeking eventual admission to the EU cannot do so.  This will 
force them and the members of the IC missions who are implementing 
programmes to make choices and perhaps to turn down offers of assistance if 
these do not fall within the overall EU model.  Alternatively, it may even force 
them to set up parallel structures where they are unwilling or simply unable to 
dispense with existing organisations.  This has already been illustrated in the 
introduction with the EU ‘coastguard model’, but a similar example exists with the 
policing of borders.  The requirement to remove the military from border control 
                                                 
93 These operations were run through ‘Pillar IV’ of the unified IC structure. 
94 This was the difficulty with the Rwandan refugees in Eastern Zaire.  In other states, particularly 
in West Africa, the numbers of discrete language groups may on occasions exceed 150.   
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functions so as to fall into line with the European ‘model’, led initially to an 
expansion of the role of the police in the Western Balkans countries and later, in 
most cases, to the creation of a specialist border police agency.  The creation of 
this additional architecture, an autonomous force answerable directly to the 
Ministry of the Interior, is expensive.  Not only that, it further fragments the often 
limited pool of highly trained senior police officers and leads to duplication of 
effort.  With a separate agency such as now exists in most, if not all, Western 
Balkan countries, questions of jurisdiction between the border agency, the 
domestic police force, and the customs arise, which could previously have been 
dealt with internally within the police.  If it is a complicated issue for a Western 
European country such as the UK to implement an effective, stand-alone border 
agency,95 then in the Western Balkans it may well prove almost impossible.  
 
In a similar manner to the free movement of goods within the EU and particularly 
within ‘Schengen’,96 the EU was determined to force the Western Balkans into a 
‘mini Schengen’ free trade zone, which it saw as a mechanism not only for 
increasing regional trade, but also as a mechanism for unifying the area and 
stimulating trade across previously impenetrable, or so it thought, ethnic 
                                                 
95 The UK is currently on the fourth iteration of its border policing model, ‘The UK Borders 
Agency’ (UKBA) which was created on 1 April 2008.  This model is to be revised, yet again, in 
2012.  The budget of the UKBA is £2.5 billion and it currently has a staff of 23,000 deployed in 
130 countries (often within embassies). This is perhaps affordable in UK terms, but 
proportionately it is not sustainable in the Western Balkans without external funding. 
96 As a result of the ‘Schengen Agreement’ 1985, the Schengen area was created both between 
some members of the EU and some affiliated countries, such as Norway.  To quote the EU, ‘The 
Schengen area represents a territory where the free movement of persons is guaranteed’.   
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boundaries.97  The problem with this policy was that it would clearly benefit the 
countries which had the most efficient means of production and perhaps the most 
developed transport system, especially to the larger markets beyond the Western 
Balkans.  Given that it was an EU diktat, the states in the southern part of the 
region saw that they had little option and agreed to the proposal, the impact of 
which was to shift the disparity in trade between Macedonia and Albania to 27:1 
in Macedonia’s favour from about 6-9:1.98   
 
The reality, had the EU staffs in Brussels and elsewhere spoken to the EC 
PAMECA mission in Albania, Europol, or any of their other police missions 
working in the Western Balkans, was that business had always transcended 
ethnic divisions and that a ‘Balkan Schengen’ was not needed solely to ensure 
inter-state trade.  If they had enquired, they would have discovered that Hashim 
Thaci,99 Milo Djukanovic,100 and Mira Markovic (Milosevic)101 had all been 
directors of the same bank102 throughout the period 1998 – 2000 at a time when 
the three protagonists were leading organisations that were fighting each 
other.103  If the EU had done that, then they may have realised that such an 
agreement would not necessarily either improve regional trade, nor bring ethnic 
                                                 
97 Conversations with Hubert Petit in 2007–8, at that time the acting head of the EC Delegation on 
the EU’s ambitions for the Balkan Schengen Agreements and other arrangements.   
98 Conversations with Ann-Margrit Westin in 2007-8, Head of the IMF office in Albania for the 
effects of the ‘Balkan Schengen’ Agreement upon the Albanian economy and balance of trade.  
99 Currently Prime Minister of Kosovo and at that time the leader of the KLA. 
100 Djukanovic was formerly Prime Minister and President of Montenegro.  He was accused by 
Italian prosecutors of cigarette smuggling in Italy in the 1990s. 
101 Mira Markovic was the wife of Slobodan Milosevic the former Yugoslav president. 
102 The bank was based in the Republic of Cyprus.  At that time Cyprus was not an EU member 
state. 
103 Unpublished information based upon research by IMC in Montenegro. 
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harmony.  For further confirmation, should it have been needed, a drive past the 
luxurious mansions in Albania close to the border with Montenegro, most of them 
funded with the proceeds of oil smuggling into Milosevic’s Yugoslavia during the 
Bosnian War, remain as a visible testament to the ability of free and, in this case, 
‘unregulated’ trade to transcend national boundaries, even when the person you 
were trading with was oppressing your own ethnic group elsewhere.104 
 
The EU also forced the Western Balkan aspirant states to reduce their trade 
tariffs over a five-year period, down to zero for the EU states, thus opening up 
their markets to EU trade.  This measure meant that the countries concerned 
were no longer able to defend their own companies and primary producers, 
particularly agriculture, which remains the single largest employer.  The impact of 
this imposed legislation was the widespread ‘dumping’ of subsidised EU 
agricultural produce such as Greek melons, for which the farmer in Greece was 
receiving105 €9 cents per melon subsidy, when across the border in Albania and 
Montenegro the sale price during the season was only €3 cents per melon. This 
meant that melons were being sold in these countries for less than they cost to 
produce and the local farmers went out of business.  Similar dumping of potatoes 
and other agricultural products took place, and the effect of this was to either 
drive the producers out of business or for some, particularly in the areas around 
Vlora, to switch to the production of cannabis sativa for which there was a ready 
market both domestically and internationally.  Only in those areas where 
                                                 
104 In Kosovo. 
105 In 2008-9. 
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‘unofficial’ customs import tariffs persisted such as in the manufacture of tiles and 
aluminium windows and doors,106 were local producers able to survive in any 
significant numbers.107  
 
By the time that Albania and the other countries of the Western Balkans finally 
enter the EU and are able to compete on level terms and to claim agricultural 
subsidies, their domestic producers will in many cases either have ceased 
trading or will have been taken over by their European competitors.108  Their 
inability to compete and the small size of their domestic market will mean, just as 
in the Czech Republic, that by the time they finally join the EU or shortly 
thereafter the top ten banks109 will undoubtedly be owned by companies who 
have their headquarters within the existing member states of the EU.110  The EU 
requirement to privatise their insurance provision111 will have a similar impact in 
that sector. These actions by the EU, according to local businessmen, amount to 
economic imperialism and to the takeover of peripheral states as economic 
                                                 
106 And where in the case of Albania 52% of the domestic production was at that time controlled 
by members of the Minister of Finance’s family. 
107 As a closed society in January 1993 Albania was self-sufficient in food and most other 
products, albeit at a low level.  In 2009, with a population reduced by some 20% by net 
emigration, Albania imports many basic food products and almost all of its processed food 
requirements.  This includes ice cream a product for which the Albanians have been famous 
throughout the Balkans for decades.  In 2009 Albania possessed only enough food reserves for 
three weeks average consumption. 
108 The exceptions are in the retail and wholesale fuel oil sector where Russian-owned companies 
now have a significant stake in both Kosovo and Montenegro.  Similarly in Montenegro, the single 
largest employer and energy consumer, the aluminium industry, is also Russian owned by 
companies directed by Mr Deripaska.  Many other commercial operations in Montenegro are also 
Russian owned. 
109 The brewing industry in Bosnia, Montenegro, and to a large extent Albania is already under 
Western European ownership.  
110 Raffeisen, the Austrian based bank, already has a leading market share in most, if not all, 
Western Balkan countries. 
111 The two state-owned insurance companies in Albania have been part-privatised by selling off 
shares in the business to the European Development Bank (EDB) in London. 
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colonies, prior to absorption within the ‘empire’ that is the EU.  Whilst that might 
be an extreme description of the process, it is indeed difficult not to see the 
current EU regulations as leading to a form of economic imperialism, particularly 
when these ‘penalties’ are tied to ‘inducements’ such as the offer of visa-
liberalisation.112       
 
All of these decisions have affected the post-conflict model in that they apply 
pressures from one institution to which that state must respond, regardless of 
whether that institution (the EU) is the mission lead in post-conflict or not.  In 
Kosovo in the period to 2009 the UN was technically the lead pillar, but the 
government of Kosovo was far more responsive to the EU, not only because 
membership of the EU is an ultimate goal but also because it had been declared 
as the long-term aim that control of the post-conflict mission would be transferred 
from the UN to the EU. 
 
For those post-conflict states in the Western Balkans which are on the path to 
accession or who are aspirant EU members, the EU remains a goal which is to 
be achieved.  This is not particularly politically contentious as they are widely 
regarded by other states as falling within the EU sphere of influence. This relaxed 
approach may change if the EU deploys into either Moldova or Georgia as part of 
                                                 
112 On many issues, the manner in which the EU is negotiating with its ‘near abroad’ is very 
similar to that of the USA (with Canada) when negotiating North American Free Trade Area 
(NAFTA) accession arrangements with the smaller states of Central America. Indeed, the 
penalties and inducements are often identical.  An additional lever being exercised in the NAFTA 
negotiations is that it is an all or none policy when it comes to Costa Rica, Nicaragua, etc.  This 
places additional pressure on those states which are more developed and economically 
successful such as Costa Rica, as the terms are much less attractive. 
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the resolution mechanism of the frozen conflicts there and the transition to post-
conflict.  In particular, if the EU recognises either Moldova or Georgia113 as a pre-
accession state and signs a Stabilisation and Accession Agreement (SAA) with 
them, what will be the response of Russia to that act?114  What message would 
that give to Turkey, which is arguably the second regional power in the area, if 
they have not already been permitted to sign an SAA?  Would they see it as 
confirmation that the EU regards itself as primarily a Judaeo–Christian 
confederacy and if not by them, might not that be the interpretation put upon it by 
other Muslim groups?115 
 
Conclusion 
 
It is clear, as has been shown in this thesis, that over a period of less than twenty 
years the EU has assumed and is acting out, a state-like role and is now 
behaving as nation-states have done previously in their imperialistic pasts.  Even 
where the EU is not present in person with missions and diplomats deployed on 
the ground, the EU is present in the form of its financial contributions.  These 
payments fund post-conflict activities and the controlling impact of the EU on the 
programmes of other institutions such as UN DPKO or UNICEF can often be 
marked.   
                                                 
113 This is a less likely scenario. 
114 Particularly response to any EU approaches to Moldova, given the Russian’s close 
relationship with the break-away Trans-Dnestr region, the area which is the cause of the current 
‘frozen conflict’. 
115 In this context, although it may fall outside the scope of this work, how does the EU reconcile 
its special trade arrangements with Israel, in effect treating it as an ‘honorary European’ state, 
with its failure to grant similar rights to other Mediterranean littoral states? 
 412 
 
Unlike the UN, increasingly the EU does have its own army, even if this is under 
the control of the member states and, in addition, it possesses a cadre of 6,500 
policemen trained to a common EU standard and who, unlike those employed by 
the UN, are declared by the individual member states as being immediately 
available for deployment.  Through its ‘Berlin plus’ agreement with NATO the EU 
has been able to avoid having to make unnecessary investments into long-term 
and technically complex military areas such as intelligence,116 by utilising 
NATO’s resources.  This particular development can be seen as one specific 
benefit of the appointment of Javier Solana by the EU.  Given his experience he 
could see the direct benefits to the EU and could understand the natural 
synergies,117 particularly in intelligence between the EU and NATO and, 
moreover, had the high level military and diplomatic contacts to make this 
development a reality.    
 
Having negotiated a source of good intelligence the EU, unlike the UN, is able to 
openly employ intelligence as a part of its mission planning and implementation 
for post-conflict.  These features of EU deployments in post-conflict are systemic 
advantages which the EU118 possesses and of which the UN can only dream.  
                                                 
116 Cyber defence and possibly in the future ‘cyber offence’ is another area where there are 
natural synergies between the EU and NATO, as is the security of the maritime littoral of Europe 
up to the limit of the 200 Nautical Mile (NM) Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ).  
117 There are other if less obvious synergies.  In return, if not directly for intelligence sharing, 
NATO no longer has to fund infrastructure projects such as highways at the peripheries of its 
member states.  In the twenty-first century projects such as the NATO-funded highway from 
Erzurum in central Anatolia to the Armenian border will be funded instead by the EU. 
118 The French Ministry of Foreign Affairs in describing the CFSP on its website actually cites the 
‘vast range of instruments’ which the EU is likely to deploy in support of its diplomatic (political) 
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Finally, and again unlike the UN, the EU has a guaranteed funding stream from 
its member states so that it can commit to long-term policies and strategies 
confident that within reason, the monies to make them a reality will be present.  
The UN post-conflict missions, on the other hand, are subject to mandate 
reviews at least annually and the funding is allocated on a similar short-term 
basis.   
 
In terms of ‘rapid response’ to a humanitarian crisis where there is a potential 
requirement to be able to rapidly project military force, the UN has at its disposal 
only the Nordic-based UN Standby High Readiness Brigade (SHERBRIG).119  
This force, which has been deployed on several occasions in Africa120, is only 
available for a maximum of six months for each deployment, at which point it 
must be relieved by other UN peacekeepers and will then not be available as a 
UN ‘reserve’ for a further eighteen months.  In contrast the EU has at its disposal 
the EU Rapid Deployment Force (RDF), a far more capable and potentially multi-
brigade size force121 which can be kept in position for a sustained period of time.  
As a result EU politicians can be pro-active in considering the deployment of this 
                                                                                                                                                 
activities ‘which no other regional organisation in the world possesses’.  Amongst those which it 
cites are preferential or free-trade agreements and policies on the facilitation of visa-abolition 
agreements etc.  
119 The Canadians are also a contributor. 
120 The UN deployed the SHERBRIG Bde to the Eritrea-Ethiopian border in the late 1990s, 
Liberia in 2004, and more recently Dharfur. 
121 The RDF are for the most part troops assigned to NATO which can be re-assigned to the RDF 
and supplemented by troops from non-NATO EU member states; Finland, the Republic of Ireland 
and Sweden.  Again these developments occurred during the period when Javier Solana was the 
SG and benefited from his experience within NATO.  This force, unlike the much smaller UN 
SHERBRIG, is effectively at zero cost to the EU until it is deployed as all costs are borne by the 
NATO bilateral member states and NATO itself.   
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force as was admitted by Finnish Foreign Minister Alexander Stubb in the context 
of a potential EU involvement in the Libyan conflict.122      
 
Increasingly for the developed world, primarily Western Europe and North 
America, the EU is rapidly becoming the institution of choice for post-conflict 
interventions, as with no third world or other potentially ‘difficult’ members,123 it 
can be managed more easily than the UN and also is not, unlike NATO, overtly 
at least military.  This is particularly so in sub-Saharan Africa where the USA 
maintains a ‘no boots on the ground’ policy124 and where some reliable ‘proxy’ is 
required.  The impact of the EU, as both the principal implementer within the 
post-conflict mission and the principal funder, clearly alters the dynamic of the 
post-conflict model as the EU is responsive to its own needs and requirements 
and not those of external funders who, in the case of the UN, acted as one of the 
checks and balances as far as the deployed missions were concerned.  For 
those post-conflict countries that aspire to membership of the EU the changing 
dynamics of political and economic influence can be very rapid.  In Albania, for 
example, a country which remained resolutely linked to the US dollar until 2006, 
despite being awarded over US $200 million in ‘millenium development goals’ 
funding, it is now clearly the EU who dictates Albanian foreign and increasingly 
domestic policy and not the USA.   
                                                 
122 As Finland is not a member of NATO any involvement by Finland militarily would be through 
the mechanism of the EU RDF.  Alexander Stubb spoke to YLE Uutiset News on 22 March 2011.  
123 Such as the members of the BRIC. 
124 Although the USA has established an Africa Command (AFRICOM), the ‘no boots on the 
ground’ policy means that this is headquartered in Stuttgart with some HQ elements stationed at 
RAF Molesworth in Cambridgeshire. 
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Whilst the EU arguably has a legitimate role in its ‘near abroad’, which would 
include the countries of the Mediterranean basin and the Caucasus, its role in 
leading, rather than just participating in, post-conflict missions further afield is 
perhaps more questionable and whilst its efforts in bringing about the Aceh 
peace accords in the wake of the Indian Ocean tsunami were laudable, it is 
questionable whether the post-conflict mission that was then deployed to Aceh 
should solely have consisted of staff from EU member states.  Whilst it is 
possible that the UN would not have been an appropriate partner, it is 
questionable why the EU did not seek to actively engage the Association of 
South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) more closely in the post-conflict process.     
 
Finally, the issue of effective EU governance of non-EU space is clearly going to 
be a topic which will increase in importance and political sensitivity and will merit 
further study in the future.  It might best be referred to as ‘governance without 
government’ and in addition to the cases in the Western Balkans already 
illustrated, countries on the fringes of ‘EU space’ where this might occur could 
include Moldova, Georgia, Azerbaijan, and perhaps the Ukraine.  EU involvement 
in the state of Palestine, one might argue, goes beyond the ‘edges’ of EU space 
and may be more controversial.  The EU is heavily engaged in developing the 
policing and justice sectors of the Palestinian State and is probably already its 
largest funder if indirect funding is included.  EU-produced food helps sustain the 
Gaza ‘strip’ and EU funds support the UNRWA and other relief agencies.  
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Increasingly the Palestinian State is coming under EU financial and diplomatic 
protection and it is for this reason that some Israeli and US commentators took 
such an extreme view when the concept of the EU RDF was established, seeing 
it as a direct threat to Israel’s sovereignty.125  While the Palestine issue is 
perhaps the most controversial, this will become a more general issue as the EU 
moves beyond the boundaries of Europe.  The topic of EU ‘governance’ of non- 
EU space is one which will have to be addressed if not by the EU itself then by 
other regional organisations and individual states.    
 
                                                 
125 See amongst others, EU rapid deployment force aimed at Israel in United Jerusalem, 22 
December 2002. 
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Chapter 9 
 
An Analysis of Post-Conflict Intervention and the Legacies and 
Consequences of IC Intervention in BiH and Kosovo. 
'Post-Conflict and Post-"Colonial" Reconstruction, the new Imperialism?'1 
 
Introduction 
 
What were the ‘legacies’ and ‘consequences’ of the IC’s involvement in post-
conflict within the Western Balkans?  While this might be an elision of ‘conceptual 
clarity’,2 the author is assuming that in general the post-conflict interventions 
were in some way ‘planned’ and that there were both intended and unintended 
and unanticipated consequences and that, for analytical purposes, these bear on 
the main aims of the thesis.  Bearing this in mind this chapter will examine both 
the intended, unintended, and unanticipated legacies and consequences of the 
IC’s management of post-conflict within the Western Balkans including the fact 
that the IC, through primarily the medium of the EU, remains heavily engaged in 
both Bosnia and Kosovo.  The chapter will also examine what did not work well 
and what were the successes that could be used to better effect in future, while 
recognising that the conflicts in the Western Balkans took place in a unique 
                                                 
1 ‘The Concise Oxford Dictionary’ - In this case taken to mean the second of the two definitions 
usually given in standard works namely, “a policy of acquiring dependent territories or extending a 
country’s influence through trade, diplomacy, etc”.  
2 See William K. Frankena, Ethics (Foundations of Philosophy) for a discussion of this issue.  In 
particular see Chapter Two, Program for Egoistic and Deontological Theories.  
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locale and at a unique time of transition within the wider Europe.  Particularly for 
Bosnia and Kosovo, it could be said that the intentions are in part being realised, 
but the planned implementation has been nowhere near so successful.   
 
Before examining the legacies and consequences, this chapter will need to be 
prefaced by a consideration of the key features of post-conflict intervention in the 
latter quarter of the twentieth century and in the twenty-first.  Within this wider 
thesis this chapter will examine whether the IC’s actions as part of post-conflict 
represent an attempt at ‘post-colonial reconstruction’ or a new form of 
‘imperialism’.  These actions will be examined in this chapter exclusively in the 
context of the wider IC, as represented by both Bosnia and Kosovo, the ‘quint’,3 
and the Peace Implementation Council (PIC).4  It will cover the period between 
1996 and 2006 in Bosnia and to 2008 in Kosovo.  It is, however, a theme which 
goes beyond this chapter as the thesis has already recognised the increasingly 
omnipresent role of the EU and what it betokens, both within the Western 
Balkans and more recently as a worldwide actor in the preceding chapter. 
 
Do the post-conflict reconstruction models used in the Balkans and other 'post-
UN’ conflicts represent a return to a new form of ‘colonial’ model?5  If it is not, 
does this remain an issue and if so, how can the international community 
                                                 
3 The ‘quint’, p. cit. Frontispiece fn 12.  The quint and the PIC were responsible for both Bosnia 
and Kosovo. 
4 The PIC for Bosnia is comprised of the representatives of 55 states.  The ‘chair’ is the High 
Representative and the steering board members are, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, 
Russia, UK, USA, the Presidency of the EU, the European Commission and the OIC represented 
by Turkey.  
5 Hobsbawm (1997), op. cit.  In particular pp 57-60. 
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demonstrate that its actions are not colonialist?  There are a number of specific 
questions which need to be addressed.  First, both Bosnia and Herzegovina 
(BiH) and Kosovo were and are widely referred to as 'protectorates'.  Is there any 
validity in that statement and if so, how much? 
 
Second, how can the IC ensure progress in reconstruction and conflict resolution 
whilst not appearing as an 'ersatz' colonial power?  What mechanisms can be 
embedded in the 'reconstruction model' so as to ensure that international donor 
resources are used wisely by domestic government partners?  Having provided 
the resources should the IC then seek to retain any control over how they are 
managed6 if a locally elected democratic structure is already in place? 
 
Should a small group of self-selected nation states,7 or increasingly, one major 
regional organization,8 be permitted to both fund and implement post-conflict 
reconstruction outside of the UN or other internationally recognised bodies?  If so 
what effective oversight mechanisms exist given that this group may embody 
major donors to the UN and perhaps often, UNSC P5 members?  How much 
influence can regional organizations exert and what is their relevance when it 
comes to strategic decision making within these groups? 
 
 
                                                 
6 If not, then what should have been the role of the 'high representative' following the first round of 
democratic national elections in BiH? 
7 Such as is the case with the PIC, for both BiH and Kosovo.  
8 The EU. 
 420 
 
Do the post-conflict reconstruction models used in the Western Balkans 
represent a return to a new form of ‘colonial’ model?   
 
Before we discuss the post-conflict model, it could be argued that Kosovo was in 
fact functioning as a colonialist and imperialist model9 up and until the NATO air 
strikes in the spring of 1999 - in this case, the colonialists were the FRY.  
Amongst others, Noel Malcolm10 describes a system that fits the colonial model 
perfectly, one where the Kosovar population, nearly 85 percent per cent of the 
whole, held only half as many positions in public administration as the Serb and 
Montenegrin minorities and an entity, where the principal object of the Yugoslav 
investment funds was to support primary industries: ‘whose products were then 
supplied at artificially low prices to processing industries elsewhere in 
Yugoslavia’.11   
It is at least arguable that the impact of the international intervention was to free 
the Kosovars from a colonial regime and to create a genuinely autonomous 
region in an area where none had previously existed.   
 
For BiH, the GFAP12 makes it clear in the text that control over defence,13 the 
police,14 and elections15 is or was vested in the PIC. These are usually regarded 
                                                 
9 In its classical form which would have been recognizable to J. A. Hobson cited in Hobsbawm 
(1997), op. cit.,  pp 83 and 383. 
10 Malcolm (1998), op. cit. 
11 Ibid., p 337. 
12 GFAP (1995), op. cit. 
13 GFAP Annexes 1A and 1B. 
14 GFAP Annex 11. 
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as determinants of a free nation state and it is clear that the absence of control 
over these areas has traditionally been a good indicator of colonial or some other 
form of subordinate status. In a similar manner the GFAP also mandates the 
military peacekeeping force, the so called ‘implementation force’ (IFOR), to 
accurately delineate the internal and international boundaries of BiH.16   
 
However, unlike many other imperialist or colonial examples, within the GFAP 
the PIC insisted upon the sanctity of the existing boundaries of the ‘republics’ as 
they were in the former Yugoslavia - including BiH.  This was in line not only with 
international law, but was also enshrined in the OSCE ‘acquis’17 and has been 
consistently maintained despite the wish of at least one element of the 
constituent population18 to be subsumed within a neighbouring state.  This 
insistence on the international boundaries of BiH was maintained19 despite the 
                                                                                                                                                 
15 GFAP Annex 3. 
16 GFAP Annex 2. 
17 CORE Research Institute, The Culture of Dialogue, the OSCE Acquis 30 years after Helsinki, p 
11. 
18  The Bosnian Serbs as evinced by numerous surveys from1996 to 1999 were consistent in 
wishing for their portion of BiH, the RS, to be unified with the Serbian Republic within the Former 
Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY).  
19 The PIC rested their case upon the sanctity of the 1945 boundaries and the position of the UN 
with regard to international boundaries.  This is summarised by Jackson and Zacher, p 5, as 
follows:   
The UN Charter of 1945 entrenched the territorial status quo. The principle of self-
determination was affirmed, but it was set in a context of respect for existing territorial 
boundaries. Aggressive war was forbidden. The right of self-defense was now the right of 
existing UN member states to defend not only their territory but also their citizens and 
thus to preserve the inviolability of their nation-state. 
It is possible, if the above statement is interpreted literally, to also use it as a justification for the 
approaches adopted by Milosevic, Tudjman, and Karadzic to the Bosnian crisis; as they could all 
have argued that they were striving to maintain the 1945 boundaries.  
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relatively recent establishment of the current boundaries20 of the ‘republic’ within 
the former state of Yugoslavia.21 
 
In the case of BiH, the principal problem of the GFAP from the point of view of 
those who wish to demonstrate that through the PIC the IC was not acting in a 
colonialist and imperialist manner was Annex 10. This annex covered the civilian 
implementation of the agreement and gave the appointed ‘high representative’ 
extensive but initially ill-defined powers, to facilitate the implementation of the 
GFAP.  In practice, the wording of Annex 10 appointed the commander of IFOR 
as his military alter ego, whilst stating that:  
The High Representative shall have no authority over the IFOR and shall 
not in any way interfere in the conduct of military operations or the IFOR 
chain of command.22   
This instruction made it clear that initially the two leadership positions, 
independently appointed, were of an equal status.23  However, in practice, as 
civilian reconstruction took priority and the need for purely military security 
diminished, the position of the high representative24 became established as the 
                                                 
20 Both the ‘republic’ of BiH and the present boundaries were established only in 1956 and then 
incorporated territories which previously formed parts of the Croatian and Serbian republics within 
Yugoslavia.   
21 And this continues to be the case.  This was despite the fact that a completely contrary 
decision was taken in the case of Kosovo in 1999. 
22 GFAP Annex 10, Article II 9. 
23 GFAP Annex 10, Article II 5, 6, and 7. 
24 This was also evident in the status of the individuals appointed to the post of High 
Representative, at least during the first seven years post-conflict.  Men such as Bildt, 
Westendorp, and Ashdown were of a similar stature within the Europe of the late twentieth 
century to the pro-consuls of the Victorian period (or for that matter the Roman period), men for 
example such as Curzon who were both senior crown servants as Viceroy of India and major 
political figures in their own right.  This contrasted to the more junior officers, and increasingly so, 
sent to command SFOR.  The commander of IFOR, on the other hand, as the initial management 
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key post.25  This development was later to influence the decision making when it 
came to Kosovo, with many international actors arguing that the commander of 
the Kosovo Force (KFOR), should simply act as the head of one of the ‘pillars’, 26 
within the post-conflict Kosovo structure and be answerable to the High 
Representative.27  
 
Annex 10 of the GFAP also provided protection to other international actors in 
Bosnia, particularly the UN and other multilateral bodies, by stating: ‘that the High 
Representative shall respect their autonomy within their spheres of influence’,28 
but significantly did not provide similar protection to the national entities.   In this 
sense, the status of the High Representative, as originally defined in the GFAP, 
could be said to be analogous to that of a colonial governor who traditionally 
enjoyed wide powers over the ‘native’ population but often had only limited 
control over the officials managed by other government departments of the 
colonial power and who usually had extremely limited and often no control over 
the military commanders assigned to his area.  In defence of this arrangement, 
as not being ‘colonial’ in nature, it could be argued that as originally conceived 
the GFAP was seen primarily as a ‘ceasefire agreement’ to be replaced with a 
                                                                                                                                                 
structure implies was only one post away from the most senior uniformed command appointment 
in the UK.   
25 Initially, as has been demonstrated in the Bosnia chapter, this situation was complicated by the 
slow pace of the civilian build-up and in particular that of the office of the High Representative 
during the period December 1995 – April 1996.  IFOR, on the other hand, was able to use many 
resources previously deployed in support of UNPROFOR and was therefore fully operational from 
the date at which the GFAP came into effect, which was 14 December 1995. 
26 This proposal was firmly resisted by the USA amongst others. 
27 Again the importance of the High Representative’s position was demonstrated by the 
appointment of a major European figure (and at that time still a possible future candidate for 
French president), Bernard Kouchner. 
28 GFAP Annex 10, Article II 1. (c). 
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more durable solution in nine months to one year.  That said, it was clear that by 
the time of the Kosovo crisis in 1999 the GFAP had in fact become a permanent 
feature29 of post-conflict Bosnia and yet a similar construct was agreed for 
Kosovo. 
 
As it became clear that the GFAP would not be replaced within one year with a 
new agreement at the national level, so the powers, both of the High 
Representative and of his alter ego (now the SFOR commander) were gradually 
increased.  Ironically, these reached their apogee under Lord Ashdown30 who 
during his long tenure ‘imposed’ more requirements and sanctions upon the 
various entities than any of his predecessors.31  Among the measures ‘routinely’ 
taken throughout the period from 1995 to 2006 were such wide-ranging activities 
as the dismissals of politicians at all levels, the dismissals of judges and other 
members of the judiciary, police, the army, and government officials and such 
items as the imposition of ‘common’ number plates, new personal identity 
documents, and perhaps in the most extreme case of all, the forcible closure of a 
bank,32 using direct military action. 
                                                 
29 It was realised, perhaps as early as 1996, that the GFAP had in practice become the ‘bedrock’ 
upon which all other post-conflict decisions were to be based.  It was realised that to renegotiate 
any one part of the GFAP meant renegotiating the entire document and this the IC was unwilling 
to do.  This was an increasingly limiting factor within Bosnia as time progressed and stifled much 
progress. 
30 Lord Ashdown was the High Representative for Bosnia from 27 May 2002 to 30 May 2006.  As 
early as July 2002 he was described as the ‘EU Viceroy’, by Mark Steyn – Daily Telegraph, 7 July 
2002.  In June 2007 he was described as ‘a former viceroy of Bosnia’, by Michael White – The 
Guardian, 22 June 2007.  
31 This was at a time when according to the traditional post-conflict development model the IC 
should have been increasingly handing powers back to the democratically elected national 
authorities.   
32 The Hercegovacka Banka, a Bosnian-Croat managed bank headquartered in Mostar, with 
approximately twenty branches throughout the Bosnian-Croat occupied areas of Bosnia. 
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Cited as a catalogue of events these acts clearly look to be colonialist and very 
probably imperialist in nature.  Indeed, they could be seen to be excessively 
harsh or even to compare unfavourably with the ‘de-Nazification’ process 
undertaken by the allies from 1945.33  The vesting of such powers in one person, 
who in the eyes of the people for whom he is to manage, emerges from an 
anonymous group of international representatives, could be said to be worse 
than that of a colonial governor whose source of power was undoubtedly 
understood and therefore to a degree regarded as ‘legitimate’ by the subject 
people, namely the monarch or president in the ‘mother’ country. 
 
In practice, the view of the initial appointment of the High Representative and his 
staff as a ‘governor’ or even ‘dictator’ with ever-widening powers is unsound, as it 
is to look at the events as they unfolded in BiH and are still unfolding in Kosovo, 
outside of a historical perspective. In practice, the widening of the powers was 
gradual, generally taken to deal with an observed problem and often undertaken 
to achieve generally beneficial objectives.  That said, in the hands of a strong 
politician who was confident in the support of the PIC such as Lord Ashdown the 
governor’s mandate could be interpreted as that of a virtual dictator.  
 
                                                 
33 By 1949, only some three years after the war, Germany had a functioning parliament and an 
effective chancellor in Konrad Adenauer.  At an equivalent stage of development to Ashdown’s 
appointment in Bosnia, Adenauer had already been chancellor for over a year. 
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To illustrate this gradual widening of powers we can identify as examples four 
actions linked in purpose but separated in time.  In the first half of 1996 IFOR34 
ordered that all military checkpoints on public highways be removed. In 1998 the 
High Representative35 enforced an order bringing into use common vehicle 
licence plates and then approved the issue of the ‘convertible mark’ with a 
guaranteed value36 underwritten by the national banks of “Western countries’.37  
Finally, the High Representative issued an instruction that the ‘entity’ police 
forces could not remain in one fixed location, when close to the IEBL separating 
the Bosnian-Croat federation from the RS, for more than thirty minutes.   
 
All of these measures, appropriate to the time at which they were introduced, 
were designed to ensure freedom of movement and were intended to assist the 
creation of a unified state.  They also could not have been imagined at the time 
that the GFAP was written.  Subsequently these measures have been proved 
effective.   
 
In practice, the High Representative, unlike the colonial governor, was unable to 
function alone.  As with the governor, he had the military commander but in 
                                                 
34 Commander IFOR was General Sir Michael Walker from the UK.  He acted in the absence of 
any instruction from the High Representative, Carl Bildt.  Significantly, independent action of this 
kind by the military commander in Bosnia did not occur after the transfer of command from IFOR 
to SFOR and the assumption of command by US generals.   
35 Carlos Westendorp was High Representative from June 1997 - July 1999. 
36 This was an essential condition in order that the new currency be accepted.  Up and until this 
stage and for some time after, the Croatian ‘Kuna’ and the Serbian ‘Dinar’ remained in use in 
areas of Bosnia dominated by these ethnic groups.  It was the collapse of the Dinar on the 
international markets which finally brought the new currency into widespread use in the RS.  
Given the success of the ‘Konvertible Mark’, a new currency underpinned by the EU was 
introduced into Kosovo almost immediately. 
37 In practice, this is the Bundesbank of the FRG. 
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addition had to work with a consortium of other internationally appointed officials 
with varying degrees of power – known as the group of ‘principals’.38  This 
structure would appear at first sight to give a broad spread of international 
responsibility, but in practice at any one time three of the principals between 
1998 and 2002 in Bosnia, were US citizens, as were two of their deputies.  
 
For Kosovo, this grouping of ‘principals’ was formalised from the outset by the 
establishment of a ‘pillar’ structure which gave each international organisation, a 
specific area of competence.  In addition to preventing overlapping, or attempting 
to do so, the pillar structure by bringing together the UN and three of the regional 
and sub-regional organisations39 gave the international management of Kosovo 
increased credibility and could also be seen as an attempt to demonstrate a clear 
indication that the management of Kosovo was neither colonialist nor imperialist 
in nature.  As such the ‘pillar’ structure was radically different in concept to say 
the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) in Iraq.  This was not only a US 
framework organisation but one which at one stage had only thirty-four of its US 
staff members who were not funded by the US DoD.40  So whilst the pillar 
structure was subsequently successfully ‘reverse engineered’ and introduced to 
BiH, it can be seen to be something of an evolutionary ‘blind alley’ in terms of the 
                                                 
38 Initially the group met informally and this only later became codified as the ‘principals’.  It 
included the commander of SFOR, the UN SRSG, the head of mission of the OSCE, the head of 
UNHCR within BiH, and the Commissioner of the UN IPTF.  Significantly it did not include any of 
the bilateral ambassadors, even from the principal contributors and donors.  Unless one of ‘your’ 
nationals held a key appointment, then receiving any read out from these meetings was 
potentially difficult for a bilateral ambassador. 
39 These were the UN, UNHCR, EU, OSCE, and NATO (KFOR). 
40 For a discussion of the CPA see D.L. Phillips (2005), op. cit. 
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development of those post-conflict structures with worldwide utility as it has not 
been used in the same format elsewhere. 
 
The situation in Kosovo was also different from that of BiH at the outset in that 
the entity had to be largely created with the arrival of the IC.  There were, for 
example, few members of the police and no one in the judiciary who were 
members of the Kosovar population.41  Unlike Bosnia, therefore, the issue for the 
IC was rather more one of creating and training new structures than of 
establishing and maintaining control of existing organisations. 
 
How can the international community demonstrate that it is neither colonialist nor 
Imperialist?   
 
Colonialists and imperialists as commonly understood have usually attempted to 
bring their ‘values’, often those of Western Europe or North America, and 
attempted to implant them into the colonial populations.  In the English language 
there has in the past been talk about the ‘spreading’ of values and religious 
beliefs.  This use of language has given the impression that this process has 
been somewhat ‘benign’, but the reality has often been rather different.  The 
spread of ‘Western’ religions is perhaps an obvious example, but Western 
educational methods and regulations enforcing changes in the standards of 
dress and the forbidding of ‘unacceptable’, but traditional, cultural and legal 
                                                 
41 There were also of course no ‘national’ authorities, as Kosovo had never existed as an 
independent state previously. 
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traditions have also been amongst the typical impacts of colonial rule, at least at 
the point when the occupying power had secured full control of the area.42  For 
the most part local culture and heritage was permitted but only if it was 
‘civilized’43 or ‘fitted in’ with the wishes of the colonial power or was seen to 
reinforce some beneficial aspect of the colonial regime. 
 
This has clearly not been the case with the IC in either BiH or Kosovo.  In both 
cases the international administration worked, at least initially, to ensure the 
continuity of old and established working practices wherever that was feasible. 
With regard to the court system, for example, in both cases these are based 
upon the former Yugoslav model.  In BiH the identity card system has maintained 
the numbering system developed during the Yugoslav period and so on.  All of 
this was done not only to speed the regeneration of the state mechanisms but 
consciously, so as to maximise the continuity with the past and hence to 
reinforce their legitimacy in the post-conflict period.44 
 
                                                 
42 As a historical example, the banning of ‘Sharia Law’ and the veil in Soviet Central Asia, in the 
aftermath of the Russian revolution is a case in point.  These areas had initially been loosely 
annexed and lightly garrisoned by Tsarist Russia in the 1860s and 1870s, but the Tsarists had 
been content to assume only titular control over these areas, largely to deny them to the British.  
Despite moving into the areas in the aftermath of the Russian civil war the Communists did not 
achieve full control over the area until the early 1930s.  
43  The British administration moved to ban the practice of ‘suttee’ or the burning of widows on 
their husband’s funeral pyre in India.  It was made illegal in 1829 even before the UK Government 
took over direct management of the colony from the East India Company (EIC). 
44 Despite their antipathy to Milosevic and the Belgrade-based regime the Kosovars wanted little 
to do with the Albanians and saw little in the Albanian system either pre or post the communist 
regime that they would wish to emulate.  It is also worth remembering that Albanian society had 
virtually imploded following the ‘pyramid’ shares scandal and was itself in a state of post-conflict 
in 1999. 
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The IC and in particular both IFOR and its successor in 1997 SFOR in Bosnia 
were scrupulous in the protection of cultural monuments as laid down in the 
Geneva Convention.45  In addition, the GFAP established an ‘Agreement on the 
Commission to Preserve Cultural Monuments’.46  This has not been a traditional 
facet of previous colonial powers and tradition where the colonial regimes have 
often been noteworthy in removing the former symbols of power and often 
replacing them with their own,47 in some cases going so far as to relocate the 
capital cities of their newly acquired colonies.48  Whilst in practice the ICs 
reputation in this respect was diminished by the despoliation of many of the Serb 
religious heritage sites during the early post-conflict period in Kosovo, it is clear 
from the ceasefire agreement with the Serbs and the ordinances passed that 
their intentions at least, in Kosovo, were identical to those in Bosnia. 
 
The rebuilding of the famous ‘Turkish’ bridge at Mostar,49 which was funded by 
the IC and the reconstruction of which was assisted by SFOR,50 was a major 
project which symbolised the re-unification of the state of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina and a historic link with the past.  While previous colonial regimes,51   
have maintained the bridge, it is unlikely that they would have rebuilt it in a 
                                                 
45  Francoise Bouchet-Saulnier, The Practical Guide to Humanitarian Law, pp 297-304. 
46 GFAP, Annex 8. 
47 The Lutyens-designed public buildings in New Delhi being but one example. 
48 As also the Austro-Hungarians had done.  They moved the ‘capital’ of Bosnia from Travnik to 
Sarajevo upon their annexation of the territory from Turkey. 
49 The old ‘Turkish’ bridge at Mostar was finally re-opened in June 2004. 
50 In particular the recovery of the original masonry from the bed of the river into which it had 
been blown when it was demolished during the war. 
51 For example, the Austro-Hungarians who occupied Bosnia 1878–1918. 
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similar manner had it been destroyed and it is clear that the IC regime was 
sensitive to cultural and religious nuances and symbols. 
 
The IC in BiH and Kosovo, unlike most previous colonial regimes, has fostered 
and often funded a post-conflict flowering of interest in local art, literature, and 
culture generally52 and fostered the opening up of these items to Western 
Europe.53 Amongst other examples, these have included a renewed interest in 
and the publication of works by Ivo Andric54 including Bridge on the Drina for 
which he won a Nobel laureate and the Day of the Consuls,55 as well as works by 
his contemporary the poet Aleksa Santic56 amongst them Selected Poems57 and 
works by modern poets such as those collected in Scar on the Stone,58 the 
publication of which was supported by foreign donors59. 
  
 
 
                                                 
52 This occurred in particular within the local communities.  Within a ‘traditional’ colonialist and 
imperialist model these would have been suppressed locally and replaced with the imported 
culture from the ‘mother’ country. 
53 It could be argued that this had happened in the Victorian period, but in those days it was 
achieved by the widespread looting of items of local cultural heritage and their removal to Europe. 
54 Ivo Andric 1892 – 1975, was winner of the Nobel Prize for Literature in 1961.  ‘Bridge on the 
Drina’, was ostensibly a historical novel about the bridge over the Drina at Visegrad in Bosnia and 
was his most famous work: Ivo Andric, The Bridge over the Drina.    
55 The book which was written during the turmoil of the Second World War tells the tale of the 
many different nationalities and faiths living in Travnik, the former capital of Bosnia during the 
Napoleonic invasions between1807 and 1814: Ivo Andric, The Days of the Consuls. 
56 Aleksa Santic (1878 – 1918), lived for most of his life in Mostar. 
57 Aleksa Santic, Selected Poems.  This volume is only available in Bosnian.  
58 Chris Agee (Ed). Scar on the Stone - Contemporary Poetry from Bosnia. 
59 The publication was supported by ‘Northern Arts’ and by a grant from the Soros Foundation’s 
‘open fund’ which paid for the translation into English.  
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How can the international community ensure progress in reconstruction and 
conflict resolution whilst not appearing as an 'ersatz'60 colonial power?   
 
The use of the pillar structure and multi-agency involvement from the IC went a 
long way to ensuring that the ICs involvement in both BiH and then Kosovo in the 
early years of the twenty-first century, was not seen by the wider IC, if not by the 
Kosovars themselves, as colonialist and was intended to be demonstrably not so.  
This IC involvement in post-conflict, which included61 the USA as a major 
partner, can be clearly contrasted with the activities of the USA in Iraq in the 
period 2003–4, which some would claim did show all of the hallmarks of a 
colonialist regime. 
 
Most colonial regimes were built around simple economic structures designed to 
benefit the ‘home’ countries or the principal of ‘unequal exchange’ as described 
by Hornborg62 and Hobsbawm who notes, that ‘the Lancashire unions joined with 
the Lancashire cotton masters to insist that India must remain deindustrialized’.63   
 
                                                 
60 This word translates as substitute or replacement in German. It is commonly used as an 
adjective in English with a somewhat pejorative meaning, as is intended here (but not in the 
original German, for which the equivalent pejorative word would be ‘surrogat’). 
61 The USA remains a major partner in both Bosnia and Kosovo, but has in recent years operated 
‘behind the scenes’ so as to ensure that the post-conflict and transition activities in both states 
are seen as being led by the EU.  The EU has a somewhat more ambivalent approach when it 
comes to Albania in that although Albania is a NATO member and an EU aspirant the USA 
openly wields much more influence whereas in practice the EU has more direct control over 
developments.  
62 Alf Hornborg, Footprints in the cotton fields: The Industrial Revolution as time–space 
appropriation and environmental load displacement, pp 74–81. 
63 Hobsbawm ‘Age of Empires’ (1997), op. cit., p 72. 
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For the most part these involved the export of raw materials, often minerals, 
followed by the import of manufactured goods from the ‘home’ countries.  The 
export of cotton from India and Egypt64 in the nineteenth century and the import 
of manufactured textiles, which was often made possible by a tariff system,65 into 
those same countries would be a case in point. 
 
From the start the IC in BiH and Kosovo adopted a policy of economic 
empowerment and development.  Not only to provide employment, but also to 
raise the per capita GDP and so reduce the burden of economic support on the 
IC.66  Attempts, often successful, were made to re-establish traditional linkages 
between business in BiH and markets in Germany for example.  This included, 
as but one example, the restarting and reconnection of a knitwear factory in 
Trebinje employing nine hundred workers with its market outlets in Germany.67  A 
similar linkage was established between a furniture factory employing six 
hundred people in Banja-Luka and its pre-war distributors also in Germany.  In 
addition to encouraging the return of traditional foreign direct investors such as 
BATA shoes in Travnik the IC encouraged new investors in, to take advantage of 
the availability of the highly skilled Bosnian labour force.  This included such well-
known names as Hugo Boss in Travnik and Burberry in Gradacac,68 both of them 
involved in quality-clothing production, for Western and worldwide markets.     
                                                 
64 See for example Angus Deaton, Commodity Prices and Growth in Africa, pp 23 – 40.  
65 This principal of ‘unequal exchange’ was clearly recognised at the time, at least by some 
amongst the leadership of the colonialists themselves.  For example see the Labour party leader; 
J. Ramsay Macdonald, The Government of India. 
66 Which for Bosnia alone, had reached US $5.1 billionn by 2001. 
67 This was assisted by the fact that the suppliers in Germany were of Yugoslav extraction. 
68 Where Burberry maintains three factories within the municipality. 
 434 
 
Beyond that, the IC also provided low or zero interest investment funds for small 
and medium enterprises, so as to increase economic sustainability and to lessen 
the need for imports.  This included the creation of dairy products factories in 
Travnik as well as extensive fish-farming operations69 in the north of the country.  
At the micro level, industries involving the collection of herbs 70 and of apiary for 
the collection of ‘royal jelly’,71 for the cosmetics industry were also developed, so 
as to assist with the regeneration of the rural economy.  These sustainable 
industries were developed under local ownership, again not a feature of many 
colonial economies.   
 
Within BiH, the IC also dealt with the problems of the major industries such as 
the steelworks at Zenica,72 the aluminium smelter in Mostar,73 and the large 
reserves of mainly poor-grade ‘brown coal’ at Gacko, Tuzla, and Ugljevik, as well 
as the cement and chemical industries,74 the latter mainly concentrated around 
                                                 
69 Prior to the conflict many of the UN’s experts on fish farming originated from Bosnia, so there 
was a strong technical skills base locally as well as an extensive extant infrastructure.  The 
external funding is required because of the time taken to generate the first commercially saleable 
product. 
70 The collection and sale of rare herbs through a local NGO and the establishment of a collective 
helped make viable the return of displaced Bosniacs to the rural areas surrounding the town of 
Srebrenica.  
71 This was collected in particular in the hilly rural areas of the RS around Banja-Luka.  Northern 
RS and the federation’s Posavina Canton in the same area also produce commercial quantities of 
tobacco, primarily for local consumption.  The re-starting of this production did not require 
external financial assistance. 
72 The core of the steelworks at Zenica was based around UK technology of the 1960s such as 
was used at Margam in South Wales (since closed).  It was located in Zenica by Tito for strategic 
and not economic reasons.  The rusting remains of a second steelworks at Prijedor in the RS will 
be referred to later in this chapter. 
73 The plant at Mostar was the sole source of high-grade aluminum for aircraft turbines etc in 
‘Western’ Europe. 
74 Most of these moved into German control through the mechanism of the Deutsche Gesellschaft 
für Technische Zusammenarbeit, the German Agency for Technical Cooperation (GTZ), who 
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Tuzla in the north of the country.  Many of these larger industries75 were 
privatised or sold off, some to international companies,76 while others received 
extensive foreign subsidies to ensure their survival.77  While it could be argued 
that there has been a degree of ‘economic colonialism’, this has clearly not been 
the principal aim of the IC, which has worked hard to secure the primary 
industrial and manufacturing base of BiH. 
 
In parallel with the above the IC has encouraged the development of new 
industries such as tourism and in particular eco-tourism.  Eco-tourism and winter 
sports,78 particularly in the area surrounding Sarajevo79 for example, offer the 
prospect of considerable, sustainable, wealth generation.80  In the short term, 
however, its growth within Bosnia is hampered by two factors, a lack of 
infrastructure and the presence of over two thousand minefields, many poorly 
                                                                                                                                                 
eventually oversaw the purchase of some 75 businesses with potential for success by German 
buyers.  For the chemical industry the model to emulate was that of the Croatian company ‘Pliva’, 
which was floated on the European stock exchanges and is now a major company in the 
European chemical industry.  
75 They had even pre-conflict suffered from the effects of the financial crisis in the former 
Yugoslavia from 1981 and had in most cases remained un-modernised and hence were 
uncompetitive in the post-conflict period.  FDI was therefore essential to get them up and running 
again in an economic way.  As an example of the effects of under investment, the brown coal 
open-cast mines were using diesel lorries to transport the brown coal to the railheads, despite the 
presence of belt conveyor systems.  This was because they lacked the investment capital to 
replace the worn belts.  Once this was done, coal production was markedly increased and 
delivered at a cheaper cost.   
76 Following strong German Government pressure and with the support of the Croatian 
Government, the Mostar aluminium works was sold to German interests. 
77 One such example being the Zenica iron and steel works. 
78 Both developments have been extremely successful, albeit on a relatively small scale within 
Montenegro, which is a neighbour to Bosnia, Kosovo, and Albania.  Of the three, Albania has 
made the most progress with small-scale eco-tourism projects and these are down entirely to 
private enterprise, as are those in Montenegro. 
79 Building upon its international standard airport, extensive hotel base and linkage both to the 
conflict and the 1980 ‘winter Olympics’ and for the historians the assassination of Archduke Franz 
Ferdinand in 1914.   
80 Tourism will also help to sustain such expensive items of infrastructure as Sarajevo airport 
which was totally rebuilt with IC funds after the conflict.  
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marked.  Within Kosovo, the high levels of pollution and the lack of any ski 
resorts within the area controlled by the central government81 will also ensure 
only limited progress in this area. 
 
There was little that the IC could do to help sustain those industries that were 
placed in BiH and Kosovo for ‘strategic’ reasons by Tito’s82 Yugoslavia. These 
include a steelworks for the manufacture of Rolled Homogenous Armour (RHA)83 
in Prijedor, the numerous weapons manufacturing plants in Travnik,84 a 
detonator factory formerly employing more than four thousand people in the 
small town of Gorazde, and the military radar factory in Banja-Luka,85 as but four 
examples of a dozen such complexes.  Additionally there were other ‘non-
strategic’ plants located in BiH to provide employment in rural locations which are 
unlikely ever to function again.  These include a wire mill in Gorazde86 and a 
battery factory in Srebrenica.87  Finally, there were also those ‘high tech’ 
industries in which Yugoslavia invested heavily and which have either seen their 
                                                 
81 There is a fully equipped ski resort at Brezovica in Kosovo but it is in the south of the country 
on the Macedonian border and within a small pocket of 12,000 Serbs which remains under Serb 
control.  The Serbs closed the ski-lifts when Kosovo declared independence in 2008.       
82 Josip Broz, a.k.a. ‘Tito’, President of Yugoslavia from 1945 until his death in 1981. 
83 RHA was used only in tank and warship manufacture.  RHA has now been replaced by such 
materials as titanium and ‘Chobham’ armour in modern Armoured Fighting Vehicles (AFV). 
84 These primarily manufactured artillery pieces and multi-barrelled rocket launchers, with the 
smaller plants producing hand grenades and small arms ammunition.  Most were closed by IFOR.  
85 The radar plant in Banja-Luka was capable of building and maintaining sophisticated air 
defence radars.  As the only such plant capable of maintaining the ‘straight flush’ radar system 
within Europe but outside of Russia this was a strategic site.  This air defence radar which was 
used by all of the former ‘Warsaw Pact’ countries was a critical asset and radars from these 
countries were taken to this site for repair and rebuilding throughout the conflict and immediately 
thereafter.   
86 Again this was a very specialist plant.  It made the wire which forms part of car tyres and before 
the conflict had supplied tyre-manufacturing plants in Germany 
87 The battery factory was the principal location where the Bosniacs were held, including many of 
the men subsequently murdered, after the fall of Srebrenica in 1995.  It has recently been re-
opened as a museum. 
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market share diminish, or which have become increasingly concentrated in the 
hands of a few large ‘global’ companies.  One of these areas was in computer 
mainframe design and the development of the associated software, an industry 
that for Yugoslavia was centred in Sarajevo.  With the dislocation of the war and 
consequent cessation of work the industry has now completely disappeared from 
the economic scene within Bosnia.88   
 
As Noel Malcolm makes clear89 there was a classic ‘colonial’ economy in 
Kosovo, but this was functioning well before the arrival of the IC.  Kosovo’s 
primary industrial base and energy resources were used to provide cheap 
imports to the remainder of the former Yugoslavia, while its rapidly growing 
population supplied markets and a cheap labour force.  The effective closure of 
the border with the remainder of Yugoslavia after 1999 has resulted in a rapid 
decline of even those industries that had survived the NATO air campaign.90  
Subsequent to 1999 the IC has attempted to re-establish some industries, but the 
absence of a skilled labour force91 and of markets has hampered reconstruction. 
 
Here though as elsewhere in Bosnia and Kosovo92 the IC has a ‘blind spot’ and 
one that was easily identified by those working in the community such as the 
OSCE.  This was in the provision of skilled technical personnel, everything from 
                                                 
88 The skilled technicians did, however, provide a pool of highly qualified and literate English 
speaking staff for the IOs and NGOs.  This was hardly the best use for their considerable skills. 
89 Malcolm (1994), p 337. 
90 The silver mining described in most economics and geography books of the former Yugoslavia, 
was in any case in terminal decline as was ‘deep’ coal mining in Bosnia. 
91 Under the former regime many key posts were denied to Kosovars and most skilled jobs were 
held by Serbs or ‘outsiders’ from other parts of Yugoslavia. 
92 A similar system existed in Albania and elsewhere under socialist systems. 
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Heavy Goods Vehicle (HGV) drivers to electricians and machine tool makers.  
Prior to the conflict, all trades people and technicians had been trained at JNA-
run, technical high schools.  These were uniformed military technical training 
establishments where young people from the age of 15 were both taught a trade 
and given pre-military training.93  These schools all closed at the beginning of the 
various conflicts in former Yugoslavia and remained closed, as military 
establishments, when the IC arrived post-conflict.  As a result of the failure to 
produce technicians domestically, even by 2002 it was becoming increasingly 
difficult to recruit such basic skilled personnel as trained electricians and HGV 
drivers etc, as there were by then none available who were aged under 30.  This 
issue was raised several times by the larger IOs before the author left Bosnia in 
2002, but nothing was done as it would mean that a completely new system 
would have to be established, one that did not depend upon the military.  This 
issue, while apparently specific to the Balkans and Eastern Europe,94 is, 
however, typical of the ‘blind spots’ that can afflict the IC in a post-conflict 
operation, particularly as the impact of ‘doing nothing’ is not immediately 
apparent but is cumulative.  It will therefore, as in Bosnia, become one of the 
many unintended legacies and consequences of the IC’s management of post-
conflict. 
 
                                                 
93 Sarajevo had two such military technical schools one at the Tito barracks in the centre of the 
city and the other at the Rajlovac airfield on the outskirts of the city. This second school trained 
radio and communications technicians. 
94 It does go wider than this however.  It is worth noting that even at the stage when the author 
arrived in Albania in 2002, both the fire service and what we would regard in the UK as the 
‘National Health Service’ (NHS), formed an integral part of the Armed Forces and nurses and 
doctors, etc, took part in military parades.  These types of arrangements are common in many 
socialist countries.  
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What mechanisms can be embedded in the 'reconstruction model' to ensure that 
international donor resources are used wisely by domestic government partners?   
 
The Rome95 and Paris96 declarations can ensure that IC donor activity is co-
ordinated and transparent.97  These mechanisms can also be used to examine 
external funding to prevent not only the ‘double-funding’ of projects,98 but also to 
ensure that any funding meets the overall objective of national development.  
Similarly, the International Monetary Fund (IMF)99 can also play a useful role in 
preventing excessive indebtedness and by preventing investment by national 
authorities in unnecessarily grandiose or wasteful projects.  None of these 
checks and balances are operative, nor are they necessary, in a classic colonial 
economy where the colony is or has been dependent upon the ‘home’ country as 
the sole source of funding or guidance. 
 
In the cases of BiH and Kosovo which are both within Europe, the role of the EU 
and the Stabilisation And Accession (SAA) process should also provide effective 
mechanisms for control of the manner in which donor resources are used by the 
domestic government partners, but as we saw in the previous chapter, that is not 
                                                 
95 The Rome Declaration on aid harmonisation in February 2003. 
96 The Paris Declaration on aid effectiveness of February 2005. 
97 For reference to the discussion on the IC’s ‘aid effectiveness’ subsequent to the Paris 
declarations see amongst others; Daniel Kaufmann, Aid Effectiveness and Governance - The 
Good, the Bad and the Ugly, pp 26–9.   
98 One project was also identified in Albania that had been ‘triple funded’.  The project had been 
100% funded by USAID, the Netherlands, and the Soros Foundation.  This only came to light 
when the OSCE became involved as an ‘implementing partner’ and discovered that ‘costs’ were 
being recovered from three separate sources. 
99 On some occasions it can also act as a counter to the WB, a fellow UN Institution, as 
increasingly can the EU. 
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always the case.  Theoretically the SAA process provides for strict guidelines and 
timetables over government activities with a series of targets to be achieved.  
Whilst broadly similar for all states aspiring to EU membership these 
requirements are tailored to individual circumstances and can and are used to 
ensure compliance in particular areas of concern.  The treatment of minorities or 
of detainees should be two such examples, however it is clear from what has 
occurred in Kosovo that the treatment of all minorities, not just the Kosovo Serbs, 
has clearly failed to meet what most people would regard as an acceptable 
criteria.  In Albania, repeated reporting by the OSCE and the Danish refugee 
council and others has demonstrated that the treatment of detainees, particularly 
those kept in ‘pre-trial detention’, gives serious cause for concern.100 
  
In addition, there are strict but flexible controls over EU funding, which forms the 
bulk of the reconstruction and nation-building funds available.  The Community 
Assistance for Reconstruction, Development and Stabilisation (CARDS)101 
funding programme102 in particular did not allow the placing of contracts by the 
local beneficiary and so could have been used to shape domestic government 
activity, so that it focuses on the primary essential activities, had the EU so 
wished. 
                                                 
100 That this is so, is even acknowledged by the Albanian legal code which counts time served in 
pre-trial detention, as ‘time and a half’ for sentences served.  One 18 year old who was the 
lookout for a mugging gang spent three years in pre-trial detention prior to being sentenced. 
101 In December 2000 CARDS replaced OBNOVA and PHARE as the instrument for EU 
programme assistance to the Balkans. 
102 The value of the programme as originally conceived was €4.93 billion with €4.65 billion being 
earmarked for the years 2001-6.  The beneficiary countries were those of the former Yugoslavia 
less Slovenia and Albania.  As at 2010, CARDS funding was still being disbursed for projects 
such as the Albanian identity cards.  
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Other ‘sticks and carrots’ include potential membership of NATO at some 
stage103 and in the shorter term the membership of the ‘Partnership for Peace’ 
(PfP) which brings significant financial and technical advantages.  In addition, the 
entry requirements for NATO stretch far beyond those obviously associated with 
military forces and into such areas as police training and control of borders 
etc.104  
 
Should a small group of self-selected nation states be permitted to both fund and 
implement, post-conflict reconstruction outside of the UN or other internationally 
recognised bodies?   
 
The example of Iraq would probably suggest no.  In the case of BiH and Kosovo, 
however, the PICs as originally constituted, before the effective take over by the 
EU, functioned under the umbrella of the UN and with a considerable degree of 
transparency.  Furthermore, this transparency extended beyond the member 
states to all of those states and institutions such as the UN and its member 
bodies who were implementing the post-conflict reconstruction.  At the time of the 
commencement of the post-conflict reconstruction effort in BiH, the UN was 
probably at the nadir, in terms of its reputation with the governments of the 
                                                 
103 Albania and Croatia joined NATO in 2008. 
104 Among the requirements for NATO membership is the requirement for a significant proportion 
of the officer and NCO cadre to speak English to an increasingly high standard as they progress 
through the ranks.  Could the requirement for all new entrants to NATO to speak English be seen 
as colonialist?  It is possible that some existing member states, in particular France, might think 
so. 
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implementing states, following the apparent failure of its UNPROFOR mission 
and was unlikely to have been capable at that stage of conducting a successful 
post-conflict reconstruction within BiH.105  By the time of Kosovo, some three and 
a half years later, the situation had altered somewhat and the UN was once 
again given a leading role.   
 
Both Bosnia and Kosovo have illustrated that an IC ‘coalition of the willing’ if 
broad enough and working under an overall UN mandate are capable of 
implementing a post-conflict reconstruction and nation-building exercise without 
appearing to be either ‘colonialist’ or ‘imperialist’.  The fact that ‘final status’ talks 
were initiated in Kosovo only seven years after the conflict and that Bosnia was 
formally moved from its ‘post-conflict’ status in spring 2007, only eleven years 
after the conflict, would superficially at least appear to reinforce that view.  In fact 
optimists could argue that in this respect the PIC demonstrated a rather less 
‘colonialist’ timetable than either the UN itself106 or its effective successor, the 
EU.  
 
If so, what effective oversight mechanisms exist, given that this group may 
embody major donors to the UN and perhaps often UNSC P5 members?  The 
Paris and Rome declarations have already been mentioned and these provide 
both oversight and transparency to the actions of major donors.  While the USA 
for example, does not always play a full part in these mechanisms most of the 
                                                 
105 If only because it is unlikely that it would have been able to raise sufficient funding. 
106 Given that the UN’s first peacekeeping mission was to Palestine where it remains deployed. 
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major IC donors do and in particular the EU, the single largest donor in the case 
of both BiH and Kosovo.  
 
Unlike even the late colonial and imperialist era, when regional organisations 
either scarcely existed or were weak, Europe at least has a range of strong, 
vibrant, and vocal regional organisations. While in other continents there may 
only be one ‘regional’ grouping, within Europe you have a ‘bag of golf clubs’,107 
where you can choose the most appropriate organisation or organisations for the 
job:  NATO, OSCE, EU, and the COE. These all have differing capabilities and 
strengths, with the OSCE having the broadest geographical spread.108 
 
Organisations such as the EU and NATO can exert considerable influence within 
the PIC, due to their political and financial strength in the case of the EU and to 
their control of security mechanisms in the case of NATO.  Other regional 
organizations, too, can be influential, particularly as they comprise amongst their 
membership all of the member states represented on the PIC.  In addition, some 
organisations such as the OSCE are specifically mandated under the UN,109 to 
involve themselves in the resolution of post-conflict situations and ‘failed’ states.  
In fact, the OSCE was a possible alternative to the UN as the lead agency in 
Kosovo from 1999 and, as was discussed earlier, at one stage seriously 
                                                 
107 A. J. Finnen, lecture at the NATO School, Oberammergau, Germany on 5 July 2005. 
108 The OSCE and NATO include two states in North America.   The OSCE has 56 member 
states.  The EU currently has 27 members, NATO 28, and the COE has 47 members.  
109 The OSCE is mandated as a regional organisation within the UN framework.  See also the UN 
Charter Chapter 8 – Articles 52 and 53 which permit local resolution of disputes by mandated 
regional organizations. Article 54 in the same Chapter says that the organization must keep the 
UNSC informed at all times about such activities. 
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considered for such a role by some actors and was in fact, the probable 
‘preferred’ solution of the US.  
 
Additionally, many of these superficially overlapping regional organisations have 
also developed specific areas of expertise such as the OSCE-ODIHR which has 
focused amongst other areas110 upon election observation and electoral reform.   
By maintaining international electoral observation not only of those elections 
administered by states, but also by international bodies such as the UN and the 
EU within and now beyond111 its geographically mandated area, the OSCE-
ODIHR seeks to guarantee the impartiality and neutrality of the election 
organisers as well as their competence.112 
 
Some organisations such as the COE and in particular the ‘Venice 
commission’,113 a body dealing with legal, constitutional, and in particular 
electoral affairs, have a history of providing impartial advice and of being seen to 
be more ‘theoretical’ than practical implementers.114  As such, they are not seen 
to form any part of a potentially colonial model, particularly as their presence 
within states which they are assisting is generally extremely small.115  
 
                                                 
110 Amongst other areas of direct relevance to both Bosnia and Kosovo are minority rights and 
the freedom of religion. 
111 This took place for the first time in Afghanistan for the elections to the ‘Loya Jirga’ on 9 
October 2004.   
112 OSCE-ODIHR “Code of Conduct for Election Observers”. 
113 It is the COE’s advisory body on constitutional affairs and was established in 1990. 
114 The COE does implement projects, although these are often at a governmental level and in 
specialist areas such as data protection or electoral legislation. 
115 On most occasions cases are ‘referred’ to the Venice Commission and there is no in country 
presence.  
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For most of the colonialist and imperialist era, the colonial states represented a 
cartel of the most powerful states, although as Fear notes: ‘before 1945 most of 
the world thought that cartels brought widespread benefits’.116   
 
During that period any state which did not support the colonial regimes generally 
kept its own counsel117 or suffered the consequences.  Criticism if any was 
muted and generally came from other colonial powers in response to what were 
perceived to be extreme cases of brutality, or deviations from the colonial 
norm.118  With the collapse of the colonial powers and in many cases the 
reduction of their status within the world order, this approach changed rapidly.  
This was particularly the case as the former subject nations were able to play the 
two power ‘blocs’ off against each other during the ‘Cold War’ era.  By the last 
quarter of the twentieth century it was clear that any state participating in what 
might be perceived as a colonial activity would face considerable opposition from 
Third World states not only bi-laterally, but perhaps more effectively multilaterally, 
through organisations such as the UN where regardless of contribution or 
population size each state receives the same voting rights. 
 
                                                 
116 Jeffrey Fear, Cartels and Competition: Neither Markets nor Hierarchies, p 1. 
117 Thailand signed a treaty of ‘Amity and Commerce’ with the UK in 1826, but harboured an 
ambition to regain much of Burma from the British.  This ambition was partially and temporarily 
realised between, 1941 and 1945, at which time Thailand was allied to Japan.  Thailand 
recognised that more was to be gained from negotiation with the colonial powers than by 
competing with them, as the successful negotiation of the ‘Anglo-Siamese Treaty’ of 1909 
demonstrated.  This treaty led to the return of the provinces of Satun, Pattani, Yala, and 
Narathiwat which had formerly been a part of British Malaya.   
118 Such as the outrage of the Western European elites at the Belgian treatment of the native 
population of the Belgian Congo during the very early twentieth century, prior to the First World 
War.  This pressure led to the abandonment of ‘royal’ control over much of the Congo.  
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The impact of globalisation, particularly the power of control over oil resources, 
has given Third World states that previously were just simply ignored, 
international influence and ensured that whatever colonialist/imperialist ideas 
might exist within the minds of any of the planners for any future post-conflict are 
opposed and discarded.  This is the case with both Bosnia and Kosovo where 
two of the larger contributors119 are particularly sensitive to this issue due to their 
colonial pasts.  
 
In addition to the ‘formal’ structures the role of the media has also changed 
dramatically since the days of colonialism and imperialism.  Not only is the media 
now an ‘instant’ source of  information, but it has also become truly ‘global’ with 
corporations such as Rupert Murdoch’s News Corporation forming part of those 
multi-national business groups which can no longer be said to be under ‘national’ 
control.  Time-Warner’s CNN satellite TV news service is another such entity,120 
which not only had a dramatic impact worldwide on how people perceived the 
military campaigns in Bosnia and Kosovo,121 but also influenced the way in which 
they believed the post-conflict activities were being carried out.  These were 
issues which CNN ‘insiders’ such as Pike,122 were only to aware of.  This though 
is a ‘partnership’ as the media and the electronic media in particular, has often 
been used by members of the political elites such as Richard Holbrooke.123  
                                                 
119 The two states were the UK and France.  They were larger contributors both in terms of troops 
and financial assistance,. 
120 Piers Robinson, The CNN Effect: The Myth of News, Foreign Policy and Intervention. 
121 Ibid.  See p 93 for a description of the ‘CNN effect’ in Kosovo. 
122 Sidney Pike, We Changed the World: Memoirs of a CNN Satellite Pioneer. 
123 Robinson (2002), op. cit., p 11. 
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Furthermore, many in the political classes would argue that in the last quarter of 
the twentieth century and the beginning of the twenty-first, many areas within the 
media have become bastions of the ‘liberal’ elements within society and have 
shown themselves to be generally ill-disposed towards colonial regimes, 
particularly those of other states.  As such they have become and remain 
generally strong supporters of self-determination and the avoidance of colonial 
strategies.  
 
‘Transparency’ is the key word in the modern world and this has affected not only 
the worldwide scene in the broadest sense, but also the understanding and 
access to information of citizens particularly those within the ‘West’.  The citizens 
of the participating states of the PIC did and continue to scrutinise each facet of 
the activities of their governments in Bosnia and Kosovo, particularly in times of 
financial stringency.  It is no longer possible for a Western democracy to carry 
out typical ‘colonial’ activities such as that of the suppression of the ‘Mau Mau’ 
campaign124 without coming under mediated scrutiny from the population in the 
home country.125  Furthermore, the presence within the home country of citizens 
from the populations directly affected, often now naturalised and holding 
citizenship and political rights126 in their ‘host’ countries, ensures that there is an 
alert ‘domestic’ audience within most of the countries of the PIC. 
                                                 
124 The successful colonial response to a liberation campaign fought in the rural areas of Kenya 
from 1951 to 1956, with considerable brutality being displayed on both sides. 
125 In this case which is continuing even some 60 years after the campaign took place. 
126 At the 2005 general election there were, according to the acting returning officer, 
approximately 650 registered voters of Albanian or Kosovar extraction in the ‘marginal’ city of 
Peterborough constituency, for example, and on which occasions the incumbent Labour 
candidate was defeated by a small margin.   There are estimated to be some 70,000 Albanians in 
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One further factor which has had no parallel during the colonial era127 has been 
the effect of the displacement of the indigenous population during the periods of 
conflict. This has had a significant impact, particularly within Bosnia, on the 
populations of both Bosnia and Kosovo and upon their attitudes upon return.  
There were significant differences, however, between the two experiences.  In 
the case of Bosnia the refugees could be divided into two groups, those who fled 
the internecine strife and who were accommodated within former Yugoslavia128 
and the hundreds of thousands who went further afield.  These primarily went to 
Western Europe, most notably to Germany, which at one stage accommodated 
in excess of 600,000 Bosnian refugees.129  
 
Even those refugees who subsequently returned stayed on average three to five 
years in their temporary shelters,130 during which time, unlike in previous mass 
forced movements on the European continent, they did not stay for the most part 
in ‘camps’ but were spread throughout the community.  There is definitely no 
colonial role model for these phenomena, which has in most cases reinforced the 
feeling amongst these Bosnians that they are European and for their children 
                                                                                                                                                 
the UK as at January 2006 (Home Office figures) although the Albanian Ambassador to the UK, 
Zef Mazi, believed in 2010 that the true figure may have exceeded 100,000.  The numbers of 
both Bosnians and (genuine) Kosovars are each significantly lower than this total. 
127 The massive displacement of populations in the Indian sub-continent in 1947-8 was the result 
of the ending of the colonial era. 
128 Primarily the Bosnian Serbs, who were accommodated in Serbia, Montenegro, and Kosovo 
and the Bosnian Croats in Croatia. 
129 This is based upon the registration figures for the Bosnian general election in 1996 and the 
municipal elections in 1997.  The Germans used the OSCE elections registration data, to which 
they had access, to identify how many refugees they had within the country.  
130 Unlike elsewhere in Europe Bosnian refugees in the UK had mostly been returned by 1998. 
 449 
exposed them to a Western European education.  In fact this dispersal of 
population, both in Western Europe and within the former Yugoslavia, has been 
in many ways too successful, in that the majority of these former ‘refugees’ have 
shown little inclination to return despite offers of generous support packages.  
The figures provided by the Institute of Migration (IOM)131 show that both refugee 
return and that of Internally Displaced People (IDP) had virtually ceased by 
2002.132  A further impact of this migration, totalling 1.2 million people in the 
period 1970-95,133 particularly amongst the Bosniac population, has been to 
reinforce the traditional German role as a provider of well-paid employment and 
to further show the advantages of rapid accession to the EU. 
 
In comparison with these figures the figures for those Kosovars housed beyond 
their immediate neighbours - Albania and FYROM - during the period when they 
fled Kosovo was small and even in these cases the receiving states took care to 
rapidly repatriate as many as possible immediately the conflict was over.  There 
was therefore little long-term cultural effect upon Kosovo from the evacuation, 
particularly as the principal receiving state, Albania,134 was considerably poorer 
and in many ways less advanced.  That said, the subsequent migration to 
Western Europe in particular has again illustrated to the population of Kosovo the 
                                                 
131 IOM, World Migration 2003 – Managing Migration, Challenges and Responses for People on 
the Move, Volume 2. 
132 Ibid., pp 312-4.  
133 Ibid., p 305. 
134 At its peak, Albania is believed to have accommodated 400,000 Kosovars, the majority of 
them in private accommodation in North Eastern Albania.  This area was itself the most isolated 
and most deprived region of what was at that time the poorest country in Europe.  
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benefits of speedy accession to the EU.135  As for Bosnia, EU membership 
remains an aspiration for both the political elites and the general population 
within the Bosniac part of the federation, while among the other two ethnic 
groups the priority probably remains union with Croatia and Serbia, regardless of 
whether these two states are within or without the EU at that time. 
  
Conclusions 
 
While superficially appearing to replicate the ‘colonial’ models of former years, 
particularly in the immediate post-conflict period, the Bosnian and Kosovan 
models of international intervention were, in fact, radically different.  At the 
beginning of both post-conflict interventions the most active participants136 
sought the authority of the UN to ratify their actions.  In addition, the major 
bilateral partners declared that this would be a transitional activity.  They have 
not attempted by means of the PIC to do as colonial powers had often done in 
the past, to extend their stay.  Indeed, the principal bilateral partners indicated 
from the outset, that they wished to remain for the minimum period possible.137 
Had the principal PIC implementers138 had their way the last High Representative 
would have departed from Bosnia in 2007.139  At that time any apparent similarity 
between the international administrators within Bosnia and a colonial regime 
                                                 
135 Agim Ceku, then Prime Minister of Kosovo, stated on 6 May 2006:  [The] path towards Europe 
is not going to be easy, but it will not be long as well.  Albania Daily News 9 May 2006. That may 
in retrospect be seen to have been an overly optimistic statement. 
136 The USA and certain of the European states including the UK. 
137 The UK withdrew militarily from Bosnia in 2002 and in 2010 from Kosovo. 
138 Including the USA and the UK. 
139 The Economist 5 May 2006, and others. 
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would have come to an end.  This it was proposed would have been after some 
eleven and a half years would have elapsed.   This period would have borne a 
remarkable similarity to the time taken to reconstruct the FRG following the 
Second world War.140 
 
The colonial ‘model’ as evidenced by the later colonies,141 particularly those 
acquired during the latter years of the nineteenth century and the first quarter of 
the twentieth century, also displayed a desire among the more benevolent 
colonial powers to ‘improve’142 the native populations and to bring them closer in 
both form and aspiration to those of the mother country.  The desire to achieve 
those objectives also involved the transfer of significant numbers of their own 
labour force, even to perform relatively simple tasks,143 within the newly occupied 
territories.  The effect of this failure to invest in local people,144 even amongst 
‘benevolent’ colonialists, was that the local population, when finally granted 
‘independence’, were totally dependent upon outside technical assistance, 
particularly if they wished to develop.145   
 
                                                 
140 The Control Commission for Germany (CCG) was withdrawn in 1956 some eleven years and 
four months after the ending of the war. 
141 Including the mandate states, following the First World War. 
142 Hobsbawm (1997), op. cit. 
143 The driving of locomotives on Kenya Railways was a task for non-Africans until after 
independence and for ‘official’ trains such as those carrying the president, right throughout the 
Kenyatta period.  In this latter period it was not a question of competence at driving the 
locomotive more one of concern about inter-tribal loyalties.  
144 As opposed to the ‘imported’ (and indentured) labour, who in the case of British East Africa 
and many other British colonies came from the Indian sub-continent. 
145 The total UK-born population in Kenya in the late 1970s was significantly greater than that in 
the late colonial period, i.e. the 1950s.  This was as a result of the requirement for increasing 
technical specialization.    
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The members of the PIC and the IC adopted no such strategies in Bosnia and 
Kosovo.  Instead they worked to ensure that the nationals of those states have 
been given the opportunity to ‘catch up’ with the other transitional states of the 
former Warsaw Pact (WP) all of whom have now joined the EU.146  It was 
intended that this process should have continued after the departure of the High 
Representative in Bosnia had he left in 2007 and it was then envisaged that this 
process would more closely resemble the developments which had previously 
taken place in the Visegrad147 countries from the mid-1990s until their accession 
to the EU on 1 May 2004.  That this process has and will continue to force 
Bosnia and Kosovo into a regulatory straight-jacket tighter than that endured by 
any colonial administration,148 of that there is no doubt.  Crucially for the PIC 
though it was a ‘contract’ freely entered into by both the political classes and the 
people of Bosnia,149 in order to gain the benefits that EU membership would 
bring. 
 
While the PIC phase of the IC’s intervention in Bosnia can be seen to have 
effectively ended in Bosnia with the conclusion of Lord Ashdown’s mandate as 
High Representative in 2006150 the transition in Kosovo is somewhat less clear 
with either the declaration of independence or the UN handover to EULEX acting 
                                                 
146 The last two were Bulgaria and Romania in 2007.  Moldova, Ukraine, and Belarus remain 
outside the EU, but formed part of the Soviet Union when they were within the WP. 
147 The Visegrad states were Poland, Hungary, Slovakia, and the Czech Republic. 
148 As early as 1997 the OHR had identified no less than twenty-two human rights ‘instruments’ 
which would need to be inserted into the constitution of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina 
to bring it into conformity with the existing international norms.  See OHR “Bosnia and 
Herzegovina Essential Texts (revised and updated edition), pp 64-92. 
149 Or entered into at least by the Bosniac elements within that society. 
150 And from which point the post of high representative was delegated to a series of bland 
functionaries and diplomats drawn from amongst the smaller states of Europe. 
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as the effective transition points.  In both cases the transition did not go as 
planned by the PIC who even as late as 2006 foresaw the immediate termination 
of the ICs involvement in both states within the following 12–24 months.  The 
subsequent developments far from ushering in the ICs departure has seen an 
enlarged EU presence which is likely to remain in both states for an indefinite 
period.      
 
The IC in both Bosnia and Kosovo had also worked throughout the period from 
1995 to empower the people of those two entities and to develop their skill sets.  
Although the numbers of foreign internationals were often considerable,151 
particularly given the small domestic populations involved,152 they were usually 
present for a relatively short period and for the most part did not settle.153.  
Indeed, a large number of citizens from both entities have moved to both 
Western Europe and North America, either to settle or to take advantage of study 
offered there.  This is not a development which was seen to any significant extent 
in any of the colonial countries during the colonial period, to say 1970, when the 
concept of capacity building was virtually unheard of. 
 
These examples illustrate the speed at which some at least of the people of 
Bosnia and to a much lesser extent Kosovo regained their places in international 
                                                 
151 There were estimated to be 16,000 foreign civilian internationals in Sarajevo alone in mid-
1998.  To this total could have been added a further 20,000 plus members of SFOR countrywide 
and an unknown but somewhat smaller number of internationals ‘working in the field’.  
152 The population of Bosnia was estimated at 3.9 million in 1998 and that of Kosovo at 1.5 million 
in late 1999.  This is an estimation based upon electoral statistics and may overestimate the 
number of people physically present in both places. 
153 Even those IC personnel who married members of the local community returned in general to 
their home countries. 
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society.  Indeed, some amongst them have since as early as 1999 formed part of 
the cadre of highly skilled international elections staff providing technical 
expertise to the UN and other organisations in Kosovo, East Timor, Afghanistan, 
Iraq, and elsewhere.154  That is to say that the IC in Bosnia and Kosovo 
challenged the local populations to compete with them for employment and 
economic advantage155 on the world stage.  This has never been a common 
characteristic among the former colonial powers, who for the most part saw their 
colonies as sources of raw materials, cheap labour, and tied markets for their 
own manufactured goods. 
 
Finally, the IC deliberately eschewed a policy of using a national model for any of 
its activities.  This was the exact antithesis of the League of Nations when it 
allocated mandates to some of the victorious powers at the conclusion of the 
First War.  In many ways one could argue that it would have been more efficient 
and more economical in financial terms had the PIC or the UN chosen to do so, 
but it did not and that particular argument goes beyond the bounds of this thesis. 
 
For both the IC and for the peoples involved, their presence may have persisted, 
and in some degree still persists, for longer than either party would have wished.  
                                                 
154 The OSCE Mission in Bosnia insisted that its national ‘election officers’ be trained to 
international standards.  As at 1998 there was no university-level course anywhere worldwide to 
train election officials.  As a result, using UK funding and in co-operation with the University of 
Essex, the OSCE mission in Bosnia created a certificated course to provide this training.  It 
incorporated a mixture of taught classes at the University of Essex and distance learning and was 
certificated following examinations overseen by UK academic staff.  Many of these officers 
continue to operate worldwide in post-conflict, most notably in Afghanistan.  
155 The international community spent a considerable amount of its effort in encouraging the 
growth of small and medium-sized enterprises within both Bosnia and Kosovo, by means of soft 
credit schemes and entrepreneurship training.   
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The IC presence is now, they and the author would hope, drawing to a close, and 
this will arguably be at the first moment when both Bosnia and Kosovo have 
before them a visible and achievable goal, which is membership of the Euro-
Atlantic structures.156  This is not an example that could be demonstrated by any 
of the colonial powers, although on some occasions in the mid-twentieth century 
there were occasions when one or two of them came close to ‘unforced’ 
withdrawals157 from colonial territories.  In short, within the boundaries of Europe 
at least, and as represented by Bosnia and Kosovo,158 it cannot be said that 
post-conflict reconstruction as developed by the PIC represents either 
colonialism or imperialism.  Rather it can be said to represent a combination of a 
self-interested desire and perhaps a certain degree of altruism by fellow 
Europeans and the North Americans to create self-sustaining and stable entities 
in their own backyards. 
 
                                                 
156 As Bosnia does not possess a functional central government structure as at mid-2011 this 
prospect continues to recede into the middle distance. 
157 The 1934 London Conference on the future of British India may have been one such occasion.  
158 Whether these models and the application of equivalent amount of funds will be equally as 
effective at some stage in the future within Moldova, should a similar model be adopted, remains 
to be seen. 
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Chapter 10 
 
Conclusions 
 
Where does modern post-conflict activity sit within our theoretical constructs? 
 
This thesis has examined three specific case studies, Bosnia, Kosovo, and the 
increasing role of the EU, as key post-conflict activities which bridge the twentieth 
and twenty-first centuries.  All three have made extensive use of the empirical 
evidence available to the author to tell us about the nature of post-conflict 
intervention in this period.  The case studies demonstrate that, whilst the 
response of the IC has in general been evolutionary, progress has not been 
consistent and, in cases such as Iraq, it has even regressed and ‘unlearnt’ 
lessons previously learned.  All three case studies are also clearly indicative of 
the break in, what had been until 1995, a period of fifty years in which post-
conflict missions had almost exclusively been deployed under a UN mandate 
with UN leadership and management.  The three case studies have set the 
baseline for post-conflict deployments in the twenty-first century and whilst 
illustrating that progress has been made demonstrate that considerably more 
work needs to be undertaken if such missions are to be successful.  The 
evidence illustrates that it is in the practical implementation of theoretically ideal 
solutions, such as the representation of women in political life, where current 
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difficulties lie and where the IC must make a conscious effort to improve its 
performance. 
 
If modern interventions adhere to any ‘model’ it is generally that of liberal 
interventionism;  any intervention with the UN in the lead or where it has a key 
leadership role, such as in Bosnia, can be said to be liberal interventionist in 
intent, at least at the outset.  Within the last two decades those few interventions 
where the IC have focused on rebuilding the state and its infrastructure and then 
leaving within a relatively short period of time,1 have not only held true to the 
liberal interventionist model but have also been, while in the short term very 
costly,2 the most successful.  Cambodia, Mozambique, and Angola, in the early 
1990s, all of them UN-led operations, fit that model as does the EU intervention 
in Aceh a decade later.  
 
These missions, which were well planned, by a team of planners answerable to a 
single and usually experienced post-conflict team,3 had a focus and at the outset 
a detailed ‘road map’ of what was needed to be achieved in order to complete 
the mission.  Ironically, it was because they had to justify and quantify their 
budgets in advance, to their contributing member states, that the planning was 
generally more detailed and hence more effective.  
 
                                                 
1 Typically between two to five years. 
2  Cambodia, Mozambique, and Angola all cost considerably less than the US $5.1 billion spent 
on Bosnia by the IC in the period from 1996 to 2001. 
3 The EU Aceh mission was in part co-ordinated by former members of the EU police mission in 
Bosnia, two key members of which had also served elsewhere in post-conflict missions. 
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The largest post-conflict operations of the past two decades have, however, been 
led either by a single state or a small group of ‘allied’ states, and their planning 
appears to have lacked the rigour of that employed in the examples given above, 
or in one case, Iraq, the detailed planning4 was simply discarded.  Additionally, 
the justifications for the initial intervention and the post-conflict responses were 
driven for the most part by political short-termist reactions to ‘problems’.  This 
particular approach to post-conflict issues can be seen, as this thesis clearly 
demonstrates, to have been initiated in Bosnia and then to have been developed 
in Kosovo where the clear over-arching political aim had been to remove 
President Milosevic.5  This concept was then carried forward into Iraq and 
Afghanistan. 
 
If the overriding initial reason for the deployment into Bosnia conformed to liberal 
interventionism this was certainly not the case for Kosovo and the initiation of the 
NATO air campaign led to a fortunately short-term human catastrophe.  If it is 
                                                 
4 This was carried out over a period of eighteen months by US State Department experts. 
5 It was this that prompted the involvement of the US Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI) in 
Western Balkan Affairs in the two years preceding the conflict.  The OTI was established during 
the Clinton Administration and is a branch of USAID who describe OTI’s functions as follows on 
their website: 
The Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI) was therefore created within USAID's 
humanitarian bureau in 1994 to provide fast, flexible, short-term assistance to take 
advantage of windows of opportunity to build democracy and peace. It lays the 
foundations for long-term development by promoting reconciliation, jumpstarting 
economies and helping stable democracy take hold. 
 
To succeed in this task, OTI instituted a distinctive mode of operations. First, OTI 
specifically encouraged a culture of risk-taking, political orientation, and swift 
response among its staff and partners.  Second, OTI is funded by a separate "Transition 
Initiatives" budget account with special authorities that allow immediate spending 
where it is most needed. 
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accepted that the Kosovo campaign and the subsequent post-conflict activities 
were neither imperialist nor colonialist, it is possible to conclude that at the time 
of the IC’s intervention its post-conflict plans and subsequent intervention fitted 
none of the existing paradigms.   
 
The past two decades also provide clear examples that post-conflict activities 
change over time.  A broadly based multi-national liberal intervention under the 
banner of the UN can, as in Bosnia or, depending upon an interpretation of 
events, Kosovo evolve into something quite different.  This leads on to a 
discussion as to which paradigm the EU in post-conflict adopts, both with 
potential accession states and farther afield, such as in Aceh or potentially post-
conflict in Libya, Syria, and to a lesser extent Yemen.  
 
Certainly no existing model, except those of imperialism and colonialism, would 
sit alongside the objective of ‘regime change’ and yet initially at least it was not 
the intent of the USA and its allies in the ‘quint group’ to dominate Kosovo in the 
longer term.  This was not the case with the EU.  With the transition to an EU-led 
management structure in both Bosnia and Kosovo, it is possible to observe both 
elements of colonialism and cultural imperialism carried out on behalf of the EU 
in both states and throughout the neighbouring states in the region;6 all of these 
states in one way or another could be declared as being post-conflict and all are 
potential accession states7 to the EU. This thesis has demonstrated that in the 
                                                 
6 Albania, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, and Serbia. 
7 Subject to a successful referendum vote Croatia is likely to join the EU in 2012. 
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EU’s treatment of potential accession states the symbols of domination and 
‘clientship’, which have typified the behaviour of earlier empires over the same 
territories, have been repeated.  Just as the EU operates today, subsidy in return 
for conformity would have been familiar to any Roman or Illyrian over 2,000 years 
ago, just as the contribution of troops to aid in wars of conquest or domination on 
behalf of the aims and objectives of the ‘empire’ were then as now provided.8  In 
the twenty-first century the EU is in effect the new European ‘empire’, something 
which the frequent references to ‘Charlemagne’9 and ‘Rome’ by certain European 
politicians would appear to suggest is not far from their thoughts.  
 
If the role of the EU within the wider Europe has been ‘imperialist’, what of its role 
in the wider world?  The participation of the EU in Aceh would appear to fit the 
‘liberal interventionist’ model and initially was a purely humanitarian intervention.  
It is likely given the success of this mission and that of the EU in the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo (DRC) that such sporadic interventions will recur as 
needed.  EU activities in Dharfur would clearly fit the same model, there being no 
reason other than simple humanitarianism for that intervention to take place.  
Where the EU’s intervention is linked either to strategic objectives or to activities 
                                                 
8 Albania provides troops operating under European or US control in Bosnia, Iraq and 
Afghanistan.  Bosnia and Serbia are also international troop contributors. 
9  The ‘Charlemagne Prize’ (Internationaler Karlspreis der Stadt Aachen) is awarded annually.  
Previous recipients have included Robert Schuman, Jean Monnet, Konrad Adenauer, and 
Edward Heath.  The city of Aachen the sponsors of the prize, refer to Charlemagne as the 
‘Founder of Western culture’.   The Schirach Report of 14 June 2011 said of the prize;  
On June 2, Jean-Claude Trichet, soon to be retired president of the European Central 
Bank, (ECB), was awarded the Charlemagne Prize in Aachen. This prize is a coveted 
and prestigious European honor. 
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which it is carrying out in other strategic spheres the issue becomes more 
complex. 
 
The EU programme in Palestine, in particular that of the police and judiciary, is 
linked to a reform of state structures and to their conformity to an ‘EU model’.  
While in the short term Palestine lacks many of the attributes of a state, 
particularly control over its own borders, when it does achieve that degree of 
autonomy then the models adopted will be European and will be able to be 
integrated into those of other EU member states in the eastern basin of the 
Mediterranean.  Given its increasing client status, due to its increasing 
dependency upon the EU, as its single largest source of finance, it is not 
unreasonable to believe that even here, beyond the range of the potential 
accession states, the EU is seeking in the long term to build a long-term client 
and that the EU’s objectives are imperialist in fact if not in intent.   Were the EU 
to become involved or to lead a post-conflict mission in Libya it is likely that this, 
too, would be imperialist in practice, if not in intent.  The EU has clear economic 
objectives in Libya, not least the security of its boundaries to prevent illegal 
migration, but also of course to maintain the security of its investments and oil 
and gas supplies.10     
 
 
 
                                                 
10 Until the beginning of the conflict Libya was responsible for the supply of gas equivalent to 55% 
of Italy’s consumption.  
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Is there a post-conflict model for IC intervention? 
 
Some post-conflict missions continue to be mounted and maintained by the UN 
and can therefore be said to follow the liberal interventionist or humanitarian 
interventionist tradition.  Others have been mounted by regional bodies either 
jointly with the UN, such as UNAMID, or, in practice, effectively independently of 
it, such as the ongoing AU mission in Mogadishu.  The UNAMID mission can be 
seen to have been motivated by ‘liberal interventionism’, but it is also on the part 
of the UN an attempt to ‘burden share’ and from the point of view of the 
neighbouring states to the crisis, who offered and then committed the AU troops, 
an activity carried out in support of self-interest.11  The second intervention in 
Mogadishu is again motivated out of self-interest.  If they are not ‘liberal 
interventionist’ then they are clearly also not ‘imperialist’, as neither mission 
seeks to take or hold territory nor to impose a regime or system of government 
on the other state.   Finally, other interventions have taken place led by a single 
state or small group of states which have been designed to ‘resolve problems’ 
and to effect ‘regime change’.  These may be to deal with a perceived terror or 
drugs threat and are clearly, as in the case of Iraq, neither liberal interventionist 
in either intent or fact and not intentionally colonialist.  These interventions are 
                                                 
11 From the AU’s point of view, as the operations were in part funded by the EU, the real costs 
were very limited.  The EU’s motivation in funding the operation was to keep its own troop 
numbers down, a political imperative and to reduce costs. 
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imperialist in nature but unlike previous such episodes12 are conducted by 
coalitions of states under a UN mandate.    
 
The thesis demonstrates that there can be no ‘post-conflict model’ as such as the 
conditions under which IC intervention post-conflict has taken place and which 
this thesis has illustrated differ so widely.  To use some examples from the last 
two decades: not only is it impossible to compare ‘state’ with ‘state’ even when 
comparing two newly emerging states of similar size, where conflict was taking 
place simultaneously, such as East Timor and Kosovo, it is also impossible to 
compare a wide range of other factors such as the composition of the 
subsequent post-conflict mission and its mandate.  While the level of destruction 
and displacement of the population within the country might be an obvious factor 
to the lay observer, other factors, such as the impact of a post-colonial 
democratic tradition13 or the degree of ethnic tolerance may be more difficult to 
quantify.  
 
Short-termism, political opportunism, and ‘change management’ by the IC 
 
The thesis has shown that the short-termist and politically opportunistic 
approaches to conflict and post-conflict14 have and will continue to impair the ICs’ 
                                                 
12 The international community’s response to the Boxer rebellion and the attack on the legations 
in Peking in 1900 may be regarded as a possible precedent for this type of imperialist response. 
13 Until the late 1990s Ivory Coast would have been a good example of this, but there are also 
other states within West Africa which have had a continuous functioning ‘Western style’ 
democracy. 
14 ‘Politicians will never take a decision unless they have to and usually then, after the last safe 
moment’.  Ambassador Robert Frowick was speaking to the author and to other senior OSCE 
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approach to post-conflict.  Similarly, the failure to anticipate the likelihood of 
change leading to conflict or at least major dislocation, even in those states 
where the IC, in particular the USA and the Europeans, have been actively 
working to promote radical change will probably continue into the twenty-first 
century.  The scenario in Eqypt illustrates this point.  The work of NDI, funded by 
the US government from the 1990s, was to promote political pluralism in Egypt, 
including campaigning support for opposition political candidates in presidential 
elections against Hosni Mubarak.  It was designed to overthrow the existing 
regime and to promote democratic change15.  It must be questioned why, if the 
long term strategy of the USA has been to overthrow, or at least to destabilize, a 
regime such as Mubarak’s in Egypt, or perhaps Ghaddafi’s Libya, the same 
actors have not been able to respond effectively when what they were working 
towards for years has eventually occurred.  This is not a new phenomenon and 
twice previously within the last decade or so, in both Kosovo and Iraq, regime 
change has been undertaken without apparently any clear idea of the likely 
outcome and without, in either case, an effective ‘change management’ plan 
being in place.   
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
elections staff in October 1996. He was discussing the prospects for the holding of the municipal 
elections in Bosnia that year.  In the event, the decision to postpone the municipal elections until 
1997 was not taken until after the close of campaigning for the presidential election campaign in 
the USA, despite the fact that the ‘last safe moment’ at which the campaign could be launched, 
had been passed some weeks before. 
15 NDI were expelled in 2005 from Egypt despite US government protests precisely for this 
reason. 
 465 
Humanitarianism versus economic issues and the mass media dynamic 
 
Should the IC’s management of post-conflict be affected both by the scale or the 
strategic importance of the state or area concerned?  From a moral standpoint 
this should not be the case but the evidence from the recent past would suggest 
that it is the case.  In Algeria and Bosnia where internal civil conflicts which were 
taking place at the same time, it is clear in retrospect that in some years in the 
period 1992-5 it is likely that more people died as a result of the civil war in 
Algeria than did in Bosnia.  It could be argued that Bosnia was more visible as it 
was part of Europe and had a large and vocal diaspora within Germany, the 
Netherlands, and Austria.  However, Algeria’s diaspora in Western Europe was 
more numerous albeit concentrated in France.16  There were also a significant 
number of French citizens who had spent a part of their lives in Algeria.  From a 
population, economic, and strategic point of view Algeria was a larger, more 
populous country than Bosnia and possessed (and exploited), far greater and a 
wider range of strategic assets.17  In financial terms the risk to the Western stock 
markets and hence to people’s pension funds etc would have been much greater 
had Algeria collapsed than was the case with Bosnia.   
 
                                                 
16 This is in contrast to the Bosnian diaspora which is spread throughout Europe.  Of the largest 
diaspora populations only that in Austria was located on the territory of a former colonial power.  
17 Algeria is currently the world’s fourth largest exporter of natural gas, in particular methane and 
is the world’s fifteenth largest supplier of oil.  Algeria is the single largest supplier of methane gas 
to the UK.  Its supply exceeds that produced domestically by the Wych Cross gas field off the 
Dorset coast. 
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Morally there was as much, if not more, justification for an external intervention in 
Algeria than in Bosnia whilst the conflict was underway.  It could be argued that 
this did not occur because the Western Balkans conflict was between two states, 
Yugoslavia and Slovenia, which had been recognized by a member of the UN.18  
That international intervention took place in the Western Balkans was due to the 
historic positions of various Western European states and to the USA whose 
citizens were strongly influenced by what they could see on their television 
screens.  While this might explain why no intervention took place during the 
Algerian conflict, it does not explain why the IC has continued to make such a 
minimal investment in the post-conflict social and political development of Algeria 
while it has continued to invest billions of US dollars in developing its oil and gas 
infrastructure.   
 
Evidence from the early years of the twenty-first century would suggest that a 
state’s relative importance politically, economically, and strategically and who is 
supporting (or who may support) whichever side in an internal conflict continues 
to affect the level of international engagement and the IC’s management and 
commitment to the necessary transition from being a state in conflict to post-
conflict.  Nepal is an example of a state which is now in post-conflict, but which is 
fragile and could easily lapse back into a state in conflict.  Some disarmament, 
rather than DDR, has taken place, particularly of the Maoist guerrillas, but three 
years after the ceasefire the Maoist leaders have left the government and the 
                                                 
18 Slovenia and Croatia were unilaterally ‘recognised’ by the Federal Republic of Germany on 23 
December 1991. 
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guerrillas remain in camps neither fully demobilized nor reintegrated.  Even at the 
most basic level, that of DDR, the post-conflict model developed by the IC for 
Nepal and agreed domestically is not being followed, nor is there funding and 
‘honest brokering’ to drive the peace process forward.   In practice, the IC’s 
investment and engagement in the process continues to be minimal beyond 
exhorting the Nepalese political actors to negotiate with each other.      
 
It can be argued that the development of an effective post-conflict strategy for 
Nepal has faltered because of the state’s relative insignificance and remoteness. 
Contrast this with a remote area in another continent, one which has only in June 
2011 become an independent state, which is receiving the full suite of post-
conflict expertise.  The UK and the EU have been active in South Sudan since 
the ceasefire in 2002, with programmes to develop governance, policing, 
education, and health.  Most EU states have already made it clear that they will 
recognise South Sudan as an independent state within the UN as soon as the 
referendum decision has come into effect.  Given this fact it is almost certain that 
South Sudan will enter the UN as a voting member some time before either the 
Palestinian Authority or Kosovo, whose independence was recognised by the UK 
in February 2008.  As such, even if ‘self interest’19 is taken as a criteria for IC 
participation in post-conflict, that can act as no reasonable guide or guarantee of 
intervention. 
 
                                                 
19 South Sudan does have exploitable reserves of oil and production and export of oil from these 
fields has started as at mid-2011.  These are, however, controlled by Chinese and not EU 
interests.  
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The changing dynamics of post-conflict management 
 
The last fifteen years have witnessed a changing dynamic in the management of 
post-conflict operations away from the UN and towards single state actors.  In 
particular the USA and to an extent the UK, along with regional groupings such 
as the EU and to a much lesser extent the AU, who as previously mentioned are 
mostly doing so with EU money.  Apart from funding issues, if one were to 
question why such regional groupings have had less resonance, in Asia and 
Latin America, than in EurAsia and to a much lesser extent Africa, the answer 
would be because they were primarily established as trade-based groups with a 
limited amount of political cohesion rather than as regional power centres.  It is 
also clear that with the exception of the EU the ambitions of these other regional 
groupings, including the AU, are confined to the region which they represent and 
are not ‘global’.  In addition to these regional groupings there are also niche 
single-state regional actors, such as Australia, who are active in post-conflict 
East Timor, the Solomon Islands, and over the longer term in Papua New 
Guinea. 
 
All of these issues lead to the conclusion that the management of post-conflict 
today is more complex than previously.  Certainly the ‘one size fits all’ model 
envisaged by many in the senior hierarchy of the US development organisations 
and which they initially attempted to apply to Bosnia on the basis of their 
experiences in Cambodia are no longer relevant, and probably never have been. 
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This thesis has so far hinted at, but not explicitly explained, why recent 
developments require the IC to be more agile in its approach to post-conflict; to 
spend more time on analyses and research of possible post-conflict areas so as 
to be better prepared in future.  In order to be more agile the IC will need to have 
a better identification of possible risks at an international level and better risk-
management strategies.  The international ideal surely must be to avoid having a 
conflict in the first place, by judicious early intervention, rather than, as again in 
2011, simply responding to developments as they occur.    
 
In 2011 a range of new ‘post-conflict’ developments in Libya and perhaps Yemen 
and ‘sub-conflict’ developments in Egypt, Tunisia, and possibly Syria and Bahrain 
are being brought about by self-inspired ‘regime change’.  As commented upon 
in more detail below, these changes although in part inspired by Western media, 
NGOs, and government action, have developed rapidly, while the IC has been 
slow to respond, particularly so in any coherent manner.  In addition to the ‘Arab 
Spring’, Myanmar (Burma) will eventually be another incipient regime change 
which will be deserving of and require international support, so as to succeed in 
the most effective manner and for which a significant amount of planning could 
be undertaken now. 
    
The developments in the ‘Arab Spring’ of 2011 present a new challenge to our 
understanding of post-conflict.  While they were and are bloody, the ongoing 
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conflicts in Syria and Yemen particularly so, and although broadly requiring the 
same ‘treatment’ by the IC as in post-conflict, they have not resulted in full blown 
internal civil wars,20 but rather in sub-conflicts.21   Furthermore, most of the 
previous internal or regional conflicts in the period following the Second World 
War have taken place in relatively unsophisticated regions of the world, 
particularly in Africa22 or in areas where the conflict occurred between the ‘centre’ 
and the people who were already on the fringes of society, such as was the case 
with the Mayan revolt in Guatemala or indeed the current Mayan revolt against 
the central authorities in southern Mexico.  The conflicts in the Western Balkans 
were not only the first conflicts in Europe since 1945, they were also the first 
conflicts where the vast majority of the populations of the states involved were 
educated to a relatively advanced level.  In Afghanistan even amongst the almost 
exclusively male Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) and Afghan National 
Police (ANP) the literacy rate is only 14 percent23.  In that respect the post-
conflict developments in the Western Balkans may serve as a good model for 
those countries which have undergone regime change as a result of the ‘Arab 
Spring’.24 
 
                                                 
20 The conflict in Libya is (currently) the notable exception. 
21 The number of deaths following the internal unrest in all six of the countries disrupted by the 
‘Arab Spring’ (Bahrain, Egypt, Libya, Syria, Tunisia, and Yemen), have met the criteria for 
‘conflict’ as defined by the US State Department.  In each case the numbers of deaths has been 
in the hundreds and in most substantially exceeded 1,000. 
22 At the time of it’s independence from Belgium there were only twenty-one (ethnically 
Congolese) Congolese citizens who were educated to graduate level. 
23 The general level of literacy in the country is much lower. 
24 This appears to be happening.  The first round of ‘democratic’ elections will be held in early 
November 2011.  International elections monitoring is being provided by the ‘Carter Centre’ an 
NGO using experienced observers who for the most part were trained in the Balkans in the 
1990s.  
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The role of the ‘diaspora’ in post-conflict 
 
Both in the Western Balkans and now in the ‘Arab Spring’ the role of the diaspora 
in publicising25 and funding the conflict and their role in the post-conflict process 
is key to the IC’s perception both of the conflict itself and how they see their role 
in the post-conflict phase.  It also reinforces the need for the IC to be more agile.  
How the IC manages post-conflict will depend upon how the diaspora are 
integrated into the post-conflict development of their state of origin.  What role 
will their state of origin play in this and what role do the diaspora have in 
motivating the IC’s response?  How does the IC motivate the diaspora, who are 
often among the wealthiest and best-educated of the citizens of the state, to take 
an active part in post-conflict reconstruction26 and to return and contribute their 
personal skills?27  Should they be allowed to vote in a country in which they are 
not resident?  How can the IC tell if the experience of the diaspora is no longer 
relevant, e.g. Khalabi in Iraq and the Afghan diaspora currently advising the 
USA?  Whatever solution is found to these problems there is in future a need to 
stress the increasing importance of the diaspora overall, particularly in those 
states where they form a significant part of the overall ethnic group and 
                                                 
25 At the end of the first decade of the twenty-first century much of the publicity is internally 
managed through media such as Facebook™ and the text-messaging video footage of events 
often by using the diaspora to transmit it to the wider audience.  The internet age and fast 
worldwide communications create a momentum of their own to which the IC need to be able to 
respond.   
26 The Croatian model saw the flotation of Croatian companies on the European stock exchanges 
where their shares were bought by amongst others the Croatian diaspora, thus giving them a 
stake in the new state.  In the same way the Croatian diaspora in Germany underwrote the funds 
for the start-up and the lease of aircraft for Croatian Airlines from Lufthansa.   
27 Albania can provide a useful model here.  In order to encourage returnees with ‘key skills’ to 
work in the state sector the government has decreed that ‘returnees’ in key posts, such as nurses 
and computer technicians, can be paid up to double the current maximum wage for locally 
recruited employees in the same posts for a period of up to three years. 
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especially where they are well educated and often financially well resourced, 
Palestine being perhaps the best example of this.28   
 
The present experience of post-conflict planning and operations 
 
If Major-General Andrew Mackay, the UK’s military commander in Helmand in 
2008, is to be believed the operations in Helmand, both conflict and post-conflict, 
continue to be characterised by muddle and lack of focus.  Mackay and Stephen 
Grey laid out a ten-point agenda which would have involved a balanced 
reconstruction and post-conflict effort to supplement the ‘war fighting’.29  In an 
interview of 29 June 2011, Mackay repeated this message saying that the UK 
was still ‘muddling through’.30  In the same documentary Mark Urban appeared to 
agree closely with Stephen Grey31 and cited a consistent failure to develop a 
clear long-term strategy as well as a failure to invest adequate resources as 
being the fundamental issues.32  Although it is still early days in terms of post-
conflict, a similar lack of clarity would appear to exist with regards to Libya.  The 
transformation of those countries who have already undergone regime change in 
                                                 
28 A more traditional, historic example is the impact that the ‘Jewish lobby’ has had on US foreign 
policy in the Middle East for the last sixty-five years.  
29 Stephen Grey and Andrew Mackay, A Ten Point Agenda on Afghanistan, AfPak Channel 15 
Jun 2011.  
30 Andrew Mackay in an interview with Mark Urban for the BBC ‘Newsnight’ programme 
broadcast on 29 June 2011. 
31 Stephen Grey, Helmand: Anatomy of a Disaster, Afpak Channel 15 June 2011.  
32 Urban (2011), op. cit. 
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the Arab Spring would appear to sit with the NGO community rather than the IC 
as the representatives of sovereign states.33 
 
Some wider conflict and post-conflict Issues-‘lessons learned’ and yet to be 
learned 
 
There are a significant number of ‘lessons learned’ to come from a study of the 
IC’s intervention in the Western Balkans.  Some lessons, but clearly by no means 
the majority, have been adopted for the later interventions in Iraq and 
Afghanistan.  To take just one example, the role of women in elected political 
office; the introduction of gender quotas is laudable but it has to be done in a 
manner which does not discredit the process and must take place in conjunction 
with a change in public attitudes towards gender.  This is a process that can only 
be carried out through the medium of public education and an area where the 
author suggests considerably greater EU funding and work would be extremely 
useful, but and only if delivered as part of long-term one-to five-year 
programmes.   In this case, as in so many other areas, the IC needs to examine 
its overall strategy in post-conflict and to arrive at a coherent policy which can 
then be implemented comprehensively and effectively as opposed to the current 
piecemeal approach.34 
 
                                                 
33 In addition to the election observation the Carter Centre, for example, have taken on the role of 
political advisors to the new Tunisian Government. 
34 Within the OSCE for example the approach to women’s rights runs in some cases counter to 
the policies of those who encourage greater religious tolerance and the promotion of religious 
values and both of which are supported by a ‘department’ in the OSCE HQ in Vienna.  
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Planning and advance planning for post-conflict – Is this possible or indeed 
desirable? 
 
This thesis has explicitly explained why the short-termist and politically 
opportunistic approach, such as that initially adopted for domestic political 
reasons by the Clinton Administration in the USA regarding both Bosnia and 
Kosovo, will continue to impair the IC’s approach to post-conflict.  By definition 
post-conflict is a form of international intervention which by its very nature 
requires time-bound35 but moderate to long-term solutions.  These solutions, as 
the UN and others36 explained to President Clinton, are often in the order of five 
to ten years and this time span is required so as to create a sustainable and self-
supporting post-conflict state.  
 
Furthermore, what this thesis has not discussed has been the failure to anticipate 
conflict, or the likelihood of a radical change in regimes, even in those states 
where the IC, in particular the USA and the Europeans, have been actively 
working to promote radical change such as in Syria, Libya, and Egypt.  In Egypt 
for example, where NDI worked to support the opposition to Hosni Mubarak.37  
                                                 
35 So as to prevent the indefinite interventions of which the UN operations in Palestine and 
Cyprus are examples.  
36 This includes both John Major and Tony Blair.  The UK view was that the full delivery of the 
post-conflict project in Bosnia would take twelve to fifteen years.  This estimate was not altered 
when the government changed in 1997. 
37 Despite the fact that Mubarak was, outside of Israel, the USA’s principal strategic partner in the 
region and strongly supported by both the US State Department and DoD.  
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Now that significant regime change would appear to be underway,38 the USA 
would appear to be undecided as to how best to proceed and the wider ICs’ 
engagement through international fora would appear to be extremely limited.   
 
Again outside of the scope of this thesis one must also question why, if the long-
term strategy has been to overthrow or at least to destabilize a regime such as 
that in Egypt or in Qadhafi’s Libya, there is not in each case a plan in place when 
what apparently large segments of the IC have been working towards eventually 
occurs.  This would permit, for example, the rapid deployment of NDI and other 
similar organisations so as to permit the rapid development of opposition parties 
which would then have a realistic opportunity of defeating the incumbent 
establishment in free and fair elections.  
 
Scope for future work 
 
The ‘moral authority’ for intervention 
 
The moral authority for intervention by the IC must be regarded as questionable  
where people have either overthrown autocratic regimes themselves, without 
direct external inputs, or without overthrowing the regime by dismantling it and 
leaving a ‘rump state’ which continues to function.39  This could be said to be the 
                                                 
38 That it has taken place is not yet, as at June 2011, clear.  What has occurred so far is that one 
element of what was in practice a military regime led by Mubarak has given way to another 
military regime.  Whether this change will lead to a speedy political evolution is not yet clear. 
39 Such as has taken place in Serbia in the period from 1993 to date and also in the Sudan. 
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case for the Sudan in 2011 or former Yugoslavia in the 1990s.  What is the moral 
authority and how does the IC intervene when the people of a state have 
refashioned themselves without foreign military or, in some cases, humanitarian 
support even if a civil conflict has taken place?  Libya may well be an example of 
this in 2011 and so may in the future be Myanmar.  If the conflict has, in general, 
subsided and the regime or its successor has regained its authority but there are 
still armed and dangerous people on the street, is it appropriate for the IC to send 
peacekeepers who are part of the military, as the Europeans did in Albania in 
1998 during operation ‘Alba’, or would some other mechanism be more 
appropriate?  If so what should that response look like and under whose control 
should it be?  If the role, as in Albania, is primarily one of maintaining law and 
order should this not be a role for the police rather than the military?  If so would 
not the MSU based on the Carabinieri/Gendarmerie model and as used in the 
Balkans be more appropriate than that of the military?  If the answer is in the 
affirmative, as the USA does not have such units, is there a role for the USA in 
this new environment;  one where the model of robust policing and the use of 
non-lethal force takes primacy over the military peacekeeping model?  It was 
quite clear in Bosnia and Kosovo there was no role for the USA in these 
activities, but there clearly remains a role for US logistics, communications, and, 
of course, finance.     
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Some issues concerning the USA, the military and post-conflict 
 
This thesis has already explained that ‘regime change’ was not an idea of 
George W. Bush, although the crude phrasing was.  The thesis has explained 
how the OTI was established under the Clinton Administration primarily to do 
away with the Milosevic regime and how from its European HQ in Budapest it 
masterminded, trained, and funded the student protest movement OTPOR40 
along with the ‘independent’ Radio B92 in Belgrade.  It is these links with 
organisations, such as OTI, which taint the relationships between the nationals of 
the state which is in post-conflict and the members of the IC who are trying to 
help them.  An examination of the impact of these elements of US foreign policy 
upon the IC’s management of post-conflict, while outside the scope of this thesis, 
would of itself merit further study.   Similarly the internal frictions between the 
peacekeepers, or the military in general, and civilian workers in the field41 would 
again merit a detailed study. 
 
The use of ‘proxy states’ in post-conflict, in particular how the USA often uses 
other people42 who are regarded more sympathetically by the host population, to 
achieve its aims and objectives, again whilst outside of the scope of this thesis, 
could be usefully analysed.  The media initiatives and policing development 
programmes in the Mayan highlands of Guatemala during the IC-funded post-
                                                 
40  OTPOR translates as resistance in English.  This movement was in existence from 1998-2003.  
41 This includes almost all civilian workers, not just aid workers.   
42 The USSR previously used the military of the Cuban regime in Angola and Mozambique in a 
similar manner. 
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conflict operations of the late 1990s are a good example of this activity.  In the 
case of Guatemala the ‘front men’ and apparent ‘owners’ of the programmes 
were the EU, in particular Spanish IOs, NGOs, and police, yet both the funding 
and direction was coming from USAID.  In this case the USA was operating 
through ‘surrogates’, not as a result of language issues or the safety of 
operations on the ground, but because it was clearly seen locally as having 
supported the government against the Mayans throughout the preceding twenty 
years of conflict.43  
 
Weaknesses in the current description of research methodologies and the role of 
the ‘observer’ 
 
In the discussion of the research design for this thesis the role of the ‘analytical 
observer’ and the ‘participating observer’ was reviewed along with that of the 
‘active participant’.  It was clear that the term ‘active participant’ offered by 
Bernard,44 had neither been fully defined nor discussed in the literature; in the 
absence of any alternatives it came closest to defining the role of the author 
during the field research phase of this thesis.  One particular reason for the 
absence of an adequate definition is that Bernard45 is focused on the role of an 
observer in an ethnograpical or clinical context and not that of an observer who is 
observing a political or other process such as post-conflict. 
                                                 
43 Both the US Government and the Roman Catholic authorities backed the government, police, 
and military against the Mayan Indians. 
44 Bernard (2000), op cit. 
45 Ibid. 
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Clearly the term ‘active participant’ is of value as a descriptor and would 
adequately define the roles of Horowitz and Lijphart who were actively interested 
in developments in Bosnia and Kosovo46 and who although active participants in 
the process were not central to it.  In other words, in the larger scheme of things 
they were neither ‘influencers’ nor ‘decision makers’.  In practice, their role, to 
use a project management definition, was that of an ‘assurer’47 someone that 
provides confidence that the ‘deliverable is appropriate’48 to the task in hand.   
Similarly, those who conducted their field research while engaged in a fairly 
minor role within a post-conflict mission, such as serving in a rural field office of 
an IO or major NGO, might sensibly, if closely defined, be termed  ‘active 
participants’. 
 
These definitions are adequate to define the two groups discussed, but they do 
not represent an adequate descriptor for the category into which the author of 
this thesis falls.  These are people who are both ‘influencers’ and ‘decision 
makers’ at a managerial level.  Such people are not only ‘active participants’ and 
‘assurers’ but also have an opportunity to shape policy and to affect the decision-
making process.  Here again, project management terminology, given that post-
conflict missions are by definition ‘projects’ albeit on a large scale, may provide a 
useful starting point.  Prince 2™ terminology defines the ultimate decision 
                                                 
46 This has been evidenced by their later writings on the topic. 
47 Prince 2™, Glossary of terms. 
48 Ibid. 
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makers, in this scenario the HOMs or the political leadership, as the ‘executive’.49  
It then goes on to describe the senior managerial functions as the ‘authority’ and 
the ‘approvers’, the people who have:  
the right to allocate resources and make decisions (applies to project, 
stage and team levels).50 
They are also: 
identified as qualified and authorized to approve a (management or 
specialist) product as being complete and fit for purpose (at which point 
there may be a further ‘assurance’ process).51 
These terms, while not wholly adequate for the purposes of both this thesis and 
further academic research, begin to define the role of someone who is the 
position of being both a manager and a critical observer.  
 
The previous paragraphs and the experience of conducting such research 
suggest that there are two additional descriptions by which observers should be 
categorized.  First there is the ‘active participant’, a description initially provided 
by Bernard but as qualified above. Secondly, there is the ‘authoritative observer’, 
someone who is either in a positions to influence events, such as the author of 
this thesis, or someone whose standing in their own particular field is already so 
great, at the time that they participated in the events, that they had been brought 
                                                 
49 Ibid. 
50 Ibid. 
51 Ibid. 
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in specifically so as not only to ‘assure’52 that the process was ‘appropriate’, but 
also who could as a result both influence and shape future events.53 
 
Conclusion 
 
The examples given in this thesis have demonstrated that the primary motivation 
for the ICs’ intervention in post-conflict is liberal-interventionism.  The thesis has 
also demonstrated how this motivation can change during the post-conflict 
process.  The thesis has further demonstrated that, unlike the UN, the EU has 
often sought to impose its global world view or European standards on those 
countries to whom it is providing assistance and support.  In these instances the 
EU has acted in an ‘imperialist’ manner when it comes to the role of ‘Western 
democracy’ and related issues in post-conflict.  The thesis has also conclusively 
demonstrated that the IC’s response to post-conflict continues to be reactive and 
not preventative in nature, that it often lacks coherence, and is driven by short-
term political considerations.  Further, the thesis has also demonstrated that the 
IC has always been and remains selective when deciding to engage in post-
conflict.54  Finally, it has concluded by demonstrating in the paragraphs above 
that the field of post-conflict is worthy of further detailed study.   
 
 
                                                 
52 Ibid. 
53 An example of such a person would be Jeff Fisher, the Vice-President of IFES, who performed 
just such a role in Kosovo. 
54 As the cases of Libya and Syria in 2011 clearly demonstrate. 
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